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RESUMEN 
A. INTRODUCCIÓN 
Las normas de defensa de la competencia desempeñan un papel importante en la 
economía de mercado, al garantizar un cierto nivel de igualdad para los operadores 
económicos y contribuir a la mejora del bienestar de los consumidores, entre otros 
aspectos, a través de una mayor variedad o calidad de los productos y servicios a un 
precio más bajo, puesto que promueven la competencia efectiva y la asignación 
eficiente de los recursos. Además de lo anterior, en el contexto de la Unión Europea, las 
normas de defensa de la competencia resultan indispensables para la consecución de un 
mercado interior efectivo y la integración de las economías europeas. 
 
En la aplicación del derecho de defensa de la competencia cabe diferenciar dos 
vertientes: la aplicación pública y la aplicación privada. Las autoridades de defensa de 
la competencia tienen generalmente encomendada la aplicación pública de las normas 
de competencia y la persecución de aquellas conductas anticompetitivas que resultan 
particularmente nocivas para el conjunto de la economía. Con carácter general, las 
infracciones de las normas de defensa de la competencia dan lugar a la imposición de 
multas a las empresas infractoras por parte de las autoridades de competencia (o de los 
tribunales a propuesta de éstas). Sin embargo, en algunos países como Estados Unidos, 
el Reino Unido e Irlanda cabe la imposición de sanciones penales. Igualmente, 
determinados ordenamientos permiten la imposición de multas y sanciones 
disciplinarias a las personas físicas. A modo de ejemplo, en España el artículo de 63.2 
de la Ley de defensa de la competencia permite imponer una multa de hasta 60.000 
Euros a cada uno de los representantes legales de la empresa infractora o a las personas 
que integran sus órganos directivos que hayan intervenido en el acuerdo o decisión. En 
el Reino Unido un consejero de una empresa que haya cometido una infracción de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia puede ser inhabilitado por un tribunal en el 
supuesto de que su conducta en el ejercicio de su cargo haga que no resulte idóneo para 
participar en la gestión de una compañía. 
 
Por su parte, la aplicación privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia hace 
referencia a la aplicación de éstas por parte de los tribunales, cuando declaran la nulidad 
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de los acuerdos anticompetitivos, adoptan órdenes de cesación y conceden 
indemnizaciones por daños y perjuicios a instancia de las víctimas de tales infracciones. 
La aplicación privada es por lo general el único modo de compensar a las víctimas de 
las conductas anticompetitivas, en la medida en que las autoridades responsables de la 
aplicación de este derecho en su vertiente pública pueden imponer a los infractores 
multas (y, en algunos casos, sanciones penales y/o disciplinarias) pero, en términos 
generales, no pueden conceder indemnizaciones por daños a los perjudicados por la 
infracción.  
 
Estados Unidos ha optado por un modelo de aplicación del derecho de defensa de la 
competencia basado fundamentalmente (en un 90% aproximadamente), en la aplicación 
privada de esta normativa. En la Unión Europea, la situación es justamente la contraria: 
la aplicación de las normas de defensa de la competencia se lleva a cabo 
fundamentalmente por las autoridades administrativas (de carácter público) y las 
acciones privadas representan una proporción comparativamente pequeña de dicha 
aplicación. No obstante, el interés por potenciar la aplicación privada del Derecho de 
defensa de la competencia en la Unión Europea se ha incrementado y en abril de 2014 el 
Parlamento europeo adoptó la primera disposición de armonización (la Propuesta de 
Directiva del Parlamento europeo y del Consejo relativa a determinadas normas por las 
que se rigen las demandas por daños y perjuicios por infracciones de las disposiciones 
del Derecho de la competencia de los Estados miembros y de la Unión Europea, en lo 
sucesivo, la “Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en materia de 
Defensa de la Competencia” o la “Directiva”) que, no obstante, aún requiere la 
aprobación final del Consejo de Ministros. Dado que Estados Unidos es un país pionero 
en el ámbito del derecho de defensa de la competencia, con una amplia experiencia en 
su aplicación, Europa puede aprender de él valiosas lecciones. No obstante, atendiendo 
al contenido de la Directiva, da la impresión de que el legislador europeo no ha 
aprovechado esta oportunidad en todo su potencial, como quedará demostrado en la 
presente tesis.  
 
Las infracciones del derecho de defensa de la competencia causan cada año daños 
sustanciales a la economía europea. En 2007 se estimó que el coste anual para la 
economía de los cárteles de fijación de precios y reparto de mercado de alcance europeo 
ascendería a entre 13.400 y 36.600 millones de euros. Si se añadiese el impacto de los 
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cárteles nacionales, dicho coste anual se elevaría a entre 25.000 y 69.000 millones de 
euros, lo que representa el 0,20-0,55% del PIB de la UE en 2011. Debe tenerse presente 
que esta cifra no incluye los costes derivados de otras infracciones en materia de 
defensa de la competencia, tales como el abuso de posición de dominio, por lo que el 
daño total que dichas infracciones generan a la economía es en realidad muy superior. 
Por este motivo, disuadir de la ejecución de conductas anticompetitivas es un tema 
crucial, particularmente en el contexto actual, en el que la economía global continúa 
estando seriamente afectada por la crisis financiera.  
 
Sin embargo, parece que en la actualidad la aplicación de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia en la Unión Europea no es suficientemente eficaz y que las multas 
impuestas a los infractores no producen por sí mismas un efecto disuasorio, dado que el 
número de cárteles (al menos el de cárteles detectados) ha seguido siendo 
sustancialmente el mismo durante el siglo XXI. La Comisión europea (en lo sucesivo, la 
“Comisión”) ha tratado de poner remedio a esta situación modificando su política 
sancionadora y examinando en qué modo la aplicación privada de la normativa europea 
de defensa de la competencia podría contribuir a desincentivar las infracciones. Ello ha 
tenido como resultado la adopción de la Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por 
Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia.  
 
Inicialmente, una de las razones que se invocaban para potenciar la aplicación privada 
era que si las empresas se viesen obligadas no sólo al pago de una multa por el ilícito 
anticompetitivo, sino también a indemnizar a las víctimas por los daños y perjuicios 
derivados de éste, el riesgo de tener que enfrentarse a extensas demandas de daños 
constituiría un primer elemento de disuasión para las empresas a la hora de cometer 
infracciones. Esto es, una mayor aplicación privada del derecho de defensa de la 
competencia incrementaría el efecto disuasorio y reforzaría el cumplimiento de esta 
normativa. Sin embargo, debe advertirse que la reciente Directiva hace hincapié en la 
función indemnizatoria de la aplicación privada, sin referirse al efecto disuasorio de las 
acciones por daños y perjuicios, aun cuando cabe sostener que la responsabilidad por 
daños tendrá al menos un efecto disuasorio indirecto sobre los futuros infractores, si el 
importe de los daños a satisfacer por éstos es sustancial. La función indemnizatoria de la 
aplicación privada es importante en la medida en que normalmente es el único modo en 
que los afectados pueden obtener una indemnización por la pérdida sufrida ya que, por 
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regla general, la aplicación pública de las normas de defensa de la competencia hace 
posible el cese la infracción y la imposición de sanciones a los infractores, pero no la 
concesión de indemnizaciones por los daños y perjuicios sufridos. 
 
La aplicación privada también alivia la carga de las autoridades de defensa de la 
competencia, que disponen de recursos limitados y persiguen únicamente aquellas 
conductas consideradas más nocivas para la economía en su conjunto. Su papel es por 
tanto complementario de la aplicación pública, haciendo posible para los particulares 
iniciar acciones cuando las autoridades de competencia no pueden o no tienen intención 
de hacerlo. Ello resulta de especial relevancia en casos de abuso de posición de dominio 
o restricciones de defensa de la competencia de naturaleza vertical, dado que las 
autoridades de competencia se muestran menos activas en la persecución de este tipo de 
infracciones, bien por razones de prioridad, o bien porque no tienen conocimiento de 
estas prácticas. En consecuencia, sería importante potenciar la aplicación privada, a fin 
de promover el cumplimiento general de las normas de defensa de la competencia y 
mejorar el bienestar de los consumidores. Asimismo, como ha puesto de manifiesto la 
Comisión, una aplicación privada del derecho de defensa de la competencia más intensa 
contribuiría en último término a garantizar mercados abiertos y competitivos dentro del 
mercado interior de la Unión Europea, en la medida en que coadyuvaría a asegurar un 
plano de igualdad para las empresas en la Unión Europea limitando las barreras a la 
competencia de carácter privado. 
 
B. OBJETIVOS Y ALCANCE  
B.1. Objetivos 
El principal objetivo de esta tesis es determinar qué medidas serían necesarias para 
garantizar una aplicación privada eficaz de las normas de defensa de la competencia en 
la Unión Europea y realizar propuestas sobre su forma de ejecución. En el estado actual 
de la legislación (i.e., con anterioridad a la trasposición de la Directiva), las normas 
procesales nacionales en esta materia son muy diversas, y tales divergencias procesales 
incrementan el riesgo de diferencias de trato y generan inseguridad jurídica, en la 
medida en que resulta más difícil, tanto para los perjudicados, como para los 
demandados predecir cuál va a ser el resultado de un proceso. Además, el reducido 
número de acciones indemnizatorias interpuestas hasta la fecha en la Unión Europea, en 
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particular por consumidores, sugiere que el sistema actual de aplicación privada no está 
funcionando de modo satisfactorio. A título de ejemplo, la carga probatoria asociada al 
ejercicio de acciones por daños es elevada, pero, al mismo tiempo, el acceso a los 
medios de prueba tiende a ser limitado. Acreditar la infracción de las normas de defensa 
de la competencia y el nexo causal entre dicha infracción y el daño sufrido es por tanto 
una tarea muy compleja. Ello parece ser el resultado de normas nacionales, procesales o 
sustantivas, poco adecuadas en materia de responsabilidad, que no toman en 
consideración las especificidades propias de las acciones indemnizatorias de defensa de 
la competencia. Por tanto, es probable que un número considerable de afectados por 
ilícitos anticompetitivos no perciban indemnización por el daño sufrido y, 
consecuentemente, que numerosas empresas infractoras retengan los beneficios 
ilícitamente obtenidos.  
 
Así, el primer objetivo de esta tesis es determinar las normas procesales que deben ser 
objeto de modificación para subsanar el actual déficit de aplicación privada de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia. Por tanto, la primera parte de la tesis se dirige al 
análisis de los obstáculos a la aplicación privada que existen actualmente en la Unión 
Europea en general y en el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia, España, Suecia y Finlandia 
en particular, al objeto de apuntar las diferencias entre estos sistemas e identificar que 
obstáculos a la aplicación privada deben ser objeto de subsanación para facilitar las 
acciones indemnizatorias en este campo.  
 
La presente tesis pretende también determinar en qué medida la finalidad de la 
aplicación privada del derecho de defensa de la competencia ha de ser indemnizar a las 
víctimas de ilícitos anticompetitivos y disuadir a los infractores de contravenir esta 
normativa en el futuro. Esa determinación es crucial, en la medida en que la necesidad 
de potenciar la aplicación y las medidas necesarias para ello dependerán de si el 
objetivo es únicamente indemnizar a las víctimas o también disuadir a las empresas en 
relación con futuras infracciones. En este sentido, una cuestión fundamental es la 
referente a cuál debería ser el equilibrio deseable entre aplicación pública y privada de 
las normas de defensa de la competencia y, de acuerdo con ello, a cómo asegurar que 
una mayor aplicación privada no generará efectos negativos sobre la aplicación pública. 
El segundo objetivo es analizar los recientes instrumentos legislativos europeos 
dirigidos a potenciar la aplicación privada: la Directiva sobre Acciones de 
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Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia y la 
Recomendación de la Comisión, de 11 de junio de 2013, sobre los principios comunes 
aplicables a los mecanismos de recurso colectivo de cesación o de indemnización en los 
Estados miembros en caso de violación de los derechos reconocidos por el Derecho de 
la Unión (en lo sucesivo, la “Recomendación sobre Mecanismos de Recurso 
Colectivo”). El propósito de este análisis es demostrar los defectos y las limitaciones de 
la reforma y determinar los aspectos adicionales que requerirían de armonización o 
aproximación legislativa. La presente tesis pretende mostrar que no es probable que la 
Directiva revolucione las posibilidades de los afectados por un ilícito de obtener una 
indemnización por los daños y perjuicios sufridos. Por el contrario, los consumidores en 
particular quedarán a merced de las organizaciones de consumidores (que a menudo 
sufren problemas de financiación) y, con toda probabilidad, habrán que ejercer sus 
derechos a través de las denominadas acciones “de seguimiento” o derivadas (follow-on 
actions); esto es, las acciones de indemnización por daños y perjuicios sólo serán 
realmente posibles una vez que las autoridades de competencia hayan declarado la 
existencia de una infracción de las normas de defensa de la competencia de la Unión 
Europea. Las medidas legislativas serán objeto de valoración crítica a la luz de las 
experiencias en varias jurisdicciones distintas y se formularán sugerencias acerca del 
modo en que pueden mejorarse.  
 
Dado que la aplicación privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia tiene un 
papel notablemente más relevante en Estados Unidos y está igualmente aumentando en 
Canadá, el tercer objetivo de esta tesis es examinar específicamente qué lecciones 
pueden extraerse de las experiencias norteamericana y canadiense en materia de 
aplicación privada del derecho de defensa de la competencia. En éste ámbito se hará 
énfasis en el papel de las demandas colectivas (class actions), los pactos de cuota litis y 
la política en materia de acceso a pruebas (discovery) a efectos del reforzamiento de la 
aplicación privada, en la medida en que todas ellas son características distintivas del 
modelo vigente en los Estados Unidos, así como en Canadá. El objetivo es examinar las 
experiencias estadounidense y canadiense y determinar qué aspectos de los modelos de 
aplicación de las normas de defensa de la competencia de estos países funcionan 
adecuadamente y cuáles son sus deficiencias. Sobre la base de este análisis, la presente 
tesis tratará, en primer lugar, de establecer si existe la necesidad de introducir en la 
Unión Europea las demandas colectivas (class actions) u otro tipo de herramientas 
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procesales existentes en los ordenamientos estadounidense y canadiense para potenciar 
la aplicación privada y, a continuación, de identificar los posibles obstáculos a la 
introducción de tales mecanismos en la Unión Europea, una vez adaptados a los 
ordenamientos y tradiciones jurídicas europeos. 
 
El último objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es determinar cuál es el modo óptimo de 
potenciar la aplicación privada. En este sentido, la última parte de esta tesis se centra en 
examinar qué aspectos adicionales a los incluidos en la Directiva deben regularse de 
modo uniforme y cómo debe llevarse a efecto su armonización. Aspectos centrales de 
esta parte de la investigación son, entre otros, si deben introducirse en la Unión Europea 
las demandas colectivas y el pacto de cuota litis, aspectos que han sido excluidos de la 
Directiva. Se examinará si es precisa una armonización total o parcial, o si la redacción 
de normas de buenas prácticas o la adopción de directrices europeas sería un modo más 
apropiado de potenciar la aplicación privada. Igualmente, es necesario determinar si 
resulta preferible una armonización sectorial específica, limitada a casos de defensa de 
la competencia, o una armonización general de las normas procesales civiles. 
Asimismo, se indicarán los instrumentos legales adecuados para llevar a efecto la 
armonización y se verificará la existencia de base jurídica para la actuación de la Unión. 
Por último, se evaluará la viabilidad y los efectos que cabe esperar de la armonización. 
 
En resumen, la presente tesis pretende demostrar que la nueva Directiva sobre Acciones 
de Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia ha sido una 
oportunidad perdida de mejorar el acceso a la justicia en los supuestos de infracción del 
Derecho de defensa de la competencia de la Unión Europea y que las reglas comunes 
propuestas no serán suficientes para asegurar una aplicación efectiva y uniforme del 
Derecho de la Unión a las indemnizaciones por infracción de los artículos 101 y 102 
TFUE. En particular, la Directiva supondrá una mejora muy leve en cuanto al 
resarcimiento de los consumidores, las víctimas últimas de los comportamientos 
anticompetitivos. 
 
B.2. Alcance 
Por lo que se refiere al alcance de esta tesis, debe advertirse que ésta se centra en los 
aspectos jurídicos de la aplicación de las normas de competencia, dado que el presente 
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trabajo es ante todo una tesis doctoral en derecho. En otras palabras, la tesis no incluye 
un análisis económico profundo, sino que este tipo de análisis sólo se efectuará en la 
medida en que resulte indispensable para el desarrollo del argumento en cuestión. Ahora 
bien, es importante poner de manifiesto que el análisis económico constituye una parte 
esencial de la aplicación de las normas de defensa de la competencia y es inherente a 
ellas, en la medida en que la aplicación del Derecho de defensa de la competencia de la 
UE lleva consigo un análisis fundamentalmente económico de los efectos de las 
potenciales restricciones anticompetitivas, al objeto de determinar si los efectos 
positivos o favorables compensan los efectos negativos de la restricción o si, por el 
contrario, se generan daños para los consumidores. Por otra parte, las infracciones cuyos 
efectos sobre la economía de la Unión Europea o de los Estados miembros son 
meramente marginales no son, por lo general, objeto de persecución por parte de las 
autoridades de defensa de la competencia, aunque a priori sí sería posible invocarlas en 
el marco de acciones privadas ante los juzgados y tribunales nacionales. En 
consecuencia, el enfoque económico debe tenerse siempre presente al evaluar las 
posibilidades existentes de interposición de acciones de indemnización por daños en 
materia de defensa de la competencia, así como las distintas opciones para fortalecer la 
aplicación privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia de la UE.  
 
La sanción civil de nulidad de los contratos que vulneren las normas de defensa de la 
competencia de la UE, así como la posibilidad de solicitar órdenes de cesación quedan 
también fuera del ámbito de esta tesis doctoral, en la medida en que las cuestiones 
objeto de investigación conciernen a las condiciones para la interposición de acciones 
indemnizatorias en materia de defensa de la competencia y a cómo proceder para una 
mejor reparación o resarcimiento de las víctimas de ilícitos anticompetitivos 
indemnizando a éstas por la pérdida que hayan sufrido como resultado de la infracción. 
 
De igual forma, se excluyen del ámbito de esta tesis las acciones de indemnización por 
daños derivados de infracciones de las normas de defensa de la competencia declaradas 
por árbitros, dado que los órganos arbitrales no necesariamente son susceptibles de ser 
considerados “tribunales” conforme al Derecho de la Unión Europea, aun cuando dicten 
decisiones en derecho y el laudo sea vinculante para las partes. No obstante, cabe 
indicar que es necesario un vínculo más estrecho entre el procedimiento arbitral y el 
sistema judicial ordinario. Es más, el arbitraje es generalmente una forma voluntaria de 
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dirimir litigios comerciales, salvo que el contrato en cuestión incluya una cláusula que 
disponga que los potenciales litigios se someterán a arbitraje. Dado el elevado nivel de 
autonomía de las partes, éstas pueden emplear reglas ad hoc u optar por reglas de una 
institución arbitral que se ajusten a sus necesidades y expectativas. Ello hace más difícil 
influir en el arbitraje a través de la adopción de disposiciones legales vinculantes. Por 
otra parte, la legislación sobre arbitraje es competencia de los Estados Miembros, lo que 
dificulta la determinación de los límites entre, de una parte, el derecho sustantivo de la 
Unión Europea (incluyendo la legislación de defensa de la competencia) y, de otra, el 
derecho nacional y el principio de autonomía procesal. Asimismo, resulta incluso más 
difícil encontrar estadísticas fiables sobre asuntos que se hayan dirimido mediante 
arbitraje que sobre acciones de indemnización por daños interpuestas ante los juzgados 
y tribunales nacionales de los Estados miembros, debido a la naturaleza privada de los 
litigios que se resuelven por arbitraje. 
 
Por último, en cuanto al análisis de los modelos de aplicación privada en los seis 
Estados miembros seleccionados (i.e., el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia, España, 
Suecia y Finlandia), Estados Unidos y Canadá, la presente tesis examinará las 
características principales de dichos ordenamientos jurídicos, pero no realizará un 
análisis en profundidad de éstos. El examen se centrará en aquellos aspectos que están 
directamente relacionados con la materia objeto de la investigación y las hipótesis 
subyacentes. 
 
B.3. Metodología y fuentes 
B.3.1. Metodología 
El objetivo de la presente tesis es determinar las imperfecciones del modelo de 
aplicación privada de la Unión Europea y, acto seguido,  proponer soluciones a nivel de 
la Unión a partir de las experiencias extraídas de la aplicación privada del Derecho de la 
Competencia en Estados Unidos y Canadá. 
 
Al objeto de analizar el actual estado de la aplicación de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia de la UE en la esfera privada, el punto de partida de la investigación será la 
Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la 
Competencia, aunque el punto de partida original cronológico en el tiempo sería el 
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Libro Verde y el Libro Blanco de la Comisión sobre Acciones de daños y perjuicios por 
incumplimiento de las normas comunitarias de defensa de la competencia. El objetivo 
es realizar un examen de los obstáculos a la aplicación de las normas en la esfera 
privada en la UE y complementarlo con un análisis de la jurisprudencia de la Unión 
pertinente, así como con distintos estudios realizados sobre la aplicación privada de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia y el recurso colectivo encargados por la Comisión. 
A continuación, se analizará de forma más exhaustiva la situación existente en 
determinados Estados miembros, concretamente Alemania como representante del 
ordenamiento jurídico germano, Francia y España como representantes de la familia 
jurídica romanista, Suecia y Finlandia en nombre de la tradición jurídica nórdica y el 
Reino Unido como representante del Common Law y uno de los países europeos 
tradicionalmente más cercanos a los ordenamientos jurídicos estadounidense y 
canadiense.  
 
Se usará una metodología comparativa. El objetivo es identificar de qué tipos de 
recursos disponen las víctimas de incumplimientos de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia. En primer lugar, se analizarán la bibliografía y las disposiciones legales 
pertinentes sobre la materia, así como la jurisprudencia más relevante. A partir de los 
resultados de dicho análisis, se procederá a comparar de forma crítica las similitudes y 
diferencias entre los Estados miembros. A continuación, se realizará una introducción a 
la Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en Materia de Defensa de la 
Competencia y a la Recomendación sobre Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo de la 
Comisión, cuyo objetivo es, entre otros, el de avanzar en la aplicación privada, para 
analizarlas con ojo crítico y determinar los defectos y limitaciones de los que adolecen y 
en qué forma pueden modificarse para tratar de solucionar los problemas que  plantea 
actualmente el modelo de aplicación privada. 
 
Como referencia de modelo óptimo de aplicación privada se basará en el estadounidense 
y en el canadiense. Se partirá del supuesto de que el modelo de aplicación privada de 
Estados Unidos, usado en la mayor parte de la aplicación del Derecho de la competencia 
en dicho país, también tendrá algo que ofrecer al modelo europeo. Habida cuenta de la 
dilatada y amplia experiencia en la aplicación privada de las normas sobre competencia 
en los Estados Unidos, cabe pensar que el análisis de la experiencia americana permitirá 
dilucidar cuáles son las ventajas e inconvenientes de su modelo y los posibles 
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obstáculos a su introducción en la UE, una vez adaptado a las tradiciones europeas de 
índole jurídica y cultural. Este análisis se realizará a la luz de la jurisprudencia y de las 
disposiciones legales de aplicación tanto a escala federal como estatal, aunque dando 
preponderancia a la legislación federal toda vez que es la que se aplica en todo el país. 
Solo se procederá a examinar la legislación estatal cuando difiera en medida 
significativa de la federal. 
 
Canadá tiene, desde la perspectiva europea, un modelo más moderado de aplicación 
privada que los Estados Unidos. No prevé, por ejemplo, indemnización por el triple de 
los daños y la mayoría de los causas sobre competencia se deciden por jueces y no por 
jurados. Por otra parte, las demandas colectivas canadienses se basan, al igual que las 
estadounidenses, en un modelo de opt-out (con exclusión voluntaria), mientras que el 
derecho de acceso a pruebas de las partes (discovery) no es tan amplio como en los 
Estados Unidos. Como ya se ha dicho, la coexistencia del  Derecho Civil y del Common 
Law en Canadá también hace que su ordenamiento jurídico sea interesante desde el 
punto de vista europeo, dado que en algunos de los Estados Miembros de la UE rige el 
Common Law, lo que hace necesario crear un modelo de aplicación privada que sea 
compatible con ambas tradiciones jurídicas. Por todo ello, la experiencia canadiense 
también puede resultar de utilidad. Se pondrá el acento sobre aquellos aspectos que 
difieren de las características del régimen jurídico estadounidense. Es decir, se toma 
como referencia el modelo de aplicación de los Estados Unidos, mientras que el 
canadiense se tiene en cuenta simplemente para complementar el análisis en aquellos 
casos en que pueda aportar un valor añadido. 
 
Por otra parte,  los estudios comparados no deben basarse exclusivamente en normas 
legislativas, decisiones judiciales, “el Derecho en los libros” y  las características 
generales del comercio, la práctica y la costumbre, sino “en todo aquello que ayude a 
configurar la conducta humana en la situación objeto de estudio”. Es decir, es 
necesario atender, por ejemplo, a las diferencias culturales, como es el hecho de que los 
Estados Unidos sean tradicionalmente “más litigiosos”. Además, podría resultar 
imposible implementar en la UE las alternativas disponibles en los Estados Unidos y 
Canadá sin la debida adaptación, debido a las diferencias en los procedimientos 
judiciales o en el contexto social. En particular, al optar por una determinada solución, 
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siempre deberá tenerse presente el marco de la aplicación privada en la UE a la hora de 
valorar las consecuencias de la acción elegida. 
 
En esta tesis se proponen medidas concretas que es preciso adoptar para avanzar en la 
aplicación privada en la UE. En este sentido, se adopta como punto de partida la 
Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en Materia de Defensa de la 
Competencia, para la que se propondrán modificaciones y ampliaciones. La obra entrará 
a analizar si es necesario armonizar las normas de procedimiento aplicables y los 
riesgos y ventajas que dicha armonización conllevaría. Se examinan también las 
alternativas a la armonización, así como sus ventajas e inconvenientes. Por último se 
expone la forma en que debería implementarse la armonización, concretamente si 
debería ser una armonización total o parcial de las normas de procedimiento que rigen 
las acciones por daños derivados de ilícitos de competencia y en qué medida debería 
adoptarse a través de instrumentos legales de carácter vinculante de la Unión Europea y 
no de forma voluntaria mediante directrices y mejores prácticas. 
 
B.3.2. Justificación y valor de una comparación legal 
A lo largo de la historia, se han venido produciendo trasvases, voluntarios o no, de 
normas jurídicas de unos países a otros. Con frecuencia los artífices de estos trasvases 
han sido los legisladores nacionales, aunque los jueces también han buscado inspiración 
en las reglas e ideas jurídicas de otros territorios para resolver causas o problemas 
similares para los que no encontraban solución en el ordenamiento interno. Los efectos 
de estas transferencias de normas jurídicas dependerán, no obstante, del marco histórico, 
político, social, religioso y cultural, incluida la cultura jurídica, del país de que se trate. 
Estos trasplantes jurídicos tienden a producirse, además, con las modificaciones que 
resultan necesarias para impedir su incompatibilidad con las estructuras y preferencias 
procesales locales.  
 
La comparación entre dos o más ordenamientos jurídicos puede plantear ciertas 
dificultades por distintos motivos, entre los que cabe mencionar los problemas 
lingüísticos y terminológicos, las diferencias culturales, la tendencia de los 
comparatistas a imponer sus propias concepciones y expectativas a los ordenamientos 
examinados y la exclusión de las reglas extrajurídicas. Sin embargo, estas dificultades 
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no impiden la posibilidad de aprender de otros países y de inspirarse en reglas o 
mecanismos jurídicos para mejorar el funcionamiento del ordenamiento interno, toda 
vez que la forma en que el ordenamiento extranjero regula una determinada cuestión 
puede resultar tanto o más eficaz para asegurar la aplicación de las normas. Las 
condiciones para realizar una comparación legal dependen, no obstante, de una serie de 
factores como son el grado de similitud de los ordenamientos comparados y la 
disponibilidad de materiales. Cuanto mayor sea la similitud entre los dos ordenamientos 
comparados, más fácil resultará la comparación. 
 
En cuanto al método para realizar el estudio comparado, resulta útil empezar por 
describir las normas, conceptos e instituciones o los problemas legales y las soluciones 
jurídicas aportadas. El ejercicio de comparación debe centrarse en aquellos aspectos de 
los ordenamientos extranjeros que desempeñan las mismas funciones, es decir, el 
análisis de la cuestión examinada no debe realizarse sobre la base de conceptos del 
ordenamiento jurídico nacional, sino centrarse en un problema jurídico concreto. Acto 
seguido habrá que identificar las diferencias y similitudes y explicar los motivos de las 
similitudes y diferencias entre los ordenamientos. Especial importancia tiene determinar 
la forma en que influyen en las decisiones jurídicas y en la interacción de los agentes 
jurídicos. Para perfilar las posibles respuestas a los problemas, debería efectuarse una 
comparación entre los distintos enfoques. En este contexto, es importante tener en 
cuenta el impacto de las posibles diferencias culturales (y factores socioeconómicos) y 
de cualesquiera otros factores que no sean de índole jurídica (por ejemplo la costumbre 
local) y que puedan haber influido en la orientación jurídica de los territorios 
comparados. Al realizar un estudio comparado, es necesario preguntarse si la norma 
funciona de verdad en la práctica y por qué; ¿hay, por ejemplo, motivos culturales, 
prácticas económicas o una determinada práctica comercial que expliquen el 
funcionamiento de las normas? Después, habrá que pasar a analizar, bajo un prisma 
crítico, los principios jurídicos a la luz de su significado intrínseco y extraer 
conclusiones en un marco comparativo (con posibles salvedades) y con un comentario 
crítico. Debería, además, relacionarse con la finalidad original del estudio. La 
evaluación crítica implica el examen de las distintas soluciones desde una perspectiva 
nueva y común, con atención sobre la funcionalidad de las soluciones. Finalmente, sería 
necesario señalar la importancia relativa otorgada a la naturaleza de los ordenamientos 
examinados, su familia jurídica, su evolución histórica o sociocultural y las posibles 
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repercusiones de dicha evolución sobre la de la propia norma/solución en comparación 
con otros regímenes jurídicos. 
 
En lo que respecta, más concretamente, al derecho sobre competencia comparado, no 
existe una metodología o bibliografía específica que pudiera servir de punto de 
referencia común para realizar el estudio ni existe tampoco un estándar internacional 
aplicable al derecho de la competencia.  No obstante, Estados Unidos suele constituir un 
valioso punto de referencia común gracias a su abundante jurisprudencia, que abarca 
más de un siglo y al hecho de que ésta contenga más material fáctico que otros 
ordenamientos jurídicos. Por ejemplo, desde finales de los noventa se han venido 
introduciendo más elementos jurídicos estadounidenses (por ejemplo, un programa de 
clemencia) en el Derecho de la competencia de la Unión. Esto no significa, sin 
embargo, que la ley y la jurisprudencia estadounidenses deban aceptarse sin más, antes 
bien al contrario, deben examinarse más detenidamente y analizarse en el contexto de 
las condiciones existentes en otros países. 
 
El valor del derecho de la competencia comparado también es cada vez mayor, puesto 
que contribuye a entender la forma en que se abordan los distintos problemas de 
aplicación, de ahí su utilidad para determinar la mejor forma de regular la aplicación de 
las normas de defensa de la competencia. A este respecto, es especialmente importante 
analizar las decisiones legales atendiendo a factores tales como los textos, intereses, 
instituciones, comunidades y modelos de pensamiento que han influido en su adopción. 
 
En esta obra, todos los países examinados pertenecen al ordenamiento de Derecho Civil 
o de Common Law, lo que hace que sean especialmente aptas para su comparación, ya 
que, a pesar de sus diferencias en términos de evolución histórica, organización, etc., 
ambos siguen las tradiciones occidentales y suelen ofrecer soluciones relativamente 
parecidas a los mismos problemas jurídicos. Sin embargo, es natural que aun dentro de 
una misma familia jurídica existan diferencias entre los distintos ordenamientos, por lo 
que, por ejemplo, resulta procedente realizar un análisis de la aplicación privada tanto 
en el Reino Unido como en los Estados Unidos a la luz de su respectivo y distinto 
derecho procesal. También debe tenerse presente que, aparte de EEUU y Canadá, todos 
los demás países estudiados forman parte del ordenamiento jurídico de la UE, lo que 
hace que la comparación legal sea especialmente oportuna, ya que todos comparten la 
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mismas normas sustantivas de competencia y que la obligación de cumplir los 
principios de equivalencia y eficacia fija el límite respecto a la aplicación de las normas 
de procedimiento internas. 
 
B.3.3. Presentación de fuentes 
Las principales fuentes consultadas para la obra serán tanto la legislación vigente como 
las propuestas legislativas y la jurisprudencia sobre la aplicación de las normas de 
competencia en la UE (en particular el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia, España, Suecia 
y Finlandia) y en los Estados Unidos y Canadá. En cuanto a las fuentes de la UE, 
además de la jurisprudencia de la Unión, se prestará particular atención a los 
documentos oficiales de la Comisión Europea, en particular la Directiva sobre Acciones 
de Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia, la 
Recomendación sobre Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo, la fallida Propuesta de una 
Directiva del Consejo sobre normas para regular las acciones de daños y perjuicios por 
infracciones de los artículos 81 y 82 del Tratado, el Libro Verde y el Libro Blanco sobre 
acciones de daños y perjuicios por incumplimiento de las normas comunitarias de 
defensa de la competencia, así como el  Documento de Trabajo de la Comisión “Hacia 
un Enfoque Europeo Coherente para la Reparación Colectiva”. En lo que se refiere a los 
Estados Unidos, las fuentes principales serán las leyes y jurisprudencia federales, 
aunque en ocasiones, cuando las diferencias entre el Derecho federal y estatal lo 
justifiquen, se hará referencia a la jurisprudencia estatal. De igual modo, las principales 
fuentes de Canadá consisten en las leyes y jurisprudencia federales, teniéndose solo en 
cuenta las de las provincias canadienses cuando sea de particular relevancia para el 
objeto de estudio. 
 
Las fuentes secundarias empleadas incluyen libros y artículos sobre doctrina jurídica 
tanto de la Unión Europea, a escala de la Unión y también nacional, como de los 
Estados Unidos y Canadá. Los artículos pertenecen, fundamentalmente, a publicaciones 
especializadas en Derecho de la competencia o mercantil pero, por ejemplo, también se 
incluyen publicaciones dedicadas al Derecho europeo o al Derecho internacional. La 
bibliografía incluirá además diversos estudios encargados por la Comisión sobre 
aplicación particular de las normas de defensa de la competencia y sobre acciones 
colectivas. 
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 La mayor parte de las fuentes consultadas serán europeas, puesto que la finalidad de la 
obra es la de proponer una solución para la insuficiente aplicación de las normas de 
defensa de la competencia de la UE. También se da preferencia a las fuentes de este 
siglo, puesto que antes la aplicación privada no recibía mucha atención en la UE y 
recientemente se han implementado importantes reformas de los modelos de aplicación 
del Derecho de la Competencia a nivel nacional en varios Estados miembros. 
 
 
C. CONCLUSIONES 
C.1. Resumen de las principales conclusiones  
C.1.1. Aplicación privada de las normas de derecho de defensa de la competencia de 
la UE a escala europea  
En la Unión Europea, la elección política en relación con la aplicación de las normas 
europeas de defensa de la competencia ha sido su aplicación pública por las autoridades 
nacionales y, hasta la modernización de la aplicación de los artículos 101 y 102 TFUE 
en mayo de 2004, fundamentalmente por la Comisión. El papel de la aplicación privada 
de dichas normas de competencia, en particular a través del ejercicio de acciones 
indemnizatorias, ha sido por tanto mucho menos relevante, a pesar de que el Tribunal de 
Justicia declaró tempranamente, en el asunto BRT c. SABAM, que los artículos 101 y 
102 TFUE surten efectos directos en las relaciones entre particulares y “crean 
directamente derechos en favor de los justiciables que los órganos jurisdiccionales 
nacionales deben tutelar”. Hasta la modernización de la normativa de defensa de la 
competencia, esto podía explicarse en parte porque la Comisión tenía el monopolio de la 
concesión de exenciones individuales en relación con aquellos acuerdos restrictivos de 
la competencia conforme al apartado primero del artículo 101 TFUE que cumpliesen las 
condiciones de exención del apartado tercero del mismo precepto legal, lo que tendía a 
paralizar las acciones privadas pendientes ante los tribunales nacionales, hasta que la 
Comisión se pronunciase sobre la solicitud de exención. Junto a ello, el Tratado no 
contiene ninguna disposición expresa en materia de responsabilidad por daños 
derivados de infracciones de los artículos 101 y 102 TFUE. Este derecho se ha extraído 
de lo dispuesto en el artículo 4.3 del TUE y del principio de eficacia y, posteriormente, 
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ha sido expresamente reconocido por el Tribunal de Justicia en un su paradigmática 
sentencia en el asunto Courage. 
 
En Courage, el Tribunal de Justicia declaró que cualquier particular podía invocar ante 
los tribunales nacionales una infracción del artículo 101.1 TFUE y que este derecho se 
extendía incluso a las partes de un contrato susceptible de restringir o falsear la 
competencia. Igualmente, el derecho a reclamar daños y perjuicios es independiente de 
si la Comisión está o no tramitando una eventual denuncia. De este modo, el Tribunal 
extendió expresamente los principios que facultan para reclamar contra los Estados 
miembros por infracción del Derecho de la Unión Europea a la responsabilidad por 
infracción por las empresas de las normas de defensa de la competencia de la UE, al 
reconocer un derecho de la Unión a la reclamación de daños y perjuicios derivados de 
ilícitos anticompetitivos, argumentando que ese derecho es necesario para garantizar la 
plena efectividad de las normas de defensa de la competencia. En otras palabras, creó 
una responsabilidad individual por infracción de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia. Asimismo, declaró que los tribunales nacionales están obligados a dar 
efectividad al derecho reconocido por la Unión a la indemnización por daños, con 
independencia de las disposiciones nacionales. 
 
La encomienda a los tribunales nacionales de la aplicación de los derechos de la Unión 
había sido ya confirmado por el Tribunal de Justicia en su sentencia van Gend & Loos, 
en la que puso de manifiesto la naturaleza complementaria de la aplicación pública y 
privada de los derechos derivados del Derecho de la Unión Europea, y declaró que los 
particulares también están facultados para participar en la vigilancia del cumplimiento 
de las obligaciones impuestas por la Unión. Pero la vigilancia por los particulares del 
cumplimiento de las normas europeas de defensa de la competencia, a través del 
ejercicio de su derecho, reconocido por la Unión, a la indemnización de daños y 
perjuicios derivados de infracciones en esta materia no ha funcionado muy 
satisfactoriamente en la práctica. La escasa aplicación privada de las normas de 
competencia en la Unión Europea se puso de manifiesto en el Estudio Ashurst, en el que 
se señalaba que la aplicación privada en la Unión Europea presentaba una 
“sorprendente diversidad y un total subdesarrollo” (traducción propia). Aun cuando el 
número de acciones indemnizatorias recogido en el Estudio Ashurst pueda resultar 
cuestionable, particularmente en lo que se refiere a Alemania, España, Francia, Reino 
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Unido, Países Bajos, Bélgica, Italia, Portugal y Suecia, a la luz de investigaciones más 
recientes, el Estudio sí sirve para acreditar el mínimo nivel general de aplicación 
privada de este Derecho en la Unión Europea hace aproximadamente una década.  
 
Por otra parte, pese a que las acciones privadas de indemnización por daños y perjuicios 
se interponen con mayor frecuencia en la actualidad, el número de acciones ejercidas en 
la Unión Europea sigue siendo reducido en términos comparativos. La Comisión ha 
estimado que, entre 2006 y 2012, se plantearon tan sólo 52 acciones indemnizatorias 
derivadas de Decisiones de la Comisión (i.e., follow-on actions). Es más, dichas 
reclamaciones se interpusieron únicamente en siete Estados miembros, en su mayor 
parte en Alemania, el Reino Unido y los Países Bajos. Por el contrario, en el resto de los 
Estados miembros parecen no haber existido acciones de seguimiento fundadas en 
Decisiones de la Comisión durante el periodo indicado. Lo anterior indica que las 
acciones de reclamación de daños y perjuicios no están funcionando de modo adecuado 
en la gran mayoría de los Estados miembros y que la aplicación privada en la Unión 
Europea es aún muy diversa, pese a la existencia de un derecho reconocido por la Unión 
a la indemnización de daños y perjuicios. 
 
Por otra parte, se considera que existen casos adicionales que han sido objeto de 
transacción extrajudicial. Ahora bien, es posible que los demandantes se encontrasen en 
una situación más débil que la de los demandados, esto es, que su poder de negociación 
haya sido o sea reducido, lo que podría dar lugar a acuerdos transaccionales poco 
ventajosos para ellos, a no ser que puedan disponer de una herramienta judicial efectiva 
que incentive al demandado a transar. Además, cuando se interponen demandas de 
indemnización por daños y perjuicios ante los tribunales, las empresas emplean 
habitualmente las normas de defensa de la competencia como instrumento de defensa en 
el marco de litigios contractuales de carácter comercial y aparentemente en muchos 
supuestos se formulan pretensiones distintas de la indemnización de daños, o ésta 
fracasa.   
 
En particular, las demandas de indemnización por daños apenas son objeto de 
interposición por parte de consumidores, y las escasas acciones “de representación” 
(representative actions) que hasta la fecha se han ejercido en su nombre  han tenido un 
éxito muy limitado, no habiendo sido objeto de indemnización la mayor parte del daño 
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sufrido por los perjudicados. Lo anterior resulta preocupante dado que, en último 
término, las víctimas de las prácticas anticompetitivas son generalmente los 
consumidores, ya que los compradores en niveles anteriores de la cadena de distribución 
pueden trasladar el sobrecoste abonado al siguiente nivel, mientras que los 
consumidores han de asumir la totalidad del sobrecoste que se les traslada.  
 
Esta insuficiente aplicación o invocación de las normas de defensa de la competencia, 
especialmente por parte de los consumidores, resulta mucho más alarmante a la luz de la 
modernización de la legislación de defensa de la competencia de la UE, dado que el 
objetivo de la reforma era, entre otros, fomentar el ejercicio de acciones privadas 
otorgando a los jueces nacionales competencia para aplicar los artículos 101 y 102 del 
TFUE en su integridad. El intento de incrementar la aplicación privada podría, de 
hecho, ser considerado como un paralelismo de la creación de los “fiscales generales 
privados” (private attorneys general) en los Estados Unidos, en virtud del artículo 4 de 
la ley americana Clayton Act.  
 
C.1.2. Obstáculos a la aplicación privada en los Estados miembros  
La limitada aplicación privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia puede 
explicarse por el hecho de que las acciones de indemnización por daños se rigen en la 
actualidad por las normas procesales nacionales. Esto es, en la práctica, la posibilidad de 
ejercer acciones indemnizatorias varía de un Estado miembro a otro. El análisis de la 
aplicación privada en el Reino Unido, Alemania, Francia, España, Suecia y Finlandia 
que se ha llevado a cabo en esta tesis muestra que los perjudicados aún han de hacer 
frente a diversos obstáculos para poder ejercer acciones de indemnización por daños en 
materia de defensa de la competencia en la Unión Europea. Incluso en aquellos Estados 
miembros en los que las acciones de defensa de la competencia son objeto de ejercicio 
frecuente, tales como el Reino Unido y Alemania, rara vez se conceden 
indemnizaciones por daños en casos de cártel. En particular, no parece que los 
consumidores dispongan de ningún remedio legal eficaz en la Unión Europea, dado que 
apenas han existido demandas colectivas de consumidores, de pequeña cuantía, relativas 
a indemnizaciones por daños derivados de infracciones del derecho de defensa de la 
competencia. 
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Resulta especialmente sorprendente el hecho de que las víctimas de cárteles no ejerzan 
acciones indemnizatorias con mayor frecuencia. Es comprensible que este tipo de 
acciones de reclamación de daños no sean objeto de interposición como acciones 
independientes, teniendo en cuenta que la detección de estos acuerdos secretos resulta 
difícil para las propias autoridades de competencia, que disponen de amplios poderes de 
inspección. En consecuencia, resulta virtualmente imposible para las víctimas de 
acuerdos de cártel aducir prueba suficiente que acredite la existencia de la infracción y 
el daño sufrido como resultado de ésta. No obstante, cabría esperar que las acciones 
derivadas o de “seguimiento” fuesen más frecuentes, particularmente dado que el 
demandante podría remitirse a la decisión de la Comisión para acreditar la existencia de 
la infracción. Sin embargo, una explicación al limitado número de acciones derivadas de 
naturaleza indemnizatoria podría residir en que la decisión por la que se declara la 
existencia de infracción no necesariamente acredita que la infracción haya causado 
daños de forma efectiva. 
 
Otra explicación podría ser que muchas de las potenciales acciones indemnizatorias son 
objeto de transacción. Pero la explicación más plausible es que actualmente existen 
demasiados obstáculos al ejercicio de acciones de indemnización por daños en materia 
de defensa de la competencia en los Estados miembros. Los elevados costes legales y la 
incertidumbre acerca del resultado de la acción desincentivan su ejercicio. El onus 
probandi es elevado, ya que los demandantes han de acreditar no sólo la existencia de 
una infracción de las normas de competencia y demostrar la relación de causalidad entre 
la infracción y el daño sufrido como resultado de ella, sino también cuantificar el 
importe exacto de dicho daño. Dado que el acceso a la prueba es limitado en la mayor 
parte de los Estados miembros, la mayoría de los demandantes se ven posiblemente 
desincentivados a iniciar un procedimiento por su prolongada duración y coste, dado 
que pueden carecer de los recursos financieros y la experiencia necesarios para 
interponer una demanda de indemnización por daños derivados de infracción de las 
normas de competencia. 
 
Para los consumidores, en particular aquellos cuya pretensión sea de relativamente 
pequeña cuantía en comparación con los elevados costes de las demandas de 
indemnización por daños, la tarea se torna virtualmente imposible, y resulta impensable 
el ejercicio de acciones independientes. Pero también las pequeñas y medianas empresas 
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pueden enfrentarse a los mismos obstáculos, especialmente cuando sean compradores 
indirectos y se les exija demostrar el importe exacto del sobrecoste que se les ha 
trasladado. En consecuencia, sería de gran relevancia para los consumidores y las 
pequeñas y medianas empresas que pudiesen ejercer acciones colectivas de forma 
conjunta con otras víctimas, al objeto de permitirles reducir los costes y riesgos 
asociados al ejercicio de la acción y tener un incentivo real para ejercitarla.  
 
El estado actual de la aplicación privada demuestra que son necesarias medidas para 
incentivar que los afectados por una práctica anticompetitiva interpongan demandas de 
indemnización por daños, así como para garantizar el cumplimiento general de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia de la UE. Dado que los consumidores son los que 
probablemente sufren en último término los efectos negativos de estas infracciones, en 
forma de precios más elevados, menor calidad y variedad de productos, etc., son en 
particular sus posibilidades de reclamar daños las que deben ampliarse y reforzarse. Las 
acciones colectivas podrían ser el remedio apropiado al efecto. 
 
La necesidad de introducir algún tipo de instrumento eficaz de actuación o acción 
colectiva en la Unión Europea es especialmente grande por lo que se refiere a los 
consumidores que han sufrido pérdidas como resultado de unos precios más elevados. 
En la actualidad, el coste y la incertidumbre sobre el resultado del litigio disuaden a 
éstos de reclamar una indemnización, particularmente cuando las pérdidas sufridas a 
nivel individual son reducidas. Sin embargo, el daño global sufrido por todos los 
consumidores y los beneficios económicos obtenidos por los miembros del cártel 
pueden haber sido sustanciales. Por ese motivo, sólo si los consumidores pueden unir 
sus fuerzas mediante la interposición de una acción colectiva existirá una posibilidad 
real de que un gran número de víctimas obtenga el pleno resarcimiento de sus pérdidas 
en estos casos.  
 
La posibilidad de decidir en un único procedimiento sobre múltiples demandas de 
menor cuantía, cuyo valor total puede ser no obstante considerable, garantizaría por 
tanto el acceso a la justicia. Igualmente, de este modo los tribunales no se verían 
obligados a decidir una y otra vez sobre múltiples asuntos similares, lo que aliviaría su 
carga de trabajo y redundaría en una mejor administración de justicia. Las acciones 
colectivas podrían también contribuir a reducir las dificultades en los casos de compra 
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indirecta, si las demandas de los compradores indirectos pudiesen consolidarse con las 
interpuestas por los compradores directos; de esta forma, un primer procedimiento 
podría determinar el sobrecoste total generado por la fijación de precios, en tanto que el 
segundo procedimiento distribuiría las indemnizaciones de daños entre los distintos 
compradores en la cadena de distribución. Ello eliminaría a su vez las indemnizaciones 
múltiples.  
 
En términos generales, las acciones colectivas entrañarían menores costes no sólo para 
los demandantes, sino también para los demandados y favorecerían una mayor 
seguridad jurídica, en la medida en que todas las demandas se resolverían posiblemente 
de una sola vez. Asimismo, reducirían la asimetría entre las partes especialmente en 
aquellas situaciones en las que existan múltiples demandas de pequeña cuantía y, en 
consecuencia, potenciarían el efecto disuasorio. 
 
Sin embargo, existen ciertos riesgos asociados a las acciones colectivas. Al reducir el 
coste legal de litigar y facilitar por tanto el inicio de un procedimiento, podrían llevar 
consigo la interposición de demandas carentes de fundamento. Los demandados, por su 
parte, podrían sentirse inclinados a transar para evitar el procedimiento judicial, incluso 
aunque su conducta no constituya una infracción de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia. No obstante, los riesgos anteriores pueden mitigarse sustancialmente 
mediante la adopción de las cautelas adecuadas. 
 
En todo caso, las acciones colectivas que actualmente existen en los Estados miembros 
no proporcionan, en general, una reparación o resarcimiento suficiente y efectivo. De 
los seis Estados miembros analizados en esta tesis, tan sólo el Reino Unido y Francia 
contemplan de modo expreso acciones “de representación” o acciones colectivas de 
indemnización por daños basadas en un incumplimiento del derecho nacional o europeo 
de defensa de la competencia. Además, en la actualidad dichas acciones sólo pueden ser 
objeto de interposición como acciones “de seguimiento” o derivadas, ejercitables tras la 
adopción por la Comisión o las autoridades de competencia nacionales de una decisión 
en la que se declare la existencia de la infracción en cuestión. Por otra parte, la 
legitimación activa para el ejercicio de estas acciones está actualmente limitada a los 
consumidores, aunque las pequeñas y medianas empresas podrán interponer acciones 
colectivas en el Reino Unido en un futuro próximo. Es importante también poner de 
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manifiesto que en Francia la acción colectiva sólo es ejercitable por las asociaciones 
francesas de consumidores, lo que priva a otras asociaciones de consumidores de la 
posibilidad de interponer una acción colectiva en ese país en nombre de consumidores 
de distintos Estados miembros. 
 
La situación en Alemania es aún más insatisfactoria, dado que únicamente cabe el 
ejercicio de acciones colectivas para órdenes de cesación o para que se ordene a los 
infractores transferir sus beneficios ilícitos al Tesoro. Esto es, no es posible formular 
demandas de indemnización por daños a través de este tipo de acciones. La acción 
colectiva contemplada en el ordenamiento finés es también limitada en términos 
comparativos, ya que únicamente está legitimado para su ejercicio el Defensor del 
Consumidor, en nombre de un grupo que pueda determinarse con antelación.  
  
En España, sólo las asociaciones de consumidores y usuarios pueden ejercer acciones 
colectivas de indemnización por daños derivados de infracciones de las normas de 
defensa de la competencia; las empresas carecen de esta posibilidad. Si los miembros 
del grupo afectado están identificados o son fácilmente identificables, también dicho 
grupo puede plantear acciones colectivas de indemnización por daños. Sin embargo, la 
indemnización se concede en relación con cada demandante individual y no al grupo en 
su conjunto, por lo que cada demandante ha de solicitar al tribunal su reconocimiento 
como miembro del grupo, así como la cuantificación de los daños individuales. Si la 
demanda es de muy pequeña cuantía, el demandante puede decidir no adherirse a la 
acción, ya que en muchos casos será difícil calcular el importe exacto del daño que ha 
sufrido. Además, la acción colectiva sólo es susceptible de interposición por parte de los 
consumidores, lo que hace especialmente difícil para las pequeñas y medianas empresas 
ejercitar sus derechos como perjudicados por una infracción de las normas de defensa 
de la competencia. 
 
En contraste con lo anterior, la acción privada de grupo sueca se consideró en el 
momento de su adopción como una acción colectiva potencialmente extensiva, pese a 
estar basada en un mecanismo de “participación voluntaria” (opt-in). La citada acción 
puede interponerse por una persona física o jurídica en nombre del grupo afectado. 
Únicamente el demandante “del grupo” será parte del procedimiento y, como regla 
general, los miembros pasivos del grupo no están obligados al pago de costas en caso de 
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desestimación de la demanda. Lo que hace atractivo este tipo de acción, al menos en un 
plano teórico, es la posibilidad de hacer uso de una versión modificada del pacto de 
cuota litis, el denominado “acuerdo de riesgos”, para el ejercicio de la acción. Sin 
embargo, hasta la fecha no se ha hecho uso de este tipo de acciones para reclamar 
indemnizaciones por daños derivados de ilícitos anticompetitivos, de modo que esta 
acción de grupo basada en el modelo de participación o inclusión voluntaria tampoco 
parece ser la solución para potenciar las demandas de indemnización por daños.   
 
La experiencia de los seis ordenamientos examinados demuestra que la situación actual 
en la Unión Europea, en relación con el ejercicio de acciones colectivas es claramente 
insatisfactoria. En la práctica, este mecanismo de resarcimiento que sólo es realmente 
efectivo – en términos potenciales – para los consumidores que hayan sufrido daños 
como consecuencia de una conducta anticompetitiva no es por lo general una alternativa 
atractiva, dado que las acciones colectivas que existen en la actualidad presentan 
numerosas deficiencias. Como se ha visto, en los ordenamientos en los que existen 
dichas acciones, rara vez se interponen, y su grado de éxito es muy limitado. Debido al 
modelo de participación voluntaria, en muchos casos el grupo de demandantes es 
demasiado reducido como para que compense el ejercicio de la acción y lleva aparejado 
un alto grado de complejidad administrativa y costes elevados. 
 
A mayor abundamiento, existen otras razones que explican porqué los consumidores no 
ejercen con mayor frecuencia acciones de indemnización por daños y perjuicios. Los 
consumidores no son necesariamente conscientes de que han sido víctimas de un cártel, 
puesto que éstos son generalmente acuerdos secretos y su detección es costosa incluso 
para las autoridades de competencia, que disponen de amplios poderes de investigación. 
Dado que los litigantes privados tienen un acceso limitado a las pruebas, y que la carga 
probatoria es elevada, la acreditación de la existencia de una conducta anticompetitiva 
es tarea difícil. Adicionalmente, el riesgo de desestimación de la demanda, unido a la 
obligación de abonar las costas de la otra parte constituyen un desincentivo al inicio de 
procedimientos por parte de aquellos demandantes cuyas demandas sean de pequeña 
cuantía. La regla de que “el perdedor paga” (i.e., la imposición de las costas a la parte 
cuyas pretensiones se desestimen) se aplica en todas las jurisdicciones, aun cuando 
algunos tribunales (e.g. el Competition Appeal Tribunal o Tribunal de Apelación en 
Materia de Competencia del Reino Unido) tienen un mayor grado de discrecionalidad 
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para decidir acerca de la imposición de las costas del procedimiento. También existen 
reglas más flexibles en materia de costas para determinados tipos de demandas. 
Asimismo, existen todavía limitaciones al uso del pacto de cuota litis, aun cuando un 
número creciente de Estados miembros parecen proclives a permitirlo en determinados 
supuestos.  
 
Lo anterior, unido a las limitadas posibilidades de ordenar la comunicación de 
documentos/información en poder de la otra parte o de terceros, hace que la única 
alternativa realista de interponer una acción de indemnización en materia de defensa de 
la competencia sea, a menudo, el ejercicio de una acción derivada o “de seguimiento”. 
Y, de nuevo, incluso en la mayor parte de estos casos los consumidores necesitarían una 
acción colectiva eficaz al objeto de reducir los costes y riesgos inherentes al litigio y 
hacer posible que se generen economías de escala. 
 
En consecuencia, cabe asumir que la razón por la que no se ha hecho uso de las acciones 
colectivas es, al menos en parte, que en su forma actual estas acciones no son percibidas 
por los consumidores como un mecanismo eficiente de resarcimiento y que las 
asociaciones de consumidores no tienen incentivos para plantear acciones 
indemnizatorias por infracciones de las normas de competencia o simplemente carecen 
de la experiencia y recursos necesarios. Por último, como en la mayor parte de los 
ordenamientos únicamente las asociaciones de consumidores y usuarios y/o los grupos 
de consumidores afectados están legitimados para interponer acciones colectivas de 
indemnización por daños y perjuicios, los competidores y otras empresas, que podrían 
tener un mejor conocimiento de la existencia de ilícitos anticompetitivos, así como de 
las normas de defensa de la competencia, están excluidos del ejercicio de dichas 
acciones. Es, en consecuencia, necesaria una solución común a escala europea para 
dotar de efectividad al derecho reconocido por la Unión Europea a la indemnización por 
daños y perjuicios. 
 
C.1.3 La solución propuesta por el legislador europeo y sus principales deficiencias  
El legislador europeo trata de potenciar el ejercicio de acciones de indemnización por 
daños en materia de competencia de dos formas distintas: la Directiva sobre Acciones 
de Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia, que prevé la 
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armonización o aproximación de determinadas normas procesales por las que se rige el 
ejercicio de las acciones de indemnización por daños y una Recomendación sobre los 
Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo. Se considera que, aun cuando estos instrumentos 
pueden tener algún valor en la medida en que probablemente contribuirán a armonizar o 
aproximar ciertos aspectos que han generado obstáculos a la aplicación privada en el 
pasado y codificarán algunos principios de Derecho de la UE por los que se rigen las 
acciones de indemnización por daños en materia de defensa de la competencia, muchas 
de las medidas a introducir son meros mínimos de armonización o simples 
recomendaciones. En consecuencia, continuarán existiendo divergencias entre los 
Estados miembros en diversas áreas, y es discutible que estos instrumentos vayan a 
mejorar el acceso a la justicia, especialmente para los consumidores perjudicados por 
una conducta anticompetitiva.  
 
Por lo que se refiere a la Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en 
materia de Defensa de la Competencia, sus principales contribuciones consisten en que 
establece un nivel mínimo de exhibición de pruebas una vez que el demandante haya 
presentado los hechos y medios de prueba que estén razonablemente a su alcance y 
acrediten el carácter plausible de su demanda de indemnización por daños, y unos 
plazos mínimos de prescripción para el ejercicio de acciones de indemnización por 
daños y perjuicios derivados de infracciones de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia, tanto de forma independiente (stand-alone actions) como derivada 
(follow-on actions). Adicionalmente, contiene disposiciones en relación con el efecto 
probatorio de las decisiones o resoluciones de las autoridades nacionales de 
competencia (en lo sucesivo, las “ANC”) que declaran la existencia de una infracción, 
la responsabilidad solidaria de los infractores (incluido el derecho a exigir una 
contribución), la denominada passing-on defense y la cuantificación del daño, así como 
disposiciones dirigidas a fomentar la resolución consensual de litigios.  
 
La introducción de una obligación mínima de exhibición de medios de prueba 
constituye un desarrollo legislativo sumamente positivo, teniendo en cuenta la asimetría 
en materia de información que generalmente existe entre los infractores de las normas 
de defensa de la competencia y los perjudicados. Cabe afirmar que el limitado acceso a 
los medios de prueba es uno de los principales obstáculos al ejercicio de acciones de 
indemnización por daños en este ámbito y la posibilidad de requerir la exhibición de 
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dichos medios de prueba debería contribuir a facilitar la interposición de demandas de 
daños y perjuicios, siempre que también se aborden de forma adecuada otros obstáculos 
relevantes (i.e., la necesidad de reducir los costes y facilitar las demandas por parte de 
los consumidores mediante mecanismos de recurso colectivo).  
 
Sin embargo, la Directiva deja otras cuestiones que han ser objeto de tratamiento. Así, 
una dificultad relevante reside en el hecho de que determinados tipos de documentos, en 
concreto las declaraciones efectuadas en el marco del programa de clemencia y las 
solicitudes de transacción, están íntegramente excluidas de la exhibición de medios de 
prueba, sin que exista obligación alguna de llevar a cabo previamente un test de 
proporcionalidad acerca de si éstas, o al menos una parte de la información contenida en 
ellas, deben revelarse al demandante al objeto de posibilitar el ejercicio de una acción 
de indemnización por daños, especialmente cuando tal ejercicio resulte imposible sin el 
acceso a parte de esta información. Frente a lo anterior, en línea con lo declarado en la 
sentencia Pfleiderer, se sugiere en esta tesis que los tribunales nacionales deberían tener 
capacidad real para valorar las consecuencias de conceder o denegar la solicitud de 
exhibición de medios de prueba, tanto para la aplicación pública como privada. La 
actual Directiva pone el énfasis en proteger – más de lo necesario – la aplicación 
pública, en detrimento de la aplicación privada. Sería preciso un enfoque más 
equilibrado al objeto de garantizar que la aplicación privada pueda servir de importante 
complemento a la aplicación pública, en lugar de jugar meramente un papel residual.  
 
Conforme a la Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en materia de 
Defensa de la Competencia, las decisiones o resoluciones firmes de una ANC 
declarando la existencia de una infracción tendrán efectos probatorios en lo que se 
refiere a la constatación de la infracción, en ulteriores acciones de indemnización por 
daños, pero únicamente si éstas se ejercen en el mismo Estado miembro. En caso de que 
la demanda de daños se interponga ante los tribunales de otro Estado miembro, es 
posible que haya de volver a enjuiciarse la existencia de una infracción de la normativa 
de defensa de la competencia, lo que supondrá una pérdida de tiempo y recursos e 
incrementará el coste de la acción. En último término, ello dependerá no obstante de las 
normas del Estado miembro en cuestión, en la medida en que éste puede conceder dicho 
efecto vinculante con arreglo a su legislación doméstica.  
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Al objeto de facilitar la interposición por los consumidores o las asociaciones de 
consumidores de demandas derivadas o “de seguimiento”, se considera que debería 
otorgarse igualmente a las decisiones firmes de las ANCs y de los tribunales de 
competencia una presunción de efectos vinculantes en procedimientos civiles ante los 
tribunales de otros Estados miembros. A cambio, podría permitirse al demandado 
refutar esa presunción si la misma vulnera los requisitos de un proceso equitativo o si el 
alcance geográfico de la infracción hace que no resulte pertinente o relevante respecto 
de la demanda indemnizatoria, en relación con el mercado en el Estado miembro en el 
que se interpone. Adicionalmente, la presunción de efectos vinculantes podría rebatirse 
si existieron errores de hecho manifiestos en la investigación. 
 
Por su parte, el establecimiento de algunas normas comunes en relación con los plazos 
de prescripción contribuirá a incrementar la seguridad jurídica. Igualmente, debería 
favorecer la interposición de demandas de indemnización por daños y perjuicios, 
especialmente en aquellos Estados miembros en los que los plazos de prescripción son 
en la actualidad muy breves. El requisito de que la víctima ha de tener conocimiento de 
la infracción y del daño que ésta le ha irrogado antes de iniciarse el cómputo del plazo 
de prescripción es crucial ya que, en otro caso, el plazo de prescripción podría haber 
expirado incluso antes de que la víctima haya tenido conocimiento de la infracción. Sin 
embargo, deberían proporcionarse directrices comunes sobre los criterios que habrían de 
valorarse al objeto de determinar si el demandante tenía tal conocimiento. De lo 
contrario se generará incertidumbre acerca del momento de inicio del cómputo del plazo 
de prescripción. Por otra parte, al establecer únicamente plazos de prescripción 
mínimos, la Directiva respeta el principio de autonomía procesal. Para las situaciones 
no específicamente reguladas por la Directiva, los plazos de prescripción habrán de 
respetar los límites establecidos por los principios de equivalencia y eficacia. 
 
La Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la 
Competencia establece que las empresas responden “conjunta y solidariamente” del 
daño causado por su comportamiento común. Sin embargo, una empresa a la que se ha 
concedido inmunidad en virtud de un programa de clemencia, sólo responderá frente a 
perjudicados distintos de sus compradores directos o indirectos, o de sus proveedores si 
aquéllos no han podido obtener la reparación íntegra de otros infractores. Las 
disposiciones en materia de responsabilidad tratan de restringir la responsabilidad de 
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una empresa a la que se ha concedido inmunidad, pero únicamente pueden hacerlo con 
un alcance limitado, en la medida en que debe respetarse siempre el derecho de las 
víctimas a obtener un resarcimiento pleno y, por otra parte, dado que las 
indemnizaciones por daños concedidas son únicamente indemnizaciones individuales, la 
posibilidad de restringir la responsabilidad por daños es limitada. 
 
Estas disposiciones hacen también posible para los perjudicados interponer acciones 
contra el demandado que esté en mejores condiciones de poder satisfacer la 
indemnización. Desde la perspectiva de los demandantes, lo anterior simplifica el 
proceso de reclamación, en la medida en que les permite obtener de un único 
demandado la indemnización correspondiente a la totalidad del daño sufrido. Los 
demandantes no necesariamente habrán de ser clientes directos del demandado, sino que 
en coherencia con lo declarado en la sentencia ÖBB-Infrastruktur, en la medida en que 
puedan demostrar que el demandado debió haber tomado en consideración que la 
conducta anticompetitiva podía dar lugar a la pérdida sufrida por los perjudicados, éste 
podrá ser declarado responsable civil del daño. Para el demandado, lo anterior puede 
generar incertidumbre acerca de si podrá obtener la contribución de los demás 
coinfractores, ya que algunos de ellos podrían haber dejado de existir y los costes de 
individualizar la responsabilidad correspondiente a cada coinfractor por el daño causado 
a los perjudicados podrían ser sustanciales. 
La Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la 
Competencia permite la passing-on defense, pero pesa sobre el infractor la carga de 
probar que se ha trasladado el sobrecoste. La carga de la prueba en relación con la 
traslación (passing-on) es distinta en los casos en que existen compradores indirectos 
que reclaman una indemnización por los daños resultantes de un sobrecoste que se ha 
trasladado en todo o en parte al demandante. Los compradores indirectos han de 
demostrar, la existencia de dicha traslación, aunque se permitirán requerimientos 
razonables de comunicación o exhibición al demandado y a terceros. Permitir la 
passing-on defense podría constituir un obstáculo al ejercicio de acciones de daños, ya 
que los compradores indirectos y especialmente los consumidores que se encuentran al 
final de la cadena de distribución tendrán grandes dificultades para probar el importe 
exacto que se les ha trasladado, especialmente en situaciones en las que hayan existido 
varios intermediarios. Al objeto de mitigar los efectos de la passing-on defense, los 
consumidores deberían tener la posibilidad de unir fuerzas mediante el ejercicio de una 
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acción colectiva o “de representación”, a fin de poder repartir los costes del 
procedimiento judicial.  
 
Por lo que se refiere a la cuantificación del daño, la Directiva contiene una presunción 
iuris tantum de que los cárteles ocasionan daños. La Comisión ha adoptado también 
directrices sobre cuantificación del daño en las demandas de indemnización por daños 
en materia de defensa de la competencia. A pesar de que dichas directrices no son 
vinculantes, el hecho de que se haya mejorado la evaluación del daño concediendo un 
mayor protagonismo a los jueces nacionales y haciendo posible la participación de las 
autoridades de competencia en la valoración del daño no deja de ser un desarrollo 
positivo. Esto podría al menos facilitar en alguna medida la indemnización, 
especialmente a los compradores indirectos, que son los que generalmente tienen 
mayores dificultades para probar el importe exacto del daño que se les ha trasladado.  
 
Pese a lo anterior, siguen existiendo problemas. A título ejemplificativo, no se han 
establecido reglas comunes en materia de causalidad, carácter mediato o remoto del 
daño, o cuantificación de las pérdidas, por lo que continuarán prevaleciendo las 
divergencias a escala nacional. Asimismo, la carga de la prueba y el estándar probatorio 
necesario en relación con la cuantificación del daño vendrán en buena medida 
determinados por la legislación nacional, que deberá respetar los principios de 
equivalencia y eficacia. Los tribunales nacionales podrán decidir discrecionalmente en 
qué medida se ajustan a las directrices – no vinculantes – de la Comisión sobre 
cuantificación del daño, por lo que, una vez más, los métodos empleados pueden variar 
significativamente entre Estados miembros. Cabe igualmente esperar que la prueba 
económica prolongue y encarezca los litigios. 
 
El interés de la Directiva por fomentar la resolución consensuada de litigios podría 
eventualmente proporcionar a los consumidores, y quizás también a las pequeñas y 
medianas empresas, al menos una posibilidad de obtener algún tipo de indemnización, 
ya que sin mecanismos eficaces de recurso colectivo, el actual ejercicio por éstos de su 
derecho de indemnización es limitado en la mayoría de los Estados miembros. Sin 
embargo, dada la ventajosa regulación prevista para los coinfractores que transen (e.g. 
suspensión de los procedimientos de indemnización por daños, responsabilidad limitada 
para dichos coinfractores y obligación de contribución limitada), podría existir el riesgo 
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de que, en la práctica, la Directiva tuviese por efecto un incremento del uso de los 
mecanismos de resolución alternativa de litigios, en perjuicio de las demandas de daños. 
Ello podría resultar problemático teniendo en cuenta que los perjudicados suelen ser la 
parte más débil y que no existirá igualdad de armas, ya que los infractores son quienes 
generalmente tienen acceso a la mayor parte de la prueba relevante necesaria para 
acreditar la infracción y el alcance del daño.  
 
Por otra parte, la Directiva no incorpora el tratamiento de determinadas cuestiones. A 
modo de ejemplo, no regula un mecanismo de recurso colectivo, ni contiene reglas 
relativas al requisito de culpabilidad de la conducta o al coste de las acciones 
indemnizatorias por daños en el ámbito de defensa de la competencia. Dado que el coste 
de estas acciones es a menudo un obstáculo relevante al planteamiento de una demanda, 
especialmente para los consumidores cuyas demandas individuales sean de pequeña 
cuantía, serían necesarias ciertas normas o, al menos, recomendaciones, relativas a las 
reglas en materia de costes. Igualmente, debería valorarse una potencial modificación 
del principio de que “el perdedor paga” en línea con lo dispuesto en la Directiva 
2004/48/CE relativa al respeto de los derechos de propiedad intelectual. 
 
Junto a lo anterior, debería reconsiderarse la prohibición de los denominados “daños 
punitivos” o “múltiples a escala europea, por cuanto resulta contraria al vigente Derecho 
de la Unión Europea. Por el contrario, debería examinarse su utilidad para ciertos tipos 
de infracciones, en concreto los cárteles, en la medida en que podría reforzar los efectos 
disuasorios respecto de los comportamientos anticompetitivos más nocivos.  
 
Pero la principal omisión de la Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por Daños 
en materia de Defensa de la Competencia es la total ausencia de algún tipo de 
mecanismo de recurso colectivo. En lugar de ello, la Comisión se ha limitado a 
introducir recomendaciones no vinculantes en relación con estos mecanismos. La 
Recomendación de la Comisión sobre los Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo pretende 
establecer algunos principios comunes a los recursos colectivos de cesación e 
indemnización, en lo que se refiere a la legitimación para el ejercicio de acciones “de 
representación”, la admisibilidad de este tipo de acciones, la información acerca de las 
acciones colectivas, el reembolso de las costas de la parte cuyas pretensiones se 
estimen, la financiación y los casos transfronterizos. Por lo que respecta 
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específicamente al recurso colectivo de indemnización, la Comisión ha emitido 
recomendaciones en relación con la constitución del grupo, basadas en el principio de 
“participación voluntaria”, las modalidades alternativas de solución de litigios de 
carácter colectivo y transacciones, los honorarios legales, la prohibición de 
indemnizaciones o daños “punitivos”, la financiación y las acciones colectivas “de 
seguimiento" o derivadas. Todos ellos son aspectos importantes que deben ser tomados 
en consideración para diseñar una óptima acción colectiva de indemnización, pero cabe 
pensar que el instrumento jurídico elegido no será susceptible de producir una mejora 
sustancial en esta materia a medio plazo. Una directiva sería un instrumento jurídico 
más eficiente, en la medida en que impone a los Estados miembros obligaciones 
vinculantes, al tiempo que permite el respeto de las distintas tradiciones jurídicas y deja 
a los Estados miembros cierto margen de elección respecto de la forma de las medidas a 
poner en práctica. 
 
Ciertamente, la Recomendación de la Comisión incluye aspectos que merecería la pena 
explorar, al objeto de proponer una disposición legal europea de carácter vinculante y 
general. A título de ejemplo, el enfoque horizontal y la posibilidad solicitar, tanto una 
orden de cesación, como una indemnización colectivas son aspectos positivos, en la 
medida en que a menudo los consumidores también se enfrentan a dificultades a la hora 
de interponer demandas en otros campos del derecho distintos del derecho de defensa de 
la competencia, como los de las demandas medioambientales o en materia de consumo. 
Sería necesario un instrumento vinculante que permitiese una mejora real del acceso a la 
justicia por parte de los consumidores. 
 
Por otra parte, las recomendaciones no son suficientemente amplias, ya que los 
principios comunes establecidos en ellas están en general basados en impulsar un tipo 
modesto de acciones colectivas y medios de financiación conservadores. Uno de los 
principales problemas de los actuales mecanismos de recurso colectivo a escala nacional 
reside en que éstos se basan habitualmente en el principio de “participación voluntaria”, 
y el coste de las acciones constituye una barrera sustancial a la interposición de 
demandas de indemnización por daños derivados de infracciones de las normas de 
competencia. Los casos Camisetas de Fútbol (Football Shirts) y el Cártel de los 
Móbiles, en el Reino Unido y Francia, ilustran la limitada efectividad del modelo de 
participación voluntaria. En el primero de ellos sólo obtuvieron indemnización una 
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pequeña parte de los perjudicados y el segundo fue desestimado. Cabe afirmar que el 
único modo eficaz de asegurar la “tutela judicial efectiva” de los consumidores 
conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 47.1 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales 
de la Unión Europea sería dejar a los tribunales la decisión acerca de si una acción de 
resarcimiento colectiva debe interponerse sobre la base del modelo de “participación 
voluntaria” (opt-in) o “exclusión voluntaria” (opt-out), al menos en los casos en que se 
planteen múltiples acciones de indemnización por daños y perjuicios de pequeña 
cuantía. 
 
La Recomendación de la Comisión es igualmente demasiado restrictiva en lo que se 
refiere al pacto de cuota litis y a los mecanismos alternativos de financiación de 
acciones colectivas. Dado que la financiación pública está disminuyendo, se hace 
necesario asegurar financiación suficiente para las acciones colectivas introduciendo en 
la Unión Europea el pacto de cuota litis (o buscando otras alternativas de financiación). 
Si el pacto de cuota litis se sujeta a revisión judicial o se regula por alguna otra vía 
eficaz se podrán reducir sus potenciales efectos negativos. Por otra parte, limitando las 
obligaciones de los miembros del grupo en materia de pago de las costas al 
representante del grupo y a aquellos miembros que hayan tenido de facto la oportunidad 
de ejercer su derecho de exclusión, la acción colectiva de “exclusión voluntaria” no 
debería en general plantear problemas de constitucionalidad. 
 
Por último, el aspecto relativo a la distribución de las indemnizaciones por daños es 
también importante, sobre todo en los casos en que existen demandantes que operan en 
distintos niveles de la cadena de distribución y, en particular, en acciones colectivas. 
Sería por ello necesario decidir sobre cómo deberían distribuirse aquellas 
indemnizaciones que no puedan ser distribuidas entre las víctimas. Se considera que 
deberían contemplarse normas sobre distribución “cy pres” (i.e., se trata de aquélla en 
que las indemnizaciones por daños no se distribuyen directamente a los perjudicados 
por una infracción de las normas de competencia para resarcirles del daño sufrido, sino 
que se emplean para alcanzar un resultado que sea lo más próximo posible a la 
reparación del daño). 
 
Entre los aspectos que no han sido objeto de tratamiento satisfactorio están también la 
coordinación de las acciones públicas y privadas en situaciones transfronterizas y las 
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normas sobre competencia (i.e. jurisdicción). En aquellos ámbitos del derecho en los 
que una autoridad pública puede adoptar una decisión declarando la existencia de una 
infracción del Derecho de la Unión Europea, dicha autoridad nacional debería poder 
actuar como amicus curiae en la acción colectiva de resarcimiento, a fin de que no se 
prolonguen de forma automática los procedimientos de resarcimiento colectivo o se 
impida el ejercicio de acciones independientes. Ello está justificado especialmente en 
aquellos casos en los que la decisión declarando la existencia de una infracción 
adoptada por una ANC no evalúa si la infracción ha producido efectivamente daños, ya 
que el valor del expediente administrativo puede ser limitado a efectos de probar éstos. 
Igualmente, sería necesario garantizar una aplicación coherente y uniforme de la 
normativa de defensa de la competencia de la UE cuando se inicie un procedimiento 
ante la ANC de algún Estado miembro y simultáneamente se interponga una demanda 
de indemnización por daños y perjuicios ante un tribunal de otro Estado miembro. En 
tales supuestos algunos han argumentado que podría modificarse la regla de 
litispendencia contemplada en el Reglamento 44/2001, para permitir al tribunal ante el 
que se haya ejercido una acción de resarcimiento colectivo declararse incompetente para 
conocer del asunto si existe un foro más apropiado en el que éste pudiese tramitarse de 
una forma más eficaz. Sin embargo, sería difícil lograr tal modificación en la práctica. 
 
Del análisis conjunto de las potenciales repercusiones de la Directiva sobre Acciones de 
Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia y de la 
Recomendación de la Comisión sobre Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo, se extrae la 
conclusión de que probablemente su impacto positivo sobre la aplicación privada será 
bastante modesto y en términos generales fracasarán en el objetivo de mejorar el acceso 
a la justicia, especialmente por parte de los consumidores. Es por ello que serían 
precisas medidas legislativas más eficaces para garantizar la aplicación efectiva y 
uniforme del derecho reconocido por la Unión a la indemnización de daños por 
infracciones de las normas de defensa de la competencia. Dado que la aplicación 
privada del derecho de defensa de la competencia juega un papel notablemente más 
relevante en los Estados Unidos y se están incrementando en Canadá, la experiencia de 
ambos países en esta materia podría servir de valiosa inspiración acerca de cómo 
potenciar las acciones de indemnización por daños en la Unión Europea, tomando por 
supuesto en consideración las particularidades de los ordenamientos europeos y sus 
tradiciones jurídicas. 
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 C.1.4. Lecciones a aprender de las experiencias norteamericana y canadiense en 
materia de aplicación privada  
En los Estados Unidos, las acciones de indemnización por daños representan en torno al 
90% de la aplicación privada del derecho de defensa de la competencia. Ello puede 
tener su explicación en la legislación procesal civil norteamericana, que contempla 
incentivos adicionales a la interposición de demandas en materia de defensa de la 
competencia, tales como la concesión de indemnizaciones por el triple del importe del 
perjuicio (los denominados treble damages) o las reglas sobre “desplazamiento de 
honorarios” en beneficio del demandante. A su vez, los abogados desempeñan un papel 
importante, dado que prácticamente todas las acciones colectivas se interponen sobre la 
base de pactos de cuota litis. Estas características probablemente facilitan el ejercicio de 
acciones incluso en casos fundados pero complejos. Sin embargo, al objeto de evitar 
posibles abusos y de asegurar un resultado equitativo para los miembros del grupo, es 
necesario verificar que los intereses de los abogados están estrechamente alineados con 
los de los miembros del grupo. 
 
En la tarea de reducir los riesgos inherentes a las acciones colectivas, puede aprenderse 
mucho de las acciones colectivas (class actions) norteamericanas y canadienses. La 
acción colectiva del derecho norteamericano se basa en el principio de “exclusión 
voluntaria” (opt-out), que permite también interponer demandas en nombre de 
miembros del grupo no identificados. La ventaja de lo anterior residen en que el grupo 
será generalmente lo suficientemente amplio como para que merezca la pena ejercer la 
acción, incluso en el supuesto de que los daños individuales de los miembros del 
colectivo harían que no resultase económicamente viable su ejercicio individual. El 
principal inconveniente del modelo de exclusión voluntaria es que los perjudicados 
quedarán vinculados por la sentencia o acuerdo transaccional que se dicte o alcance 
como resultado del ejercicio de la acción si no se han excluido del grupo en tiempo y 
forma. Otro inconveniente, éste desde la perspectiva del demandado, es que las 
exclusiones hacen que la transacción tenga menos sentido. No obstante, la ventaja es 
que el demandante conocerá el número exacto de demandas potenciales que resten por 
interponer.  
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De forma similar, en Canadá la introducción de las acciones colectivas ha incrementado 
el ejercicio de las acciones de indemnización por daños en materia de defensa de la 
competencia. Ontario y algunas otras jurisdicciones contemplan acciones colectivas de 
exclusión voluntaria, mientras que otros territorios, como la Columbia Británica, han 
optado por una combinación de los regímenes de “participación voluntaria” y 
“exclusión voluntaria”: el principio de exclusión voluntaria se aplica a los residentes, 
mientras que los no residentes están sujetos al principio de participación voluntaria. Por 
otra parte, se admiten pactos de cuota litis generosos, al objeto de garantizar el acceso a 
la justicia. Tanto en Estados Unidos como en Canadá los acuerdos transaccionales han 
de ser aprobados por un tribunal y deben ser equitativos, razonables y concluirse en 
interés y beneficio del grupo. 
 
Sin embargo, en la Unión Europea, las acciones colectivas de exclusión voluntaria y, 
especialmente, la class action del derecho norteamericano han sido tradicionalmente 
vistas con excepticismo. Cabe argumentar que esta resistencia a las “acciones de clase” 
en Europa se deba al menos parcialmente al desconocimiento de las acciones del tipo 
del modelo norteamericano. Otras características del proceso civil norteamericano, tales 
como los juicios con jurado y las indemnizaciones por el triple del importe del daño (los 
treble damages citados anteriormente) que son posibles, aunque no necesarias, en 
acciones colectivas son sin embargo percibidas a menudo como parte inherente de éstas. 
A modo de ejemplo, los treble damages se conceden también de forma automática en 
caso de estimación de una acción individual de indemnización por daños en materia de 
defensa de la competencia, por lo que no constituyen una característica especial de la 
acción colectiva. Por otra parte, los abusos del mecanismo de las acciones colectivas se 
producen fundamentalmente en otros ámbitos del derecho; la complejidad e 
incertidumbre acerca del resultado de las acciones colectivas en materia de defensa de la 
competencia tiende a limitar los abusos. De hecho, el American Antitrust Institute 
(Instituto Americano para la Defensa de la Competencia) ha señalado incluso que no 
existen pruebas de acuerdos transaccionales poco fundados. Bien al contrario, en 
ocasiones los demandantes transan casos fundados por cuantías pequeñas. 
Adicionalmente, la Ley norteamericana de Equidad en el ejercicio de Acciones 
Colectivas (Class Action Fairness Act de 2005) ha limitado aún más el riesgo de abusos, 
estableciendo por ejemplo que los honorarios de los letrados deben estar alineados con 
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los importes indemnizatorios concedidos a los miembros del grupo en casos de 
transacción de acciones colectivas (coupon settlement). 
 
Del mismo modo, dado que determinadas provincias canadienses han optado por el 
modelo de exclusión voluntaria, sin que se tenga conocimiento de que ello haya llevado 
a abusos de los procedimientos de acción colectiva, y el número de éstas ha sido 
razonable gracias al control de los tribunales, no existen razones para excluir por 
completo este modelo de acciones colectivas en la Unión Europea. Por el contrario, 
existe una necesidad de acciones de exclusión voluntaria en aquellos casos en los que la 
cuantía de las demandas individuales haría que fuesen demasiado pequeñas como para 
interponerlas. En tales situaciones, el derecho constitucional al acceso a la justicia 
quedaría mejor garantizado en este modelo. A pesar de que el modelo de participación 
voluntaria permite asegurar en mayor medida que un particular no participará en un 
litigio en contra su voluntad, la posibilidad de que todos los particulares hagan valer sus 
derechos en ese escenario es, en la práctica, limitada y no necesariamente cumplirá con 
el artículo 47 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea. 
 
A la luz de las experiencias norteamericana y canadiense cabe concluir que las acciones 
colectivas son una herramienta valiosa a efectos de la aplicación privada del derecho de 
defensa de la competencia. En consecuencia, la Unión Europea debería considerar la 
posibilidad de introducir un instrumento similar a las class actions que podría, no 
obstante, adaptarse a las especificidades de los ordenamientos jurídicos europeos. 
Probablemente, ello reforzaría fundamentalmente el ejercicio de acciones derivadas, 
pero también podría ser útil en acciones independientes relativas a abusos de posición 
de dominio y restricciones verticales.  
 
C.2. El camino a seguir 
Los recientes instrumentos legislativos adoptados por la Unión Europea con el fin de 
potenciar la aplicación privada son un paso en la buena dirección, aun cuando resultan 
insuficientes para facilitar el acceso a la justicia, en especial a los consumidores. No 
obstante lo anterior, los citados instrumentos podrían servir como base para una futura 
directiva en materia de acciones colectivas en supuestos de daños en masa, así como, 
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modificando y mejorando las disposiciones actuales, para facilitar la interposición de 
demandas de daños por infracción de las normas de defensa de la competencia. 
 
Se considera que entre las principales modificaciones que requiere la Directiva sobre 
Acciones de Indemnización por Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia, están 
las relativas a asegurar un mayor equilibrio entre la aplicación pública y privada en 
relación con el acceso a la prueba, así como a coordinar de forma más eficiente de los 
procedimientos administrativos incoados en un Estado miembro con las demandas de 
indemnización por daños interpuestas en otro Estado miembro. También deberían 
especificarse con mayor precisión los plazos de prescripción para la interposición 
demandas de indemnización por daños derivados de infracciones las normas de defensa 
de la competencia. Y lo que es más importante: debería introducirse una acción 
colectiva vinculante a escala UE para casos de dimensión transfronteriza y los tribunales 
deberían estar facultados para decidir caso por caso si ésta debe ejercerse sobre la base 
del principio de “participación voluntaria” o del de “exclusión voluntaria”. El aspecto 
relativo a la distribución de las indemnizaciones por daños, así como los tipos de 
indemnización disponibles también requerirían un mayor desarrollo. Junto a lo anterior, 
habrían de revisarse las reglas relativas a las costas, así como las aplicables en materia 
de financiación de las acciones de indemnización por daños derivados de infracciones 
de las normas de defensa de la competencia, tanto en acciones individuales como 
colectivas. 
 
En lo que se refiere al acceso a los medios de prueba, ninguna categoría de documentos 
debería estar excluida per se de la obligación de exhibición o comunicación, pero la 
Directiva tendría que permitir a los jueces nacionales llevar a cabo un test de 
proporcionalidad en relación con la solicitud de exhibición de documentos y valorar las 
implicaciones de su comunicación, tanto para la aplicación pública como privada, en 
línea con lo declarado en la sentencia Pfleiderer. Probablemente, en la mayoría de los 
casos seguiría concediéndose protección a las declaraciones y solicitudes de clemencia 
– y por tanto esta disposición no reduciría indebidamente la efectividad de la aplicación 
pública –, pero excepcionalmente se concedería acceso a dichas declaraciones o a parte 
de la información contenida en ellas a aquellos demandantes que de otro modo no 
podrían ejercer acciones fundadas de indemnización por daños en materia de defensa de 
la competencia.  
42 
 
 En cuanto a la coordinación de los procedimientos públicos y privados tramitados en 
distintos Estados miembros, se propone que la decisión firme declarativa de la 
existencia de una infracción que adopte una ANC constituya cuando menos una 
presunción iuris tantum de la existencia de una infracción de las normas de defensa de 
la competencia en el procedimiento civil que se tramite ante los tribunales de otro 
Estado miembro. El demandado podría refutar esta presunción acreditando, por 
ejemplo, que se infringe el derecho a un proceso equitativo o la existencia de un error de 
hecho manifiesto en la investigación. Igualmente, para evitar decisiones contradictorias 
debería permitirse a las ANCs, a discrecionalidad del juez nacional, actuar como amicus 
curiae ante los tribunales de otros Estados miembros, por ejemplo formulando 
alegaciones.  
  
También han de precisarse en mayor detalle los plazos de prescripción para la 
interposición de demandas de daños por infracción de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia. Dado que en algunos Estados miembros ha existido cierta incertidumbre 
respecto del momento en el que debe entenderse que el demandante tuvo conocimiento 
de la infracción y del daño causado por ésta, deberían proporcionarse algunas directrices 
acerca de los criterios que han de valorar los tribunales al objeto de determinar éste. 
 
En relación con las acciones colectivas, sería apropiada la introducción tanto de 
acciones “de representación” como colectivas. Es crucial que puedan interponerse 
también acciones por los particulares, al objeto de garantizar en mayor medida que las 
víctimas dispondrán también de un mecanismo de recurso cuando los órganos de 
representación, por razones de prioridad o de otro tipo, decidan no ejercer acciones. Sin 
embargo, debería existir la posibilidad de un modelo de “exclusión voluntaria” al menos 
para demandas de pequeña cuantía, a fin de asegurar el acceso a la justicia y una tutela 
judicial efectiva conforme al artículo 47 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de 
la Unión Europea. Los tribunales deberían poder decidir caso por caso en la fase de 
certificación si la acción colectiva debe ejercitarse sobre la base del principio de 
“participación voluntaria” o de “exclusión voluntaria”. Cabe sostener que en 
determinados supuestos podría estar justificado certificar varios sub-grupos atendiendo 
a motivos diferentes, por ejemplo aplicando el requisito de “participación voluntaria” a 
los miembros del grupo no residentes y el de “exclusión voluntaria” a los residentes. 
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Ello debería generalmente permitir asegurar un tamaño suficiente del grupo como para 
que tenga sentido el ejercicio de la acción, al tiempo que evitaría que los miembros del 
grupo no residentes se viesen vinculados por una sentencia en contra de su voluntad. 
Igualmente, deberían proporcionarse directrices acerca de los criterios a tomar en 
consideración para valorar si los intereses de los miembros del grupo están 
adecuadamente protegidos. En particular, en acciones colectivas transfronterizas el 
tribunal responsable de la tramitación del asunto debería garantizar el cumplimiento de 
los requisitos de equidad procesal (tales como la notificación en términos razonables), 
así como valorar si es el foro más apropiado para tramitar la acción. En caso de que 
exista otro tribunal que podría tramitar el asunto de forma más eficaz, debería permitirse 
al tribunal encargado de la acción colectiva de resarcimiento que se declare 
incompetente. 
 
Y lo que es más importante, la acción colectiva europea para casos de dimensión 
transfronteriza debería introducirse a través de una directiva, al objeto de mejorar el 
acceso a la justicia. La directiva debería regular igualmente la distribución de las 
indemnizaciones por daños así como el reparto de los costes entre los miembros del 
grupo. A pesar de que el principal objetivo habría de ser el pleno resarcimiento del 
daño, los daños no reclamados podrían repartirse conforme al criterio denominado “cy 
pres” (vid. supra), o asignarse a un fondo para la financiación de futuras acciones 
colectivas de indemnización. Deberán además establecerse suficientes cautelas, como 
limitar la obligación de reembolso de las costas a los representantes del grupo, al objeto 
de evitar que los miembros del grupo que verdaderamente no hayan podido excluirse en 
plazo tengan que abonar las costas.  
 
En casos fundados pero de resultado incierto por su gran complejidad serían no obstante 
necesarios mayores incentivos para la interposición de acciones de indemnización por 
daños y perjuicios. Dado que los órganos de representación pueden preferir emplear sus 
(limitados) recursos financieros en aquellos asuntos que estiman que pueden prosperar, 
puede existir una cierta necesidad de abogados especializados en la interposición de 
demandas complejas de indemnización por daños en materia de defensa de la 
competencia. Sería preciso desarrollar incentivos, como el pacto de cuota litis, al objeto 
de promover esa especialización, si bien este tipo de pactos habrían de estar sujetos a 
aprobación judicial a fin de evitar abusos. Dado que los honorarios de los letrados 
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dependerían del éxito de la demanda, se verían fuertemente inclinados a aceptar 
únicamente aquellos casos que sea probable que prosperen. Por este motivo, deberían 
ser posibles también otras formas de financiación alternativa, como la financiación por 
instituciones financieras independientes, siempre que se eliminasen los potenciales 
conflictos de interés, y el importe de los daños debería estar sujeto a aprobación judicial 
a fin de asegurar un resultado equitativo para el grupo.  
 
Junto con lo anterior, los tribunales deberían estar facultados para modular la regla de la 
imposición de las costas a la parte cuyas pretensiones se desestimen, en línea con lo 
dispuesto en la Directiva 2004/48/CE, al objeto de propiciar el ejercicio de demandas de 
indemnización por daños. Podría también permitirse a los tribunales establecer límites a 
las costas y ajustar los costes de litigar limitándolos a lo que se estime razonable y 
proporcionado. Igualmente, debería eliminarse cualquier referencia a la prohibición de 
daños “punitivos”, dado que el Tribunal de Justicia ha declarado que no son contrarios 
al Derecho de la Unión Europea.  
 
A mayor abundamiento, la Comisión debería proporcionar algunas directrices sobre 
causalidad, carácter mediato o remoto, y previsibilidad, a fin de facilitar la valoración de 
los daños. Estos aspectos, así como la carga de la prueba y el estándar probatorio para la 
cuantificación del daño vienen determinados por las normas nacionales, lo que genera 
divergencias. En lo que se refiere a la cuantificación del daño, a pesar de que la 
adopción de directrices prácticas estaba justificada como un primer paso, teniendo en 
cuenta que el tipo y alcance del daño dependen de la concreta infracción de la normativa 
de defensa de la competencia y deben ser valorados caso por caso, a la luz de la 
experiencia de los Estados miembros debería considerarse si deben reclamarse ciertos 
estándares mínimos de naturaleza vinculante a escala UE.  
 
En cuanto a la elección del modelo de puesta en práctica del instrumento de la acción 
colectiva, el enfoque horizontal adoptado por la actual Recomendación de la Comisión 
requiere mayor consideración. Es necesaria una acción colectiva europea de 
indemnización por daños para situaciones de daños en masa en las que se hayan 
vulnerado derechos reconocidos por la legislación de la Unión Europea. Una directiva 
parece el instrumento jurídico más apropiado, en la medida en que permitiría respetar 
las tradiciones jurídicas y las diferencias culturales entre los Estados miembros y 
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resolver los problemas constitucionales de la forma más adecuada posible, al tiempo 
que proporcionaría un grado suficiente de uniformidad. Pero sea cual fuere la solución 
por la que finalmente se optase, debería poder aplicarse de forma efectiva en la práctica. 
 
Una acción colectiva europea podría adoptarse en virtud del artículo 81.2.f) TFUE, que 
permite la eliminación de obstáculos al buen funcionamiento de los procedimientos 
civiles, fomentando la compatibilidad de las normas de procedimiento civil aplicables 
en los Estados miembros cuando ello resulte necesario para asegurar el buen 
funcionamiento del mercado interior. Esta base legal estaría justificada en atención a la 
necesidad de asegurar el respeto efectivo a los derechos sustantivos reconocidos a las 
personas físicas y jurídicas por la legislación de la Unión y un mismo nivel de 
protección para dichos derechos en toda la Unión Europea. Ello evitaría a su vez 
ventajas competitivas para las empresas establecidas en Estados miembros en los que 
resulte difícil para los consumidores ejercer sus derechos. La introducción de una acción 
colectiva europea mejoraría igualmente el acceso a la justicia en situaciones 
transfronterizas, dado que en la actualidad las organizaciones de consumidores no están 
legitimadas en algunos Estados miembros para interponer acciones colectivas en 
nombre de consumidores que no sean nacionales. 
 
De forma alternativa, podría establecerse una acción colectiva sectorial específica para 
indemnizaciones por daños derivados de infracciones de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia, que posteriormente podría expandirse a otros ámbitos en los que se hayan 
producido daños masivos. Esta vía sería apropiada en caso de que resulte difícil 
conseguir respaldo suficiente para una acción colectiva horizontal europea vinculante, y 
si existen dudas acerca de la necesidad de dicha acción en otros ámbitos. En cuanto a las 
acciones de indemnización por daños en materia de defensa de la competencia, ya ha 
quedado demostrada la necesidad de un acceso colectivo eficaz, en la medida en que 
actualmente los consumidores rara vez obtienen una indemnización por el daño sufrido. 
La base legal de una directiva que introdujese una acción colectiva de indemnización 
por daños podría ser la misma que la de Directiva sobre Acciones de Indemnización por 
Daños en materia de Defensa de la Competencia, i.e. los artículos 103 y 114 TFEU. 
Es más: en los últimos años varios Estados miembros han introducido acciones 
colectivas, de modo que parece existir una voluntad política de potenciar el 
resarcimiento colectivo y mejorar el acceso a la justicia. Por tanto, sería cuestión de 
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negociar los detalles del diseño de la acción colectiva, para lo cual la actual 
Recomendación de la Comisión podría servir como punto de partida. El momento ideal 
para ello sería el año 2016, en que la Comisión evaluará la aplicación de su 
Recomendación sobre los Mecanismos de Recurso Colectivo. Al menos los aspectos 
expuestos anteriormente debería ser objeto de tratamiento a fin de hacer más eficaz el 
mecanismo de recurso colectivo. 
 
C.3. Consideraciones finales 
El análisis de la situación actual de la aplicación privada en la Unión Europea ilustra 
que, a pesar de que se ha producido un incremento de las acciones de indemnización por 
daños derivados de infracciones de las normas de defensa de la competencia en los 
últimos 5-10 años, dichas acciones fueron interpuestas fundamentalmente por empresas, 
y a menudo se fundaban en la existencia de una relación contractual. Por otra parte, se 
cree que numerosas acciones de indemnización por daños son objeto de transacción. La 
utilización de acciones de indemnización “como arma” es generalmente menos 
frecuente y, lo que resulta más preocupante, muy pocas demandas indemnizatorias son 
interpuestas por consumidores. De hecho, los consumidores parecen carecer de acceso a 
la justicia a través de mecanismos de recurso colectivo frente a infracciones de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia.  
 
En los Estados miembros siguen existiendo diversos obstáculos a la interposición de 
demandas de indemnización por daños en materia de defensa de la competencia y 
existen aún notables divergencias en las normas procesales y en materia de 
responsabilidad aplicables a dichas acciones. A título ejemplificativo, se aplican normas 
y estándares divergentes en cuanto al acceso a la prueba, a la forma de los mecanismos 
de recurso colectivo disponibles o la financiación de las acciones indemnizatorias. Las 
acciones de indemnización por daños derivados de infracciones de las normas de 
competencia parecen concentrarse fundamentalmente en siete Estados miembros, y en 
especial en Alemania, los Países Bajos y el Reino Unido, mientras que la aplicación 
privada en materia de demandas de indemnización es bastante laxa en otros Estados 
miembros. 
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Hasta fechas recientes, la aplicación privada en la Unión Europea se ha visto potenciada 
fundamentalmente por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia. El tribunal ha creado 
un derecho europeo a la indemnización de daños derivados de infracciones de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia y ha clarificado el alcance de la legitimación para 
la interposición de acciones de daños. Igualmente, ha establecido ciertos principios para 
reconciliar la aplicación pública y privada, en lo relativo al acceso a las declaraciones 
realizadas en el marco de una solicitud de clemencia. Sin embargo, los recientes 
instrumentos legislativos adoptados por la Unión Europea parecen tender a limitar los 
efectos de esta jurisprudencia, al conceder una clara preferencia a la aplicación pública. 
De hecho, suponen una armonización mucho más modesta de las normas procesales 
nacionales que regulan las acciones de indemnización por daños en materia de 
competencia de la se había previsto inicialmente durante el proceso legislativo. En 
particular, en lugar de introducir una acción colectiva a escala europea, la Comisión se 
ha limitado a recomendar a los Estados miembros que establezcan acciones colectivas y 
de representación. Cabe sostener que, previsiblemente, las disposiciones comunes 
previstas en relación con las acciones de indemnización por daños en materia de 
competencia, que son en su mayoría medidas mínimas de armonización, mejorarán o 
potenciarán fundamentalmente las posibilidades de las empresas de interponer 
demandas de daños en forma de acciones “de seguimiento” o derivadas fundadas en una 
previa decisión de la Comisión o en una decisión firme de la ANC de su Estado 
miembro. 
 
Los consumidores, por su parte, serán posiblemente los grandes perdedores de esta 
reforma. Continuarán haciendo frente a posibilidades limitadas de acreditar el daño 
sufrido, así como a los elevados costes y riesgos asociados a los litigios. Las limitadas 
posibilidades de obtener una indemnización socavan el objetivo de asegurar la plena 
reparación, crear un plano de igualdad para las acciones de indemnización y remover los 
obstáculos al buen funcionamiento del mercado interior. En la práctica, los 
consumidores de los Estados miembros que faciliten la interposición de acciones 
colectivas eficaces tendrán más fácil obtener una indemnización y, en consecuencia, las 
empresas establecidas en dichos Estados miembros se enfrentarán a un mayor riesgo en 
materia de responsabilidad civil derivada de infracciones del derecho de defensa de la 
competencia. 
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Ello no significa que la observancia del derecho de defensa de la competencia en la 
Unión Europea deba hacerse depender fundamentalmente de su aplicación privada, pero 
ésta sí debería ser un complemento útil y creíble a la aplicación pública. El objetivo 
primordial de la aplicación privada debería ser la reparación del daño derivado de las 
conductas anticompetitivas, pero es evidente que cualquier obligación de indemnización 
generará potencialmente efectos disuasorios para las empresas. Tanto la aplicación 
pública como privada son por tanto necesarias para asegurar el cumplimiento de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia, pero la nueva directiva no satisface las 
expectativas a este respecto. Es una oportunidad perdida de mejorar sustancialmente el 
acceso a la justicia por parte de los perjudicados de las prácticas anticompetitivas y no 
garantiza el derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva consagrado en el artículo 
47 de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea, especialmente para 
los consumidores. En consecuencia, la Unión Europea debería tratar de abordar este 
asunto llevando a cabo una revisión o transformación en profundidad de las normas 
reguladoras de las acciones de indemnización por daños en materia de defensa de la 
competencia, en línea con las propuestas que se formulan en esta tesis, en el año 2020 
cuando la Directiva será revisada. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust rules play an important role in the market economy by ensuring a certain level 
playing field for the market players and by contributing to consumer welfare, for 
instance, in the form of a wider selection and better quality of products and services at 
lower prices given that these rules promote effective competition and an efficient 
allocation of resources. In addition, in the European Union context, the antitrust rules 
are indispensable in order to accomplish a functioning internal market and the 
integration of European economies. 
 
As to the enforcement of the antitrust rules, a distinction can be made between public 
and private enforcement. Competition authorities are usually entrusted with the public 
enforcement of the antitrust rules and pursue anti-competitive conduct that is the most 
harmful to the economy as a whole. In general, breaches of the antitrust rules result in 
competition authorities (or courts upon the proposal of the competition authorities) 
imposing fines1 on the infringing companies. But in some countries, such as the United 
States,2 the United Kingdom3 and Ireland,4 criminal sanctions5 are also possible. 
* The Spanish title of this thesis was registered before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. The English 
title “Private Enforcement of EU Antitrust Rules in Light of the U.S. and Canadian Experience: The Case 
for Harmonization” reflects the change brought about by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
following which the European Union has replaced and succeeded the European Community, thereby 
making it necessary to replace any reference to the “EC” by “EU”. 
1 Apart from fines, the competition authorities may also impose structural remedies or other measures or 
constraints if they are available under national procedural law. See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private 
Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 6. 
2 In the United States, any contract or engagement in any combination or conspiracy declared illegal by 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act shall be deemed guilty of a felony and can be punished by imprisonment up 
to 10 years. Alternatively, a fine not exceeding $100,000,000 can be imposed on a corporation or a fine 
not exceeding $1,000,000 can be imposed on any other person. It is also possible to combine both 
punishments. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the punishments are the same for 
monopolization, or the attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States. 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
3 In the United Kingdom, a person who has committed a cartel offence, i.e. who is guilty of price-fixing, 
market-sharing, bid-rigging or limitation or prevention of production or supply in the United Kingdom, 
(see Enterprise Act 2002, section 188) can be imprisoned for a maximum of five years or be liable to a 
fine, or both, see Enterprise Act 2002, section 190. 
4 Pursuant to section 8(1)(b)(ii) of the Irish Competition Act 2002, an individual guilty of an offense 
under section 6 of the Competition Act, i.e. who has entered into, or implemented, an agreement, or has 
made or implemented a decision, or has engaged in a concerted practice prohibited by Article 81(1) EC 
[now Article 101(1) TFEU)] or by its Irish equivalent, section 4(1) of the Irish Competition Act 2002, can 
be convicted to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years. Alternatively, a fine not exceeding 
€4,000,000 or 10 per cent of the turnover of the individual in the financial year ending in the 12 months 
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Moreover, in certain jurisdictions, fines6 and disciplinary sanctions7 can be imposed on 
individuals. For example, in Spain, it is possible to impose a fine of up to 60,000 Euros 
on each of the legal representatives of the infringing undertaking or on the persons that 
comprise the management bodies that have participated in the anti-competitive 
agreement or decision.8 In the United Kingdom, a director of an undertakings which has 
breached competition law can be disqualified by a court if his conduct as a director 
makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company.9  
 
Private enforcement of antitrust rules, in turn, refers to the application of antitrust rules 
by courts when they declare anti-competitive agreements null and void, grant 
injunctions, and award damages on the basis of actions brought by the victims of 
antitrust violations. Private enforcement is also usually the only manner to compensate 
victims of antitrust violations, since public enforcers can only impose fines (and in 
certain cases criminal and/or disciplinary sanctions) on the infringers but cannot, in 
general, award damages to the victims.10 
 
The United States has opted for an enforcement model that is mainly (approximately 
90%)11 based on private enforcement of the antitrust rules, whereas the situation is the 
opposite in the EU where the enforcement is principally carried out by the public 
competition authorities, and private actions only account for a comparatively small part 
prior to the conviction, whichever of the amounts is the greater, can be imposed on the individual or he 
can be subject to both such fine and imprisonment (not exceeding 5 years). 
5 Criminal sanctions mainly refer to imprisonment. For the discussion on whether the fines imposed by 
the Commission are of criminal law nature, see WILS, W.P.J., The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust 
Law. Essays in Law & Economics, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002, at p. 226-230. 
6 This is the case, for instance, in the United States. See note 2, supra. 
7 Disciplinary sanctions refer to disqualification orders, for example, barring the persons concerned from 
holding a position as corporate director. See WILS, W.P.J., The Optimal Enforcement of EC Antitrust 
Law. Essays in Law & Economics, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002, at p. 222. 
8 Article 63(2) of Competition Act 15/2007.  
9 Enterprise Act 2002, section 204, which amended the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.  
10 However, sometimes public competition law enforcers may take into account the injury that victims of 
an antitrust violation have suffered and oblige the infringer to compensate them, for example, through an 
informal settlement. Moreover, for instance, in France, under Article L442-6 of the Commercial Code, the 
competition authority may claim damages on behalf of the victims. See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private 
Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 8, note 32. 
11 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4. 
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of the enforcement.12 However, the interest in enhancing private enforcement of the 
antitrust rules in the EU has been growing,13 and in April 2014 the first piece of 
harmonizing legislation14 was adopted by the European Parliament, although it still 
requires final approval from the Council of Ministers. As the United States is 
frontrunner in antitrust law and has a long experience of antitrust enforcement, Europe 
could learn valuable lessons from the United States. Nevertheless, judging on the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, it appears that the EU legislator has not fully 
seized this opportunity, as will be demonstrated in this thesis. 
 
Annually antitrust violations cause significant damage to the European economy. In 
year 2007, it was estimated that the yearly costs for the economy of price-fixing and 
market-sharing EU-wide cartels alone would amount to between 13.4 and 36.6 billion 
12 It has been estimated that antitrust damages actions account at most for 10% of antitrust enforcement in 
the EU. See CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, ERASMUS UNIVERSITY 
ROTTERDAM and LUISS GUIDO CARLI “Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: 
welfare impact and potential scenarios”, Report for the European Commission, Contract DG 
COMP/2006/A3/012, Brussels, Rome and Rotterdam, December 21st, 2007, at p. 28. However, arguably, 
there is reason to believe that, in some Member States, they account for a more modest part of antitrust 
enforcement. For instance, there have only been a handful of damages actions in Finland, although the 
damages claims arising from the Asphalt Cartel have increased the number of claims due to the 
involvement of numerous parties. See HAVU, K., KALLIOKOSKI, T., and WIKBERG, O., 
Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingon korvaus, Edita, Helsinki 2010, at p. 129. and 133. It should also be borne 
in mind that a number of cases are settled and, therefore, the information publicly available might not 
always reflect the situation exhaustively. For instance, in the United Kingdom, a majority of antitrust 
disputes are settled out of court. See e.g. RODGER, B.J., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the 
Hidden Story: Competition Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005”, E.C.L.R., Volume 
29, Issue 2, 2008, p. 96-116, at p. 97.  
13 For example, the European Commission has adopted a Green Paper and a White Paper on antirust 
damages actions, and has held a public consultation on collective redress. See Commission Green Paper 
on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, 
Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final, 
2.4.2008, and Commission Staff Working Document, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173 final, 4.2.2011. At national level there have also been 
developments. For instance, the UK Government has decided to introduce stand-alone and follow-on 
collective actions before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which would decide on whether the collective 
action should be brought as an opt-in or opt-out action. See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS 
INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition law: a consultation for options on reform – 
government response”, January 2013, at p. 31-32 and also refer to Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
14 Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (hereinafter “Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions”), see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0089+002-002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. On June 11th, 2013, the 
Commission also issued recommendations on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of the rights granted under 
Union law. See 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations 
of rights granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
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of euros.15 If the impact of domestic cartels were also added, the yearly costs would be 
between 25 and 69 billion of euros, which would correspond to 0.20-0.55% of the GDP 
of the EU in 2011.16 It should be noted that this number does not include the costs of 
other types of antitrust violations, such as the abuse of a dominant position, so the 
aggregate damage of antitrust violations to the economy is, in fact, much higher. Thus, 
it would be crucial to deter antitrust violations. This is even more important today when 
the global economy is still severely affected by the financial crisis.  
 
Nevertheless, at present it seems that the enforcement of the antitrust rules in the EU is 
not sufficiently effective, and the fines imposed on the infringers do not alone have a 
deterrent effect since the number of (at least uncovered) cartels seems to have remained 
essentially similar in the 21th century.17 The European Commission (hereinafter “the 
Commission”) has attempted to remedy this by amending its fining policy,18 and has 
been examining how the private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules could contribute 
to increase the deterrence of antitrust violations,19 which has resulted in the adoption of 
the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions.  
 
15 See CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM and 
LUISS GUIDO CARLI “Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and 
potential scenarios”, Report for the European Commission, Contract DG COMP/2006/A3/012, Brussels, 
Rome and Rotterdam, December 21st, 2007 (hereinafter “External Impact Study”), at p. 107. 
16 See Commission Staff Working Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 22. 
17 See statistics on cartel cases decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf.  
18 See Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 
1/2003, OJ C 210, 1.09.2006, p. 2-5. According to the Guidelines, the basic amount is now calculated on 
a proportion up to 30% of the value of the undertaking’s sales of goods or services to which the 
infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant geographic area within the EEA. This amount is 
then multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement, thus reflecting more the 
duration of the infringement and resulting in higher fines than under the previous guidelines. The fines for 
cartels are also increased because of the introduction of so-called “entrance fees” for such infringements. 
Similarly, the fines in cases involving recidivism will increase the basic amount of the fine by 100%. See 
paragraphs 13, 21, 24, 25 and 28 of the Guidelines. 
19 As stated in Note 13, on December 19th, 2005, the Commission adopted a Green Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules and, on April 2nd, 2008, a White Paper on Damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules. See Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005 and Commission White Paper on Damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008.  
53 
 
                                                 
Initially, one of the reasons advocated for enhancing private enforcement was the idea 
that if companies were not only obliged to pay a fine for the antitrust violation, but also 
had to compensate the damages that they have caused to victims, the risk of facing large 
damage claims could serve to deter companies from committing the violations in the 
first place. Increased private antitrust enforcement would thus enhance deterrence and 
strengthen the compliance with antitrust rules.20 However, it should be noted that the 
recent Directive is rather emphasizing the compensatory function of private 
enforcement as it does not refer to the deterrent effect of damages actions,21 although 
liability in damages will, arguably, at least have an indirect deterrent effect on future 
infringers, provided that the amount of damages to be paid is considerable. The 
compensatory function of private enforcement is important in that it is usually the only 
way for victims to obtain compensation for the loss that they have suffered since, in 
general, public enforcement of antitrust rules can only put an end to the infringement 
and impose sanctions on the infringers, but cannot award damages for the harm 
suffered. 
 
Private enforcement serves also to ease the burden on competition authorities, which 
have limited resources and only prosecute conduct that is deemed to be most harmful to 
the economy as a whole. Its role is thus complementary to public enforcement, and it 
makes it possible for private individuals to take actions when competition authorities 
cannot or will not. This is particularly important in cases involving abuse of a dominant 
position or vertical competition restraints as the competition authorities are less active 
in these types of infringements due to priority reasons, or because they are not aware of 
these practices.22 Consequently, it would be important to enhance private enforcement 
in order to foster compliance with the antitrust rules in general and increase consumer 
welfare.  
 
20 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 16.  
21 See Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions the aim of which is to ensure the effective enforcement of 
the EU competition rules by optimizing the interaction between public and private enforcement of 
competition law and ensuring that victims of EU antitrust violations can obtain full compensation for the 
harm they have suffered. 
22 See BÖGE, U., “Up and Running, or is it? Private enforcement – the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives”, E.C.L.R., Volume 27, Issue 4, 2006, p. 197-205, at p. 198. 
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Furthermore, as the Commission has pointed out, enhanced private antitrust 
enforcement would ultimately also contribute to ensuring open and competitive markets 
in the EU internal market given that it would help ensuring a level playing field for 
companies in the EU by keeping private barriers to competition in check.23 
 
1.1. Objectives and Scope 
1.1.1 Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to establish what measures would be required to 
ensure the effective private enforcement of antitrust rules in the EU, and to suggest how 
they should be implemented. As the law stands today (before the implementation of the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions), the relevant national procedural rules are very 
divergent, and these procedural divergences increase the risk of differences in treatment 
and lead to legal uncertainty as it is more difficult for the victims and defendants to 
foresee the outcome of an action.24 Moreover, the low number of antitrust damages 
actions that have been brought to date in the EU in particular by consumers25 suggests 
that the current system of private enforcement is not working satisfactorily. For 
instance, the burden of proof in damages actions is high but, at the same time, the access 
to evidence tends to be limited.26 Proving an infringement of the antitrust rules and the 
causal relationship between that infringement and the harm suffered is therefore a very 
complex task. This appears to be a result of inadequate national tort rules of legal or 
procedural nature that do not take into account the specificities of antitrust damages 
actions.27 As a consequence, it is probable that a considerable number of victims of 
antitrust violations are left without compensation of the harm that they have suffered 
and, accordingly, many infringers are able to keep their illegal gains. 
23 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 7. 
24 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 8. 
25 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: “Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-20122” Conference on September 15th 2012 at LSE, London, 
available at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf, which concluded that there have been 
almost no small value mass consumer antitrust damages claims. 
26 See Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 
672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 5.  
27 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 8. 
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 Thus, the first objective of the thesis is to establish what procedural rules would need to 
be modified in order to remedy the current under-enforcement of antitrust rules through 
private actions. Therefore, the first part of the thesis aims to analyze the existing 
obstacles to private enforcement in the EU in general and then in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and Finland, in particular, in an attempt to outline 
differences in those systems, and to define what obstacles to private enforcement should 
be remedied in order to facilitate antitrust damages actions. 
 
This thesis also aims to determine to what extent the purpose of private enforcement 
should be to compensate victims of antitrust violations as well as to deter infringers 
from violating the antitrust rules in the future. This determination is crucial as the need 
to enhance private enforcement and the measures required to achieve that will depend 
on whether the aim is only to compensate the victims, or also to deter future antitrust 
violations. A fundamental question is therefore what should be the desired balance 
between public and private antitrust enforcement and, accordingly, how to ensure that 
enhanced private enforcement will not have a negative effect on public enforcement of 
the antitrust rules. 
 
The second objective is to analyze the recent EU legislative instruments to enhance 
private enforcement: the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions28 and the 
Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms.29 The purpose is to demonstrate 
the flaws and limitations of the reform, and to determine the additional issues that 
would also require a harmonization or approximation. The thesis aims to show that the 
Directive is not likely to revolutionize the possibilities of victims of antitrust violations 
obtaining compensation for the harm that they have suffered. On the contrary, in 
particular consumers will be left at the mercy of consumer organizations (which often 
suffer problems of funding) and, in addition, will most likely have to rely on so-called 
follow-on actions, i.e. damages claims will only be realistically possible after the 
competition authorities have first established an infringement of the EU competition 
28 Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. 
29 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
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rules. The legislative measures will therefore be critically assessed in light of 
experiences from a number of different jurisdictions, and suggestions will be made as to 
how to improve them. 
 
Given that private enforcement of antitrust rules plays a remarkably more significant 
role in the United States,30 and is also increasing in Canada,31 the third objective of the 
thesis is to examine especially what lessons could be learned from the U.S. and 
Canadian experiences of private antitrust enforcement. In particular, the focus will be on 
the role of class actions, contingency fees, and discovery in strengthening private 
enforcement since these features are distinctive of the private enforcement model in the 
United States and in Canada. The aim is to use the U.S. and Canadian experiences to 
establish what in the U.S. and Canadian antitrust enforcement model works successfully 
as well as what the drawbacks of these models are. Based on that analysis, the thesis 
aims to first establish whether there is a call for introducing class actions or other forms 
of procedural devices available in the U.S. and Canadian legal systems in the EU in 
order to enhance private enforcement, and then to define the possible obstacles to 
introducing such enforcement mechanisms in the EU, once they have been adapted to 
the European legal systems and traditions. 
 
The last objective of the thesis is to establish the optimal way of improving private 
enforcement. Hence, the final part of the thesis will focus on what issues must be 
regulated in a uniform way in addition to those included in the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions, and how the harmonization of these rules should be implemented. 
Central questions for the research are, for example, whether collective actions and 
contingency fees should be introduced in the EU as these have been excluded from the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. The thesis will examine whether a partial or 
total harmonization of these rules is required, or whether developing best practice rules 
or issuing Union guidelines would be a more appropriate manner to enhance private 
30 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4. 
31 For instance, class actions in cartel cases have become more frequent. See WRIGHT, C.M. and BAER, 
M.D., “Price-fixing Class Actions: A Canadian Perspective”, Loy. Consumer L. Rev., 16, 2004, p. 463-
478, at p. 463 and HUTTON, S., “Chapter 3. Canada” in KNABLE GOTTS, I., (ed.), The Private 
Competition Enforcement Review, 2nd edition, Law Business Research, London, 2009, p. 30-49, at p. 30. 
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enforcement. Similarly, it is necessary to determine whether a sector-specific 
harmonization limited to antitrust cases or a harmonization of civil procedural rules in 
general is to be preferred. Furthermore, the appropriate legal instruments for 
implementing the harmonization will be determined, and the existence of a legal basis 
for Union action will be verified. Finally, the feasibility and the expected implications 
of the harmonization will be assessed. 
 
In short, this thesis aims to demonstrate that the new Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions is a missed opportunity to improve access to justice in cases involving 
infringements of the EU competition rules, and the common rules proposed will not be 
sufficient to ensure the effective and uniform enforcement of the Union right to 
compensation for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter “TFEU”). In particular, the Directive 
will do little to improve redress for consumers, the ultimate victims of antitrust 
violations. 
 
1.1.2 Scope 
As to the scope of the thesis, the focus will be on the legal aspects of antitrust 
enforcement since the thesis is first and foremost a doctoral thesis in law. In other 
words, the thesis will not include any in-depth economic analysis, but economic 
analysis will only be conducted to the extent that it is indispensable for the development 
of the argument in question. However, it is important to note that economic analysis is 
an essential and inherent part of antitrust enforcement, since the application of the EU 
antitrust rules involves an economics-based analysis of the effects of potential 
competition restrictions in order to determine whether the positive effects outweigh the 
negative effects of the restrictions in question or, on the contrary, result in consumer 
harm.32 Moreover, antitrust violations the effects of which on the EU economy or the 
economies of the Member States are only minor will, in general, not be pursued by the 
32 See the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 130, 19.5.2010, p. 1-46, at paragraphs 122-127, and 
Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 11, 14.1.2011, p. 1-72, 
at Recital 20. For a summary of the main principles of the economics or effects-based approach to Article 
102 TFEU, see “Antitrust: consumer welfare at heart of Commission fight against abuses by dominant 
undertakings” IP/08/1877, Brussels, December 3rd, 2008, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-08-1877_en.htm?locale=en. 
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competition authorities,33 although it would, in principle, be possible to enforce them 
through private actions before the national courts. Consequently, the economics-based 
approach will always be borne in mind in assessing the existing possibilities of bringing 
antitrust damages actions, and different options for enhancing private enforcement of 
the EU antitrust rules. 
 
The civil sanction of nullity of contracts violating the EU antitrust rules as well as the 
possibility of applying for injunctions also fall outside the scope of this thesis, since the 
research questions concern the conditions for bringing antitrust damages actions, and 
how to proceed in order to enhance redress for the victims of antitrust violations by 
compensating them for the loss that they have suffered as a result of the violations in 
question.  
 
Similarly, antitrust damages actions decided by arbitrators are excluded from the scope 
of the thesis because arbitral bodies are not necessarily considered as “courts” under EU 
law even if they give judgments according to law and the award is binding between 
parties, but a closer link between the arbitration procedure and the ordinary court system 
is required.34 Moreover, arbitration is usually a voluntary form of deciding commercial 
disputes, unless the contract in question includes a clause requiring that possible 
disputes must be submitted for arbitration. Because of the high degree of party 
autonomy, the parties may use customized rules, or choose institutional arbitration rules 
that suit their needs and expectations.35 This makes it more difficult to influence on 
arbitration by the means of the adoption of binding legal rules. Moreover, arbitration 
33 The Commission is entitled to refer to the Union interest in order to determine the degree of priority to 
be applied to the various cases brought to its attention and it may decide not to investigate a case if there 
is insufficient Union interest to justify further investigation. See Judgment of 18 September 1992, 
Automec  v Commission, Case T-24/90, ECR, EU:T:1992:97, paragraph 85. 
34 See Judgment in Nordsee v Reederei Mond, C-102/81, EU:C:1982:107, paragraphs 10-13, and CRAIG, 
P. and DE BÚRCA, G., EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
New York, 2011, at p. 446. However, if public authorities are involved in arbitration, the arbitrators might 
be considered as courts. See Judgment in Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark v 
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, C-109/88, EU:C:1989:383, paragraphs 7-8, where the European Court of 
Justice held that a Danish Industrial Arbitration Board was considered as a court for the purpose of 
Article 267 TFEU because the board’s jurisdiction over disputes between parties to collective agreements 
did not depend upon the parties’ agreement, but were subject to the Agreed Standard Rules adopted by 
the Employers' Association and Employees' Union. Moreover, those rules governed the composition and 
procedure of the Industrial Arbitration Board, and its decisions were final.  
35 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at p. 
1348. 
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law falls under the competence of the Member States, which  makes it challenging to 
determine the boundaries between substantive EU law (including EU competition law), 
on the one hand, and national law and the principle of procedural autonomy, on the 
other hand.36 In addition, it is even more complicated to find reliable statistics on cases 
that have been dealt with by the means of arbitration than damages actions brought 
before the national courts of the Member States due to the private nature of disputes 
solved by arbitration. 
 
Finally, with regard to the analysis of private enforcement models in the six selected 
Member States (i.e. the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and 
Finland), the United States and Canada, the thesis will only examine the main features 
of the selected legal systems, but does not intend to conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
legal systems concerned. Instead, the focus will be on the issues that are closely linked 
to the research topic and the underlying hypotheses.    
 
1.2. Structure 
The thesis will consist of an introduction (Chapter One), a chapter on the background of 
the research project and the state of the art in the field (Chapter Two), Part One “The 
Flaws in the EU Private Antitrust Enforcement Model and the Need for 
Harmonization” (Chapter Three), Part Two “The Flaws and Missing Pieces of the 
Current Reform” (Chapters Four and Five), Part Three “Enhancing Private 
Enforcement of the EU Antitrust Rules by Learning from the U.S. and Canadian 
Experiences” (Chapters Six and Seven), and conclusions (Chapter Eight).  
 
Chapter One (“Introduction”) will define the research questions and outline the 
research topic. It will define the objectives and scope of the thesis, and present the 
structure of the thesis. It will explain the justification for and the value of conducting a 
legal comparison, and present the methodology and the sources used in the thesis. 
Chapter Two (Background of the Research Project and the State of the Art in the Field) 
will, in turn, explain the background of private enforcement in the European Union by 
36 See IDOT, L., “The Role of Arbitration in Competition Disputes” in LIANOS, I and KOKKORIS, I, 
The Reform of EC Competition Law. New Challenges, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
2010, p. 75-94, at p. 75. 
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referring to initiatives at the Union level, such as the Commission Green Paper37 and 
White Paper on Damages action for breach of the EC antitrust rules,38 the recent 
Directive on Antitrust Damages actions,39 and the Recommendation on Collective 
Redress Mechanisms,40 and to the most important case law in this field.  
 
Part One (“The Flaws in the EU Private Antitrust Enforcement Model and the Need for 
Harmonization”) will examine the existing obstacles to private enforcement in the EU. 
Chapter Three (Obstacles to Private Enforcement in the EU”) will therefore contain an 
analysis of the state-of-play of private enforcement in the EU in general and the 
obstacles to antitrust damages actions, in particular. It will then briefly analyze the 
situation in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and Finland with a 
view to outlining differences in those systems and establishing the challenges to be met 
in this field as well as the problems that must be remedied in order to enhance private 
enforcement of the EU antitrust rules. 
 
Part Two of the thesis (“The Flaws and Missing Pieces of the Current Reform”) will 
focus on the reforms included in the recent legislative measures in areas relevant to 
private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules. First, Chapter Four (Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions) will explain and critically assess the measures included in the 
Directive by comparing them to earlier proposals made by the Commission. It will also 
identify the missing pieces of the reform. Chapter Five (“The Commission 
Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms”) will then proceed to analyze the 
recommendations issued by the Commission on collective redress mechanisms in 
Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law. The purpose 
is to determine the main flaws of the Recommendation and the issues that should be 
modified in order to contribute to enhanced private enforcement. 
37 Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 
final, 19.12.2005. 
38 Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 
final, 2.4.2008. 
39 Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0089+002-
002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
40 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
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 Part Three (“Enhancing Private Enforcement of the EU Antitrust Rules by Learning 
from the U.S. and Canadian Experiences”) will examine the U.S. and Canadian 
experiences in order to draw lessons that could serve as inspiration for a reform of the 
EU private enforcement model. Chapter Six (“Drawing Lessons from the U.S. and 
Canadian Experiences”) will analyze private antitrust litigation in the United States and 
Canada. In particular, the use of class actions and the availability of pretrial discovery, 
treble damages and contingency fees will be examined as they are common in the 
United States and, therefore, could also serve as a model in order to reform the private 
enforcement system in the EU. The Canadian enforcement model is of added interest, 
first, because it does not include all, but only some of the features of the U.S. model, 
thus offering an interesting point of reference for a private enforcement model going 
further than the current EU model, but not as far as the U.S. model. Second, the 
coexistence of Civil Law and Common Law systems in Canada could give valuable 
insights on how to reform the procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions in 
the EU in a manner that respects both the Civil Law and Common Law legal traditions. 
Based on the analyses of the U.S. and Canadian enforcement models, Chapter Six then 
aims to establish what lessons could be learned from the U.S. and Canadian 
experiences, and whether there would be a call for introducing some of the procedural 
devices available in those jurisdictions in the EU. It will consider the relevance of the 
U.S. and Canadian experiences for the private enforcement in the EU by outlining the 
legal and cultural differences between the U.S., Canadian and European legal systems 
and traditions.  
 
Chapter Seven (“The Case for a More Comprehensive Harmonization: A Proposal for 
Enhancing Private Enforcement of the EU Antitrust Rules in Light of the U.S. and 
Canadian Experiences of Private Enforcement”) will define the issues, which require to 
be regulated in a uniform way in order to remedy the current under-enforcement of the 
EU antitrust rules through private actions, and will outline how these issues should be 
regulated. It will draw on the U.S. and Canadian experiences in proposing measures that 
could contribute to a more effective private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules than 
those currently included in the reform. It will attempt to demonstrate that the most 
efficient manner would be a further harmonization of certain procedural rules governing 
antitrust damages actions, and the introduction of European collective actions, and will 
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suggest how this harmonization should be implemented. It will examine to what extent 
a partial or total harmonization would be required, and define the issues which it would 
be more appropriate to develop by introducing some form of best practice rules or 
issuing Union guidelines. Similarly, it will determine whether sector-specific collective 
actions or introduction of collective actions of a more general nature should be 
preferred. It will define the appropriate legal instruments for implementing the 
harmonization, and will assess the feasibility of the harmonization. In this context, the 
legal and cultural backgrounds of the EU Member States as well as the existence of a 
political will among the Member States will be assessed.  
 
Finally, Chapter Eight (“Conclusions”) will include a summary of the main findings of 
the thesis, and will also evaluate the likely-hood that the proposed harmonization could 
be politically achieved. It will also contain a brief analysis of the expected implications 
of a harmonization. In addition, it will include recommendations on what actions should 
be taken next, and an outlook towards the future. 
 
1.3. Methodology and Sources 
1.3.1. Methodology 
This thesis aims first to establish the flaws in the EU private enforcement model and 
then to suggest remedies at the Union level by learning from the U.S. and Canadian 
experiences of private antitrust enforcement. 
 
In order to analyze the state-of-play of private enforcement of the antitrust rules in the 
EU, the starting point for the research will be the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions, although the chronological starting point would be the Commission Green 
Paper and White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions.41 The objective is to analyze the 
obstacles to private enforcement in the EU, and to complement it with an analysis of the 
relevant EU case law as well as various studies conducted on private enforcement and 
41 Similarly, the Commission Staff Working Papers accompanying the Green paper and the White paper 
will be analyzed: Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on 
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005; Commission 
Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008; and Commission Staff Working Document, 
Accompanying document to the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008. 
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collective redress which have been commissioned by the Commission.42 An in-depth 
analysis will then focus on a number of selected Member States. These will include 
Germany as a representative of the Germanic legal system, France and Spain of the 
Romanic legal family, Sweden and Finland representing the Nordic legal traditions, and 
the United Kingdom as a representative of the Common Law system, and one of the 
European countries traditionally closest to the U.S. and Canadian legal systems.  
 
The methodology used will be comparative. The aim is to identify what forms of redress 
are available for victims of breaches of antitrust rules. First, the relevant legal 
provisions and literature in the field as well as the most relevant case law will be 
analyzed. Based on the findings of this analysis, the similarities and differences in the 
Member States will be critically compared. Next, the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions and the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms by the 
Commission which aim, inter alia, to enhance private enforcement will be presented, 
and critically assessed in order to determine their flaws and limitations, and how they 
should be modified so as to address the problems with the current private enforcement 
model.  
 
42 The proposals for legislative initiatives (including soft law) encompass the failed Proposal for a 
Council Directive on rules governing damages actions for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty which was never officially published nor adopted, see Annex III of LOWE, P. and MARQUIS, M. 
(eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2014; the Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013; 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on 
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States 
concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65; 
Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; Commission Staff Working 
Document – Practical Guide on quantifying harm in  actions for damages based on breaches of Articles 
101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Accompanying the Communication 
from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; and Commission Staff Working Document, 
Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173 
final, 4.2.2011. The studies include the External Impact Study; STUDY CENTRE FOR CONSUMER 
LAW – CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW, KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN, 
“An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of consumer redress other than redress through 
ordinary judicial proceedings”, Final Report, A Study for the European Commission, Health and 
Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate B – Consumer Affairs, Leuven, January 17th, 2007; 
OXERA, “Quantifying antitrust damages. Towards non-binding guidance for courts”, Study prepared for 
the European Commission, December 2009; and BUCCIROSSI, P., CARPAGNANO, M., CIARI, L., 
TOGNONI, M. and VITALE, C., “Collective Redress in Antitrust” Study, IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, June 
2012. 
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In order to find an optimal private enforcement model, inspiration will be sought from 
the U.S. and Canadian experiences. The presumption will be that the U.S. private 
enforcement model, accounting for the major part of the total antitrust enforcement in 
the United States,43 will also have something to offer the EU model. Due to the long and 
extensive experience of private enforcement of antitrust rules in the United States, there 
is, arguably, a call to assess the U.S. experience in order to establish the advantages and 
drawbacks of the American model and possible obstacles to introducing such a model in 
the EU, provided that it is first adapted to the European legal and cultural traditions. As 
a basis for this analysis, case law and applicable statutory provisions at both federal and 
state level will be used. However, the focus will be on federal law as it is applicable 
throughout the United States. Only when significant differences exist between federal 
and state law, will an analysis of state law be included. 
 
Canada, in turn, has – from a European point of view – a more moderate model of 
private enforcement than the United States. For instance, it does not provide for treble 
damages, and the majority of antitrust cases are decided by judges, not juries.44 
Moreover, the Canadian class action is based on an opt-out model as the U.S. class 
action, but discovery rights are less extensive than in the United States.45 As stated, the 
coexistence of Civil Law and Common Law systems in Canada also makes the 
Canadian legal system interesting from a European perspective as some EU Member 
States belong to the Common Law legal family, and it is therefore necessary to create a 
private enforcement model which is compatible with both Common Law and Civil Law 
legal traditions. Consequently, useful lessons could be learned from the Canadian 
experience as well. The focus will be on those aspects that differ from the features of 
the U.S. legal system. In other words, the U.S. enforcement model is taken as a point of 
reference, whereas the Canadian model is merely used to complement that analysis 
when it provides added value. 
 
43 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4. 
44 See WATSON, G. D., “Class actions: the Canadian experience, Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L., 11, 
Spring/Summer 2001, p. 269-287, at p. 269. 
45 See OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, COMPETITION 
COMMITTEE, Policy Roundtables, “Private Remedies”, 2007, DAF/COMP(2006)34, January 11th, 
2008, at p. 373. 
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In addition, when conducting a comparative research not only legislative rules, judicial 
decisions, the “law in the books” and general conditions of business, customs, and 
practices should be taken into account, but “everything whatever which helps to mould 
human conduct in the situation under consideration”.46 This means that e.g. cultural 
differences, such as the fact that the United States is traditionally “more litigious”, 
should be considered too. Furthermore, it might not be possible to implement without 
modifications the alternatives available in the United States and Canada in the EU due 
to differences in court proceedings or the social context. In particular, in opting for a 
certain solution, the context of private enforcement in the EU should always be kept in 
mind when assessing the implications of the remedy chosen.  
 
This thesis will propose concrete measures that need to be adopted in order to enhance 
private enforcement in the EU. In this context, the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions will be taken as a starting point to which modifications and additions will be 
proposed. The thesis will examine whether a modification of the applicable procedural 
rules would require a harmonization, and what the risks and advantages of a 
harmonization would be. The alternatives to a harmonization will also be analyzed as 
well as the advantages and drawbacks of the other options. The final step will be to set 
out how the harmonization should be implemented, i.e. whether it should be a partial or 
total harmonization of the procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions, and to 
what extent it should be adopted through binding Union legal instruments instead of 
implemented on a voluntary basis in the form of guidelines and best practices.  
 
1.3.2. Justification for and Value of a Legal Comparison 
At different points in history, jurisdictions in different parts of the world have adopted 
legal rules from other jurisdictions47 either voluntarily or involuntarily. Often the 
transfer of legal rules has been made by national legislators, but courts have also 
actively been inspired by legal rules and ideas from other jurisdictions in deciding 
similar kinds of cases or problems not finding solution in the domestic legal order. The 
46 See ZWEIGERT, K. and KÖTZ, H., Introduction to comparative law, 3rd revised edition, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1998, at p. 11. 
47 For example, the reception of Roman law in Europe and the influence of the French Civil Code in other 
civil law counties in Europe and other jurisdictions. See DE CRUZ, P., Comparative Law in a Changing 
World, Third Edition, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007, at p. 511. 
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effect of the transfer of a legal rule will, however, depend on the historical, political, 
social, religious and cultural context, including the legal culture of the country in 
question.48 Moreover, legal transplants tend to occur with modifications in order to 
avoid that they are incompatible with existing domestic procedural structures and 
preferences.49  
 
The comparison of two or more legal systems may be challenging because of a number 
of reasons: linguistic and terminological problems, cultural differences, the tendency of 
comparatists to impose their own legal conceptions and expectations on the systems 
under examination, the exclusion of extra-legal rules, to name some of the difficulties.50 
However, this does not exclude the possibility of learning from another jurisdiction, and 
using a legal rule or mechanism as inspiration in order to improve the functioning of the 
domestic legal system, since the manner in which the foreign legal system regulates a 
particular issue may be as effective or more so to ensure norm enforcement. The 
conditions for conducting a legal comparison depend, nevertheless, on a number of 
issues, such as the level of similarity of the systems compared and the availability of 
materials. The comparison will be facilitated the more similar the two legal systems 
compared are. 51   
 
As to the method of comparative research, as a starting point, it is useful to describe the 
norms, concepts and institutions, or legal problems and legal solutions provided. The 
comparison must focus on those issues in the foreign legal systems which fulfill the 
same functions, in other words, the issue under examination must not be analyzed in the 
light of domestic legal concepts, but the focus must be on a concrete legal problem.52 
Then the differences and similarities should be identified, and the reasons for the 
similarities and differences between the systems should be explained. It is of particular 
48 See DE CRUZ, P., Comparative Law in a Changing World, Third Edition, Routledge-Cavendish, 
London, 2007, p. 510-512. 
49 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at p. 
1357. 
50 For a more extensive list and a description of the dangers which comparatists face, see DE CRUZ, P., 
Comparative Law in a Changing World, Third Edition, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007, p. 219-231. 
51  
52 See ZWEIGERT, K. and KÖTZ, H., Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiet des 
Privatrechts, 3rd revised edition, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1996, at p. 33. 
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importance to determine how they influence legal decisions and the interaction of legal 
actors.53 In outlining the possible answers to the problems, the different approaches 
should be compared. In this context, it is important to take into consideration the impact 
of possible cultural differences (and socio-economic factors), and any other non-legal 
factors (e.g. local customs) that may have influenced the legal position in the 
jurisdictions compared. Relevant research questions are how does the rule really operate 
in practice and why? Are there, for instance, cultural reasons, economic practices, or 
certain trade practice which explain the operation of the rules? Next, the legal principles 
should be critically analyzed in terms of their intrinsic meaning, and conclusions should 
be drawn within a comparative framework (with possible caveats) and with critical 
commentary. It should also be related to the original purpose of the study.54 The critical 
assessment entails studying the different solutions from a new and common perspective, 
focusing on the functionality of the solutions.55 Finally, it would be necessary to 
indicate the relative importance given to the nature of the systems being examined, their 
parent legal family, their historical or socio-cultural development, and the possible 
repercussions of these developments on the legal development of the rule/solution in 
relation to other legal systems.56   
 
Regarding comparative competition law more specifically, there is no specific 
methodology or body of works that could serve as a common reference point for 
research,57 and there is also no international standard for competition law. Nevertheless, 
the United States tends to serve as a valuable common reference point thanks to its 
considerable number of cases spanning over a century, and the fact that more factual 
material is often contained in its judicial opinions than what is available in other legal 
53 See GERBER, D.J., “Comparative Antitrust Law” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 1193-1224, at p. 
1194. 
54 See DE CRUZ, P., Comparative Law in a Changing World, Third Edition, Routledge-Cavendish, 
London, 2007, p. 244-245. 
55 See ZWEIGERT, K. and KÖTZ, H., Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiet des 
Privatrechts, 3rd revised edition, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1996, at p. 43. 
56 See DE CRUZ, P., Comparative Law in a Changing World, Third Edition, Routledge-Cavendish, 
London, 2007, p. 244-245. 
57 See GERBER, D.J., “Comparative Antitrust Law” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN , R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 1193-1224, at p. 
1195. 
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systems.58 For instance, in the EU, since the late 1990s more U.S. law elements have 
been introduced into EU competition law.59 However, this does not mean that the U.S. 
law and experience should be accepted uncritically, but it should be more carefully 
examined, and should be related analytically to the conditions found in other 
countries.60  
 
The value of comparative competition law is also increasing as it contributes to an 
understanding of how different enforcement issues are dealt with61 and, arguably, can 
therefore be useful in determining the optimal way for regulating the enforcement of 
antitrust rules. In doing so, particular importance should be given to legal decisions in 
relation to the factors, such as texts, interests, institutions, communities, and patterns of 
thought, which influence them.62  
 
In this thesis, all the examined jurisdictions belong either to the Civil Law or Common 
Law system, which makes them particularly apt to be compared since – despite their 
differences in historical development, organization, etc. – they all follow Western 
traditions, and often provide for relatively similar solutions to the same legal problems. 
However, even within a legal family, there are naturally differences between legal 
systems and, therefore, for example an analysis of private enforcement in both the 
United Kingdom and the United States is called for in light of their rather different 
procedure law. It is also important to bear in mind that apart from the U.S. and 
Canadian legal systems, all the other jurisdictions studied form part of the EU legal 
system, thus making a legal comparison particularly appropriate since all the 
substantive competition rules are the same in these jurisdictions, and the obligation to 
comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness serves as a limit on the 
application of national procedural rules.  
 
58 Ibid., at p. 1205-1206.  
59 For example, the U.S. immunity program served as a model for the introduction of a leniency program 
into the EU. See GERBER, D.J., “Comparative Antitrust Law” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, 
R. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 1193-
1224, at p. 1211. 
60 Ibid., at p. 1223. 
61 Ibid., at p. 1218. 
62 Ibid., at p. 1222. 
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1.3.3. Presentation of Sources 
The primary sources used in the thesis will include legislation in force as well as 
legislative proposals and case law regarding antitrust enforcement in the EU (notably in 
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and Finland) and in the United 
States and Canada. As to Union sources, in addition to EU case law, the emphasis will 
be on the official documents of the Commission, in particular, the Directive on the 
Antitrust Damages Actions,63 the Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing 
antitrust damages actions,64 the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms,65 
the failed Proposal for a Council Directive on rules governing damages actions for 
infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the Green Paper66 and White Paper 
on Damages action for breach of the EC antitrust rules67 as well as the Commission 
Staff Working Document ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress’.68 With regard to the United States, the main primary sources will be federal 
statutes and case law, although reference will sometimes be made to state case law, 
when significant differences between federal and state law justify this. Similarly, with 
regard to Canada, the main sources consist of federal statutes and case law, while 
statutes and case law of the Canadian provinces will only be taken into account when 
that is of particular relevance for the research topic. 
 
63 Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0089+002-
002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
64 Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013. 
65 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
66 Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 
final, 19.12.2005 and Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on 
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005. 
67 Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 
final, 2.4.2008, Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, and Commission 
Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008. 
68 Commission Staff Working Document, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach 
to Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173 final, 4.2.2011. 
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Secondary sources employed will encompass books and articles on legal doctrine both 
in the EU – at the Union as well as at the national level – and the United States and 
Canada. The articles are mainly published in legal reviews specialized in competition 
law or commercial law but, for instance, some legal reviews with the focus on EU law 
or international law are also included. In addition, the bibliography will contain several 
studies commissioned by the Commission on private enforcement of the antitrust rules 
and on collective actions. 
 
The main part of the sources used will be European since the aim of the thesis is to 
propose a solution to remedy the under-enforcement of the EU antitrust rules. Similarly, 
predominantly sources from this century will be used because private enforcement did 
not receive much attention in the EU before, and important reforms of the antitrust 
enforcement models have recently been implemented at the national level in several 
Member States.69 
 
1.4. Definitions 
This section defines key legal concepts that will be used in the thesis. 
 
Antitrust violation 
An antitrust violation refers to an infringement of the antitrust rules. In the EU context, 
this means an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, i.e. the violation could consist 
in a cartel, a horizontal or vertical anti-competitive agreement or practice, or an abuse of 
a dominant position. The corresponding U.S. antitrust rules are Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, while the Canadian equivalents are Sections 45, 78 and 79 of the 
Canadian Competition Act.70 In addition, all Member States of the European Union 
have their own national antitrust rules. 
 
Collective action 
69 See Section 2.2 for some examples. 
70 Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34. In addition, Section 47 criminalizes bid-rigging, and Section 
77 prohibits under certain conditions restrictive practices, such as exclusive dealing, tied-selling and 
market restriction.  
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A great variety of forms of group litigation exist and, hence, it is difficult to classify 
different categories of group litigation in a satisfactory way.71 In this thesis the term 
“collective actions” is used as an umbrella term to encompass different types of actions 
brought by several claimants together, or by one claimant or a representative entity on 
behalf of several claimants. It thus includes class actions, representative actions, and 
collective claims in which the claims of several victims are brought under one single 
collective claim. However, this thesis will not examine the so-called joint actions in 
which a set of claims are brought by several claimants together against the same 
defendant, or are joined by the judge hearing the claims due to a legal link between 
them, because these actions are not appropriate to improve access to compensation, as 
they are only available when individuals have already taken actions against the 
infringers. Moreover, if the claimants are numerous, this will result in complex mass 
litigation in which all claims must be treated separately, and awards must be made 
individually, although a single judgment may be made with regard to the cases of all the 
claimants.72  
 
The term “class action” serves to define the U.S.-style class action, i.e. under which one 
party or a group of parties may bring an action as representatives of a larger class of 
unidentifiable individuals. Any member of the class that does not opt out will be bound 
by the judgment, and any award resulting from the action will be made to the members 
of the class as a whole. “Representative action” is used to define an action brought by a 
representative organization, such as a consumer association, on behalf of its members, 
and any awards are, in general, made to individual members.73 Finally, “collective 
action”, or alternatively “group action”, refers to a single claim, which is brought on 
behalf of a group of identified/identifiable individuals (except when “collective action” 
is used as an umbrella term in this thesis). Any damages resulting from the action will 
be awarded to the group as a whole.74 
71 See External Impact Study, at p. 268. 
72 See STADLER, A., “Collective Action as an Efficient Means for the Enforcement of European 
Competition Law” in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 195-213, at p. 202. 
73 See WAELBROECK, D., SLATER, D. and EVEN-SHOSHAN, G., “Ashurst Study on the conditions of 
claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules”, August 31st, 2004, at p. 43.  
74 These definitions are mainly based on the definitions made in the Ashurst Study (see WAELBROECK, 
D., SLATER, D. and EVEN-SHOSHAN, G., “Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages in 
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 Corporate statements  
By corporate statements the Commission refers to “all those voluntary presentations, by 
or on behalf of an undertaking to the competition authority, of the undertaking’s 
knowledge of a cartel and its role therein, which are drawn up specifically for 
submission under the Leniency Notice”.75  
 
Cy pres 
A cy pres distribution means that the damages are not distributed directly to those 
injured by an antitrust violation in order to compensate for the harm that they suffered, 
but are instead used to achieve a result which is as close as possible to the compensation 
of the harm.76 Typically a cy pres distribution of damages is used in US-style class 
actions when it is very difficult or impossible to identify all the victims, or when the 
distribution of the damages would be too costly because of the limited damages award. 
 
Discovery 
Discovery refers to the obligation of parties to court proceedings to disclose information 
that the disclosing party may use to support its case. In the United States, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure contain very liberal discovery rules. Information to be 
disclosed could relate to the identities of individuals likely to have discoverable 
information, copies or descriptions of relevant documents in the control of the party, 
and a calculation of damages claimed. This information must be disclosed without 
waiting for a discovery request.77 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
provided that it is not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, 
even if the relevant material is not admissible at the trial, “if discovery appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”78 On the 
case of infringement of EC competition rules”, August 31st, 2004, at p. 43), but the content of each action 
varies between the Member States. 
75 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 86. 
76 Ibid., at p. 18. 
77 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). 
78 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
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contrary, this is usually not possible in most EU Member States where only identified, 
specific documents being admissible as evidence may be requested.79 
 
Follow-on action 
The term “follow-on action” is used to describe an action for damages that is brought on 
the back of a decision adopted by public (competition) authorities.80  
 
Leniency 
Under EU law, leniency refers to rewarding undertakings which are or have been party 
to secret cartels affecting the European Union and which have cooperated in the 
Commission investigation in order to uncover the cartel and bring it to an end. Under 
the leniency program,81 the Commission will grant immunity from any fine which 
would otherwise have been imposed on an undertaking disclosing its participation in an 
alleged cartel if the undertaking is the first to submit information and evidence which 
will enable the Commission to carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the 
alleged cartel or find an infringement of Article 101 TFEU in connection with the 
alleged cartel.82 Other undertakings disclosing their participation in an alleged cartel 
affecting the Union may be eligible to benefit from a reduction of any fine that would 
otherwise have been imposed, if they provide the Commission with evidence of the 
alleged infringement which represents significant added value with respect to the 
evidence already in the Commission's possession.83 
 
Opt-in collective action 
An opt-in collective action refers to a collective action brought by a claimant on behalf 
of group members who have been identified in advance and have taken active steps to 
join the action. The claims of the claimant and the group members are merged into one 
79 See JOELSON, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer. A Guide to the Operation of United States, 
European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy, 3rd edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, at p. 106. 
80 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 6-7. 
81 See Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ C 298, 
8.12.2006, p. 17-22. 
82 Ibid., at § 8. 
83 Ibid., at § 23-24. 
74 
 
                                                 
single action. The judgment will only bind those individuals who have expressly 
decided to join (“opt in”) the collective action.84  
 
Opt-out collective action 
Contrary to the opt-in collective action, an opt-out collective action can also be brought 
on behalf of unidentified persons, and the judgment given in the case will bind all group 
members except the members, who have opted out from the action within a period 
established by a court.85 
 
Passing-on defense 
The passing-on defense means that the defendant in an antitrust damages case is 
allowed to invoke that the claimant has passed on to his customers all or part of the 
illegal overcharge (i.e. the part of the price paid that is in excess of the competitive 
price) that he has paid to the defendant. If the passing-on defense is allowed, the 
defendant can limit his liability for compensation.86 
 
Private enforcement  
Private enforcement of antitrust rules refers to the application of antitrust rules by courts 
when they declare anti-competitive agreements null,87 grant injunctions in order to put 
an end to anti-competitive behavior or award damages to the victims of antitrust 
84 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 20. 
85 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 21 and LESKINEN, C., 
“Antitrust Damages Actions: The Case for Opt-out Collective Actions in Cases Involving Numerous 
Individual Claims of Low Value” in VELASCO SAN PEDRO L.A, ALONSO LEDESMA C., 
ECHEBARRÍA SÁENZ J.A., HERRERO SUÁREZ C., and GUTIÉRREZ GILSANZ J. (eds.), Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2011, at p. 289. 
86 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 63. 
87 The nullity of agreements which breach Article 101(1) TFEU and do not meet the conditions in order to 
justify an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU can be relied on by anybody, i.e. both parties to the 
agreements and third parties. See Judgment in Courage, C-453/99, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 22. It is 
e.g. possible to invoke the antitrust rules as a defense, especially against actions for the enforcement of a 
contract, or against actions for the enforcement of other rights, for example, intellectual property rights if 
the enforcement of such rights constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. See Commission Staff 
Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 7, Note 5. 
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violations.88 However, for the purpose of this thesis, the term “private enforcement” 
will only be used to refer to antitrust damages actions, unless otherwise noted.  
 
Public Enforcement is used to describe enforcement actions taken by competition 
authorities. Generally, the aim is to punish infringers for the antitrust violations which 
they have committed, and to deter future infringements. The most commonly used 
sanctions are fines imposed on companies – and in some jurisdictions also on 
individuals – but some countries also provide for criminal sanctions and/or disciplinary 
sanctions.89 
 
Stand-alone action 
A stand-alone action refers to an action for damages that is brought when there is no 
prior decision from a competition authority finding an antitrust violation.90  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 The intervention by the European Commission or national competition authorities as amicus curie in 
civil proceedings between private parties could also be characterized as private enforcement. See 
EHLERMANN, C-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European Competition Policy Annual: 2001. Effective 
Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003, p. i-xlii, at p. xxiv. 
89 See e.g. section 188 of the UK Enterprise Act 2002 and section 8(1)(b)(ii) of the Irish Competition Act 
2002. 
90 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 18. 
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2. BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT AND THE STATE OF THE 
ART IN THE FIELD 
2.1. At Union Level 
In the EU, the policy choice for the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules has been 
public enforcement. The focus has hence been on the enforcement by the competition 
authorities, i.e. by the Commission, which imposes fines on undertakings that have 
committed an antitrust violation. Before May 2004, national competition authorities and 
national courts used to only play a minor role in the enforcement of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU91 [ex Articles 81 and 82 EC]92 since only the Commission could grant an 
individual exemption to undertakings whose agreements or concerted practices were 
caught by the prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU, but which met the conditions laid 
down by Article 101(3)].93 In order to obtain legal certainty about the compatibility of 
their agreements with the EU antitrust rules, companies therefore notified their 
agreements to the Commission and sought either an exemption or a so-called negative 
clearance, i.e. either a formal decision or, in practice, an informal comfort letter in 
which the Commission stated that there were no grounds under Article 101(1) TFEU or 
Article 102 TFEU to take action in respect of the agreement or practice notified to it.94  
 
Similarly, when an antitrust violation occurred, the victims would rather file a 
complaint with the Commission than lodge a complaint before the national competition 
authorities or bring an action before the national courts,95 because neither the national 
91 See JONES, A. and SUFRIN, B., EU competition law. Text, cases and materials, 4th edition, Oxford 
University Press Inc., New York, 2011, at p. 1152. 
92 Given that the Treaty numbering has been changed twice since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome, in 
referring to the main antitrust rules the Treaty numbering currently in force will be used throughout the 
thesis for the sake of simplification. 
93 See Article 9(1) of EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the Treaty, OJ 13, 21/02/1962, p. 204-211. However, it is recalled that the national courts could apply 
block exemptions to the agreements the legality of which they were requested to decide on. See 
Commission Notice on the co-operation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 
85 and 86 EEC, OJ C 39, 13.2.1993, p. 6-12, at § 8. 
94 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy. Antitrust and 
control of concentrations”. Nevertheless, the undertakings did obviously not notify hard-core violations 
of Article 101(1) TFEU to the Commission, so the notification system did not serve to detect the most 
serious antitrust violations. See WILS, W.P.J., Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005, at p. 10-11.   
95 See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 25-26. 
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competition authorities nor the national courts had competence to assess whether the 
agreement or concerted practice fulfilled the criteria required for granting an individual 
exemption under EU law and, therefore, could not decide whether an agreement 
infringing Article 101(1) TFEU was compatible with the EU antitrust rules, unless the 
agreement was covered by a block exemption regulation.  
 
Nevertheless, national courts had the competence to enforce Article 101(2) TFEU96 and 
thus to declare anti-competitive agreements or concerted practices null if the 
Commission had refused to grant an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, since the 
competition authorities cannot decide on the civil consequences of anti-competitive 
agreements, but that task is entrusted to the courts.97 Similarly, national courts could 
declare an agreement null if the undertakings had failed to notify it to the Commission. 
Furthermore, if it was clear that the agreement could never fulfill the criteria laid down 
in Article 101(3) TFEU, they could declare the agreement null.98 In other situations in 
which a court was asked to decide on an alleged antitrust violation, the court was forced 
to suspend the proceedings until the Commission had decided on whether or not to 
exempt the agreement in question. 
 
National courts were normally faced with claims alleging antitrust violations in the 
context of disputes regarding contractual obligations. The claimant would either allege 
that his co-contractor had breached his contractual obligations or would demand that the 
co-contractor fulfill his contractual obligations. The co-contractor would then counter-
argue that he could not be obliged to fulfill these obligations since the agreement in 
question was violating Article 101 TFEU and had to be considered null.99 Thus, the EU 
antitrust rules were typically used by individuals as a “shield” in order to defend 
themselves against claims, usually based on a contract, but also by third parties 
invoking Article 102 TFEU as a defense, for example, to an intellectual property 
96 See Judgment in BRT v SABAM, C-127/73, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16. 
97 See Commission Notice on the co-operation between national courts and the Commission in applying 
Articles 85 and 86 EEC, OJ C 39, 13.2.1993, p. 6-12, at § 6. 
98 See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 30-31. 
99 See KOMNINOS, A.P., “Introduction” in EHLERMANN, C.-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European 
Competition Policy Annual: 2001 Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Oxford – Portland, 
Oregon, 2003, p. xxi-xlii, at p. xxvii. 
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infringement action brought by a dominant undertaking. On the contrary, the use of the 
EU antitrust rules as a so-called “sword” by lodging a claim before a national court 
requesting damages, restitution, injunctive relief, or interim measures was quite 
unusual.100  
 
The Commission’s monopoly to grant exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU required 
a significant part of the resources assigned to the Directorate-General for Competition 
(hereinafter “DG COMP”).101 In addition, DG COMP tended to exempt most of the 
notified agreements102 or to close the case by a comfort letter, i.e. an informal 
administrative letter either stating that there were no grounds under Article 101(1) or 
102 TFEU to take action in respect of the agreement or conduct notified to it (a so-
called negative clearance), or stating that the agreement fulfilled the conditions for 
granting an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.103 Moreover, as national courts 
could not apply Article 101(3) TFEU, in practice, undertakings could bring court 
proceedings regarding an antitrust violation to a halt by lodging a notification with the 
Commission, thus causing a major obstacle to a more extensive application of the 
antitrust rules by national courts.104 In view of the enlargement of the European Union 
to central and eastern Europe that was about to take place, and would increase the EU 
Member States by ten new members, the notification practice was therefore no longer 
considered as an efficient way of enforcing the EU antitrust rules.105  
 
Consequently, in order not to diminish the enforcement of EU competition law, the EU 
decided to modernize the enforcement model of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by 
100 See JACOBS, F.G., “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Rules: A Community Perspective” in EHLERMANN, C.-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European 
Competition Policy Annual: 2001 Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Oxford – Portland, 
Oregon, 2003, p. 187-232, at p. 189-190. 
101 See WILS, W.P.J., Principles of European Antitrust Enforcement, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2005, at p. 11. 
102 See White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty – 
Corrigendum, COM (99) 101 final, OJ C 132, 12.5.1999, p. 1-33, at § 77. 
103See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, “Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy. Antitrust and 
control of concentrations”. 
104 See White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty – 
Corrigendum, COM (99) 101 final, OJ C 132, 12.5.1999, p. 1-33, at § 100. 
105 See BASEDOW, J., “The modernization of European competition law: a story of unfinished 
concepts”, Tex. Int’l L.J., Volume 42, Number 3, p. 429-439, at p. 429. 
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adopting Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter “Regulation 1/2003”).106 The new 
enforcement framework, which entered into force on May 1st, 2004, decentralized the 
enforcement of EU antitrust rules in that it abolished the Commission’s monopoly to 
grant exemptions and established a directly applicable exception system. Hence, all 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 101(1) TFEU which 
satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU shall not be prohibited and a prior 
decision to that effect is not required.107 Similarly, all agreements and concerted 
practices that infringe Article 101(1) TFEU and are not covered by a block exemption 
or do not fulfill the criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU are automatically void under Article 
101(2) TFEU. As a consequence, companies themselves are to assess whether their 
agreements comply with the EU antitrust rules. The new model has thus abolished the 
ex ante notification system, and is instead based on an ex post control of agreements. As 
a result, the Commission now has more resources to deal with the most serious forms of 
antitrust violations, such as cartels.  
 
The new antitrust enforcement framework establishes a decentralized enforcement 
model where the Commission and the national competition authorities (hereinafter “the 
NCAs”) form a network, the “European Competition Network” (hereinafter “the 
ECN”), for cooperation in the application and enforcement of EU competition policy.108 
It is built on a system of parallel competences in which all competition authorities have 
the power to apply Articles 101 or 102 TFEU,109 and its aim is to ensure an efficient 
division of work, and an effective and consistent application of EU antitrust rules.110 In 
order to achieve this uniform application of the EU antitrust rules throughout the 
106 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25. Regulation 1/2003 
replaced Regulation 17, which had governed the enforcement of the EC antitrust rules for approximately 
40 years and had created a centralized notification system. See EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First 
Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204-211. For more details 
on the institutional framework established by Regulation 1/2003, see Chapter 1 of ORTIZ BLANCO, L., 
EU Competition Procedure, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
107 Article 1(2) of Regulation 1/2003. 
108 See Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 
27.4.2004, p. 43-53, at § 1. 
109 For more details on the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the NCAs, see Chapter 3 of 
ORTIZ BLANCO, L., EU Competition Procedure, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
110 Ibid., at § 3 and 5. 
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European Union, Regulation 1/2003 provides for certain safeguards. As a consequence, 
when a NCA applies Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, it shall inform the Commission in 
writing before or without delay after commencing the first formal investigative 
measure.111 Similarly, it shall inform the Commission at least 30 days before it adopts a 
decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, accepting commitments or 
withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption Regulation.112 If the Commission initiates 
proceedings in a case, the NCAs will be relieved of their competence to apply Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. The Commission may also take over a case that is being dealt with 
by a NCA, but only after consulting with that NCA.113 In addition, when the NCAs rule 
on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU which are 
already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions which would 
run counter to the decision adopted by the Commission.114  
 
In the new decentralized competition enforcement model, national courts may also 
enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.115 As the NCAs, they cannot take decisions 
running counter to a decision already adopted by the Commission. Moreover, they must 
avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the 
Commission in proceedings which it has initiated and, if they deem it necessary for the 
fulfillment of that obligation, the national courts may stay the proceedings in 
question.116  
111 Article 11(3) of Regulation 1/2003. 
112 Article 11(4) of Regulation 1/2003. 
113 Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003. 
114 Article 16(2) of Regulation 1/2003. 
115 For more details on the role played by national courts, see Chapter 2 of ORTIZ BLANCO, L., EU 
Competition Procedure, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
116 Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. It should, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the fact that national 
courts cannot take decisions contrary to Commission Decisions does not mean that public enforcement 
would somehow prevail over private enforcement by civil courts, but only that the Commission, in its 
capacity as a supranational Union organ, has primacy over national courts. See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC 
Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 16. Similarly, if the Commission decides not to 
proceed to find an infringement of the EU antitrust rules, but accepts commitments, the national civil 
courts are not bound by those commitments with regard to the applicability or non-applicability of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and may decide whether or not those rules have been breached. However, 
they cannot undermine the effectiveness of the Commission Decision and, consequently, the judgment 
could only have inter partes res judicata effect, whereas the Commission’s commitments decision would 
be binding erga omnes. National civil courts are also not bound by settlements or leniency programs, but 
remain free to award damages if they find that the EU antitrust rules have been infringed. Ibid, at p. 19-
20. 
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 According to the Commission, the aim of the reform of the enforcement of the EU 
antitrust rules was also to promote private enforcement through national courts, and to 
bring the role national courts play in the enforcement of the antitrust rules in line with 
the important role that they play in the enforcement of EU law in general,117 since both 
Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 101(3) TFEU confer rights on individuals, which 
should be protected by national courts.118 In the new enforcement model, national courts 
thus play a three-fold role by deciding contractual liability proceedings,119 non-
contractual liability proceedings, and granting injunctions. Undertakings, in turn, are 
able to invoke the direct applicability of Article 101(3) TFEU as an argument in their 
defense before the courts, which allows them to obtain immediate civil enforcement of 
those of their restrictive practices which satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Similarly, victims of illegal agreements should be able to obtain damages more 
quickly.120  
 
As Regulation 1/2003 confers national competition authorities and courts the 
competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in full, the modernization of the EU 
antitrust rules has, at least in theory, paved the way for increased private enforcement 
given that national courts are now allowed to also apply Article 101(3) TFEU directly. 
In other words, they can examine whether an alleged anti-competitive agreement or 
practice fulfills the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU, and there is no longer a need to 
stay the national proceeding until the Commission has decided on whether these 
conditions are met or not.121 If the agreement fulfills the criteria laid down in Article 
117 For examples of the importance of the national courts in the enforcement of Union rights, see 
Judgment in van Gend & Loos, C-26/62, EU:C:1963:1 and Judgment in BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, 
paragraphs 15-17.  
118 Recital 2C 1(a) of the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, 
(EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 ("Regulation implementing Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty"), COM (2000) 582 final, OJ C 365E, 19.12.2000, p. 284–296. 
119 Contractual liability proceedings refer to disputes between parties to an agreement, whereas non-
contractual liability proceedings refer to disputes between a third party and one or more parties to the 
agreement, see White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty – Corrigendum, COM (99) 101 final, OJ C 132, 12.5.1999, p. 1-33, at § 100. 
120 Ibid., at § 99-100. 
121 However, it should be noted that although the notifications have been abolished, national courts may 
in certain situations still have an obligation to suspend their proceeding and await the Commission 
Decision on a complaint or an ex officio investigation regarding the same alleged antitrust violation. For 
more details, see Section XXX.  
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101(3) TFEU, the agreement or concerted practice is consequently exempt from the 
application of the prohibition laid down by Article 101(1) TFEU. Conversely, if the 
agreement or concerted practice infringes Article 101(1) TFEU and fails to fulfill all the 
cumulative criteria of Article 101(3) TFEU, the court in question must find the 
existence of an antitrust violation. Moreover, the court must declare the anti-competitive 
agreement or concerted practice null.122  
 
However, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not contain any 
explicit provision on liability in damages for infringements of Article 101 and 102 
TFEU.123 Instead, this right has been deduced from Article 4(3) TEU [ex Article 10 EC] 
and the principle of effectiveness,124 and later explicitly recognized by the European 
Court of Justice (hereinafter “the ECJ”) in Courage.125  
 
First, the ECJ held in BRT v SABAM that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU produce direct 
effects in relations between individuals and “create direct rights in respect of the 
individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard”.126 This means that 
individuals may bring an action before the national courts against an undertaking which 
has infringed Article 101 or 102 TFEU, or they may defend themselves against a claim 
by invoking a breach of these articles.127 
 
Second, Article 4(3) TEU provides that Member States shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from action taken by the institutions of the Union. Moreover, they shall facilitate the 
122 Article 101(2) TFEU. 
123 But in spite of this the Commission has always considered that undertakings bear the risk of being held 
liable to pay damages and interest for antitrust violations to third parties. See JONES, C. A., Private 
Enforcement of Antitrust in the EU, UK and the US, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, at p. 33-
34. 
124 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 9. 
125 Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 26. 
126 Judgment in BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16. According to the doctrine of direct effect, 
articles of the TFEU produce direct effects if they are intended to confer rights on individuals, and are 
sufficiently clear and unconditional. If these conditions are fulfilled, individuals can rely on the Treaty 
Article in question before national courts to enforce the rights it confers on them. See CRAIG, P. and DE 
BÚRCA, G., EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford New 
York, 2011, at p. 186. 
127 See JONES, A. and SUFRIN, B., EU competition law. Text, cases and materials, 4th edition, Oxford 
University Press Inc., New York, 2011, at p. 1185. 
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achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize 
the attainment of the Union’s objectives. Given that the ECJ has held that Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU have direct effect, Member States are obliged to ensure the enforcement 
of those articles and to refrain from measures that could jeopardize the enforcement of 
the EU antitrust rules. 
 
Third, the ECJ has held in numerous judgments starting with Van Gend & Loos128 that 
the full effectiveness of EU law requires that not only the Commission and the Member 
States, but also individuals ensure the fulfillment of the obligations imposed by the 
Treaty.129 Accordingly, individuals should also be entitled to participate in the vigilance 
of the compliance with Union obligations. 
 
The meaning of “effectiveness” can be two-fold: first, it could refer to “effective 
enforcement” in the sense of effective compliance by the Member States with their 
obligations under EU law. Thus, the judicial protection of the individuals concerned 
would only be an instrument to ensure the effective compliance of Member States with 
their obligations and would not be an aim as such. Second, effectiveness could refer to 
“effective judicial protection”, i.e. individuals would have to be able to obtain redress 
when their rights are infringed by a breach of EU law.130  
 
The case law on state liability provides further guidance on this issue and, in fact, 
served as a basis for the ECJ when it confirmed that a civil liability in damages of 
individuals exists for antitrust violations. In Francovich, the ECJ derived the existence 
of state liability from the necessity to protect the rights granted by Community [now 
Union] rules by enabling individuals “to obtain redress when their rights are infringed 
by a breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible”.131 
The Court added that the obligation of Member States to make good such a loss and 
128 Judgment in van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1. 
129 See, for example, Judgment in Kraaijeveld and Others, C-72/95, EU:C:1996:404, paragraph 56, 
Judgment in Muñoz and Superior Fruiticola, C-253/00, EU:C:2002:497, paragraphs 30-31, and NEBBIA, 
P., “Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law: compensation or deterrence?”, E.L. 
Rev., Vol. 33, No. 1, February 2008, p. 23-43, at p. 28-29. 
130 See NEBBIA, P., “Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law: compensation or 
deterrence?”, E.L. Rev., Vol. 33, No. 1, February 2008, p. 23-43, at p. 28-30. 
131 Judgment in Francovich and Bonifaci, C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428, paragraph 33. 
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damage derives from Article 10 EC [now Article 4(3) TEU], and it includes the 
obligation to nullify consequences of a breach of Community [now Union] law.132  
 
In Brasserie du Pêcheur, the ECJ clarified that in the event of an infringement of a right 
directly conferred by a Community [now Union] provision upon which individuals are 
entitled to rely before national courts, “the right to reparation is a necessary corollary 
of the direct effect of the Community provision whose breach caused the damage 
sustained”.133 However, it did not explicitly state that liability in damages would help 
ensuring compliance by the Member States with their obligations under EU law, but 
emphasized the judicial protection rationale of state liability.134  
 
What is more, in Konle, the Court stressed the effective judicial protection by holding 
that Member States are to ensure that individuals obtain reparation for loss and damage 
caused to them by non-compliance with EU law regardless of which public authority is 
responsible for the breach or, under national law, responsible for making reparation.135 
In other words, what matters is that the individual is compensated for his loss regardless 
of whether the breach of EU law has de facto been caused by the Member State,136 and 
the Member State is held responsible for the breach even if the public authority 
responsible for it did not have the necessary powers, knowledge, means or resources.137 
Consequently, the full effectiveness of directly applicable EU law requires that national 
courts may award damages138 in the event of a breach of that law. As a consequence, in 
order to guarantee the full effectiveness of the directly applicable EU antitrust rules, 
victims of an antitrust violation should also be entitled to claim damages.139 
132 Judgment in Francovich and Bonifaci, EU:C:1991:428, paragraph 36. 
133 Judgment in Brasserie du Pêcheur v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State 
for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, C-46/93 and C-48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 22. 
134 See NEBBIA, P., “Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law: compensation or 
deterrence?”, E.L. Rev., Vol. 33, No. 1, February 2008, p. 23-43, at p. 32. 
135 Judgment in Konle, C-302/97, EU:C:1999:271, paragraph 62. 
136 See NEBBIA, P., “Damages actions for the infringement of EC competition law: compensation or 
deterrence?”, E.L. Rev., Vol. 33, No. 1, February 2008, p. 23-43, at p. 34. 
137 Judgment in Haim, C-424/97, EU:C:2000:357, paragraph 28. 
138 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 9. 
139 Similarly, the full effectiveness of directly applicable EU law, including Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
also requires that national courts may grant injunctive relief when they can establish a breach of the 
directly applicable provision in question. 
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 In its case law on state liability the ECJ has thus confirmed that an EU right to damages 
exists for breach of EU law regardless of whether national law recognizes a damages 
remedy for those breaches. In other words, the right to damages is an EU law remedy, 
which national courts must enforce. In the context of antitrust damages actions, Member 
States’ procedural autonomy is therefore limited given that the right to compensation is 
founded directly on EU law, and Member States are obliged to enforce that right. If a 
Member State refused to do so, it could itself be required to pay damages for having 
breached its obligations under Article 4(3) TEU by not providing full protection of 
Union rights.140 
 
In his opinion in Banks, AG van Gerven stated that the right to damages would also be 
applicable in horizontal situations, i.e. where an action for damages is brought by an 
individual or undertaking against another individual or undertaking for breach of a 
directly effective EU provision, in the case at issue Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU. 
According to AG van Gerven, the full effect of EU law requires that an individual who 
has suffered damage as a result of a breach of a right granted under EU law has the 
possibility of seeking compensation from the party responsible for that breach.141      
 
In 1997, in Guérin automobiles v Commission, the ECJ found that any undertaking 
[italics supplied] that has suffered damage as a result of a restrictive practice may rely 
before the national courts on the rights conferred by Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU, 
particularly if the Commission has decided not to act on a complaint, because these 
articles produce direct effect in relations between individuals.142 Consequently, the ECJ 
recognized that undertakings may rely on these Treaty articles to claim damages for loss 
caused by antitrust violations. But it was not until Courage that the Court held that any 
individual [italics supplied] could rely on a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU before the 
national courts, and that this right extended even to a party to a contract that was liable 
140 See JONES, C. A., Private Enforcement of Antitrust in the EU, UK and the US, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1999, at p. 72-73. 
141 Opinion of AG van Gerven in Banks v British Coal, C-128/92, EU:C:1993:860. However, the ECJ did 
not rule on this issue as it reached the conclusion that the relevant Treaty applicable to the case was the 
ECSC Treaty and not the EEC Treaty. Judgment in Banks v British Coal, C-128/92, EU:C:1994:130, at § 
8-10.  
142 Judgment in Guérin automobiles v Commission, C-282/95 P, EU:C:1997:159, paragraph 39. 
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to restrict or distort competition.143 Moreover, the right to seek damages is independent 
of whether or not the Commission is acting on a possible complaint as the ECJ did no 
longer refer to that particular situation. The Court found that a right to damages for 
antitrust violations is necessary in order to ensure the full effectiveness of Article 101 
TFEU and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in that 
provision144 since it discourages anti-competitive agreements and practices, which are 
often secret.145  
 
In Courage, the ECJ thus expressly extended the principles giving rise to a remedy 
against Member States for breaches of EU law to liability for breaches of the EU 
antitrust rules by individuals in that it recognized an EU right to claim damages for 
antitrust violations, arguing that this right is necessary in order to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the antitrust rules. In other words, the judgment created individual 
liability for breaches of Articles 101 and, arguably, 102 TFEU. Moreover, national 
courts are obliged to give effect to the EU right to damages regardless of national 
provisions.146 
 
Although Courage only refers to Article 101 TFEU, any individual that has suffered 
harm as a result of a breach of Article 102 TFEU should also be entitled to bring an 
action for damages, since the full effectiveness of Article 102 TFEU would also be put 
at risk, if any individual could not claim damages for loss caused to him by abusive 
conduct.147 Similarly, even though the ECJ only expressly stated that even contracting 
143 Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24. 
144 Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 26. 
145Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 27. 
146 See JONES, C. A., Private Enforcement of Antitrust in the EU, UK and the US, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1999, at p. 74. 
147 See LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case 
of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), 
Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Volumen VIII, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76, at 
p. 38-39. Although infringements of Article 102 TFEU differ from infringements of Article 101 TFEU in 
that some of the latter infringements are committed through the conclusion of secret agreements which 
already because of their nature are very difficult to detect, putting an end to an abuse of a dominant 
position would, however, also benefit the economy since the abuse could otherwise, for example, lead to 
the foreclosure of the market, ineffective allocation of resources, and higher prices. Consequently, if an 
individual (be it a consumer, customer or competitor) were to bring an action for damages for a breach of 
Article 102 TFEU in a case were the Commission or the NCAs have not taken action, it would contribute 
to the deterrent effect of the EU antitrust rules. Moreover, the ECJ has held that Article 102 TFEU has 
direct effect, and that any undertaking that has suffered damage as a result of restrictive practices may 
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parties could rely on Article 101 TFEU, third parties must also be entitled to bring 
antitrust damages actions.148 This has been confirmed in Manfredi in which an Italian 
court asked in a preliminary reference whether third parties could claim damages for the 
harm suffered as a result of an agreement or concerted practice prohibited by Article 
101 TFEU.149 The ECJ held that “any individual can claim compensation for the harm 
suffered where there is a causal relationship between the harm and an agreement or 
practice prohibited under [Article 101 TFEU]”.150 Provided that the claimant can 
establish a causal relationship between the anti-competitive agreement or practice and 
the harm that he has suffered as a consequence of it, he would thus be entitled to bring 
an antitrust damages action.151  
 
However, as there are no Union procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions, 
but the detailed procedural rules are laid down by Member States,152 the ECJ reiterated 
in Courage its earlier case law,153 pursuant to which EU law does not prevent national 
courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by EU law 
does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them.154 EU law does also not 
prevent national courts from denying a party who is found to bear significant 
responsibility for the distortion of competition the right to obtain damages from the 
other contracting party, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
rely before the national courts on rights conferred by Article 102 TFEU. There is no reason to assume 
that, for instance, consumers harmed by an infringement of Article 101 TFEU would be entitled to claim 
damages whereas they would be denied that right in case of a breach of Article 102 TFEU. See Judgment 
in BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16 and Judgment in Guérin automobiles v Commission, 
EU:C:1997:159, paragraph 39. 
148 See LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case 
of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), 
Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Volumen VIII, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76, at 
p. 39.    
149 Judgment in Manfredi, C-295/04-C-298/04, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 21. 
150 Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 61. 
151 See LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case 
of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), 
Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Volumen VIII, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76, at 
p. 39. 
152 Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 29. 
153 E.g. Judgment in Ireks-Arkady v Council and Commission, C-238/78, EU:C:1979:226, paragraph 14, 
Judgment in Hans Just I/S v Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, C-68/79 EU:C:1980:57, paragraph 26, 
and Judgment in Michaïlidis, C-441/98 and C-442/98, EU:C:2000:479, paragraph 31. 
154 Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 30. 
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respected.155 This means that the procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions 
may not be less favorable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of 
equivalence), and that they may not render practically impossible or excessively 
difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (principle of effectiveness).156 
Therefore, national courts must abstain from applying any national rule that impedes the 
awarding of damages for antitrust violations, unless those rules are also permitted under 
EU law.157 Arguably, this is also a logical consequence of the doctrine of supremacy of 
EU law, according to which EU law prevails over national law,158 since it would not 
make much sense if Member States could undermine rights conferred by EU law by 
applying national rules, of substantive or procedural nature, which would hinder the 
enforcement of those rights. 
 
The fact that national courts are entrusted the enforcement of Union rights is neither 
new nor surprising in the Union legal system since already in van Gend & Loos, the 
ECJ established the complementary nature of public and private enforcement of rights 
derived from Community [now Union] law by stating:  
 
“The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective 
supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 [now 258 TFEU] 
and 170 [now 259 TFEU] to the diligence of the Commission and of the Member 
States”.159  
155 Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 31. According to the ECJ, when assessing whether 
the claimant is entitled to compensation, the national court seized with the claim must take into account 
the economic and legal context in which the parties find themselves and the respective bargaining power 
and conduct of the two parties to the contract. The national court must, in particular, ascertain whether the 
claimant found himself in a markedly weaker position than the other party, which would seriously 
compromise or even eliminate “his freedom to negotiate the terms of the contract and his capacity to 
avoid the loss or reduce its extent, in particular by availing himself in good time of all the legal remedies 
available to him”. Paragraphs 32-33. 
156 Judgment in Palmisani v INPS, C-261/95, EU:C:1997:351, paragraph 27, and Judgment in Courage, 
EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 29. 
157 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 30, and LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of 
third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ 
BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), Derecho de la competencia europeo y 
español. Volumen VIII, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76, at p. 43. As mentioned above, national 
courts may, for instance, take steps to ensure that the protection of the rights guaranteed by EU law does 
not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them.    
158 See Judgment in Costa, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66, and CRAIG, P. and DE BÚRCA, G., EU Law. Text, 
Cases and Materials, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 2011, at p. 256-258. 
159 Judgment in van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1. 
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 But, the vigilance of individuals of the compliance with the EU antitrust rules by 
enforcing their Union right to damages for antitrust violations has not worked very well 
in practice. The under-enforcement of antitrust rules through private actions in the EU 
was revealed by a study on claims for damages in case of infringement of the EU 
antitrust rules that was commissioned by the Commission and was delivered by the 
Ashurst law firm in August 2004.160 The study found that private enforcement in the EU 
showed an “astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment”.161 At the time of the 
report, it was estimated that damages actions had only been judged in around 60 
cases.162 
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that – contrary to the conclusion made in the Ashurst 
Study, according to which private enforcement throughout the EU would be 
underdeveloped163 – Germany constitutes an exception because several hundred cases 
of civil proceedings are brought every year.164 But most of the actions brought in 
Germany concern abuses of a dominant position or vertical agreements,165 whereas 
victims of hardcore cartels have traditionally seldom been awarded damages.166 
Similarly, later research has also found more private litigation cases in Spain, France, 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Sweden, although in 
many of the cases undertakings have used the competition rules as defenses to breach of 
contract claims.167 
 
160 See WAELBROECK, D., SLATER, D. and EVEN-SHOSHAN, G., “Ashurst Study on the conditions 
of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules”, August 31st, 2004 (hereinafter 
“Ashurst Study”). 
161 See Ashurst Study, at p. 1.  
162 Idem. 
163 Idem. 
164 See BUNDESKARTELLAMT, “Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven”, 
Diskussionspapier für die Sitzung des Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht am 26. September 2005, at p. 4. See 
also infra, Section 3.3. “Germany”. 
165 RODGER, B.J., (ed.), Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress 
across the EU, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2014, at p. 146-147. 
166 See BÖGE, U., “Up and Running, or is it? Private Enforcement – the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives”, E.C.L.R., Volume 27, Issue 4, 2006, p. 197-205, at p. 197-198. 
167 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: “Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-20122” Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, 
available at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf, at p. 1. 
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However, in spite of the situation in some Member States, the overall scarcity of 
antitrust damages actions in the EU is at first sight surprising taking into account that 
the ECJ already held in BRT v SABAM that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU produce direct 
effects in relations between individuals and “create direct rights in respect of the 
individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard”.168 This can partly be 
explained by the Commission’s previous monopoly to grant an individual exemption for 
agreements infringing Article 101(1) TFEU, but satisfying the conditions of Article 
101(3) TFEU, which tended to paralyze private actions pending before the national 
court until the Commission had dealt with the notification for exemption.169 
Consequently, private enforcement did not begin to receive more attention in Europe 
until the modernization of the EU antitrust rules took place, and facilitated the 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU by national courts and, approximately at the same 
time, the ECJ held in Courage that any individual can rely on a breach of Article 101(1) 
TFEU before the national courts.170 
 
But despite the existence of a Union right to damages, the number of damages actions 
brought has been comparatively low in many Member States, even though there has 
been an increase after the modernization of the antitrust rules. Between May 1st, 2004 
and the third quarter of 2007, 96 antitrust damages actions based on the EU competition 
rules or on both national and EU rules were brought.171 However, according to the 
External Impact Study on the White Paper prepared by the Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and LUISS Guido Carli, these actions were only 
brought in 10 Member States.172 The majority (61) of the actions brought concerned 
vertical restraints whereas only 13 concerned horizontal agreements, concerted practices 
168 Judgment in BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16. 
169 See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 29. 
170 Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24. 
171 See External Impact Study, at p. 38-39. 
172 Ibid., at p. 40. It should, nevertheless, be noted that this finding of the External Impact Study is not 
entirely accurate since, during the period examined in the study, damages actions were brought (although 
they were not resolved then), for example, in Finland, and Finland does not figure among the ten Member 
States enumerated in the study. See Case Qvist v. John Crane Safematic, The District Court of Central-
Finland, No. 05/631, and Case VPT v. Stora Enso, District Court of Imatra, No. 04/597. It is therefore 
likely that some more damages actions were brought in that period, but it does not change the fact that the 
number is still likely to be modest. For more recent estimates, see the research project “Competition Law: 
Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress in the EU” described in the next paragraph.  
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or naked cartels. Actions based on an abuse of dominance accounted for 22 cases. No 
damages were awarded in the cases involving vertical restraints in final judgments, 
while 46% of the cartel cases and 55% of the abuse of dominance cases resulted in 
damages awards. As a consequence, antitrust damages actions are often not successful. 
In addition, stand-alone actions173 are rare, and most of the actions brought tend to be 
follow-on174 actions.175 In other words, it is more common that damages actions are 
brought once the competition authorities have established the existence of an antitrust 
violation. 
 
According to the research project “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement 
and Collective Redress in the EU” regarding the period 1999-2012 led by Professor 
Barry Rodger and financed by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, there have 
been more private enforcement cases than estimated in particular in Germany, Spain, 
France United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Sweden, although 
usually the competition law rules are used as a defense by companies in commercial 
contract disputes.176 But the results (which are preliminary data and not strictly 
accurate) indicate that in many cases other remedies than damages were sought, or the 
damages claims were unsuccessful.177 Overall, the research project concluded that 
private enforcement of competition law in the EU is “a very mixed landscape”.178  
173 A stand-alone action refers to an action for damages that is brought when there is no prior decision 
from a competition authority finding an antitrust violation. See Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 
COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 18. 
174 The term “follow-on action” is used to describe an action for damages that is brought on the back of a 
decision adopted by public (competition) authorities. See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 
1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 
672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 6-7. 
175 See External Impact Study, at p. 40. 
176 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012, Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, available 
at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf.  
177 See AHRC Project on Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress, LSE September 15th 
Conference Rapporteur Presentations: Matrix of competition private enforcement cases from the 24 
rapporteurs who presented at the conference, available at  
http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/LSEConferencePresentationNotes.pdf.  
178 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012 Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, available 
at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf. This has been confirmed at least with regard to 
follow-on actions, since the Commission has estimated that between 2006 and 2012 claims for damages 
were brought as follow-on actions based on Commission Decisions only in seven Member States, most of 
them were brought in Germany, the United Kingdom and Netherlands. See Commission Staff Working 
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 In order to find a solution to remedy the under-enforcement of antitrust rules in the EU, 
which the Ashurst Study had revealed,179 as a first step, the Commission published a 
Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules180 and a 
Commission Staff Working Paper,181 an annex to the Green Paper, in December 2005. 
The Green Paper and the Commission Staff Working Paper address the conditions for 
bringing damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules. They also identify 
obstacles to the existing framework, and present different alternatives to solve the 
problems related to the current system with a view to facilitating private enforcement of 
EU competition law. The Green Paper was submitted to public consultation in order to 
stimulate debate and consult stakeholders on several possible options which could 
facilitate private damages actions.182 
 
In its 2007 Legislative and Work Program,183 the Commission endorsed that a White 
Paper on damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules be prepared. It published a 
call for tenders for provision of an impact study on the White Paper in order to facilitate 
the preparation of the White Paper and the accompanying impact assessment.184 The 
impact study was prepared by the Centre for European Policies Studies together with 
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali 
Guido Carli.185 It analyzed the potential impact of more effective private damages 
Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages actions for breach of the EU antitrust 
rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under 
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 19. Hereinafter this document will be referred to 
as “Impact Assessment Report on the Draft Directive”. 
179 See Ashurt Study, at p. 1. 
180 Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 
final, 19.12.2005. 
181 Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions 
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005. 
182 See DG Competition’s web page on damages actions, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html.  
183 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Commission Legislative and Work 
Programme 2007, COM(2006) 629 final, 24.10.2006, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0629en01.pdf. 
184 See Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008, at p. 5. 
185 See External Impact Study. 
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actions based on the breach of antitrust rules in the EU, and assessed the available 
options to encourage meritorious damages actions before national courts of the Member 
States.186 It found that several measures facilitating antitrust damages actions would 
ensure the adequate compensation for victims, enhance deterrence of unlawful conduct 
and have positive overall economic effects. Moreover, it identified the measures that 
were most likely to minimize negative effects.187 
 
This study then served as key input for the Commission when the latter prepared its 
Impact Assessment Report188 accompanying the White Paper,189 but the Commission 
conducted its own analysis of the study and the material gathered during consultation of 
various stakeholders. As a result, it partly reached divergent conclusions from those 
presented in the External Impact Study. The Impact Assessment Report analyzed a wide 
variety of different policy options.190 The Commission stated that some of them could 
also be assessed by other Directorates-General of the Commission and, based on all 
these assessments, the Commission would closely coordinate various initiatives, in 
particular with regard to collective redress.191 
 
In April 2008, the Commission published a White Paper on Damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules in which it presented policy options and specific measures that 
aimed to ensure that all victims of infringements of the EU antitrust rules would have 
access to effective redress mechanisms in order to obtain full compensation for the harm 
that they have suffered as a result of the infringements.192 The White Paper was 
186 Ibid., at p. 27. 
187 See Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008, at p. 8. 
188 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008. 
189 Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 
final, 2.4.2008. 
190 See Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact assessment, SEC(2008) 405, 2.4.2008, at p. 8. 
191 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 9. 
192 See Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 
165 final, 2.4.2008.  
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accompanied by a Commission Staff Working Paper,193 which developed the principles 
of the White Paper in more detail. The White Paper and the Commission Staff Working 
Paper were submitted to public consultation until mid-July 2008.194 
 
The Commission White Paper contained proposals and recommendations e.g. on 
standing, access to evidence through inter partes disclosure, collective actions, the 
passing-on defense, costs of damages actions, calculation of damages, and the 
interaction between damages actions and leniency programs.195 For instance, the 
Commission proposed a minimum level of inter partes disclosure in antitrust damages 
cases when the claimant has been able to assert sufficient facts to establish a plausible 
claim that it has suffered some harm as a consequence of an antitrust violation. In 
addition, the claimant would have to demonstrate that it is unable to assert the specific 
facts or produce the means of evidence for which it is requesting disclosure, and must 
specify sufficiently precise categories of information or means of evidence to be 
disclosed. Finally, the court seized with the claim would have to verify whether the 
disclosure measure is relevant to the case, necessary and proportional in scope.196 
 
The Commission also suggested that victims of antitrust violations should be entitled to 
bring an “opt-in” collective action for damages or be represented in a representative 
action for damages by qualified entities. Qualified entities should include entities 
designated in advance by the Member States according to national procedures, 
representing legitimate and defined interests. Alternatively, other existing entities could 
be certified in order to bring a representative action in relation to a particular 
infringement on an ad hoc basis. This second option would be limited to entities whose 
primary task is to protect the defined interests of their members, such as trade 
associations defending the interests of their members, active in a given industry. Both 
forms of qualified entities that have standing in one Member State should also 
automatically be granted standing in all other Member States. These forms of collective 
193 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008. 
194 See  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html. 
195 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 12. 
196 Ibid., at p. 31. 
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actions were to ensure a minimum level of protection, but Member States could decide 
to go beyond these types of actions conforming to their legal traditions.197  
 
As regards the distribution of damages in collective actions, the White Paper stated that, 
in case of representative actions, in principle, the damages should be used to 
compensate the harm suffered by those represented in the action. Only exceptionally 
could it be necessary to reflect on the possibility to award damages to the representative 
entity which would distribute the damages to related entities, or use them for related 
purposes.198 In an opt-in collective action the damages would be awarded to the 
individually identified claimants according to the harm suffered by them.199  
 
Furthermore, the Commission proposed that final decisions by national competition 
authorities finding an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU should have a binding 
effect on national courts when they decide an action for damages based on an 
infringement of the EU antitrust rules. Similarly, national courts should be bound by 
final rulings by review courts upholding a NCA decision, or themselves finding an 
infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.200 The binding effect of NCA decisions 
would thus be similar to that of the Commission’s own decisions but, under Article 267 
TFEU, national courts could, and in certain situations must,201 seek clarification on the 
interpretation of Article 101 or 102 TFEU made by the NCA.202 In addition, it would be 
possible to make the binding effect of an NCA decision from another Member State 
197 Ibid., at p. 18-20. 
198 The distribution of damages would hence be a cy pres distribution meaning that the damages are not 
distributed directly to those injured to compensate for the harm that they suffered but are used to achieve 
a result which is as close as possible. See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 
accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 
final, 2.4.2008, at p. 18-20. 
199 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 21. 
200 Ibid., at p. 43-45. 
201 Pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, a court of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law must make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ if a decision on the 
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. 
202 The aim of this proposal is to enhance the consistent application of the EU antitrust rules and relieve 
the claimants of the burden to demonstrate again the infringement that has already been established by the 
NCA. See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 43-45. Consequently, a 
national court seized with an antitrust damages claim would not have to re-examine whether an 
infringement of the antitrust rules exists, but would examine whether there is a causal relationship 
between the infringement and the alleged harm and, if that is so, decide the quantum of damages. 
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subject to the requirement that it be compatible with the public policy of the Member 
State where the damages claim is brought.203  
 
As regards the requirement under national law of fault as a condition for a damages 
claim based on an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, the Commission 
maintained that it must be limited to very exceptional situations, and that once it has 
been proven that the defendant has infringed the EU antitrust rules, it could only escape 
liability if it could demonstrate that the infringement was the result of an excusable 
error. In order for the error to be considered excusable, the defendant must show that “a 
reasonable person in the same circumstances applying a high standard of care could 
not reasonably have been aware that the conduct restricted competition”.204  
 
With regard to the scope and calculation of damages, the Commission argued that the 
Union acquis regarding the definition of damages should be codified in a Union 
legislative instrument in order to provide legal certainty, and it should constitute a 
minimum standard for the scope of damages.205 It recalled that the ECJ had confirmed 
in Manfredi206 that a victim of an antitrust violation has the right to obtain full 
compensation for the harm suffered, and that this includes compensation for both actual 
loss (damnum emergens) and loss of profit (lucrum cessans) as well as interest.207 
Moreover, the ECJ has not considered punitive damages to be contrary to European 
public order and, according to the principle of equivalence, they are therefore available 
for an infringement of the EU antitrust rules if they are available for an infringement of 
national competition law and are awarded in accordance with the general principles of 
EU law. The Commission concluded that the broad concept of full compensation does 
not exclude the calculation of antitrust damages by the ex aequo et bono method (i.e. the 
203 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 48. 
204 Ibid., at p. 52-53. 
205 Ibid., at p. 58-59. 
206 Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 95. 
207 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 56. 
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court could award a reasonable amount of damages which would be based on some 
economic approximation) or by using simplified rules of estimation.208  
 
The White Paper also contained suggestions on how to treat the passing-on of over-
charges to the next level in the production or distribution chain. It suggested that in 
order to ensure the full compensation of the actual [emphasis supplied] harm that the 
victim of an antitrust violation has suffered, the defendant must be able to invoke the 
passing-on defense against a claimant who is not a final consumer if the claimant has 
passed on to its clients the overcharge that it has paid because of the antitrust violation. 
The defendant must prove that the claimant has passed on the overcharge to the next 
level in the distribution chain and the extent to which it has passed on the overcharge. 
Furthermore, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of antitrust damages claims, the 
standard of proof should not be lower than the standard to which the claimant has to 
prove the existence and the amount of its damages.209  
 
With a view to easing indirect purchasers’ burden of proving the passing-on of the 
overcharge, the White Paper proposed that they could rely on rebuttable presumption 
that the overcharge that the defendant illegally imposed on the direct purchaser has been 
passed on in its entirety down to their level. However, the indirect purchaser must still 
prove the infringement, the existence of the initial overcharge as well as the damage that 
it has suffered. Finally, in order to avoid situations of over- and under-compensation 
208 Ibid., at p. 55-59. In addition, the Commission stated that it intended to issue pragmatic, non-binding 
guidance for the calculation of antitrust damages. Ibid., at p. 60-61. To this aim, as a first step, it 
commissioned a study from Oxera, which was published in December 2009. See OXERA, “Quantifying 
antitrust damages. Towards non-binding guidance for courts”, Study prepared for the European 
Commission, December 2009. Based on that study, the Commission published in 2011 a Draft Guidance 
Paper on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. See Draft Guidance Paper Quantifying Harm in Actions for 
Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union - Public Consultation, Brussels, June 2011. Finally, in June 2013, the Commission issued a 
communication on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 
TFEU, which were accompanied by a Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based 
on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. See Communication from the Commission on quantifying 
harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, OJ C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 19-21; and Commission Staff Working Document – 
Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Accompanying the Communication from the 
Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, SWD(2013) 205, 11.6.2013. 
209 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 64-65. 
98 
 
                                                 
when purchasers at different levels in the distribution chain bring a joint action or 
parallel or consecutive actions for antitrust damages, the White Paper encouraged 
national courts to use all mechanisms available to that aim under national, Union or 
international law.210  
 
With regard to the costs of antitrust damages actions, the Commission recalled that 
these actions tend to be lengthy and complex, and their outcome can be difficult to 
assess. Thus, the fact that most Member States currently apply the “loser pays” principle 
and the claimant must pay certain fees in advance may discourage potential claimants 
from bringing an action if the court fees are high. However, the Commission did not 
propose any common Union rules regarding the costs of antitrust damages actions, but 
encouraged Member States to reflect on their cost rules in order to facilitate meritorious 
actions. It encouraged the Member States to design procedural rules that foster 
settlements, since settlements could mitigate the costs for antitrust damages actions,211 
and to empower national courts to issue cost orders derogating from the normal cost 
rules. On the whole, the Commission encouraged the Member States to adjust their 
court fees so that they would not to constitute a disincentive to antitrust damages 
actions.212 
 
Too short limitation periods could also constitute an obstacle to the recovery of antitrust 
damages. The White Paper therefore recalls the Union acquis, according to which 
limitation periods may not render antitrust damages actions practically impossible or 
excessively difficult, for instance, if a short limitation period starts to run from the 
moment in which the infringement began and cannot be suspended. In order to ensure 
effective antitrust damages actions, the Commission hence suggested that if the antitrust 
violation is continuous or repeated, the limitation period cannot start to run before the 
day on which the violation has ceased. Furthermore, it should not start to run before the 
victim of the antitrust violation can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of the 
infringement and of the harm it caused it. With regard to follow-on actions, the 
Commission also proposed that a new limitation period of at least two years would start 
210 Ibid., at p. 66-68. 
211 Ibid., at p. 74-76. 
212 Ibid., at p. 79. 
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to run once the infringement decision on which the claimant relies its antitrust damages 
action has become final.213  
 
In addition, the White Paper aimed to ensure that private enforcement will not have 
negative effects on the public enforcement of the EU antitrust rules. The objective was 
to avoid that the risks of damages actions would discourage companies that have 
participated in cartels from informing the Commission by the means of leniency 
applications of the existence of those cartels.214 In order to achieve this objective, the 
Commission stressed the need to protect the disclosure of corporate statements215 
submitted by leniency applicants by not making them available in antitrust damages 
actions. In the Commission’s view, this protection should apply to all leniency 
applications related to an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, i.e. both to those submitted 
to the Commission and those submitted to a NCA, in order to increase legal certainty 
and the efficiency of the ECN. The Commission also wished to avoid that voluntary 
disclosure of corporate statements by leniency applicants would affect negatively on the 
competition authorities’ investigations and, therefore, maintained that this must be 
precluded at least until the statement of objections has been issued. Finally, the 
Commission invited to further reflection on whether it would be possible to limit the 
immunity [emphasis supplied] recipient’s civil liability to its direct and indirect 
contractual partners.216 
 
However, the White Paper did not contain any reference to the legal basis on which the 
Commission would base the proposed measures, but merely stated that the ECJ 
judgments Courage and Manfredi have indirectly confirmed the competence of the 
Union to adopt legislative measures aimed at making antitrust damages actions more 
effective.217 On the other hand, even though procedural rules fall under Member States’ 
213 Ibid., at p. 70-73. 
214 Ibid., at 84-85. 
215 By corporate statements the Commission refers to “all those voluntary presentations, by or on behalf 
of an undertaking to the competition authority, of the undertaking’s knowledge of a cartel and its role 
therein, which are drawn up specifically for submission under the Leniency Notice”. See Commission 
Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 86.  
216 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 85-89. 
217 Ibid., at p. 97, Note 164. 
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competence, this does not exclude the possibility of a harmonization at the Union level. 
For example, under Article 103 TFEU, the Council may lay down regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and, 
therefore, it should be examined whether this article could constitute an appropriate 
legal basis for a harmonization of the national procedural rules governing antitrust 
damages actions. 
 
In December 2008, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
issued an opinion on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions for the Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs. In general, it welcomed the Commission’s 
proposals in the White Paper, but called on establishing two conditions for commencing 
collective actions, i.e. first, the merits of the action should be assessed by an appropriate 
national authorizing body and, second, there should be some preliminary attempt or 
recommendation to the parties to reach settlement through alternative dispute 
resolution.218 On the whole, it considered that the Commission should encourage 
arrangements for out-of-court settlements. In addition, it found that Member States 
should take appropriate measures to reduce costs associated with antitrust damages 
actions, for example, by limiting the level of court fees.219  
  
In January 2009, the Committee on Legal Affairs issued its opinion on the White Paper 
on Antitrust Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs.220 The main suggestions which it made included the same type of 
recommendations regarding collective actions as the Committee on the Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection had proposed in its opinion. In addition, the Committee on 
Legal Affairs found that any proposal in that area should be based on a model that could 
also be applied to other kinds of disputes in order to provide judicial protection for 
consumers in similar cases.221 Similarly, the court seized should have wide powers to 
218 See Opinion of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee on the White Paper on 
Antitrust Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 
3.12.2008, at § 6. 
219 Ibid., at § 7-9. 
220 Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions for the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 22.1.2009. 
221 Ibid., at § 2c). 
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deliver a preliminary ruling on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the case.222 
Furthermore, the Committee on Legal Affairs considered that it would be advantageous 
for victims of antitrust violations if undertakings offered a just settlement to them in 
exchange of a reduction in the fine imposed on them for that violation.223 It also 
expected that an independent cost/benefit analysis would be conducted before any 
legislative proposal.224  
 
In March 2009, the European Economic and Social Committee (hereinafter “EESC”) 
issued its opinion on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions.225 The Committee 
welcomed the Commission White Paper226 and was in favor of a more effective system 
allowing victims of antitrust violations to receive fair compensation for the damage 
suffered. It considered that the Commission should codify in a Union legislative 
instrument the Union acquis on the scope of damages that victims of antitrust violations 
can recover and draw up a framework with non-binding guidance for quantification of 
damages. Moreover, it invited the Commission to encourage the use of out-of-court 
systems in the EU and improve their quality, but noted that they can only offer a 
credible alternative for providing redress for victims if mechanisms for effective judicial 
redress by courts were available.227  
 
As the other Committees which have issued opinions on the White Paper on Antitrust 
Damages Actions, the EESC also stressed the importance of coordinated collective 
redress for antitrust violations with other proposals on collective redress, i.e. those 
envisaged by the Directorate General for Health and Consumers (hereinafter “DG 
SANCO”). But it proposed that the Commission should clarify whether it would be 
possible to bring a representative action on behalf of a group of unidentified persons, 
since it considered that this possibility would be appropriate in certain circumstances 
involving a large number of victims. It was, however, opposed to the introduction of 
222 Ibid., at § 4. 
223 Ibid., at § 6. 
224 Ibid., at § 7. 
225 See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the White paper on damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, OJ C 228, 25.3.2009,  p. 40-46. 
226 Ibid., at p. 40. 
227 Ibid., at p. 42-43. 
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contingency fees in the EU,228 but believed that the Commission should examine the 
existing cost rules, and that meritorious actions should be allowed if costs otherwise 
prevented these claims from being brought. In addition, it suggested that notification 
and collection of putative claimants could be made through a public European electronic 
register of actions.229 
 
End-March 2009, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs published a report 
on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions.230 The principles contained in that 
report were essentially adopted as such by the European Parliament in its resolution of 
March 26th, 2009 on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions231 and, therefore, 
instead of examining the report and resolution separately, the analysis will now focus on 
the resolution of the European Parliament. However, in this context, it is interesting to 
note that the rapporteur of the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs doubts, first, that private-law enforcement mechanisms are under-developed in 
the Member States and, second, that the Commission has competence for its proposals 
on antitrust damages actions.232 Arguably, his conclusions on both issues are incorrect, 
but this will be discussed further in Sections 3.2-3.7 and Chapter Four of the thesis. 
Similarly, inter alia, his arguments in favor of limiting collective actions to opt-in 
representative actions and opt-in collective actions, and not regulating access to 
evidence at the Union level233 will be examined and refuted in Chapters Four and Five.  
 
On the whole, the European Parliament welcomed the White Paper and stressed the 
importance of ensuring effective enforcement of the EU antitrust rules by making it 
possible for victims of antitrust violations to claim compensation for the damage 
228 Ibid., at p. 44. 
229 Ibid., at p. 45-46. It should be noted that the suggestions and remarks of the EESC described here are 
not exhaustive, but only include some of the most interesting ones with regard to the Commission White 
Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions that do not fully accept the Commission’s proposals, or add a new 
aspect, or are relevant taking into account the focus of this thesis. 
230 COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, “Report on the White Paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (2008/2154(INI)), March 9th, 2009. 
231 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)). 
232 See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, “Report on the White Paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (2008/2154(INI)), March 9th, 2009, at p. 9. 
233 Ibid., at p. 9-10. 
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suffered.234 Nevertheless, it noted that the Commission had not specified a legal basis 
for its proposals, although they would intervene in national proceedings for non-
contractual damages and national procedural law.235 The European Parliament recalled 
that existing obstacles to effective private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules, such as 
mass and dispersed damage and information asymmetries, also occur in other areas, for 
instance, product liability and other consumer-related actions. Thus, although it was in 
favor of setting up mechanisms to improve collective redress while avoiding excessive 
litigation, it highlighted that measures at Union level must not lead to arbitrary or 
unnecessary fragmentation of national procedural laws. The European Parliament 
therefore asked the Commission to examine the possible legal bases and how to proceed 
in a horizontal and integrated way. Moreover, the Commission should refrain from 
presenting any collective redress mechanism for antitrust damages without allowing the 
Parliament to participate in the adoption of it.236  
 
Furthermore, the Parliament requested that only a clearly delimited group of claimants 
be eligible to participate in collective redress actions, and that the identification of the 
members of that group must be completed without unnecessary delay. The 
compensation must also be paid to the identified group of claimants, and qualified 
entities may be compensated only for the costs of bringing the action. The Parliament 
thus stressed that only damage actually suffered should be compensated.237  
 
It is worth noting that the rapporteur of the report of the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions argued that the 
doctrine of cy pres would not be compatible with the principle of only compensating 
damage actually suffered since it would result in damage actually incurred not being 
compensated.238 Consequently, the rapporteur objected that a principle of cy pres be 
234 See European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), at § 1. 
235 Ibid., at § 2. 
236 Ibid., at § 3-5. 
237 Ibid., at § 10. 
238 See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, “Report on the White Paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (2008/2154(INI)), March 9th, 2009, at p. 10. 
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introduced,239 something that the Commission had proposed in its White Paper for 
exceptional situations where it would not be possible to directly compensate the damage 
suffered and, therefore, the representative entity would distribute the damages to related 
entities or use them for related purposes.240 
 
In the Parliament’s view, the merits of a collective action should be assessed in a 
preliminary stage of the procedure. On the whole, claimants in collective redress actions 
were to be treated identically with individual claimants.241 Nonetheless, the European 
Parliament admitted that, given the more advanced analysis of civil competition law 
redress and the advanced framework of competition authorities, it would be justified to 
move forward rapidly in certain areas by already proposing sectoral measures with 
regard to the particular complexities and difficulties which victims of antitrust 
violations face. Some of these measures could then later be extended to other fields of 
law.242 
 
The Parliament also considered that it would be desirable to achieve a “once-for-all 
settlement” for defendants in order to reduce uncertainty and exaggerated economic 
effects and, consequently, called for an assessment of a possible introduction of an out-
of-court settlement for mass claims.243 In the Parliament’s opinion, competition 
authorities should also take into account compensation paid or to be paid when 
determining the fine, which they intend to impose on antitrust infringers, but this should 
neither affect the full compensation of the damage caused by the antitrust violation nor 
endanger the deterrent effect of fines.244 
 
According to the resolution, the Commission should, in principle, be obliged to allow 
victims of antitrust violations access to necessary information for prosecuting damages 
239 See KORTMANN, J.S. and SWAAK, C.R.A., “The EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions: 
why the Member States are (right to be) less than enthusiastic”, E.C.L.R., Vol. 30, Issue 7, 2009, p. 340-
351, at p. 344. 
240 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 20. 
241 See European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), at § 12. 
242 Ibid., at § 6. 
243 Ibid., at § 7.  
244 Ibid., at § 11. 
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actions since Article 15 TFEU [ex Article 255 EC] and Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001245 provide for a right of access to documents of the Union’s institutions.246 
Finally, the European Parliament insisted that any legislative proposal be preceded by 
an independent cost-benefit analysis.247  
 
In May 2009, an unpublished Proposal for a Council Directive on rules governing 
damages actions for infringements of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (hereinafter “the 
Failed Draft Directive”)248 was leaked to the press. It essentially built on the proposals 
in the White Paper, with a few exceptions, and, in addition, provided for additional 
safeguards regarding representative actions and access to evidence.249 Its aim was to 
ensure in all Member States access to effective redress mechanisms by reducing the 
main obstacles to victims’ right to obtain compensation for antitrust damages, and to 
establish common minimum guarantees on antitrust damages actions. In this manner, 
the Failed Draft Directive aimed to give full effect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to 
create a level-playing field for undertakings and consumers.250  
 
The Failed Draft Directive intended to take into account the feed-back received from 
stakeholders in the public consultations relating to the Green Paper and the White 
Paper. It maintained that the Commission’s approach based on compensation found 
practically full support amongst stakeholders, whereas there were objections to 
measures which would primarily pursue an objective of deterrence through antitrust 
damages actions, such as opt-out class actions, pre-trial discovery and multiple 
damages.251  
245 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 
31.5.2001, p. 43-48. 
246 See European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), at § 13. 
247 Ibid., at § 24. 
248 See Proposal for a Council Directive on rules governing damages actions for infringements of Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, Annex III of LOWE, P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law 
Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts 
and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014. 
249 Explanatory Memorandum on the Failed Draft Directive, at p. 5. The content of the Failed Directive 
will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
250 Ibid., at p. 3. 
251 Ibid., at p. 4. 
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 However, the Failed Draft Directive was withdrawn by the Commission in October 
2009252 and it was not until June 2013 that another Draft Directive253 was published. 
The likely reason for the withdrawal is the lack of potential support amongst 
stakeholders as it was generally considered as controversial, especially by the business 
lobbies. 
 
In December 2009, the external study “Quantifying antitrust damages. Towards non-
binding guidance for courts” prepared for the European Commission by Oxera and a 
multi-jurisdictional team of lawyers led by Dr Assimakis Komninos was published.254 
The study provides a brief overview of the toolkit of economic methods, models and 
techniques for damages calculation in the context of private enforcement of the EU 
antitrust rules. In addition, it identifies some further insights provided by the economics 
and finance literature and legal precedent that can assist in calculating damages. The 
aim of the study is to assist the Commission in developing guidance for the calculation 
of antitrust damages.255 
 
Drawing on the external study, the Commission published in 2011 a Draft Guidance 
Paper on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,256 which was subject to a 
public consultation. The Guidance Paper aims to assist national courts and parties to 
damages actions by making information relevant for quantifying the harm caused by 
antitrust violations more widely available, including the existing key methods and 
252 See CHELLEL, K., “Competition class actions suffer setback as EU shuns directive” The Lawyer, 
October 6th, 2009. 
253 Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013. 
254 See OXERA, “Quantifying antitrust damages. Towards non-binding guidance for courts”, Study 
prepared for the European Commission, December 2009, available at 
 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_study.pdf. 
255 Ibid., at p. i- ii. 
256 Draft Guidance Paper Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - Public Consultation, Brussels, June 2011, 
available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_actions_damages/draft_guidance_paper_en.pdf. 
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techniques to quantify such harm.257 A number of law firms, bar associations, public 
authorities, organizations and research institutions across the EU submitted their views 
on the Guidance Paper.258 A final version of the Guidance Paper259 was published in 
June 2013, and it was attached to a communication on quantifying harm in antitrust 
damages actions260 adopted by the Commission on the same day. The Communication 
refers to the main existing principles governing the quantification of damages, such as 
the right to full compensation for harm suffered as a result of an infringement of Article 
101 or 102 TFEU, including the actual loss and loss of profit and interest, which are 
then further developed in the Practical Guide. However, the Practical Guide does not 
have a binding character, and it does not modify the national legal rules governing 
actions for damages or affect the rights and obligations of the Member States or natural 
or legal persons under EU law.261  
 
The latest developments on antitrust damages actions at the Union level relate to 
collective redress and the publication of a proposal for a Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions.262 In 2011, the Commission held public a consultation on collective 
redress entitled ‘Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress’,263 with a 
view to, inter alia, identifying common legal principles on collective redress and 
exploring their adoption into the EU as well as the national legal systems.264 These 
257 Ibid., at p. 2. 
258 See the contributions available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_actions_damages/index_en.html#contributions.  
259 Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
SWD(2013) 205, 11.6.2013. 
260 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches 
of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 
19-21. 
261 Ibid., at point 12. 
262 See Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013. 
263 COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, PUBLIC CONSULTATION: Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress, SEC(2011) 173 final, 4.2.2011. 
264 The contributions to the public consultation have been evaluated by Prof. Dr. Burkhard Hess and the 
University of Heidelberg, but the Commission has stressed that the study does not necessarily reflect the 
Commission's own analysis of the contributions. See Study JUST/2010/JCIV/CT/0027/A4. Evaluation of 
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principles were intended to serve as guidance for an EU-wide legislative initiative called 
“An EU framework for collective redress”, foreseen in the Commission Work 
Programme 2012265 and which had been called for by the European Parliament.266 In 
addition, the Commission Work Programme 2012 envisaged a legislative initiative on 
actions for damages for breaches of antitrust law. The aim would be to ensure effective 
damages actions before national courts for breaches of EU antitrust rules and to clarify 
the interrelation of private enforcement with public enforcement of the EU antitrust 
rules. However, according to the proposal, public enforcement should continue to have 
a central role in the EU.267  
 
In this context, it is worth noting that in May 2012, the Heads of the European 
Competition Authorities issued a resolution on protection of leniency material in the 
context of civil damages actions.268 The resolution highlighted the need to protect 
leniency material against disclosure to the extent necessary to ensure the effectiveness 
of leniency programs. In this respect, the Vice-President of the European Commission 
responsible for Competition Policy, Joaquín Almunia, also stated that the Commission 
intended to propose legislation ensuring the right balance between the protection of 
leniency programs and the victims’ rights to obtain compensation.269 
 
The resolution can be seen as a response to the Pfleiderer ruling of the Court of Justice 
in which the Court held that EU law on cartels and in particular Regulation 1/2003 do 
not preclude a victim of an infringement of the EU antitrust rules who is seeking to 
obtain damages from being granted access to documents relating to a leniency 
contributions to the public consultation and hearing: “Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress”, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/study_heidelberg_overview_en.pdf 
265 Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work 
Programme 2012, COM(2011) 777 final, Brussels, 15.11.2011, at p. 20. 
266 See European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach 
to Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), Brussels, 2.12.2012. 
267 Ibid, at p. 3. 
268 Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012, 
Protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf.  
269 See ALMUNIA, “Antitrust enforcement: Challenges old and new”, speech delivered at the 19th 
International Competition Law Forum, St. Gallen, June 8th, 2012. 
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procedure involving the infringer.270 Since there are no common rules on the right of 
access to documents relating to a leniency procedure, national courts must determine on 
the basis of national law the conditions under which access must be permitted or 
refused. They must weigh the interests protected by EU law in doing so. In other words, 
they must weigh the usefulness of leniency programs for detecting cartels against the 
contribution of damages actions for the maintenance of effective competition.271 The 
result seems to be, that it is not certain that corporate statements will always be 
protected from disclosure to private litigants.272 However, this will change when the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions has been implemented, since it provides that 
access to corporate statements will not be granted.273 
 
The European Parliament, in turn, issued in February 2012 a resolution on the 
Commission’s proposal on adopting a legislative initiative on antitrust damages 
actions274 as well as one on collective redress.275 It seemed overall to be favorable to the 
adoption of a legislative initiative on antitrust damages actions and collective redress. 
Importantly, the Parliament recognized the specific nature of the antitrust field and the 
need to take it into account in adopting an instrument regarding collective redress,276 
although it highlighted the need for a horizontal framework for collective actions in 
general and that specific rules should be constrained to a limited number of competition 
law or consumer protection issues.277 Nevertheless, it reiterated its view that collective 
redress should be based on an “opt-in” model so as to only allow clearly identified 
claimants to bring a collective action or public authorities or representative bodies to 
270 See Judgment in Pfleiderer, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 32. 
271 See Judgment in Pfleiderer, EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 30. 
272 This has been confirmed by the Court of Justice in Donau Chemie in which the Court held that refusal 
to grant access to documents relating to leniency proceedings to injured parties must be justified by 
overriding reasons relating to the effectiveness of the national leniency program, and the disclosure of the 
documents in question must actually undermine that public interest in order for the refusal to be justified. 
See Judgment in Donau Chemie, C-536/11, EU:C:2013:366, paragraphs 47-48. 
273 See Article 6(6) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
274 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the Annual Report on EU Competition Policy 
(2011/2094(INI)), Brussels, 2.12.2012. 
275 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), Brussels, 2.12.2012. 
276 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the Annual Report on EU Competition Policy 
(2011/2094(INI)), Brussels, 2.12.2012, at § 24. 
277 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), Brussels, 2.12.2012, at § 15-17. 
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bring an action on behalf of such claimants. The Parliament was also opposed to 
contingency fees as well as third-party funding of antitrust damages actions.278 
Similarly, it rejected the introduction of discovery.279 With regard to the interaction 
between public and private enforcement, the Parliament believed that the Commission 
should ensure that fines would take into account any compensation already paid to third 
parties.280 
 
Moreover, a study entitled “Collective Redress in Antitrust”281 was delivered in June 
2012 in order to take into account the issues raised by the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs in its opinion of October 20th, 2011 on 
the Commission Staff Working Document ‘Towards a coherent European approach to 
collective redress’. The study aimed to analyze and develop the issues of collective 
redress in the field of antirust taking into account the views expressed by the 
Committee.282 It recommended, inter alia, that a collective redress system for antitrust 
actions should be introduced through a sector-specific measure in order to be efficient, 
and should be based on Article 103 TFEU. The preferred legal instrument should be a 
regulation in order to create a uniform, efficient EU procedural instrument. The study 
advocated for the adoption of a collective redress model based on the “opt-in” principle, 
with the exception of some clear and limited situations, for example, involving 
consumers suffering harm of low value. It also supported more flexibility concerning 
funding and did not believe that contingency fees alone, without some other procedural 
mechanisms available in the United States, would automatically lead to excessive 
litigation. According to the study, the possibility of reducing the civil responsibility of 
the first leniency applicant should also be contemplated as damages may reduce the 
attractiveness of leniency programs.283 Although these are only some of the 
recommendations included in the study, they are of particular interest because many of 
278 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the Annual Report on EU Competition Policy 
(2011/2094(INI)), Brussels, 2.12.2012, at § 25-26. 
279 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), Brussels, 2.12.2012, at § 20. 
280 Ibid., at § 32. 
281 BUCCIROSSI, P., CARPAGNANO, M., CIARI, L., TOGNONI, M. and VITALE, C., “Collective 
Redress in Antitrust” Study, IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, June 2012. 
282 Ibid., at p. 15. 
283 Ibid., at p. 88-90. 
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them are contrary to the points raised by the European Parliament in its resolutions 
regarding antitrust damages actions and collective redress.284 
 
The most significant development is the publication of a proposal for a Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions.285 The Draft Directive on rules governing antitrust damages 
actions aims to ensure the effective enforcement of the EU competition rules by 
optimizing the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law 
and ensuring that victims of EU antitrust violations can obtain full compensation for the 
harm that they have suffered.286 The proposed harmonized rules will not only apply to 
damages actions for breaches of the EU competition rules, but also of national 
competition rules when they are applied in parallel with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.287  
 
The Draft Directive was modified during the ordinary legislative procedure and a text 
agreed on by the Council and the European Parliament was adopted by the Parliament 
on April 17th, 2014.288 During the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council adopted 
its general approach on the Commission's proposal on December 2nd, 2013. The 
amendments proposed by the Presidency included allowing Member States to protect 
documents which have been obtained solely through access to the file of a competition 
authority,289 and the removal of the cross-border binding effect of national decisions. 
Instead, Member States would be obliged to accept such decisions as means of 
evidence. The protection of leniency applicants against civil liability was limited to 
what is necessary to neutralize the negative effects of damages actions on leniency 
programs and public enforcement.290 On January 27th, 2014, the ECON Committee of 
284 These recommendations will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
285 See Proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013. 
286 Ibid., at p. 2-3. 
287 Ibid., at p. 23. 
288 See the amended text available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0089+002-002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.  
289 See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, General Approach on the Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
2013/01285 (COD), 27.11.2013, at p. 2.  
290 Ibid., at p. 3. 
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the European Parliament adopted its Report on the Proposal291 which includes the 
opinions of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on the Internal Market 
and Consumer Protection.292 In order to reach an agreement on the text, three political 
trilogues293 and several technical meetings took place in February and March 2014.294 A 
text was agreed on March 20th, 2014 and it was endorsed by COREPER on March 26th, 
2014.295 Following the adoption by the European Parliament, the text still requires the 
final approval of the Council. 
 
The proposals contained in the Draft Directive proposed by the Commission and the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions adopted by the European Parliament (pending 
the final approval of the Council) will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter Four. Next, 
only a brief overview of the main features of the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions will be given.  
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions provides for a minimum level of 
disclosure of evidence if the claimant has presented reasonably available facts and 
evidence showing the plausibility of its claim for damages.296 National courts can then 
order the defendant or third party to disclose relevant evidence in their control. The 
party requesting disclosure of evidence must specify either pieces of this evidence or 
relevant categories of this evidence defined as precisely and narrowly as possible on the 
basis of reasonably available facts. The disclosure of evidence must also be limited to 
what is proportionate. There must also be effective measures to protect confidential 
information and to give full effect to professional privilege. Moreover, national courts 
can never order the disclosure of leniency corporate statements and settlement 
submissions.297 Member States must also provide for penalties for failure or refusal to 
291 See THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, Report on the proposal for 
a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, COM(2013)0404 – C7-0170/2013 – 2013/0185(COD), 27.1.2014.  
292 The opinions of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Committee on the Internal Market and 
Consumer Protection will be commented upon in Chapter Four. 
293 I.e. meetings of representatives of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
294 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/proposed_directive_en.html.  
295 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/141926.pdf. 
296 Article 5 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
297 Article 6 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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comply with a disclosure order, the destruction of relevant evidence, failure or refusal to 
comply with an obligation to protect confidential information, or breach of limits on the 
use of evidence.298 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions also proposes that final infringement 
decisions by a national competition authority will have a probative effect in subsequent 
damages actions brought in the same Member State as far as the finding of an 
infringement is concerned. However, final decisions by NCAS in other Member States 
have only to be considered as prima facie evidence that an infringement of competition 
law has occurred. 299 
 
The limitation period must be at least five years from the moment when the 
infringement has ceased and the claimant knows or can reasonably be expected to have 
the knowledge of the infringement, the harm it caused and the identity of the infringer. 
Moreover, the limitation period for a follow-on action must be suspended or interrupted 
until at least one year after the decision by the competition authority in question is final 
or proceedings are otherwise terminated.300 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions establishes that undertakings are jointly 
and severally liable for harm caused by their joint behavior. However, an undertaking 
which has been granted immunity under a leniency program will be liable to injured 
parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only if they were unable 
to obtain full compensation from the other infringers. An infringing undertaking may 
recover a contribution from any other infringing undertaking which corresponds to their 
relative responsibility for the harm caused by the antitrust violation.301 
 
According to the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, the passing-on defense is 
allowed, but the infringer has the burden of proof that the overcharge has been passed 
on.302 As to the quantification of harm, the Directive contains a rebuttable presumption 
298 Article 8 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
299 Article 9 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
300 Article 10 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
301 Article 11 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
302 Article 13 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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of harm resulting from a cartel.303 Antitrust harm is quantified on the basis of national 
rules, which must comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. If the 
actual situation has to be compared with a hypothetical one, the national courts must be 
able to estimate the harm in order not to make the right to damages practically 
impossible or excessively difficult.304  
 
The Directive also aims to encourage consensual dispute resolution by suspending the 
limitation period during the consensual dispute resolution process.305 Similarly, 
Member States are to ensure that national courts may suspend antitrust damages 
proceedings in case the parties to those proceedings are involved in consensual dispute 
resolution concerning the same damages claim. Finally, the claim of an injured party 
which settles is reduced with the settling co-infringer’s share of the harm inflicted upon 
the injured party. Non-settling co-infringers cannot recover contribution from the 
settling co-infringer for the remaining claim of the settling injured party.306 
 
It is important to note that the Directive does not include all the measures suggested in 
the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules or the Failed 
Draft Directive of 2009. For instance, it does not provide for collective redress, or 
contain rules regarding the fault requirement or costs of antitrust damages actions. The 
White Paper therefore continues to be of interest for the purpose of examining how the 
private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules could be enhanced in the future, as the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions is arguably insufficient to bring about a 
significant change at least regarding damages claims brought by consumers. 
 
However, as to collective redress, the Commission has adopted recommendations on 
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in 
the Member States concerning violations of the rights granted under Union law.307 
These recommendations concern collective redress mechanisms for violations of rights 
303 Article 17 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
304 Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, at p. 29. 
305 Article 18 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
306 Article 19 of the Directive of Antitrust Damages Actions. 
307 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
115 
 
                                                 
granted under EU law, in other words, they do not only apply to antitrust violations, but 
mass harm situations caused by violations of rights granted under EU law in general. 
Their purpose is to facilitate access to justice, put an end to illegal practices, and allow 
the compensation of victims of violations of rights granted by EU law in mass harm 
situations.308 They recommend that Member States should empower representative 
entities to bring representative actions and/or empower public authorities to bring such 
actions.309 Alternatively, a collective redress action may be brought by two or more 
natural or legal persons who have been harmed in a mass harm situation.310 These 
actions should, as a general rule, be based on the “opt-in” principle.311 The 
recommendations also deal with the criteria of admissibility of collective actions, 
funding, representation and lawyers’ fees, follow-on actions and cross-border cases, to 
name some of the issues covered by the recommendations. These will be analyzed in-
depth in Chapter Five. At this point it should only be pointed out that the main problem 
is that the recommendations are not binding, so it is debatable that they will really serve 
to improve much the compensation of consumers who have suffered harm as a result of 
an antitrust violation. 
 
Apart from the initiatives mentioned above, the Commission also assists national courts 
in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, for example, by providing a funding 
program for training of national judges and judicial cooperation between national judges 
in EU competition law.312 
 
In light of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions and the Recommendation on 
Collective Redress Mechanisms as well as the views expressed by stakeholders during 
the consultation procedure, the questions crucial to examine for the purpose of this 
thesis concern, above all, access to evidence and the interaction between public and 
private enforcement, the funding and costs of antitrust damages actions, the damages 
available for antitrust violations and the necessity to introduce a collective redress 
mechanism and an out-of-court settlement procedure. With regard to collective redress, 
308 Point 1 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
309 Points 4 and 6 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
310 Point 3a) of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
311 Point 21 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
312 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/training.html.  
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the choice between a horizontal and a sectoral legislative approach as well as the 
existence of a legal basis for a possible binding EU collective redress action should, in 
particular, be examined. 
 
The Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms and the 
obligation of minimum level of disclosure in the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions are of particular interest for this thesis because class actions and discovery are 
distinctive features of antitrust enforcement in the United States and Canada. Much 
could therefore be learned from the U.S. and Canadian experiences of these procedural 
devices, taking into consideration the long and extensive experience of private 
enforcement of antitrust rules especially in the United States.  
 
Similarly, the significance of treble damages313 and contingency fees in private 
litigation should be examined since antitrust damages actions are significantly more 
frequent in the United States, where treble damages and contingency fees are available, 
and the cost rules and damages awards are likely to contribute to this result. It is worth 
noting that these issues have not been included in the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions, and the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms even state that 
punitive damages should be prohibited.314 There is hence a call to examine whether 
some of the available procedural mechanisms in the United States and Canada could 
also serve to enhance private enforcement of antitrust rules in the EU and especially 
improve the possibilities of injured consumers obtaining compensation for the loss that 
they have suffered as a result of antitrust violations.  
 
313 Treble damages are only available in the United States, whereas Canadian courts seldom award 
punitive damages. See. WATSON, G. D., “Class actions: the Canadian experience, 11 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int’l L., Spring/Summer 2001, p. 269-287, at p. 269. But tort claims based on common law may also 
allow punitive damages which are not available under Section 36 of the Canadian Competition Act. See 
HOOD, J., KENT, D. and LOW, M., “Canada: Private Antitrust Litigation”, The Antitrust Review of the 
Americas 2011. 
314 Point 31of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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2.2. At Member State Level 
At the national level, several Member States have in the last decade introduced 
competition law reforms the aim of which includes facilitating antitrust damages 
actions.315  
 
In Germany, the 7th Amendment to the German Competition Act316 conferred a right to 
compensation to persons affected by a breach of the German or EU antitrust rules.317 
This has made it easier to bring damages actions since the reform has abolished the 
previous requirement that a provision that serves to protect another person must have 
been violated before a claim for damages can be brought. The latest 8th amendment to 
the German Competition Act,318 which entered into force on June 30th, 2013, now also 
allows consumer associations to order the infringing undertaking to pay an amount 
equivalent to the additional illegal proceeds to the Treasury in certain circumstances.319 
 
Moreover, not only Commission Decisions, but also NCA Decisions and decisions of 
the courts of the Member States that establish an infringement of Article 101 or 102 
TFEU are binding on the courts before which antitrust damages actions are brought as 
regards the existence of the infringement.320 Similarly, the decisions of the German 
315 The examples provided in this section are not exhaustive, but only indicative of some of the main 
reforms relating to private antitrust enforcement implemented in the selected Member States as well as in 
Italy, and they will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
316 The 7th Amendment to the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
317 Section 33(1) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
318 8th Amendment to the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
319 Section 34a of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
320 Section 33(4) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. As regards Commission 
Decisions, the reference to their binding character is merely aimed at providing a clarification, since these 
decisions already bind national courts pursuant to Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25. The extension of the binding effect to decisions by foreign competition 
authorities and courts was criticized by the Monopolies Commission during the elaboration of the 7th 
Amendment of the German Competition Act, since the binding effect of administrative decisions is not 
limited to claims against parties addressed by the decision. Consequently, even parties that are not 
addressees of the decision or could not duly participate in the administrative proceedings will not be able 
to defend themselves against the alleged antitrust violation before German courts. See WURMNEST, W., 
“A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law 
against Restraints of Competition”, German Law Journal, Vol. 06, No. 08, 2005, p. 1173-1190, at p. 
1186. According to the Monopolies Commission, the binding effect should be limited to the addressees of 
the decision since these are the only ones that can appeal the decision. Moreover, in this manner there 
would be larger incentives for companies to apply for leniency. See MONOPOLKOMMISSION, “Das 
allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle”, Sondergutachten der Monopolkomission 
gemäss § 44. Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB, at p. 24. 
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competition authority finding an infringement of the German antitrust rules will bind 
German courts – as far as the existence of an infringement is concerned – when they 
decide private damages claims. 
 
In Spain, the main change with regard to private enforcement brought about by the new 
Competition Act 15/2007 of July 3rd is that the Commercial Courts may now directly 
apply Articles 1 and 2 of the new Competition Act, i.e. the equivalents of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. Contrary to the old Competition Act, under which a final administrative 
decision finding an infringement had to exist before a damages action could be 
brought,321 under the new law, the Commercial Courts can also award damages to 
victims of antitrust violations when the damages claims are based on national 
competition law, even if no final administrative decision finding an infringement 
exists.322 
 
Sweden introduced important amendments to its Competition Act in 2005, for instance, 
by expanding the sphere of those entitled to damages for antitrust violations. Previously, 
only undertakings and contracting parties had been entitled to seek compensation,323 but 
thanks to the amendments, this limitation has been removed from the Competition Act, 
and any injured party is entitled to damages. The limitation period was also extended 
from five to ten years324 calculated from the time when the damage was caused.325 
Moreover, the Swedish Group Proceedings Act 2002 introduced collective actions 
based on an “opt-in” model.326 Under this act, the group action can be brought as a 
private group action, an organization action or a public group action.327 The private 
321 Article 13(2) of Competition Act 16/1989 of July 17th.   
322 This is the case because the law provides that Commercial Courts have jurisdiction in civil actions 
concerning the application of Articles 1 and 2 of the Competition Act and does not include any 
requirement that a previous final administrative decision exist. See First Additional Provision of 
Competition Act 15/2007 of July 3rd, Official State Gazette No. 159, of July 4th, 2007.  
323 See ANDERSSON, H., and LEGNERFÄLT, E., “Effective private enforcement: The Swedish 
experience, a lesson for the EU?”, Concurrences, Nº 3-2009, p. 156-162, at p. 158. 
324 Idem. 
325 Section 25 of the Competition Act (2008:579) as amended by Law (2010:642). 
326 Group Proceedings Act (2002:599).  
327 Section 1 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
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group action may be brought by natural persons or a legal entity328 and is also available 
in antitrust damages cases. 
 
In Finland, a new Competition Act (948/2011) entered into force on November 1, 2011 
and it also includes amendments regarding antitrust damages actions. The amendments 
concerning damages claims are similar to the amendments introduced by Sweden in 
2005 in that the standing for bringing an antitrust damages action has been expanded to 
anyone who has suffered harm as a result of an antitrust violation.329 The new Act has 
also clarified the limitation periods of bringing antitrust damages actions with regard to 
the moment when the limitation periods will start to run and will end.330 The right to 
seek damages will expire if the action for damages has not been brought within ten 
years from the day when the antitrust violation occurred. In case of a continuous 
infringement, the limitation period will expire ten years from the day when the violation 
ended. For follow-on actions, a one-year limitation period will, however, start running 
once the decision on which the damages action is based has become final.331  
 
Collective actions are also in principle possible following the adoption the Act on Class 
Actions (444/2007). But only the Consumer Ombudsman may bring a collective action 
on behalf of a group of consumers in mass consumer disputes between consumers and a 
trader.332 The collective action is based on an opt-in model and to date no antirust 
collective actions have been brought. 
 
Italy has introduced a collective action by Law No. 99/09 of July 23rd, 2009, which has 
amended the Consumer Act.333 Article 140 bis of the Consumer Act was amended in 
2012 in order to enable collective damages claims to protect homogenous individual 
328 Sections 1 and 4 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
329 Section 50 of the Competition Act (948/2011). 
330 Government Bill 88/2010 on a new Competition Act, at p. 1. 
331 Section 20 of the Competition Act (948/2011). 
332 Section 1 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
333 Article 49 of Law No. 99/09 of July 23rd, 2009 Provisions on the development and internationalization 
of undertakings, as well as in the field of energy, published in the Official Gazette No. 176 of July 31st, 
2009. 
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rights and collective interests.334 Before the amendment, such actions could only be 
brought to protect identical individual rights. 
 
Also in France has a collective action recently been introduced following the adoption 
of the Consumer Act.335 The act allows, inter alia, collective follow-on actions after a 
decision of French or EU competition authorities.336 However, only national consumer 
associations may bring such a claim and solely on behalf of consumers who have 
decided to opt in.337 
 
Interestingly, in the United Kingdom, several proposals to reform collective actions for 
antitrust damages have been made. In 2007, the Office of Fair Trading published 
recommendations on ways of enhancing redress for individuals harmed by breaches of 
competition law.338 The OFT recommended that representative actions for damages 
should be possible for consumers as well as businesses, both as stand-alone and follow-
on actions, because both consumers and businesses face obstacles to private redress.339  
 
In 2012, the BIS (Department for Business Innovation & Skills) published its 
consultation on options for reform of private enforcement.340 Regarding collective 
actions, the consultation focused on who should be allowed to bring such actions and 
whether they should be brought as follow-on actions or whether stand-alone actions 
should also be permitted. Moreover, it dealt with the issue of opt-in or opt-out actions 
and even presented a model somewhat in-between these two models: parties would be 
required to join the action in order to be represented by the group, but they would be 
334 Law No. 1/12 of January 24th, 2012, Urgent provisions for competition, the development of 
infrastructure and competiveness, published in the Official Gazette No. 19 of January 24th, 2012.  
335 Law No. 2014-344 of March 17th, 2014 on consumer protection. 
336 Articles L. 423-1 and L. 423-17. 
337 Article L. 423-1. 
338 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading, OFT916resp, November 
2007. 
339 Ibid., at p. 23. 
340 DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition law: a 
consultation for options on reform”, April 2012. 
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able to do so even after liability had been determined, provided that damages had not 
yet been quantified.341  
 
The response of the UK Government to the consultation was published in January 
2013.342 As to collective actions, both stand-alone and follow-on collective actions will 
be introduced and they are to be brought before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The 
Competition Appeal Tribunal will have to certify the group and decide on whether the 
collective action should be brought as an opt-in or opt-out action. Moreover, collective 
actions could only be brought by claimants or “genuine representatives” of the group – 
i.e. trade associations or consumer organizations. In addition, the UK Government will 
also introduce an opt-out collective settlement system for competition law in the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal.343 
 
The developments both at the Union and national level indicate that private enforcement 
is likely to be under examination in the EU for some time. Arguably, the Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions and the Recommendation on Collective Redress 
Mechanisms will not be sufficient to enhance private enforcement in the EU, at least not 
for consumers, since a number of issues have not been satisfactorily addressed.344 
Therefore, this thesis aims to examine how to optimally improve private enforcement of 
the EU antitrust rules in the long-term, and to make proposals for the reforms required 
to enhance the rules applicable to private enforcement in the EU, and to ensure effective 
access to justice. 
 
Furthermore, as private enforcement in the form of antitrust damages actions currently 
still accounts for a modest part of competition law enforcement in many Member 
States345 and in particular damages claims by consumers are seldom brought,346 it is 
341 Ibid., p. 29-31 
342 DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition law: a 
consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013. 
343 Ibid., at p. 31-34. 
344 For more details, see Chapters Four and Five. 
345 See Commission Staff Working Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 19. 
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clear that more effective redress mechanisms are needed in order to compensate 
especially consumers injured by antitrust violations. Introducing effective EU collective 
actions and ensuring the financing of such actions could be a means to encourage 
private enforcement, and increase the likely-hood of victims obtaining compensation. 
This in turn would require a further harmonization of certain national procedural rules 
in the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
346 AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: “Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective 
Redress in the EU 1999-20122” Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, available at 
http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf. 
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PART I: THE FLAWS IN THE EU PRIVATE ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT MODEL AND THE NEED FOR 
HARMONIZATION  
3. OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU 
3.1. General overview 
In the light of EU case law, it is today clear that a Union right to damages for 
infringements of the EU antitrust rules exists. This has expressly been confirmed by the 
ECJ in Courage347 and in Manfredi.348 Thus, any individual that has been harmed as a 
result of a breach of the EU antitrust rules may bring an antitrust damages action before 
the national courts in order to seek compensation for the loss that he has suffered 
regardless of whether he is a co-contracting party to the illegal agreement or a third 
party.349  
 
However, as antitrust damages actions are currently governed by national procedural 
rules, in practice, the possibilities of bringing antitrust damages actions vary from 
Member State to Member State.350 In fact, the overall number of private antitrust 
damages actions is still low in the EU despite the existence of a Union right to damages. 
Based on available data, the Commission has estimated that between 2006 and 2012, 
only 52 actions for damages were brought as follow-on actions based on Commission 
Decisions in seven Member States. It is noteworthy that most of them were brought in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Netherlands, which constitute the main exceptions 
to the overall low number of antitrust damages actions. In the rest of the Member States 
there appear to have been no follow-on actions based on a Commission Decision during 
347 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24. 
348 See Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 61. 
349 Recently, the Court of Justice held that an injured party does in principle even have a right to claim 
compensation from cartel members from loss resulting from umbrella pricing by an undertaking not party 
to the cartel. See Judgment in ÖBB-Infrastruktur, C-557/12, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 37. 
350 For instance, the limitation periods for follow-on actions for damages vary from six months to five 
years. See Commission Staff Working Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 16. Hereinafter this 
document will be referred to as “Impact Assessment Report on the Draft Directive”. 
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the period examined.351 This is the case even though Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have 
direct effect,352 and according to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of EU 
law, Member States must ensure the same treatment of actions for safeguarding rights 
derived directly from EU law and similar domestic actions as well as the effective 
exercise of those rights.353 Moreover, under Article 4(3) TEU, Member States have an 
obligation to ensure the application of EU law and to refrain from measures which 
could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives. They must therefore protect 
rights conferred to individuals by the Treaties and, if necessary, set aside contrary 
national provisions, since EU law prevails over national law.354 
 
Divergent national tort and procedural rules could explain why private enforcement in 
Europe is remarkably lagging behind the United States where private antitrust 
enforcement accounts for more than 90% of the total antitrust enforcement.355 
Furthermore, the incentives to bring damages actions are small in the EU, since the 
difficulties of proving the infringement and the uncertainty in the outcome of the action 
make bringing an antitrust damages action too difficult or not attractive enough.356  
 
In 2005, the Commission Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, which was elaborated using the Ashurst Study as reference, found that 
the obstacles to bringing antitrust damages actions relate, inter alia, to access to 
evidence, the burden of proof, the fault requirement, the definition and quantification of 
damages, the passing-on defense and indirect purchaser standing, collective actions, 
costs of actions and limitation periods.357  
 
351 See Impact Assessment Report on the Draft Directive, at p. 19.  
352 I.e. individuals can rely on them to enforce their rights before national courts. See Judgment in BRT v 
SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16. 
353 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 29.  
354 See Judgment in Simmenthal, C-106/77, EU:C:1978:49, paragraphs 17 and 21. 
355 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4.   
356 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 8. 
357 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 12-14. 
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Arguably, the limited access to evidence – combined with a high burden of proof of 
causation and damage which rests on the claimant – constitutes the main obstacle to 
private enforcement. The claimant must quantify the damages which is a difficult task, 
for instance, when the claimant must show the difference between the overcharge that it 
has paid due to a cartelized price and the fictional price that it would have paid were it 
not for the existence of the cartel in question. In order to demonstrate the actual harm 
that it has suffered, the claimant would, inter alia, need access to evidence relating to 
the commercial activities and trading practices of actual and potential market players. 
However, this information is usually in the hands of the defendant or third parties. 
Consequently, there is often a striking information asymmetry between the claimant and 
the defendant,358 which makes it difficult for the claimant to bring its damages claim 
successfully. 
 
As regards the availability of collective actions, already in 2003, the Ashurst Study 
found that some sort of collective or representative actions existed in nearly all Member 
States. Nevertheless, they cannot always be used to claim damages, but often they can 
only be brought in order to request injunctive relief.359 Furthermore, collective or 
representative actions have mainly been brought in financial services cases, and are 
often based on unfair contractual terms. Thus, they are not common in antitrust damages 
cases. But there has been some development in this area and increasingly more Member 
States provide for collective actions. However, only few jurisdictions have specific 
legislation expressly providing for representative damages actions in case of breach of 
the antitrust rules,360 whereas other Member States either do not limit the types of 
claims that can be brought by the use of collective actions, or limit collective actions to 
specific subject matters, which so far do not include damages claims based on antitrust 
violations.361 
358 Ibid., at p. 17. 
359 See Ashurst Study, at p. 46-47. For instance, this is the case in Germany. 
360 In the United Kingdom, representative follow-on actions can be brought before the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal. See Section 47B of the Competition Act 1998. France, in turn, allows collective follow-
on actions after a decision of French or EU competition authorities. See Articles L. 423-1 and L. 423-17 
of Law No. 2014-344 of March 17th, 2014 on consumer protection. 
361 See STUDY CENTRE FOR CONSUMER LAW – CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC LAW, 
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN, “An analysis and evaluation of alternative means of 
consumer redress other than redress through ordinary judicial proceedings”, Final Report, A Study for 
the European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Directorate B – 
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 Another important issue affecting the feasibility of bringing antitrust damages actions is 
whether passing-on defense is permitted. According to the Ashurst Study, the passing-
on defense could constitute an obstacle for private actions, as it is likely to complicate 
claims and reduce the incentives for plaintiffs to bring actions.362 This is so because the 
indirect purchaser must in general bear the burden of proof and demonstrate the causal 
relationship between the infringement and the damage that he has suffered as a result of 
the antitrust violation.363 If passing-on is permitted, indirect purchases and, especially 
consumers at the end of the distribution chain, will encounter large difficulties in 
proving the exact amount that has been passed on to them. Making it possible for 
indirect purchasers to bring a collective action together with other injured indirect 
purchasers could therefore serve to facilitate damages actions.  
 
Other factors contributing to the comparatively low number of antitrust damages actions 
in the EU are believed to include the fact that the incentives for bringing antitrust 
damages are low since the outcome is often uncertain and the costs for bringing them 
are usually high.364 The damages awarded are also often modest since they traditionally 
aim only to compensate victims for the loss that they have suffered as a result of an 
antitrust violation.365 Given that the burden of proof in damages actions is high and the 
claimant must prove the violation of the antitrust rules and the causal relationship 
between that violation and the harm suffered, and must quantify his damages, bringing 
an antitrust damages action is a very complex task.366 The often limited access to 
evidence367 coupled with high litigation costs, the uncertainty in the outcome, and the 
potentially low damages award may therefore discourage potential claimants from even 
trying to bring damages claims. In addition, the very divergent national substantive and 
Consumer Affairs, Leuven, January 17th, 2007, at p. 278. Hereinafter this study will be referred to as 
“Consumer Redress Study”.  
362 See Ashurst Study, at p. 6. 
363 Ibid., at p. 111. 
364 Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions 
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 15. 
365 Ibid., at p. 35. 
366 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 8. 
367 See Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005) 
672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 5.  
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procedural rules contribute to the legal uncertainty and the differences have even 
increased since 2004.368  
 
The obstacles referred to above only constitute examples of hurdles that victims of 
antitrust violations face when they wish to bring a damages action and seek 
compensation for the loss that they have suffered as a consequence of a violation. It 
should also be borne in mind that defendants face disadvantages. For example, they face 
the risk of being sued for damages in several Member States, or in the Member State 
where the substantive or procedural rules are most advantageous to the claimant.369 
However, in light of the overall modest number of antitrust damages actions brought in 
the EU,370 it is clear that, under the current framework, private antitrust enforcement in 
the EU still leaves much to wish for. Therefore, in the following sections, the various 
obstacles to bringing antitrust damages actions in the EU will be examined by a study of 
the rules governing private enforcement in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, 
Spain, Sweden and Finland.  
 
3.2. The UK 
3.2.1. General Overview 
In principle, it has been possible to award damages for infringements of the EU 
competition rules in the United Kingdom since the Garden Cottage case.371 The cause 
of action for damages both for breach of EU competition law and the UK Competition 
Act 1998 is the tort of breach of statutory duty.372 Since the entry into force of the 
Enterprise Act 2002, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) has been able to award 
damages throughout the United Kingdom following infringement decisions by the 
European Commission and/or the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) and now its successor 
the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”).373 In other words, only follow-on 
368 Impact Assessment Report on the Draft Directive, at p. 16-17. 
369 Ibid., at p. 17. 
370 See External Impact Study, at p. 28. 
371 Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. Respondents v. Milk Marketing Board Appellants [1984] A.C. 130.  
372 See Ashurst Study, at p. 4-6. 
373 Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998. UK competition law applies uniformly throughout the 
United Kingdom, but Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own legal systems. See National Report on 
the UK prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of 
EC competition rules, at p. 2. 
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actions for damages have been possible so far. However, the CAT does not have an 
exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust damages claims, but the claimant can go to civil 
courts. Stand-alone actions must be brought before the High Court.374  
 
The CAT was bound by final decisions of the OFT finding an infringement when a 
damages claim was brought before it,375 although it was not always easy to determine 
the scope of that binding effect.376 In fact, the CAT does not have jurisdiction to 
establish liability as this is established by the competition authority (or other sectorial 
regulators), but it can only decide on causation and the amount of damages to be 
awarded. The infringement decisions adopted by the OFT were also binding upon the 
ordinary civil courts once the time for appeal had lapsed or the appeal had been 
unsuccessful.377 The same binding effect now applies to final decisions of the CMA. 
Following the ECJ judgment in Masterfoods, the Commission’s infringement decisions 
are also binding on ordinary courts.378 
 
Currently two types of collective actions exist in England and Wales: representative 
actions brought on behalf of consumers and Group Litigation Orders that courts can use 
to group together similar actions raising the same issues.379 Section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998 provides for representative follow-on actions brought on behalf 
of consumers before the CAT. The actions are limited to claims brought on behalf of 
named consumers who have consented to be bound by the outcome of the litigation, and 
can only be brought by specified bodies that meet the criteria laid down by the Secretary 
374 See RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 3. 
375 Section 47A(9) of the Competition Act 1998. 
376 See RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 4-5. 
377 See National Report on the UK prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for 
damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 4. 
378 In Masterfoods the ECJ held that the obligation of national courts not to take conflicting decisions on 
agreements or practices, which may subsequently be the subject of a decision by the Commission, is even 
more important when national courts rule on competition matters that are already subject of a 
Commission Decision. See Judgment in Masterfoods, C-344/98, EU:C:2000:689, paragraph 52. 
379 It should be noted that the UK government has decided to extend the representative actions as will be 
discussed below. 
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of State.380 So far, Which? (i.e. the former Consumers’ Association) is the only 
specified body that may bring a consumer claim in the CAT.381 
 
The consumers, on behalf of which the action is brought, must be affected by an 
infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU or their UK equivalents, i.e. Chapters I and II 
of the Competition Act 1998. Moreover, the OFT or the Commission must have found 
that an infringement has taken place. All claims must relate to the same antitrust 
violation and relate to goods and services which the claimant received otherwise than in 
the course of business.382 In case individual consumers have brought individual claims, 
a specified body can take over these claims and they can thus be dealt with together. In 
the event that the CAT awards damages they must be paid directly to the represented 
consumers individually. However, the CAT may order the damages to be paid to the 
specific body, if all the individuals and the specified body agree on this.383 
 
In England and Wales, the courts can also use Group Litigation Orders to group 
together similar actions that raise the same issues.384 A Group Litigation Order must 
contain directions about the establishment of a group register on which the claims 
managed under the Group Litigation Order will be entered.385 It must also specify the 
issues, which will identify the claims to be managed as a group made under the Group 
Litigation Order, and specify the court which will manage the claims on the group 
register.386 
 
380 These criteria are the following: “1. The body is so constituted, managed and controlled as to be 
expected to act independently, impartially and with complete integrity; 2. The body is able to demonstrate 
that it represents and/or protects the interests of consumers. This may be the interests of consumers 
generally or specific consumers. 3. The body has capability to take forward a claim on behalf of 
consumers. 4. The fact that a body has a trading arm will not disqualify it from bringing consumer group 
claims, provided that the trading arm does not control the body, and any profits of the trading body are 
only used to further the stated objectives of that body”. See United Kingdom – National Report, 
November 15th, 2006, prepared for the Consumer Redress Study, at p. 13. Hereinafter this report will be 
referred to as “United Kingdom – National Report”. 
381 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper, Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, OFT844, May 2006, at p. 13-14. 
382 See United Kingdom – National Report, at p. 13.  
383 Ibid., at p. 3. 
384 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 18. 
385 Civil Procedure Rules 19.11(1). 
386 Civil Procedure Rules 19.11(2). 
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Liability is established for the main part of the case that affects the whole group. The 
group is then split into different groups sharing similar damages claims and the claims 
of each group are considered by the court, which assesses individual damages.387 A 
judgment given in a claim on the group register in relation to a Group Litigation Order 
issue is binding on the parties to all other claims that are on the group register at the 
time the judgment is given or the order is made, unless the court orders otherwise. 
Claims that are subsequently entered on the group register are binding on the parties to 
the extent to which the court has given directions.388 But the Group Litigation Order is 
only an alternative to bringing an action, and it does not impede harmed consumers 
from bringing an individual action.389 
 
A Group Litigation Order is very flexible, but it leaves considerable discretion with the 
judge. The judge can decide which aspects of a case should be treated as Group 
Litigation issues and which ones as individual matters. Consequently, it is difficult for 
the parties to predict to which extent a judge will make use of a Group Litigation Order. 
Moreover, the court determines which costs are individual and which are common costs 
under the Group Litigation Order. The party is liable for its individual costs and is 
severally liable for its portion of the common costs.390  
 
As these forms of collective actions and the available redress for victims of antitrust 
violations are not sufficiently efficient, the OFT published recommendations on ways of 
enhancing redress for individuals harmed by breaches of competition law, as it 
considered that the redress system left room for improvement. The OFT recommended 
that representative actions for damages should be possible for consumers as well as 
businesses, both as stand-alone and follow-on actions, because they face obstacles to 
private redress. Since the resources of competition authorities are limited, consumers 
are in certain cases obligated to pursue the cases alone, but they often lack resources or 
387 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 18. 
388 Civil Procedure Rules 19.12(1). 
389 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 16. 
390 See United Kingdom – National Report, at p. 11-12. 
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skills to do so and are, consequently, disadvantaged vis-à-vis the infringing companies. 
Similarly, businesses may face significant barriers to bringing damages claims, and 
some kind of collective action would be needed to balance the economic harm caused 
by the infringers.391 Therefore, meritorious cases may not be brought or may only be 
brought by a small number of the victims. If it were instead possible to bring 
representative actions on behalf of consumers or businesses at large, this would 
encourage a larger number of well-founded actions being brought.392 
 
The OFT recommended that the judge should be able to decide whether given claims 
should be brought as representative action on behalf of consumers or businesses at 
large, or on behalf of named consumers or businesses, or as individual actions. This 
case-by-case assessment would, nevertheless, be made on the basis of appropriately 
defined criteria and filters.393   
 
The UK government did not act on the recommendations of the OFT, but the BIS 
(Department for Business Innovation & Skills) published its consultation on options for 
reform of private enforcement in 2012.394 The UK Government then published its 
response to the consultation in January 2013,395 which aims to improve the private 
actions regime by making it easier for consumers and companies to seek redress from 
undertakings that have infringed competition law. In order to achieve this, the UK 
Government proposes in particular to make the CAT the main jurisdiction for damages 
claims, to introduce a limited form of opt-out collective actions, to promote alternative 
dispute settlement resolution, and ensure that private litigation actions complement 
public enforcement.396  
 
391 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading, OFT916resp, November 
2007, p. 15-19. 
392 Ibid., at p. 23-27. 
393 Ibid., at p. 29. 
394 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform”, April 2012. 
395 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013. 
396 Ibid., at p. 14-15. 
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Therefore, the UK Government has decided to introduce both stand-alone and follow-on 
collective actions, which may be brought before the CAT. Apart from stand-alone 
actions, collective actions could also be brought in order to request injunctive relief 
before the CAT so as to make it the main forum for competition litigation. Moreover, it 
will become possible to transfer competition law cases to the CAT and vice versa. The 
objective behind this reform is to take advantage of the expertise of CAT in competition 
litigation, and to facilitate bringing competition claims by reducing the opportunity for 
contesting jurisdiction. In this manner, the UK Government believes that both claimants 
and defendants are likely to benefit from efficient case management and the flexible 
procedures of the CAT. 397 
 
A fast-track mechanism will be introduced for simpler cases in the CAT. This model is 
mainly to be used by SMEs, although the CAT may also decide to apply this procedure 
in other cases. However, it will mainly focus on granting injunctive relief. It should be 
noted that all the cases using the fast-track must be cost-capped,398 so it will be possible 
to better manage the costs of the action. 
 
As to the new collective action, it may be brought both for consumers or businesses or a 
combination of both. However, it should only be allowed if it is the best way of 
bringing a case. Moreover, collective actions may only be brought before the CAT. The 
CAT will have to certify the group and decide on whether the collective action should 
be brought as an opt-in or opt-out action.399 This certification process should include “a 
preliminary merits test, an assessment of the adequacy of the representative and a 
requirement that a collective action must be the best way of bringing the case”.400 It is 
also important to bear in mind that the opt-out element of collective actions would only 
apply to claimants domiciled in the United Kingdom, whereas claimants in other 
jurisdictions could opt in if they wished. This limitation will be introduced in order to 
avoid that defendants would have to pay twice for the same harm to foreign 
defendants.401 
397 Ibid., at p. 18. 
398 Ibid., at. 21-22. 
399 Ibid., at p. 31-32. 
400 Ibid., at p. 40. 
401 Idem. 
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 Furthermore, collective actions could only be brought by claimants or “genuine 
representatives” of the group – i.e. trade associations or consumer organizations, 
whereas law firms, third party funders or special purpose vehicles would not qualify for 
bring such actions. This restriction is considered as necessary in order to avoid risk of 
abuse which could occur if such parties were allowed to bring a collective action only 
for the purpose of litigation.402 Nevertheless, there are arguably other ways of reducing 
the risk of abuse, which would have less restrictive effect on the possibility of bringing 
collective antitrust damages actions.403 Other restrictions on future collective actions 
include the prohibition of exemplary damages and contingency fees. But conditional fee 
agreements (i.e. the lawyer can obtain a success fee in addition to the initial legal fee if 
the claim is successful), and “after the event insurance” will still be allowed even in 
collective actions.404 These restrictions are arguably likely to make the new collective 
action less efficient than desirable in that there will be less incentives to bring such 
actions, and funding might constitute an additional obstacle to bringing collective 
damages claims. If an opt-out collective action is settled, it will require judicial 
approval. The judge must also consider the reasonableness of the fees of legal 
representatives, and claimants must be given an opportunity to opt-out of the 
settlement.405 
 
In addition, the UK Government will also introduce an opt-out collective settlement 
system for competition law in the CAT, which is modelled after the Dutch Mass 
Settlement Act.406 Under this system, the defendant and a representative of injured 
parties (or multiple representatives of different categories of claimants) could jointly 
apply to the CAT for approval of their opt-out settlement agreement. This type of 
settlement would only apply to claimants domiciled in the UK, but claimants in other 
jurisdiction would be able to opt in if they wished to join the settlement. The case would 
have to be certified as suitable by the CAT. The requirements would be similar as the 
402 Ibid., at p. 34. 
403 See Section 7.4. 
404 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 40-41. 
405 Ibid., at p. 43. 
406 Ibid., at p. 32. 
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certification of a collective action, although the parties would not have to demonstrate 
the superiority of the action. There would also not be any merits test since the 
settlement would be consensual. Also, the settlement itself would require the approval 
of CAT in order to ensure that it is “fair, just and reasonable”. 407 
 
As to damages, the UK Government (contrary to what is provided by the new Directive 
on Antitrust Damages Actions) has decided not to introduce a rebuttable presumption of 
loss for cartel cases, since it would depart form one of the basic principles of English 
law. It considers that in many cases substantial economic evidence would still be 
needed since the defendant would try to rebut the presumption, and such a presumption 
could be difficult to operate in cases involving purchasers at different levels in the 
distribution chain. Similarly, the UK Government has also decided not to address the 
passing-on defense in legislation, but considers that its application would be better 
addressed through case law.408 Any unclaimed damages must, in principle,  be paid to 
the Access to Justice Foundation. However, in order to give the defendants an incentive 
to settle, an exception could be made for the benefit of the defendants or a cy-près, 
provided that that other basis is approved by the CAT.409 
 
Finally, limitation periods for the CAT will be the same as those of the High Court. This 
means that in all private action cases brought in England and Wales and Northern 
Ireland, the action has to be brought within six years from the date on which the cause 
of action accrued.410 This would improve the situation of claimants before the CAT 
where the claim must currently be brought within two years of, depending on which is 
the later, the date of the final infringement decision (establishing a breach of the UK or 
EU antitrust rules) or the date on which the cause of action accrued.411 There is also a 
special limitation period for those cases where the claimant did not have full knowledge 
of the facts related to the tort. In these cases, the limitation period will start to run from 
the date when the claimant has acquired sufficient knowledge about the facts in order to 
407 Ibid., at p. 50. 
408 Ibid., at p. 25. 
409 Ibid., at p. 42. 
410 In Scotland the applicable limitation period of five years will not be subject to any modification. See 
DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition law: a 
consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 18. 
411 Section 47A(7) and 47A(8) of the Competition Act 1998. 
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bring a claim.412 But even in these cases, the limitation period will end 15 years from 
the actual date of the tort.413 
 
The most important case of private enforcement is undoubtedly Bernard Crehan v. 
Inntrepeneur Pub Company, Brewman Group Ltd,414 since in that case a preliminary 
reference was made to the Court of Justice in which the ECJ confirmed that a Union 
right to damages exists for harm suffered as a result of a breach of Article 101 TFEU. 
The damages action was brought by Mr. Crehan who had acquired the lease on two 
pubs which Inntrepeneur Pub Company owned. Under the leases, Crehan was obligated 
to purchase beer from Courage during 20 years (i.e. the duration of the lease). As 
Crehan’s business was unsuccessful, he was forced to surrender the leases to 
Inntrepeneur Pub Company to whom he still owed arrears of rent. In addition, he had 
not paid for all the beer and goods that he had purchased from Courage and, therefore, 
Courage initiated proceedings against him in order to recover the debts. Crehan claimed 
that the leases and the beer ties breached Article 101 TFEU, and sought damages for the 
loss that this infringement had caused him. He argued that his competitors, i.e. nearby 
untied pubs, could purchase beer at significant discounts, and sell it at a much lower 
price than he could because of the beer tie that obligated him to buy all the beer from 
Courage. But the Chancery Division of the High Court held that the beer supply market 
had not been foreclosed to would-be entrants to the extent that it would constitute an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU, and dismissed the damages claim. 
 
Crehan appealed the decision and the Court of Appeal awarded damages for the first 
time in the United Kingdom for breach of Article 101 TFEU.415 According to the Court, 
the beer ties infringed Article 101 TFEU, since they had significantly contributed to the 
foreclosure of the market and had therefore caused the failure of Crehan’s business. 
Consequently, Crehan was entitled to provisional damages of £131,336 plus interest.416 
However, in June 2006, the House of Lords overturned the ruling by the Court of 
412 Section 11(4)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980.  
413 Section 14B of the Limitation Act 1980. 
414 Bernard Crehan v. Inntrepeneur Pub Company, Brewman Group Ltd [2003] EWHC 1510 (Ch). 
415 National Report on the UK prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages in 
case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 1.   
416 Bernhard Crehan v Inntrepeneur Pub Company, Brewman Group [2004] EWCA Civ 637. 
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Appeal holding that the High Court had properly assessed all the evidence and reached 
the appropriate conclusion.417 It should be noted that the House of Lords focused its 
ruling on the duty of sincere co-operation, which all national courts must comply with, 
and concluded that if there was no “real conflict” between a Commission Decision and a 
judgment by a national court, the national court would not be bound by the Commission 
Decision, but could take the Commission Decision into account to the extent that this 
was supported by evidence.418 It is possible that the House of Lords chose to focus its 
analysis on other aspects than the damages claim itself in order to find a justification not 
to grant damages to a party to an anti-competitive agreement since this would be 
contrary to English law, which does not allow a party to an illegal agreement to claim 
damages from the other party.  
 
Another antitrust damages case of interest is Provimi,419 which was a follow-on action 
brought by two English undertakings and a German undertaking, after the European 
Commission had found that various manufacturers of vitamins belonging to the 
Hoffman-La Roche and Aventis groups had breached Article 101 TFEU by 
participating in cartels in relation to the sale of vitamins within the EU and the EEA.420 
The claimants were direct purchasers of vitamins from undertakings within the 
Hoffman-La Roche and Aventis groups. The UK Commercial Court held that it had 
jurisdiction over foreign defendants domiciled outside the United Kingdom that were 
subsidiaries to the companies which had infringed the competition rules because they 
had implemented the anti-competitive agreement.421 Nevertheless, the case was settled 
before the court ruled on the substantive issues of the case.422 It has been suggested that 
417 Crehan v. Inntrepeneur Pub Co (CPC) and another (Office of Fair Trading and others intervening) 
[2006] 3 W.L.R. 148.  
418 See RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 19. 
419 Provimi Limited v. Aventis Animal Nutrition SA [2003] E.C.C. 29.  
420 Case COMP/E-1/37.512  – Vitamins, Commission Decision of November 21st, 2001. 
421 The Court held that when companies belong to the same undertaking [within the meaning of 
undertaking under EU competition law] and one of those companies had together with other independent 
undertakings infringed Article 101 TFEU, all the other companies within the undertaking which had 
breached the competition rules had also infringed the competition rules, if they had implemented the anti-
competitive agreement. Consequently, claimants were entitled to seek damages from these companies for 
loss caused by the anti-competitive agreement. See Provimi Limited v. Aventis Animal Nutrition SA 
[2003] E.C.C. 29. 
422 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
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this judgment could encourage claimants from other jurisdictions to bring antitrust 
damages claims in the United Kingdom, because of the possibility of discovery, 
exemplary damages and group litigation in the United Kingdom.423 In fact, the UK is 
one of the EU Member States with most antitrust damages actions.424 
 
In March 2007, the consumers’ association Which? brought a claim for damages on 
behalf of approximately 130 individual consumers against JJB Sports plc. This was the 
first (and so far only) case of representative action in an antitrust case in the United 
Kingdom. The consumers had purchased replica Manchester United football shirts at 
their launches for the 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 seasons, or replica England shirts in the 
month before and at the time of the Euro 2000 tournament. The action arose as a result 
of the findings made by the OFT and the CAT in respect to three price-fixing 
arrangements involving JJB Sports plc in the sale of replica football kit in 2000 and 
2001. The claimant sought compensatory damages for each shirt bought by a consumer 
from a participant in one of the three infringements during the period of the 
infringement found by the OFT and the CAT, as well as exemplary or restitutionary 
damages to the sum of 25% of the relevant turnover of JJB Sports net of VAT, or such 
other sum found appropriate by the CAT.425 
 
However, in January 2008, JJB Sports plc settled the case with Which?.426 Fans who 
had paid up to £39.99 for the football shirts and joined the case against JJB Sports 
received a payment of £20 each, while other customers who were not part of the case 
were able to claim back £10.427 It should be noted that due to the difficult task of 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 29.  
423 See BULST, F.W., “The Provimi Decision of the High Court: Beginnings of Private Antitrust 
Litigation in Europe, European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, 2004, p. 623-650, at p. 
650. 
424 See Commission Staff Working Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 19. 
425 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07. 
426 See “JJB Sports PLC - Agreement With Which?”, Reuters, Jan 9th, 2008, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS114080+09-Jan-2008+RNS20080109. 
427 See HODGE, N., “EC acts on antitrust breaches”, Financial Director, June 2008, at p. 42. 
138 
 
                                                                                                                                               
defining the customers, whether injured parties could profit from the action generally 
depended on their willingness to claim compensation during the settlement period. 428 
 
This case demonstrates the shortcomings of opt-in representative actions. As one 
commentator has observed, it forced Which? to attract individual consumers to opt in by 
launching a media campaign. But only comparatively few consumers signed up 
although Which? had estimated that approximately 2 million consumers were victims of 
the cartel. Another reason why the final compensation of each consumer varied was that 
not all claimants could adduce proof of purchase. In addition, access to evidence from 
OFT and JJB Sports plc proved burdensome and expensive.429 
 
Another attempt to bring a representative claim has also failed. The representative claim 
was brought by Emerald Supplies Ltd under r.19.6 of the Civil Procedure Rules430 
against British Airways. The undertaking sought damages for losses that it and other 
direct and indirect purchasers of air freight services had suffered from agreements and 
concerted practices between British Airways and certain other international airlines 
breaching Article 101(1) TFEU, Article 53 EEA and Section 2 of the UK Competition 
Act 1998. Because of the antitrust violation, the prices of air freight services had been 
inflated.431 But the claim was struck down by the High Court since a representative 
action could only be brought under r.19.6 if the claimants held the same interest at the 
time when the claim was initiated.432 The harm suffered had also to be common and the 
remedy sought had to be beneficial to all claimants. In this case, the Court deemed that 
the remedy sought would not equally benefit all the claimants since they were situated 
at different levels in the chain of distribution, but there would be conflicts between the 
claims of the different members of the class. This was due to the fact that the class was 
described as “direct or indirect purchasers of air freight services the prices of which 
were inflated by the arrangements or concerted practices”, and therefore the criteria for 
428 See MULHERON, R., “The case for an opt-out class action for European Member States: a legal and 
empirical analysis”, Colum. J. Eur. Law, 15, Summer, 2009, p. 409-453, at p. 439. 
429 See HODGES, C., The Reform of the Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems. A 
New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, 
at p. 25. 
430 Under this provision, a representative action can be brought on behalf of parties who have the same 
interest in the claim. 
431 Emerald Supplies Ltd v. British Airways Plc [2009] C.P. Rep. 32.  
432 Ibid., at § 31. 
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including claimants in the class depended on the outcome of the action. As a result, it 
was not possible to determine the members of the class at the time when the claim was 
issued.433 The Court of Appeal upheld this ruling.434 
 
The ruling in Devenish Nutrition Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis SA435 on preliminary issues has, 
in turn, clarified the remedies available in English law for breaches of Article 101 
TFEU.436 The claimants, who were vitamin premix and food processing companies, 
brought an action for damages against companies within the Hoffmann LaRoche, BASF 
and Aventis groups relating to vitamins cartels, which the latter had operated in the 
1990s. The preliminary issues concerned the claimants’ possible right to exemplary 
damages, restitutionary damages, and an account of the profits. The judge rejected all 
these claims. 
 
Exemplary damages were not available because the Commission had already imposed 
fines on the companies participating in the cartels, and the objective of the fines was to 
punish the defendants, and to deter them from participating in cartels, i.e. the objective 
of the Commission Decision was the same as that of exemplary damages. Awarding 
exemplary damages would also have been contrary to the non bis in idem principle, and 
could be interpreted as a decision running counter to the Commission Decision, since it 
would implicitly have meant that the national court had found the fines imposed by the 
Commission to be insufficient.437 
 
The judge also held that restitutionary damages are not available in antitrust cases, and 
can only be awarded when compensatory damages are not available. Similarly, the 
judge stated that an account of profits is only available in exceptional circumstances, 
and could not be awarded in this case because compensatory damages were available.438 
433 Ibid., at § 33-36. 
434 Emerald Supplies Ltd & Anor v British Airways Plc [2010] EWCA Civ 1284. 
435 Devenish Nutrition Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis SA [2007] EWCH 2394 (Ch). 
436 See SINGLA, T., “The remedies (not) available for breaches of Article 81 EC”, E.C.L.R., Volume 29, 
Issue 3, 2008, p. 201-205, at p. 205. 
437 Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25 and 
Judgment in Masterfoods, EU:C:2000:689, paragraph 52. 
438 Devenish Nutrition Ltd v. Sanofi-Aventis SA [2007] EWCH 2394 (Ch). 
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Following the ruling, it appears that under English law only compensatory damages can 
be awarded for infringements of the EU competition rules,439 and possibly exemplary 
damages can be awarded if no Commission Decision exists. 
 
This ruling should be contrasted with 2 Travel Group PLC (in Liquidation) v. Cardiff 
City Transport Services Ltd, in which the CAT awarded £60,000 as exemplary damages 
in addition to a damages award in lost profit.440 This case is also significant because it is 
the first case in which a final award of damages before the CAT has been successful.441 
 
Access to evidence and the conciliation of public and private enforcement has also been 
the subject of a ruling. In National Grid, the claimant requested the disclosure from the 
defendant of the confidential version of the relevant Commission Decision, some 
responses to the Commission’s statement of objections as well as some requests for 
information by the Commission. The defendants had been fined by the Commission for 
participating in the Gas Insulated Switchgear Cartel. The judge made a case-by-case 
analysis of whether proportionality and procedural fairness required the documents to 
be disclosed, which is in line with the balancing test established in Pfleiderer. He 
considered in particular that the request was not for the leniency statements as such, but 
statements from them included in the documents sought by the claimant. Also, it would 
be difficult for the claimant to access the information from other sources, and the 
documents were relevant for the claim. As a result, access was granted to some of the 
information contained in the documents requested.442 As will be demonstrated later, the 
rules concerning disclosure are more generous in the United Kingdom than in many 
civil law jurisdictions, which made it easier for the judge to assess individually the 
pieces of information contained in the relevant documents.443  
 
439 See MCDOUGALL, A., “Vitamins litigation: unavailability of exemplary damages, restitutionary 
damages and account of profits in private competition law claims”, E.C.L.R., Volume 29, Issue 3, 2008, 
p. 181-184, at p. 184. 
440 2 Travel Group PLC (in Liquidation) v. Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd [2012] CAT 19. 
441 See RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 8. 
442 National Grid [2012] EWHC 869. However, it should be noted that the documents in question only 
quoted from the corporate statements and were not themselves corporate statements. 
443 See GUTTUSO, L., “The enduring question of access to leniency materials in private proceedings: one 
draft Directive and several court rulings”, G.C.L.R., 2014, 7(1), p. 10-22, at p. 19. 
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Although (with the exception of the past few years) there have been comparatively few 
antitrust damages actions before the courts in the UK,444 the number of antitrust cases is 
believed to be much higher. In fact, a majority of antitrust disputes are settled out of 
court before a final judgment is given.445 Research conducted by Professor Barry J. 
Rodger suggests that during the period 2000-2005 at least 43 competition cases were 
settled.446 The reasons for settling the case were most frequently evidential difficulties 
or, particularly in cases involving abuse of dominance, uncertainty in the outcome of the 
litigation.447 This tendency seems to continue, but it should also be noted that there has 
been a significant increase in damages claims in the past few years. For instance, during 
the period between 2009 and 2012 over 30 antitrust damages claims were brought, 
although it is believed that a significant part of such claims are still settled out of 
court.448 
 
In particular, more antitrust damages actions have been brought before the High 
Court.449 The reason why the High Court seems to have been preferred over the CAT by 
claimants includes the possibility of bringing a claim before the High Court before the 
infringement decision on which the claim is based becomes final. This is particularly 
important if there a risk for a so-called “torpedo action” by the defendant, where the 
defendant would try to raise a negative declaratory action in an alternative jurisdiction. 
By contrast, a follow-on action for damages can only be brought before the CAT once 
the appeal procedure has been completed.450  
 
444 Until 2005, only 15 final judgments in antitrust damages cases have been given in the UK. See 
RODGER, B.J., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition Litigation 
Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005”, E.C.L.R., Volume 29, Issue 2, 2008, p. 96-116, at p. 
115.  
445 Ibid., at p. 97 and Joint Working Party of the Bars and Law Societies of the United Kingdom (“JWP”), 
Response to the Commissions Green Paper “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, May 
2006, at p. 2. 
446 See RODGER, B.J., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition 
Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005”, E.C.L.R., Volume 29, Issue 2, 2008, p. 96-
116, at p. 100. The actual number is, however, expected to be much higher since the response rate of the 
questionnaires on antitrust settlements sent to law firms involved in antitrust litigation was approximately 
39%. See op. cit. at p. 99.  
447 Ibid., at p. 112. 
448 See RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 42. 
449 Ibid., at p. 4. 
450 Ibid., at p. 24. 
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Of private litigation actions, claims for damages have generally been the most 
successful type of actions, but they have, until recently, only resulted in interim 
damages being awarded. The first final, successful, damages award was only granted in 
2012 by the CAT,451 and it was followed in 2013 by Albion Water v. Dwr Cymru 
Cyfyngedig.452 
 
3.2.2. Main Obstacles to Private Enforcement 
As regards the main obstacles to private enforcement, the OFT highlighted legal costs 
and uncertainty in the outcome of the litigation as potential obstacles to private antitrust 
actions brought by consumers as well as undertakings. Other obstacles include 
evidential barriers in bringing competition cases and the burden of proof.453 A further 
disincentive for bringing antitrust damages actions is the lengthy proceedings due to the 
unsatisfactory knowledge of lawyers and the judiciary, and the fact that competition law 
and judicial remedies in private enforcement are novel.454 
 
Analyzing these obstacles in more detail, the disclosure obligation under the Civil 
Procedure Rules is fairly extensive as parties must disclose all documents which are 
relevant to the litigation, regardless of whether they support or harm their own case.455 
But the parties will not have access to all kinds of evidence, since access to leniency 
materials may be limited. However, it is a positive sign that, in light of the National 
Grid ruling, the issue of access to such material will be decided on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into consideration inter alia the difficulty of the claimant obtaining access to that 
material from other sources, and its relevance for bringing the claim. 
 
As to the costs of antitrust damages actions, they partly depend on the court before 
which they are brought. The “loser pays” rule applies in the High Court, although the 
court may decide to deviate from it by considering all the circumstances of the case.456 
451 2 Travel Group PLC (in Liquidation) v. Cardiff City Transport Services Ltd [2012] CAT 19. 
452 Albion Water v. Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig [2013] CAT 6. 
453 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 8-10. 
454 See National Report on the UK prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for 
damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 34. 
455 Civil Procedure Rules Part 31. 
456 Civil Procedure Rules 44.3. 
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The costs will depend, inter alia, on the amount involved, the importance of the matter 
to all the parties, the complexity of the matter or the difficulty or novelty of the 
questions raised, as well as the skill, effort, specialized knowledge and responsibility 
involved.457 By contrast, the “loser pays” principle does not apply in the CAT, but the 
parties may be ordered to pay their own costs. Exceptionally the claimant may be 
ordered to pay any costs incurred by the defendant (with interests) if the defendant has 
made an offer to settle which the claimant has failed to better following a substantive 
hearing. However, the CAT will not order the payment if it considers it unjust.458 
Because of this rule, the defendant will have a strong incentive to offer a settlement 
since there is a possibility that the claimant will pay for the costs incurred by him.459 
 
Moreover, it has to be noted that lawyers’ fees are very high in the United Kingdom,460 
which may discourage claimants from bringing antitrust damages actions, even if they 
are well-founded, if the outcome is uncertain because of the complexity of the case. In 
order to reduce the legal risks, a claimant may enter into a conditional fee agreement, 
according to which its lawyer can obtain a possible success fee in addition to the initial 
legal fee. If the claim fails, the lawyer must pay both sides’ costs.461 The risk therefore 
shifts to the lawyer, provided that the lawyer is willing to bring the action.462 
 
The claimant may also insure against the costs of the other party by using an “After the 
Event Insurance” thanks to which it does not incur the risk of paying those cost if its 
claim fails. Although the insurance premium must be paid in advance, it can be 
recovered if the claim succeeds. However, as the outcome of many antitrust damages 
actions is uncertain, insurers are likely to charge a premium that would be too high to 
make taking an insurance pay off. In addition, conditional fee arrangements have not 
457 Civil Procedure Rules 44.5. 
458 CAT Rules 43.7. 
459 See PEYSNER, J., “Costs and Financing in Private Third Party Competition Damages Actions”, 
CompLRev, Volume 3, Issue 1, December 2006, p. 97-115, at p. 109. 
460 Ibid., at p. 98. 
461 See External Impact Study, at p. 208. 
462 See LESKINEN, C.  “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 8(1), 2011, p. 87-121. 
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been commonly used in antitrust damages actions, which seems to be due to the 
complexity and unpredictability of these actions.463 
 
 
In order to give an incentive to lawyers to bring well-founded actions, the OFT also 
proposed that in conditional fee arrangements it should be possible to increase the 
percentage more than 100%, particularly in complex or novel competition cases,. 
However, it argued that the funding arrangement should be subject to judicial 
supervision. Furthermore, it recommended allowing the courts discretion to cap parties’ 
costs liabilities in competition cases in order to encourage well-founded actions. In 
certain cases and, in particular, in representative actions, it could even be appropriate to 
cap the claimant’s liability for the defendant’s costs at zero.464 The OFT recommended 
that courts be given discretion to cap parties’ costs liabilities in antitrust cases since it 
would provide claimants with certainty as to their potential exposure if they lost their 
case. In addition, costs-capping can reduce incentives to run up costs with the result that 
parties are encouraged to conduct litigation efficiently.465 To certain extent, these 
recommendations have been followed-up by the adoption of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which allows so-called damages-based 
agreements, i.e. contingency fees, in civil cases. But the UK Government has decided to 
preserve the “loser pays” rule, and contingency fees will not be available to opt-out 
collective actions in the CAT. In addition, it considered the existing possibility of 
capping costs and damages before the CAT as sufficient in order to exceptionally depart 
from the “loser pays” rule.466  
 
More flexibility as to the way in which antitrust damages actions can be funded is a 
positive development, but it would seem that the reforms to be introduced in the UK 
463 See PEYSNER, J., “Costs and Financing in Private Third Party Competition Damages Actions”, 
CompLRev, Volume 3, Issue 1, December 2006, p. 97-115, at p. 99-100. 
464 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading, OFT916resp, November 
2007, at p. 32-34. Other recommendations included requiring the UK courts to have regard to OFT’s 
decision and guidance and to establish a merits-based litigation fund. The Secretary of State should also 
be conferred the power to exclude leniency documents from use in litigation without the consent of the 
leniency applicant, and to remove joint and several liability for immunity recipients in private antitrust 
actions so that they would only be liable for the harm they caused. See p. 3 of the recommendations. 
465 Ibid., at p. 32-34.  
466 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 41. 
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will not be sufficient. In particular, this will be the case for consumers whose individual 
losses may be too small to merit the bringing of an action. Therefore, the envisaged 
reform of the collective action by providing for the possibility of opt-out collective 
actions in certain cases is very welcome. As have been seen above, the current 
representative action for bringing competition claims has only been used once, and in 
the end that action was also settled.467 It is logical to presume that representative actions 
exclusively on behalf of named consumers fail to optimize economies of scale, and 
result in unnecessary costs and complexity, which in turn have the implication that 
meritorious cases might not be brought, or might only be brought by a small number of 
the victims.468 
 
The existing alternative to a representative action, the Group Litigation Order, has even 
more drawbacks. For instance, consumers must individually issue claims before 
common issues can be assessed, and individual claimants must also often share the costs 
of a test case, and pay the costs of the defendant if the case is unsuccessful. In addition, 
there is not the possibility of optimizing economies of scale by bundling the claims 
together in an action brought by the representative body. Group Litigation Orders 
therefore increase the costs and are more time-consuming than representative actions,469 
again not making the Group Litigation Order an optimal remedy for consumers who 
have been victims of an antitrust violation. 
 
The new collective action, which makes it possible to bring an opt-out collective action 
on behalf of consumers (and in justified cases also on behalf of undertakings) should 
enhance access to justice of injured parties as the group of claimants will be more likely 
to be sufficiently large at least in mass harm situations for the action to pay off. 
However, whether the action will actually serve to enhance redress of injured parties 
will ultimately depend on sufficient funding. The limitations of the envisaged collective 
action, which are said to act as safeguards against unmeritorious actions, might in fact 
undermine the efficiency of the action. Prohibiting contingency fees in opt-out 
467 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07. 
468 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading, OFT916resp, November 
2007, at p. 23. 
469 Ibid., at p. 16-17. 
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collective actions clearly limits the possibilities of having access to sufficient funding. 
Similarly, the prohibition of bringing collective actions by third-party funders has the 
same effect.  
 
Coupled with the requirement that the action may only be brought by a “genuine 
representative” of the victims, there is a risk that some meritorious actions may not be 
brought if the organization in question is not willing to bring the action, for instance, 
because the outcome of the action is uncertain and there is a risk of incurring high costs. 
Arguably, the case-by-case assessment by the court in order to certify the group and 
decide on whether the collective action should be brought as an opt-in or opt-out 
action470 should be sufficient in order to exclude those actions in which there might be 
some abuse, and there is no need to exclude actions brought by law firms of third-party 
funders. In addition, the fact that no treble or exemplary damages in collective actions 
will be available471 reduces the incentives to bring an action if the amount of damages 
to be awarded is low.  
 
Overall, however, the reform of private enforcement presents some welcome 
improvements which could be expected to increase antitrust damages claims (and other 
types of private litigation actions).  One of the main changes includes the possibility of 
also bringing stand-alone actions before the CAT. This is particularly important in those 
cases where there would otherwise exist a risk that the defendant brings a so-called 
torpedo action before the decision of the competition authority has become final and the 
claimant is finally allowed to bring a follow-on action before the CAT.472 Moreover, 
making the CAT the main forum for antitrust damages action would also serve to 
increase the expertise of the court in deciding such actions, and would thus reduce the 
problem of the judiciary not always having a satisfactory knowledge of the relevant 
competition law issues. The length of the proceedings would also be reduced in that an 
infringement decision would not be required. Nevertheless, in cartel cases, follow-on 
470 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 31-32. 
471 Ibid., at p. 40-41. 
472 Unless permission is granted to the claimant to bring the action before the infringement decision has 
become final. 
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actions would still remain the only realistic redress possibility since proving the 
existence of a cartel is practically impossible without extensive pre-trial discovery. 
 
Finally, the decision to introduce an opt-out collective settlement system for 
competition law in the CAT could give incentives to claimants to settle claims quickly 
in order not to receive bad goodwill in cases involving numerous claimants, and to 
avoid the risks and costs of litigating the case in court. But settlement mechanisms will 
only be an effective remedy in case there is an effective judicial remedy available for 
the claimants if the defendant were to try to abuse its position as the stronger party 
(which would usually be the case in settlements involving damages claims by 
consumers or SMEs) so as to dictate settlement terms beneficial to it. Although the 
court will have to approve the settlement, injured parties might still be willing to accept 
a settlement offer significantly below the level they could get in court, provided that the 
collective action remedy is efficient. It should be recalled that the funding of these 
actions might be compromised in the model envisaged by the UK Government. 
 
3.3. Germany 
3.3.1. General Overview 
Already when the German Act against Restraints of Competition473 was drafted in 1955 
the idea was to give an important role to private parties in the enforcement of 
competition law as “private attorney generals”.474 Contrary to the situation in most 
Member States, private actions have therefore been common in Germany. The 
conclusion made in the Ashurst Study, according to which private enforcement is 
underdeveloped in the EU,475 is hence not correct regarding the situation in Germany. 
However, private enforcement has not played a significant role with regard to victims of 
hardcore cartels in Germany.476 This is, for instance, due to the judiciary’s hesitation to 
473 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen. 
474 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 18. 
475 See Ashurst Study, at p. 1. 
476 Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Cartel Office on the 
Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, at p. 1. 
However, there is an increasing awareness among undertakings of follow-on damages claims against 
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give standing or to award damages to private parties. In addition, the Act against 
Restraints of Competition of 1955 only conferred the right to bring an antitrust damages 
action, if a provision of the Act having a protective purpose had been infringed. The 
courts were thus required to analyze in each individual case whether it had been the 
intention of the legislator to protect the claimant in question, and this resulted in 
confusing case-law making it fairly unpredictable whether a provision was regarded as 
protective or not.477  
 
As regards cartel cases, an infringement of competition rules was only found to exist if 
the cartel members aimed at harming or eliminating a specific customer group on the 
market, i.e. mainly in boycott cases. In addition, the dominating opinion was that 
hardcore cartels were sanctioned heavily and efficiently as administrative offences by 
the German Competition Authority and, therefore, private enforcement was not needed 
in this area.478 
 
Furthermore, Section 33 of the Act against Restraints of Competition was inapplicable 
to breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Instead, these claims were based on Section 
823(2) of the German Civil Code, which also required a protective character of the 
norm that had been infringed in order to give rise to an obligation to compensate the 
damage caused intentionally or negligently. The Supreme Federal Court generally 
acknowledged that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU fulfilled this protective character 
criterion, but only with respect to competition restrictions directed against actors on the 
other side of the market, i.e. direct purchasers. These difficulties together with the 
burden of proof resting on the claimant to prove the existence of an anti-competitive 
practice and the active involvement of the defendant therein as well as the quantifiable 
loss in which the infringement had resulted479 made it quite difficult for private parties 
cartelists. See PEYER, S., AHRC Project, “Germany. Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer 
Redress in the EU”, at p. 19. 
477 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 18-19. 
478 See THOMAS, S., “Damages claims under the revised German Act against restraints of competition (§ 
33 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), e-Competitions, January 2007-I, No 12706.  
479 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
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to bring antitrust damages actions. However, changes brought about by the 7th 
Amendment to the German Act against Restraints of Competition and developments in 
the case law on private antitrust enforcement have facilitated bringing antitrust damages 
claims in Germany. 
 
The 7th Amendment to the German Act against Restraints of Competition entered into 
force on July 1st, 2005. Contrary to the previous law, according to which these claims 
required a violation of a provision that serves to protect another person,480 it conferred a 
right to compensation to persons affected by a breach of the German or EU competition 
rules.481 The Act defined affected persons as competitors or other market participants 
impaired by the infringement. Anyone who intentionally or negligently commits an 
infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, or violates a provision of the German 
Competition Act or a decision taken by the German competition authority is liable for 
the damages caused by the infringement to affected persons.482 As a result, 
infringements of the EU competition rules are treated in the same manner as breaches of 
the German competition rules. 
 
Nevertheless, the law did not contain any provision on whether indirect purchasers 
would also be entitled to claim damages.483 It has been suggested that they would have a 
right to claim damages arguing that the term “market participants” seems to be inspired 
by the Act Against Unfair Competition, which includes in that term consumers and 
businesses that have no direct relationship to the party infringing upon unfair 
competition.484 This amendment is thus likely to have facilitated antitrust damages 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 18-20. 
480 See BÖGE, U., “Up and Running, or is it? Private Enforcement – the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives”, E.C.L.R., Volume 27, Issue 4, 2006, p. 197-205, at p. 199. 
481 Section 33(1) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition. 
482 Section 33(3) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition. 
483 See BUNDESKARTELLAMT, “Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung. Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven”, 
Diskussionspapier für die Sitzung des Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht am 26. September 2005, at p. 7. 
484 See WURMNEST, W., “A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal 
of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition”, German Law Journal, Vol. 06, No. 08, 2005, 
p. 1173-1190, at p. 1182. In fact, the right of indirect purchasers to bring antitrust damages claims has 
now been confirmed by the Federal Court of Justice. See Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of June 28th, 
2011, KZR 75/10, ORWI. 
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actions, since it also widened standing of potential claimants to indirect purchasers.485 
As to passing-on, Section 33(3) states that it shall not be excluded that damage exists 
when goods or services that have been purchased at an excessive price are resold. 
Consequently, claimants can bring a damages action even if they have passed the higher 
cartel-price on to their customers, provided that they have still suffered some harm by 
the competition infringement. This in turn limits the passing-on defense.486 
 
Moreover, not only Commission Decisions, but also NCA Decisions and decisions of 
the courts of the Member States that establish an infringement of Article 101 or 102 
TFEU are binding on the courts before which antitrust damages actions are brought as 
regards the existence of the infringement. Similarly, the decisions of the German 
competition authority finding an infringement of the German antitrust rules will bind 
German courts – as far as the existence of an infringement is concerned – when they 
decide private damages claims.487 
 
The 7th Amendment to the Act Against Restraints of Competition also extended the 
three-year limitation period for bringing a damages claim by providing that the 
limitation period is suspended with the initiation of antitrust proceedings by the 
Commission or the national competition authorities or courts of the Member States.488  
 
485 This would also be in line with the ECJ ruling in Courage, according to which any individual harmed 
by an infringement of the EU competition rules may seek compensation for the loss caused to him as a 
result of the infringement. 
486 See THOMAS, S., “Damages claims under the revised German Act against restraints of competition (§ 
33 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), e-Competitions, January 2007-I, No 12706.  
487 Section 33(4) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. As regards Commission 
Decisions, the reference to their binding character is merely aimed at providing a clarification, since these 
decisions already bind national courts pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003. The extension of the 
binding effect to decisions by foreign competition authorities and courts was criticized by the Monopolies 
Commission during the elaboration of the 7th Amendment of the German Competition Act, since the 
binding effect of administrative decisions is not limited to claims against parties addressed by the 
decision. Consequently, even parties that are not addressees of the decision or could not duly participate 
in the administrative proceedings will not be able to defend themselves against the alleged antitrust 
violation before German courts. See WURMNEST, W., “A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in 
Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition”, German Law 
Journal, Vol. 06, No. 08, 2005, p. 1173-1190, at p. 1186. According to the Monopolies Commission, the 
binding effect should be limited to the addressees of the decision since these are the only ones that can 
appeal the decision. Moreover, in this manner there would be larger incentives for companies to apply for 
leniency. See MONOPOLKOMMISSION, “Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-
Novelle”, Sondergutachten der Monopolkomission gemäss § 44. Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB, at p. 24. 
488 See BÖGE, U., “Up and Running, or is it? Private Enforcement – the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives”, E.C.L.R., Volume 27, Issue 4, 2006, p. 197-205, at p. 199 
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These changes seemed to have increased damages claims in Germany.489 Research 
undertaken by the German competition authority on the extent of private enforcement in 
Germany on the basis of data from the year 2004 found that, during that year, 240 
decisions involving an antitrust violation were registered and in 68 cases antitrust 
claims were used as a sword. In 38 of these cases damages were claimed and 19 of them 
were successful.490 However, the investigation revealed that most of the actions brought 
concerned abuses of a dominant position or vertical agreements, but victims of hardcore 
cartels have at that time only been awarded damages in one claim, namely the Vitamins 
case,491 although several equivalent proceedings were settled.492 More recent research 
covering the period between 2004 and 2009 shows that other remedies are usually 
preferred over damages claims, although damages are sometimes requested together 
with a primary remedy for injunction. However, monetary claims are also made more 
frequently as unjust enrichment claims.493  
 
In the Vitamins case, the Regional Court of Dortmund held that the claimant fell within 
the protective character of Article 101 TFEU or its German equivalent, Section 1 of the 
Act Against Restraints of Competition, when it was directly and objectively affected 
and was an identifiable market participant. Consequently, it is not necessary that the 
anti-competitive behavior be directed against a particular person for the provision to be 
applicable to the claimant. The Court therefore awarded almost €1.6 million in damages 
to a confectionary manufacturer who had bought products from the Vitamins cartel.494  
 
489 See PEYER, S., AHRC Project, “Germany. Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in 
the EU”, at p. 2. 
490 See BUNDESKARTELLAMT, “Private Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung, Stand, Probleme, Perspektiven”, 
Diskussionspapier für die Sitzung des Arbeitskreises Kartellrecht am 26. September 2005, at p. 4. 
491 See BÖGE, U., “Up and Running, or is it? Private enforcement – the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives”, E.C.L.R., Volume 27, Issue 4, 2006, p. 197-205, at p. 197-198. See Regional Court of 
Dortmund, Judgment of April 1st, 2004, 13 O 55 /02. 
492 See Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of November 23rd, 2004, KZR 11/04 or Düsseldorf Higher 
Regional Court, VI U 37/04, and BÖGE, U., “Up and Running, or is it? Private Enforcement – the 
Situation in Germany and Policy Perspectives”, E.C.L.R., Volume 27, Issue 4, 2006, p. 197-205, at p. 
198.  
493 See PEYER, S., AHRC Project, “Germany. Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in 
the EU”, at p. 19. 
494 Regional Court of Dortmund, Judgment of April 1st, 2004, 13 O 55 /02. 
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Nevertheless, two other follow-on actions brought as a consequence of the Vitamins 
cartel that were decided by the Regional Court of Mannheim and the Regional Court of 
Mainz before the ruling of the Regional Court of Dortmund, denied the claimants the 
right to damages on the grounds that the cartel had to be specifically directed at the 
claimant in order for it to be entitled to damages. The judgment of the Regional Court of 
Mannheim was upheld by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe,495 but that decision 
was in turn appealed to the Federal Court of Justice.496 Eventually the parties settled the 
case out of court and the appeals were withdrawn.497  
 
Some commentators have argued that the rulings of the regional courts in question 
constituted a violation of the principle of effectiveness, as they did not take into account 
the ECJ judgment in Courage.498 The Regional Court of Mannheim expressly stated 
that the case did not have anything to do with the ECJ ruling, since the latter concerned 
the right of a co-contractor to damages, and in the case at hand a customer’s claim was 
at stake.499 Nonetheless, as has rightly been submitted, customers of a cartel member 
cannot be deprived of their right to damages only because the cartel is not intentionally 
directed at them, but all market participants.500  
 
495 Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, Judgment of January 28th, 2004, WuW, Section E DE-R, p. 1229. 
496 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 31. 
497 See BÖGE, U., “Up and Running, or is it? Private Enforcement – the Situation in Germany and Policy 
Perspectives”, E.C.L.R., Volume 27, Issue 4, 2006, p. 197-205, at p. 204. 
498 See ANDRELANG, C., “Damages for the Infringement of Art. 81 EC by Cartel Agreements according 
to sec. 33(3) GWB: The Changes of Law concerning the ‘Protective Law’ Requirement and the ‘Passing 
On’ Defence”, World Competition 30(4), 2007, p. 573-593, at p. 592, and MIEGE, C., “Modernisation 
and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU and the 
German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in 
Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics (ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, 
February 17th, 2005, at p. 30-31. 
499 Since, in the light of Courage, any individual has a right to damages, it does not matter whether the 
claimant is a co-contractor or a third party. 
500 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 30. Moreover, as stated above, it has 
been settled in Manfredi that third parties may also seek damages for harm caused by an antitrust 
violation. 
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As to the legal costs of damages actions, lawyers’ fees and court fees are contained in 
tables of fixed tariffs, and the parties are not allowed to deviate from them. The fees 
depend on the amount in dispute and a multiplier is applied to the tariff in question. The 
multiplier is determined on the basis of the steps taken at the various stages of the legal 
proceedings.501 The lawyers’ fees depend on the nature of the proceedings, but the 
specific effort required in a particular case is not considered as such, but cases involving 
a small amount are assumed to require less effort to resolve. In civil litigation, the 
lawyer is entitled to a case-handling fee and a hearing fee. If a dispute is settled, the 
lawyer can charge an additional settlement fee. Court fees must be paid when the action 
is brought, but if the action succeeds, the claimant can recover the cost paid in advance 
from the defendant.502 
 
Nevertheless, in antitrust damages cases, the claimant may request the court to adjust 
the case value to its financial situation if it would considerably be jeopardized if the 
claimant had to bear the full litigation costs. The court may require the claimant to 
plausibly demonstrate that its costs will not be covered by a third party. Accordingly, 
the party will only have to pay the fees of its lawyer corresponding to the adjusted case 
value.503 
 
A party and lawyer can also agree on hourly fees, provided that they are not lower than 
the fees provided by statute. Such higher fees can generally not be recovered from the 
other party since the principle of full fee shifting is only limited to fixed fees. The costs 
of the proceedings are therefore confined to the costs fixed by the statutes regardless of 
whether the party and its lawyer have agreed to another type of remuneration for the 
lawyer.504 
 
Until recently, contingency fees were prohibited in Germany.505 Nevertheless, in 2006, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court held that a complete ban was contrary to the 
501 See WAGNER, G., “Litigation costs and their recovery: the German experience”, C.J.Q. 28(3), 2009, 
p. 367-388, at p. 367-370. 
502 Ibid., at p. 370-372.  
503 Section 89a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
504 See WAGNER, G., “Litigation costs and their recovery: the German experience”, C.J.Q. 28(3), 2009, 
p. 367-388, at p. 374-378. 
505 Section 49 b (2) of the Rules and Regulations for the Bar. 
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constitutional right of the professional freedom of lawyers, since potential claimants 
could be deterred from enforcing their rights due to the risk of losing and, the resulting 
obligation to bear the costs of the litigation.506 Following this ruling, the Lawyer’s 
Remuneration Act was amended in 2008 in order to allow contingency fees. But they 
are limited to cases where the claimant would otherwise not be able to enforce its rights 
because of its financial situation.507 The agreement on remuneration must contain the 
estimated remuneration by statute and, if applicable, the agreed remuneration for which 
the lawyer would be willing to accept the case, as well as which remuneration would be 
applicable and under which conditions.508 In addition, contingency fees will not apply to 
costs that can be recovered under fee shifting.509  
 
The possibility of adjusting the litigation costs of the claimant in a meritorious antitrust 
damages action510 if its financial situation would otherwise be jeopardized considerably  
appears to enhance the bringing of such actions in Germany. Moreover, the 
predictability of the costs helps assessing the possible risks of bringing a claim. 
Nevertheless, in order to make actions by consumers with scattered claims feasible, 
adjustments should be made to the rules on contingency fees in order to ensure effective 
redress. 
 
One of the most interesting developments so far is the damages claims brought as a 
follow-on action to the decision of the German competition authority to fine the 
members of the concrete cartel, which operated on the cement market between 1989 and 
2002.511 The claim was brought by a Belgian undertaking, “Cartel Damage Claims SA”, 
which was specifically founded for the purpose of antitrust litigation.512 The Cartel 
506 Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of December 12th, 2006, Entscheidungen des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 BvR 2576/04. 
507 Section 4a(1) of the Lawyer’s Remuneration Act. 
508 Section 4a(2) of the Lawyer’s Remuneration Act. 
509 Section 4a(3) of the Lawyer’s Remuneration Act. 
510 See WAGNER, G., “Litigation costs and their recovery: the German experience”, C.J.Q. 28(3), 2009, 
p. 367-388, at p. 374-375. 
511 See THOMAS, S., “De facto class action for cartel damages in Germany? A German Court rules on 
procedural key issues for cartel damages suits (Cartel Damage Claims SA), e-Competitions, February 
2007-II, No 13224. 
512 See THOMAS, S., “Damages claims under the revised German Act against restraints of competition (§ 
33 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), e-Competitions, January 2007-I, No 12706.  
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Damage Claims SA bought the damages claims from 29 customers, who had allegedly 
been harmed by the concrete cartel513 and brought the claims in the name of the 
company before the Regional Court of Düsseldorf. The idea was to render the litigation 
process more efficient for the claimants514 by bundling the claims into one legal person, 
thus creating economies of scale, which would reduce procedural efforts and increase 
informational synergies as in class actions. The Cartel Damage Claims SA bought the 
claims for a symbolic amount of €100 and committed to pass on to the harmed 
customers approximately 85% of any damages awards. Moreover, the customers were 
to bear parts of the procedural costs by advanced payment.515 In its interlocutory 
judgment of February 21st, 2007, the Regional Court of Düsseldorf recognized the 
claimant’s right to bring the claim.516 The defendant concrete producers appealed that 
decision, but their appeal was rejected by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf in 
May, 2008.517 The ruling of the Regional Court of Düsseldorf has been upheld by the 
German Federal Court of Justice.518 But due to the administrative cost of solicitation 
and collection of assignments of individual claims, this model is only likely to work if 
the number of claimants is limited and the individual damages claims are 
considerable.519 
 
In the view of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the 
Federal Cartel Office, the 7th Amendment of the Act Against Restraints of Competition 
implemented measures necessary for the effective enforcement of antitrust damages 
claims and there was no need to take further action in Germany.520 Nevertheless, 
513 See THOMAS, S., “De facto class action for cartel damages in Germany? A German Court rules on 
procedural key issues for cartel damages suits (Cartel Damage Claims SA), e-Competitions, February 
2007-II, No 13224. 
514 See THOMAS, S., “Damages claims under the revised German Act against restraints of competition (§ 
33 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), e-Competitions, January 2007-I, No 12706. 
515 See THOMAS, S., “De facto class action for cartel damages in Germany? A German Court rules on 
procedural key issues for cartel damages suits (Cartel Damage Claims SA), e-Competitions, February 
2007-II, No 13224. 
516 Press release of the Regional Court of Düsseldorf No. 02/2007, available at http://www.lg-
duesseldorf.nrw.de/presse/pressearchiv/07-02.pdf. 
517 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, Judgment of May 14th, 2008 in Case No.VI-U (Kart) 14/07. 
518 See Judgment of the Federal Court of Justice of April 7th, 2009 in Case No. KZR 42/08. 
519 See WAGNER, G, “Collective redress – categories of loss and legislative options”, L.Q.R., 127(Jan), 
2011, p. 55-82, at p. 75. 
520 See Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Cartel Office on 
the Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, at p. 1-2.  
156 
 
                                                 
arguably these amendments are not sufficient to eliminate all obstacles to private 
enforcement in Germany, especially for consumers, as will be explained in the 
following section. 
 
3.3.2. Main Obstacles to Private Enforcement 
Despite the amended Competition Act, obstacles to private enforcement of antitrust 
damages claims remain. The main problematic issue is that the Competition Act does 
not ease the burden of proof for claimants wishing to bring stand-alone actions, but will 
only make it easier to bring follow-on actions. Since competition authorities with wide 
powers of inspection are not able to detect and prove all hardcore cartels, it is virtually 
impossible for private claimants to do so under the current rules on evidence and burden 
of proof. Consequently, stand-alone actions will, as the law stands, neither serve as a 
complement to public enforcement nor ease the burden on the competition authorities in 
this type of competition infringement.521 Under Section 810 of the Civil Code, the 
claimant can inspect documents in the possession of another person, but only if they 
have been drawn up in the interest of the claimant. The condition limits the possibilities 
of claimants being able to rely on access to documents relating to an antitrust violation 
since they would not have been created in their interest. However, once the antitrust 
violation has been established, courts have frequently ordered the defendant to disclose 
information if the claimant needs additional information. Similarly, in follow-on actions 
claimants will also have access to documents in the possession of the competition 
authority, although access will not be granted to leniency documents. But even with 
regard to such documents, the lawyer of the injured party has a right to inspect the file, 
unless the investigation would be put at risk.522  
 
Moreover, in most cases, the essential facts and figures needed to quantify damages are 
not available. However, the judge may, pursuant to Section 287 of the German Code of 
Civil Procedure, estimate the antitrust damage by taking into account the proportion of 
the benefit that the cartel member has derived from the infringement. But even in this 
521 See BERRISCH, G.M., “Kartellerechtliche Schadensersatzansprüche nach der 7. GWB – Novelle. 
Eine Einschätzung der Zukunft privater Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung mittels Schadensersatzklagen in 
Deutschland”, WuW 9/2005, p. 878-888, at p. 883-888. 
522 See PEYER, S., AHRC Project, “Germany. Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in 
the EU”, at p. 11. 
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case the estimation must be based on solid factual grounds and be plausible and 
verifiable.523 Nonetheless, it is also possible to split between the basis for and the 
amount of the damages claim. In fact, in the majority of damages claims the aim is to 
establish an obligation to pay compensation for the damages caused, and then the 
amount of damages is often established within the framework of a settlement.524  
 
There are also no collective damages actions available for consumers and businesses, 
which have suffered loss as a result of an infringement of competition rules. 
Consequently, in particular consumers who have suffered comparatively small 
individual losses are lacking incentives to bring antitrust damages actions. Collective 
actions are only available for applying for injunctions. Initially, the 7th Amendment to 
the Act Against Restraints of Competition only entitled associations for the promotion 
of commercial interests to do so, whereas consumer associations lacked standing.525 The 
latest amendment, the 8th Amendment to the Act Against Restraints of Competition, 
which entered into force on June 30th, 2013, now also allows consumer associations to 
bring an action for injunction in certain circumstances.526 
 
Furthermore, the 7th Amendment to the Act Against Restraints of Competition conferred 
representative associations a right to order an undertaking that has infringed competition 
rules to pay an amount equivalent to the additional proceeds, which it has incurred 
through its anti-competitive behavior.527 The 8th Amendment to the Act Against 
Restraints of Competition extended this right to consumer associations. However, the 
additional proceeds are to be paid to the Treasury, and the representative association is 
only entitled to having its legal costs reimbursed, which in practice does not provide any 
incentive to bring such a claim because in the best-case scenario, the representative 
association will only get its costs reimbursed.528 In addition, the right to deprive 
523 See THOMAS, S., “Damages claims under the revised German Act against restraints of competition (§ 
33 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), e-Competitions, January 2007-1, No 12706. 
524 Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Cartel Office on the 
Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, at p. 7. 
525 Section 33(2) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition, including the 7th Amendment. 
526 Section 33(2) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition, including the 8th Amendment. 
527 Section 34a of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
528 See “Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle”, Sondergutachten der 
Monopolkomission gemäss § 44. Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB, at. p. 51. 
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infringers from their profits is subsidiary to the German competition authority’s right to 
order the skimming off of benefits.529 This explains why associations have not made use 
of this type of procedure.530 
 
Nonetheless, in the field of investment law, another instrument that is similar to a 
collective action was introduced in 2005, and could serve as inspiration also for 
resolving antitrust damages claims. The Capital Investor Test Case Litigation Act 
provides for test case litigation for capital investors.531 The call for such a new legal 
instrument became evident, inter alia, when approximately 15.000 investors brought 
liability claims for statements made in a prospectus (Prospekthaftungsansprüche) 
against the Deutsche Telekom AG. This instrument makes it possible to bring a test case 
when there are multiple capital market disputes involving similar issues.532 The test case 
is used to decide common legal and factual questions and they are then applied to the 
individual cases.533 
 
But the use of test case litigation for capital investors is limited as it only applies to 
capital investment law.534 It can thus not be used in antitrust cases, but lessons could be 
learned from it when designing a collective damages action for antitrust violations. The 
main problems for consumers harmed by antitrust violations in Germany therefore 
remain: they lack incentives to sue and there is no real possibility of obtaining 
compensation for their loss, as the costs of individual stand-alone actions would by far 
exceed the possible compensation awarded.  
 
529 Section 34a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition.  
530 See PEYER, S., AHRC Project, “Germany. Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in 
the EU”, at p. 10.  
531 Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz. 
532 See REUSCHLE, F., “Das Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM 
FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, “Band I: 
Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente der Unterlassungsklage und der 
Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection Instruments of Actions for Injunction 
and Group Damages Actions”, Conference on February 24th, 2006 in Vienna, p. 66-72, at p. 67. 
533 See Germany – National Report, November 15th, 2006, prepared for the Consumer Redress Study, at p. 
22. 
534 See STADLER, A., “Collective Action as an Efficient Means for the Enforcement of European 
Competition Law” in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), “Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 195-213, at p. 203-204. 
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To conclude, although Germany is one of the Member States with most private 
enforcement, it has to be noted that a majority of antitrust damages actions are brought 
by undertakings. Damages actions are also the least preferred remedy of private 
enforcement, and the success rate of such claim is estimated to be 26%.535 Therefore, 
the redress possibilities of consumers should be enhanced and access to evidence should 
be made more feasible in stand-alone cases. 
 
3.4. France 
3.4.1. General Overview 
Any individual that has suffered harm as a result of the breach of the French or the EU 
competition rules can bring an antitrust damages claim in France. These claims are 
governed by the general law of civil liability, i.e. Article 1382 of the French Civil Code. 
Pursuant to Article 1382, “Any act of man, which causes damages to another, obliges 
the person at fault to repair it”. A wrongful act is deemed to exist when a civil or 
criminal law has been violated. Intent is not required. Consequently, a wrongful act 
would exist when it has been proven that EU competition law has been infringed.536  
 
The action for damages can be brought before civil or commercial courts and, in 
principle, even before criminal courts if an individual has fraudulently taken a personal 
and decisive part in the design, organization or implementation of anti-competitive 
practices, and the injured party is claiming damages for the harm caused by the antitrust 
violation.537  
 
In France, there are more antitrust damages actions than what was found in the Ashurst 
Report. The French Rapporteur for the research project “Competition Law: 
Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress in the EU” regarding the 
period 1999-2012 identified indeed approximately 80 cases of private litigation (i.e. also 
535 See PEYER, S., AHRC Project, “Germany. Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in 
the EU”, at p. 20-21. 
536 See HAHN ROSOCHOWICZ, P., “Deterrence and the relationship between public and private 
enforcement of competition law”, in the Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, 
Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics (ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at 
p. 9-10. 
537 See Article L.420-6 of the French Commercial Code and CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French 
Report. Competition law, private enforcement and collective redress in France”, at p. 3,. 
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including other types of claims than claims for damages) during the research period in 
question. Most of the follow-on actions were claims for damages brought for cartel 
infringement decisions, although antitrust damages actions are often decided through 
arbitration or settled. It should also be noted that a significant number of damages 
actions are not successful. Moreover, apart from proving the antitrust violation, the 
claimant must also prove fault, the existence of damage with certain characteristics, and 
a causal relationship between the infringement and the harm suffered.538 These last 
requirements could explain why many follow-on damages actions have not been 
successful in the end. 
 
In addition, there appears in general to be more stand-alone actions than follow-on 
actions,539 which is surprising since proving an antitrust violation is not an easy task. 
But this can at least partly be explained by the fact that such actions are often based on a 
contractual relationship, where an action for nullity is sometimes brought in 
combination with a claim for damages, although pure claims for damages have also 
been brought.540 
 
It is also striking that there are practically no actions brought by consumers, which 
could be explained by the fact that their individual losses are comparatively low.541 An 
important obstacle to consumers bringing antitrust damages actions was the flaws with 
the collective actions available before the adoption of the new Consumer Act in March 
2014.542 Until then, there were two different types of collective actions which could be 
used for claiming damages in France: an action to assert a collective interest and an 
action brought on behalf of several individuals. An action to assert collective consumer 
interests could be brought by approved consumer associations.543 A direct or indirect 
collective injury of consumers had to exist, and it had to be different from the injuries 
538 See CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French Report. Competition law, private enforcement and 
collective redress in France”, at p. 3-6. 
539 Ibid., at p. 3. 
540 Ibid., at p. 7 and e.g. Emirates Case, Court of Appeal of Paris, Judgment of December 14th, 2011. 
541 See CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French Report. Competition law, private enforcement and 
collective redress in France”, at p. 5. 
542 Law No. 2014-344 of March 17th, 2014 on consumer protection. 
543 Article L.422-1 of Law No. 93-949, the Consumer Code. 
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suffered personally by the consumers,544 as it was not possible to repair individual 
injuries under this action.545 Moreover, this type of action could only be brought when 
an offense had been committed. Its use was therefore very limited, as criminal laws 
must be strictly interpreted.546 
 
Actions could be brought on behalf of several individuals when several consumers had 
been injured as a result of the actions of the same professional.547 Only approved 
consumer associations who represented consumers at a national level were entitled to 
bring these actions. Furthermore, the prior authorization of at least two consumers that 
allowed the association to sue on their behalf was required.548 The association could 
then solicit the authorization of more potential victims, for instance, in newspapers and 
magazines, or if expressly permitted, on television or radio. A consumer could withdraw 
his authorization and pursue the action himself. If the collective action was 
unsuccessful, consumers could no longer bring the action themselves, if they had not 
chosen to withdraw their authorization before the outcome. If the consumer association 
won the action, the damages and interests awarded had to be attributed to the injured 
consumers because only the repair of the individual injuries of consumers was allowed 
under this type of action. An association could also simultaneously bring an action on 
behalf of several individuals and an action to assert collective interest of consumers.549  
 
The advantage of this action was that consumer associations paid the trial costs and, 
hence, consumers did not have to bear the financial risk normally involved in bringing 
544 See LONGUET, A. and DIGUERES, D., “Travaux pour l’introduction d’une action de groupe en 
France” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND 
KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, “Band I: Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente 
der Unterlassungsklage und der Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection 
Instruments of Actions for Injunction and Group Damages Actions”, Conference on February 24th, 2006 
in Vienna, p. 55-58, at p. 56. 
545 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 303. 
546 See France – National Report, November 15th, 2006, prepared for the Consumer Redress Study, at p. 
18. 
547 Article L.422-1 of Law No. 93-949, the Consumer Code. Apart from the possibility of bringing a 
representative action on behalf of consumers, such an action is also possible for investors pursuant to 
Article L.452-2(1) of the Monetary and Financial Code and, pursuant to Article L.142-3(1) of the 
Environmental Code, for the protection of the environment.   
548 Article L.422-1 of the Consumer Code. 
549 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 303. 
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legal proceedings, but would be compensated in case the action was successful.550 The 
drawback was that the association needed the mandates of every claimant instead of a 
collective mandate.551 The associations found that their action was paralyzed by the 
heaviness and costs of the administration of the mandates.552 
 
Several initiatives have been taken in the last decade with a view to improving the 
possibility of using collective actions. In May 2005, a website, ClassAction.fr, was 
created in order to enable the general public to go online to join in pending court 
proceedings. However, the law firm Avocats Du Nouveau Siècle brought actions 
against the administrators of the ClassAction.fr website and against the company Class 
Action.fr. The First Instance Civil Court of Lille held that it was illegal to advertise 
Class Action.fr’s legal services through the website, since it is a commercial company 
and not a legal entity authorized to provide legal advice. Moreover, its practice 
constituted illicit acts of solicitation, thus amounting to unfair competition with regard 
to the rest of the legal profession.553 Consequently, the company was ordered to end 
these practices.554 
 
The French government also intended to enhance collective actions, but at first it did not 
lead to any results because consumer associations were divided on the model of 
collective action that should be adopted, and there was also opposition from the 
550 See France – National Report, November 15th, 2006 prepared for the Consumer Redress Study, at p. 
15. Hereinafter referred to as “France – National Report”. 
551 See “Actions de groupe: le rendez-vous manqué de la LME”, usinenouvelle.com, June 18th, 2008, 
available at http://www.usinenouvelle.com/article/actions-de-groupe-le-rendez-vous-manqu-de-la-
lme.141271. 
552 See LONGUET, A. and DIGUERES, D., “Travaux pour l’introduction d’une action de groupe en 
France” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND 
KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, “Band I: Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente 
der Unterlassungsklage und der Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection 
Instruments of Actions for Injunction and Group Damages Actions”, Conference on February 24th, 2006 
in Vienna, p. 55-58, at p. 56. 
553 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 304. 
554 Ibid., at Note 9. Also several consumer associations brought an action against Class Action.fr. arguing 
that the services offered by it constituted illicit solicitation. The Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris 
ruled in favor of the claimants, and prohibited the company to collect mandates to sue online. See op. cit, 
at p. 304. 
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professional bodies, which feared that such actions would lead to a U.S. style of 
litigation.555 
 
One important incentive to reform the collective actions was motivated by the decision 
by the Competition Council of November 2005 to fine the mobile operators Orange 
France, SFR and Bouygues Télécom for fixing prices and market shares. In order to 
bring legal proceedings to repair the losses suffered by consumers as a consequence of 
the price fixing, the consumer association UFC-Que-Choisir set up a website so that 
consumers could join the action.556 On appeal the Court of Appeal held that this 
constituted canvassing and was therefore prohibited by Article L.422-1 of the Consumer 
Code.557 This ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court.558 
 
This was the first case in France in which a consumer association brought an antitrust 
damages action.559 It is also noteworthy that early on in the proceedings UFC-Que-
Choisir had claimed that it would not be able to deal with more than 40,000 files due to 
the limitations of the collective action procedure,560 although the potential number of 
claimants was 20 million (i.e. the number of mobile phone service subscribers). 
Nevertheless, eventually less than 1% of the subscribers decided to join the action,561 
which also demonstrates the difficulties with collective actions based on the opt-in 
model as the group of claimants risks to be only a fraction of the actual number of 
victims. 
 
555 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 305. 
556 See HODGES, C., The Reform of the Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems. A 
New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, 
at p. 84.  
557 UFC-Que-Choisir v. Bouygues, Court of Appeal, Judgment of January 22nd, 2010. 
558 UFC-Que-Choisir v. Bouygues, Court of Cassation, Judgment of May 26th, 2011. 
559 See IDOT, L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Recommendations Flowing from the 
French Experience” in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), “Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 85-106, at p. 96. 
560 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 306. 
561 See UFC-QUE-CHOISIR, “Trade practices and competition / Mobile telephone cartel”, presentation at 
the CLEF meeting on May 17-18th, 2007, Brussels, available at http://www.clef-
project.eu/media/d_GaellePatettaUFCcasecartelmobile_75402.pdf. 
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Despite the fact that the French government had promised to enhance collective actions, 
and the drawbacks of the existing ones were considerable, it was not until March 2014 
that a collective action was introduced in France by the Consumer Act.562 The new act 
provides for collective follow-on actions after a decision of French or EU competition 
authorities. However, only national consumer associations may bring such a claim in 
order to obtain compensation for individual harm suffered by consumers in the same or 
identic situation and which has been caused by the same professional or 
professionals.563  The action is based on the “opt-in” model, so once the judge has 
decided on the admissibility of the action and has ruled on the liability of the 
professional, he or she will identify the group, and will decide on the conditions for 
joining the group.564 In collective antitrust damages actions, the liability of the 
professional established by the competition authority binds the judge.565 
 
The judge will determine the harm to be compensated for each consumer or each 
category of consumers which forms part of the group, as well as the amount or all the 
elements needed to assess the harm.566 To this end, the judge may order any measure 
lawfully available which is necessary to preserve the evidence and the disclosure of 
documents.567 This is important because one of the reasons why the previously existing 
collective actions in France were considered to be of limited use, was that the judge in 
civil cases did not have discovery or compulsory powers of investigation at his or her 
disposal.568 Moreover, once the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions has been 
implemented in France, national law must at least provide for minimum disclosure of 
evidence and sanctions for failure or refusal to comply with a disclosure order and the 
destruction of evidence.569 
 
562 Law No. 2014-344 of March 17th, 2014 on consumer protection (hereinafter “Consumer Act”). 
563 Articles L. 423-1 and L. 423-17 of the Consumer Act. 
564 Article L. 423-3(1) of the Consumer Act. 
565 Article L. 423-17 of the Consumer Act. 
566 Article L. 423-3(2) of the Consumer Act. 
567 Article L. 423-3(3) of the Consumer Act. 
568 See CONSEIL DE LA CONCURRENCE, “Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de 
l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles”, at p. 11. 
569 Articles 5 and 8 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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The judge will also order the measures to be taken in order to notify group members of 
the liability of the professional, which will be undertaken at the cost of the 
professional.570 The time-limit for joining the group must be established to be between 
two and six months counting from the moment when the notification ordered by the 
judge has taken place.571  
 
There is also a simplified collective action for those cases in which the identity of the 
injured consumers is known and those consumers have suffered the same amount of 
harm. In these cases, the judge may order the professional to compensate directly and 
individually, within a time-limit and under the conditions established by the judge.572 In 
case some of these consumers do not receive the compensation within the established 
time-limit, the association will represent them in the proceedings to enforce their rights 
under the judgment.573 
 
It is also possible to decide on compensation through mediation, but only the 
association can participate in the mediation under the conditions fixed by legislation,574 
and all settlements must be approved by the judge, who will assert that the settlement is 
conforming to the interests of those to which it will apply. The settlement also fixes the 
conditions for notifying the consumers concerned about the possibility of opting in, the 
time-limit, and conditions for opting in.575 
 
The bringing of a collective action will also suspend the limitation period for individual 
damages claims, and it will start to run again from the date when a decision on the 
liability of the professional has become final. The new limitation period must not be 
shorter than six months.576 
 
570 Article L. 423-4(1) and L. 423-4(2) of the Consumer Act. 
571 Article L. 423-5(1) of the Consumer Act. 
572 Article L. 423-10 of the Consumer Act. 
573 Article L. 423-13 of the Consumer Act. 
574 Article L. 423-15 of the Consumer Act. 
575 Article L. 423-16 of the Consumer Act. 
576 Article L. 423-20 of the Consumer Act. 
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A number of follow-on actions have been brought by undertakings. For example, in 
Concurrence SA v. Sony Concurrence SA brought a follow-on damages action after the 
Competition Council had decided that Sony, whose distributor was Concurrence SA, 
had breached Article L. 420-1 of the French Commercial Code, the French equivalent of 
Article 101 TFEU. The Commercial Court awarded Concurrence SA damages on the 
basis of a lump sum for the loss it had suffered as a result of Sony’s anti-competitive 
practices, but when Sony appealed the decision, the Court of Appeal held that the causal 
relationship between all the practices and the damage could not be proven. 
Consequently, damages could only be awarded for the practices for which the causal 
relationship had been proved. Furthermore, the Court held that damages could not be 
awarded on the basis of a lump sum, but it was necessary to assess the exact amount of 
the injury suffered.577  
 
Another follow-on damages action was brought by Sté Eco System against Peugeot 
after the ECJ had upheld a Commission Decision finding that Peugeot had infringed 
Article 101(1) TFEU by sending a letter to its distributors instructing them not to 
deliver cars to Eco System. The Commercial Court held that the breach by Peugeot had 
a direct influence on the evolution of Eco System’s business activity, and there was a 
causal relationship between the infringement and the damage alleged by Eco System. 
Peugeot was therefore liable for compensation for the loss of operating income that had 
occurred while the letter sent to the distributors was in force. Nevertheless, the Court 
found that it could not be proven that the loss of business value, for which Eco System 
had also claimed damages, was a result of Peugeot’s fault, because it did not rest 
entirely on sales of Peugeot cars.578 
 
The French Competition Council has highlighted a risk for divergent decisions when an 
antitrust damages action is brought in parallel with a public enforcement action. This 
risk is, however, reduced in France thanks to the fact that the Court of Appeal of Paris is 
the only court of appeal both for appeals against the decisions of the Competition 
Council and of civil judges. Another risk is inefficiency of the public action in case the 
claimant prefers to bring an antitrust damages action before the Competition Council 
577 Concurrence SA v. Sony, Paris Court of Appeal, Judgment of October 22nd, 1997. 
578 Sté Eco System v. Peugeot, Paris Commercial Tribunal, Judgment of October 22nd, 1996.  
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has had an opportunity to conduct inspections in the premises of the alleged infringers 
of the competition rules, since this may prompt the suspected companies to destroy 
evidence. In such a case, the private action would not compensate for the lack of public 
enforcement.579 
 
A sign of the preference for public enforcement is also the adoption of Law No. 2011-
525, which prohibits access to “documents prepared and held by the Competition 
Authority in exercising its powers of investigation, preparatory inquiry and decision-
making”.580 However, there are also procedural rules which make it possible to order 
pre-trial measures of inquiry if there is a legitimate reason to do so in order to maintain 
or establish proof of facts relevant for the outcome of the case,581 or to order the 
production of all documents held by the other party or third parties, provided that there 
are no justified impediments for ordering the disclosure.582 But a drawback is that the 
court cannot impose a sanction on a party which refuses to comply with the disclosure 
order. 
 
The issue of access to evidence and burden of proof is also of relevance for the passing 
on defense. A number of follow-on actions have been brought in France following the 
infringement decisions concerning the Vitamins Cartel and the Lysine Cartel. In many 
of these cases, direct purchasers were not able to obtain damages because the courts 
considered that passing-on of the overcharge is a common commercial practice, and the 
claimants had not been able to demonstrate that they had not passed on the 
overcharge.583 The main problem in these cases were, however, the burden of proof on 
the claimants to show that they had not passed on the overcharge instead of requiring 
the defendant to invoke the passing-on defense, and show that the claimant had indeed 
passed on the overcharge to the next level in the distribution chain. 
 
579 See CONSEIL DE LA CONCURRENCE, “Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de 
l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles”, at p. 20. 
580 Article 50 of Law No. 2011-525, May 17th, 2011, Simplification and improvement of the Law quality, 
amending Law No. 78-753 of July17th, 1978. 
581 Article 145 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
582 Article 11 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
583 See CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French Report. Competition law, private enforcement and 
collective redress in France”, at p. 13-14. 
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Compensation may in principle be claimed for different types of harm; including moral 
and material damage, actual loss and loss of profits. Notably, compensation may be 
obtained both for current and future damage. The compensation should be full 
compensation, which ultimately serves as a limitation to the courts’ wide discretionary 
power in the assessment of damages. Some uncertainty still remains regarding the 
assessment of damage because courts do not have any obligation to specify the factors 
or the method that they have used to assess the damage.584 
 
As to the costs of damages actions in France, the court fees are limited and should not 
generally constitute an obstacle to bringing claims.585 But the situation might be 
different if an expert is appointed, because then the claimant may have to pay a certain 
sum in advance,586 which could serve as a disincentive for bringing the claim if the 
costs are high and the outcome of the action is not certain. Moreover, lawyers’ fees can 
be considerable,587 and contingency fees are not allowed.588 But it is possible to agree 
that depending on the outcome of the action, the lawyer may charge “complementary 
fees”, provided that they constitute a reasonable portion of the fixed fees.589 In addition, 
the court fees are subject to fee shifting, whereas lawyers’ fees are not,590 so the 
claimant must always pay the fees of its lawyer(s). If the costs are too high compared to 
the possible damages awards, the claimant might be discouraged from bringing the 
damages claim in the first place.  
 
The limitation period for bringing antitrust damages actions is today five years from 
“the day the holder of the right knew or should have known the facts allowing him to 
584 Ibid., at p. 13-15. 
585 See HODGES, C., VOGENAUER, S. and TULIBACKA, M., “Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: 
A Comparative Study”, at p. 11, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511714. 
586 See National Report on France prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages 
in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 27 
587 See HODGES, C., VOGENAUER, S. and TULIBACKA, M., “Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: 
A Comparative Study”, at p. 56, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511714. 
588 Article 10 of Act No. 71-1130 of December 31st, 1971 on the reform of certain legal professions.  
589 See MAGNIER, V., “The French Civil Litigation System, the Increasing Role of Judges, and 
Influences from Europe” in HENSLER, D.R., HODGES, C. and TULIBACKA, M. (eds.), “The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Globalization of Class Actions”, Sage 
Publications (CA), Volume 622, March 2009, p. 114-124, at p. 122, note 20. 
590 See HODGES, C., VOGENAUER, S. and TULIBACKA, M., “Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: 
A Comparative Study”, 20, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511714.  
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exercise it”.591 It is therefore shorter than the limitation period that was in force until the 
law of June 17th, 2008 established the current limitation period.592 The limitation period 
may be interrupted and suspended for example if the claimant cannot bring the damages 
claim due to a legal impediment or force majeure,593 or the parties try to settle the claim 
through mediation.594 But in any case the suspension or interruption of the limitation 
period may not have the effect of extending the right to bring the claim beyond 20 years 
from the date of the existence of the right.595 
 
3.4.2. Main Obstacles to Private Enforcement 
The main obstacles to private enforcement in France include limited access to evidence 
and the burden of proof, especially when the claimant must prove secret anti-
competitive practices. The claimant must prove all the facts of the case, the 
infringement, the existence of damage and the causal relationship between the 
infringement and the damage suffered. In addition, it must be able to assess the damage 
caused by the anti-competitive behavior, which is often challenging.  
 
As to proving the infringement of the national competition rules, a decision of the 
French Competition Authority does not have a binding effect, although courts tend to 
take it into account.596 In this respect, the effect of the decision by a national 
competition authority is therefore different than that of Commission Decisions which 
have a binding effect as to the existence of an infringement of the EU competition rules 
although the claimant will still have to prove that the infringement has actually caused it 
damage. 
 
More problematic is the situation when the public enforcement investigation has 
resulted in a commitment decision because such decisions do not settle the issue of 
liability. Therefore, it is unclear to what extent could a private party try to obtain access 
591 Article 2224 of the French Civil Code. 
592 See CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French Report. Competition law, private enforcement and 
collective redress in France”, at p. 8. 
593 Article 2234 of the French Civil Code. 
594 Article 2238 of the French Civil Code. 
595 Article 2232 of the French Civil Code. 
596 See CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French Report. Competition law, private enforcement and 
collective redress in France”, at p. 5. 
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to evidence in the file of the competition authority. In any case, it is not possible to 
disclose information which could only have been known rough access to the file of the 
competition authority.597 
 
Moreover, the proceedings in France are both long and costly. In particular, in follow-
on cases, the public enforcement action can be very lengthy, which may explain why 
there have been comparatively few follow-on antitrust damages actions in France.598 As 
to the costs for bringing antitrust damages actions, experts are often appointed to 
remedy the lack of expertise on the part of judges in complex damages evaluations, and 
these experts do not always have the required expertise in all the different fields 
involved in the case, or may encounter difficulties in obtaining the documents needed to 
conduct investigations.599  
 
The general cost rule is the “loser pays” principle,600 which means that if the outcome of 
the action is uncertain, the bringing of a claim for damages entails certain financial 
risks. However, the court may derogate from the cost allocation rules if there are 
justified reasons, in particular of equity, to do so.601 This is also possible if equity or the 
economic situation of the losing party gives cause to adjusting the cost allocation 
rules.602Although the court fees are low, as lawyers’ fees can be considerable603 and 
experts might be needed in antitrust damages actions in order to demonstrate and 
quantify the damage, the incentives for bringing antitrust damages actions may not 
necessarily be sufficient.604 This would, in particular, be the case for consumers, whose 
individual harm might be low although the aggregate harm might be considerable. The 
fact that there have practically not been any antitrust damages actions brought by 
597 See Article L.463-7 of the French Commercial Code and CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French 
Report. Competition law, private enforcement and collective redress in France”, at p. 11.  
598 Ibid., at p. 10. 
599 See National Report on France prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages 
in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 33.  
600 Article 696(1) of the French Civil Code. 
601 Article 696(2) of the French Civil Code. 
602 Article 700 of the French Civil Code. 
603 See HODGES, C., VOGENAUER, S. and TULIBACKA, M., “Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: 
A Comparative Study”, at p. 56, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511714. 
604 See LESKINEN, C., “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 8(1), 2011, p. 87-121, at p. 102. 
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consumers, with the exception of the failed representative action brought by UFC-Que-
Choisir, appears to support the conclusion that more efficient redress mechanisms and 
greater incentives might be required in order to ensure access to justice for consumers 
and full compensation of victims of antitrust violations. 
 
The previous collective actions, which in fact were rather representative actions, were 
not very efficient, and they were seldom used. The main obstacles were arguably that a 
mandate from all claimants was required in order to bring the action. The costs of 
collective actions are also usually very high so, in practice, only law firms can bear the 
costs. It would consequently be necessary to permit advertising of a particular case and 
solicitation, if the court has admitted a collective action,605 since the prohibition on 
advertising is the reason why collective actions have not been successful in France in 
the past.606 Furthermore, lawyers should be allowed to charge fees depending on the 
outcome of the case.607  
 
Other weaknesses of the previous collective action and the current one include that it is 
limited to consumers. Business associations may only bring an action before the civil or 
commercial court when there has been a direct or indirect damage to the collective 
interest of the profession or sector which they represent or to fair competition.608 This 
means that they cannot seek compensation of harm which they have suffered 
individually.609 This is problematic since especially SMEs might struggle with similar 
problems as consumers, i.e. that the possible damages awards are lower than the costs 
they might incur for bringing a claim for damages. Therefore, it would be necessary that 
they could also join forces in a collective action in order to seek redress for individual 
harm and not only in cases where their sector has been collectively damaged. One could 
for instance envisage that only a small part of a sector has suffered harm as a result of 
605 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 310-311. 
606 See France – National Report, November 15th, 2006, at p. 14.  
607 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 311. 
608 Article L.470-7 of the French Commercial Code. 
609 See CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French Report. Competition law, private enforcement and 
collective redress in France”, at p. 9. 
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an antitrust violation. In such a case, it is debatable whether the action under Article 
L.470-7 of the Commercial Code would be applicable. 
 
The new collective action is an improved version of the former representative action in 
that it allows an association to first bring an action to establish the liability of the 
defendant, and then parties who have suffered an injury are invited to come forward 
with their damages claims. However, they still need to opt in, which might make it 
difficult to achieve a significant number of group members in order for the action to 
have deterrent effect on the infringers. But it appears very unlikely that France would 
adopt a collective action that would allow one person to sue on behalf of a group of 
persons without requiring any prior mandate, since it would be contrary to constitutional 
and procedural principles inherent to French law.610  
 
As regards stand-alone actions, the situation is very challenging for claimants. For 
example, in order to demonstrate that the practice in question has harmed competition in 
the market, they must be able to provide information that allows an analysis of the 
market and the assessment of the economic effect of the practice on the market. This 
task is eased by the fact that the French minister in charge of economy may intervene 
before the civil courts and present conclusions and issue statements which may serve to 
resolve the case.611 Also, the Competition Council and the European Commission may 
act as amicus curiae, and the judge can make a preliminary reference to the ECJ under 
Article 267 TFEU.612 But, in practice, the possibility of requesting an opinion from the 
Competition Authority has not been used.613 There is therefore room for improvement 
in order to make damages claims more effective. 
 
610 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 306. 
611 See CONSEIL DE LA CONCURRENCE, “Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de 
l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles”, at p. 20-22. 
612 Article L.462-3 of the French Commercial Code. 
613 See CHAGNY, M., AHRC Project, “French Report. Competition law, private enforcement and 
collective redress in France”, at p. 11. 
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3.5. Spain 
3.5.1. General Overview 
The main principles governing the right to damages for antitrust violations in Spain are 
laid down in Competition Law 15/2007 of July 3rd and Unfair Competition Law 3/1991 
of January 10th. Moreover, Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code contains a general 
rule on liability in tort, according to which a person is obliged to compensate the 
damage that his act or omission, by fault or negligence, has caused to another person. 
The claimant has hence to prove that the author of the damage has caused the damage to 
it by fault or by negligence. The damage must also be unjust, there must be a causal 
relationship between the harm and conduct, and the damage must be quantified.614 As 
antitrust damages actions are tort claims, the limitation period is the same as for general 
tort actions. It will start to run either from the date on which the injured party became 
aware of the harm,615 or the date when the action could be exercised.616 
 
Before Competition Law 15/2007 entered into force on September 1st, 2007, the old 
Competition Law 16/1989 of July 17th established that before damages actions based on 
the illegality of practices prohibited by that law could be brought, a final administrative 
competition decision had to exist.617 The Spanish Supreme Court confirmed this in its 
CAMPSA ruling stating that Article 13(2) of Competition Law 16/1989 required a 
previous final decision by the Spanish competition authorities (or the Commission) 
establishing the existence of an anti-competitive conduct before a damages action could 
be brought. According to the Supreme Court, the existence of a final decision was a 
procedural requisite for the damages action, and if it did not exist, the courts and 
tribunals had no jurisdiction.618 Consequently, under the old Competition Act, it was not 
possible to bring a stand-alone action for damages based on an infringement of the 
national competition rules. 
 
614 See JIMÉNEZ-LAIGLESIA, J. and MASÍA, J., “Examen de cuestiones de naturaleza práctica relativas 
a la aplicación privada del Derecho de la Competencia en España”, Gaceta jurídica de la Unión Europea 
y de la Competencia, No. 30, November-December 2012, p. 26-39, at. p. 29. 
615 Article 1968(2) of the Civil Code. 
616 Article 1969 of the Civil Code. 
617 Article 13(2) of Competition Law 16/1989 of July 17th. 
618 Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 1262/1993, of December 30th, 1993. 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court incorrectly interpreted the ECJ ruling in BRT v SABAM 
with regard to direct effect by drawing the conclusion that national civil courts could 
only directly apply Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU if that application was incidental, i.e. 
if the EU competition rules were not being invoked as a main plea of the claim, and the 
Commission or the Spanish Competition Tribunal had not initiated proceedings in the 
same case. The Supreme Court thus interpreted that only the national authorities whose 
competence to apply Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU derived from Article 104 TFEU 
were competent to apply those articles directly, if they were invoked as a main plea.619  
 
However, in BRT v SABAM, the ECJ did not distinguish between the incidental and 
principal application of the EU competition rules. It clarified that Regulation 17 
identified the national authorities, which are in charge of the public enforcement of 
competition rules. Although, in some Member States, these authorities also include 
certain courts,620 the Court held that this “cannot exempt [such] a court before which 
the direct effect of Article 86 [now Article 102 TFEU] is pleaded from giving 
judgment”.621 The Court thus merely made a distinction between public and private 
enforcement of the EU competition rules,622 but it did not limit the competence to 
directly apply those rules to certain courts. Further, it clearly stated that Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU “create direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned which 
national courts must safeguard”.623 Consequently, the CAMPSA ruling not only 
erroneously construed the ECJ judgment, but in denying the direct effect of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, it ignored one of the fundamental principles of EU law, i.e. the direct 
effect of EU law.624 By doing so it made it impossible for individuals to directly rely on 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in Spain in order to seek damages for antitrust violations. 
 
619 Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 1262/1993, of December 30th, 1993. 
620 Judgment in BRT v SABAM, 127/73, EU:C:1974:25, paragraphs 18-19. 
621 Judgment in BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 20. 
622 See FERNÁNDEZ, C. and GONZALEZ-ESPEJO, P., “Actions for Damages Based on Community 
Competition Law: New Case Law on Direct Applicability of Articles 81 and 82 by Spanish Civil Courts”, 
E.C.L.R., Volume 23, Issue 4, 2002, p. 163-171, at p. 165. 
623 BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16. 
624 As stated, the principle of direct effect was established in the Judgment in van Gend & Loos, 
EU:C:1963:1. 
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Nevertheless, since the ECJ has declared that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have direct 
effect625 and, consequently, national courts are obliged to give effect to those articles, 
several commentators have submitted that the existence of a final decision by the 
Commission could not be required for bringing damages claims based on an 
infringement of the EU competition rules.626  
 
In 2000, the Spanish Supreme Court finally confirmed in DISA that the EU competition 
rules are directly applicable by declaring the disputed contract in question null and void 
for being incompatible with EU law and by application of Article 1(2) of Competition 
Law 16/1989 interpreted conforming to EU law. The Court reasoned its ruling by 
considering that the incompatibility in question was so apparent that the contract could 
never be granted an individual exemption by the Commission.627 The Supreme Court 
thus did not require the existence of a previous final decision by the Commission, but 
applied the EU competition rules directly for the first time.628 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court held that a national judge should apply the EU competition rules when it was 
seized with private lawsuits.629 
 
Although the legal question at issue in DISA was the nullity of contracts contrary to 
Article 101(1) TFEU and not damages based on Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code, 
and it has been submitted that since the only reference in the ruling to possible damages 
was limited to possible responsibility in contrahendo flowing from the specificity of the 
dispute it cannot be extended to the majority of conducts contrary to Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU,630 it is still noteworthy that the Supreme Court did not require a previous 
625 BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16. 
626 See FERNÁNDEZ, C. and GONZALEZ-ESPEJO, P., “Actions for Damages Based on Community 
Competition Law: New Case Law on Direct Applicability of Articles 81 and 82 by Spanish Civil Courts”, 
E.C.L.R., Volume 23, Issue 4, 2002, p. 163-171, at p. 166, and GUTIÉRREZ, A. and GARCÍA SANZ, J., 
“La indemnización por daños y perjuicios ocasionados por infracciones de las normas de defensa de la 
competencia: desarrollo en España e hitos recientes”, Actualidad Jurídica Uría Menéndez, nº 12, 
September-December 2005, p. 84-86, at p. 84.  
627 Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 540/2000, of June 2nd, 2000. 
628 See MONTESA LLOREDA, A. and GIVAJA SANZ, A., “Private actions for damages derived from 
antitrust law infringements in Spain (Conduit / Telefónica – Antena 3 / Spanish Football League)”, e-
Competitions, Damages, Vol. I, No 469. 
629 Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 540/2000, of June 2nd, 2000. 
630 See GUTIÉRREZ, A. and MÁRTINEZ SÁNCHEZ, A., “Nuevas perspectives en la aplicación de las 
normas de defensa de la competencia por la jurisdicción civil”, Actualidad Jurídica Uría & Menéndez, No 
1/2002, p. 39-55, at p. 53-54. 
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final administrative decision before declaring the contract in question null and void. As 
the Supreme Court has confirmed the DISA ruling in its rulings in Mercedes Benz631 and 
Petronor,632 it is settled case law that Spanish courts can directly apply Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU. Arguably, the courts must also be able to award damages for infringements 
of those articles in order to ensure their direct effect and to comply with EU law.633  
 
The DISA ruling consequently introduced a welcome change because the CAMPSA 
ruling not only was in breach with EÚ law,634 but also constituted a significant obstacle 
to private enforcement of the competition rules.635 Moreover, Competition Law 15/2007 
of July 3rd should contribute to facilitate private antitrust enforcement. The main change 
brought about by the reform of the Competition Act is that it confers Commercial 
Courts jurisdiction to directly apply Articles 1 and 2 of the new Competition Act, i.e. 
the equivalents of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This is important, since Commercial 
Courts can thus also award damages to victims of antitrust violations when the damages 
claims are based on national competition law even if no final administrative decision 
finding an infringement exists. As the Commercial Courts were already given 
jurisdiction to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 636 as from September 1st, 2004, the 
same procedures now apply to damages claims under national and EU competition 
law.637  
 
A person wishing to claim damages for an infringement of competition rules can base 
his claim on Article 1902 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[a]ny person who by 
631  Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 202/2001, of March 2nd, 2001. 
632  Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 232/2001, of March 15th, 2001. 
633 It is submitted that even before the DISA judgment, in spite of the CAMPSA ruling, civil courts would 
have had jurisdiction to apply the EU competition rules since the ECJ had already held that the 
competition rules have direct effect, and because of the supremacy of EU law established in Costa, 6/64, 
EU:C:1964:66. 
634 See the ECJ Judgments in van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1, Costa, EU:C:1964:66, and BRT v SABAM, 
EU:C:1974:25. 
635 See MONTESA LLOREDA, A. and GIVAJA SANZ, A., “Private actions for damages derived from 
antitrust law infringements in Spain (Conduit / Telefónica – Antena 3 / Spanish Football League)”, e-
Competitions, Damages, Vol. I, No 469. 
636 Article 7(2f) of the Organic Law on Judicial Power 8/2003, of July 9th, BOE No. 164, of July 10th, 
2003. 
637  The Commercial Courts were created by Organic Law on Judicial Power 8/2003 of July 9th, BOE No. 
164, of July 10th 2003, which amended the Organic Law on Judicial Power 6/1985 of July 1st, BOE No. 
157, of July 2nd 1985). 
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an act or an omission involving fault or negligence causes damage or harm to another 
shall compensate the damage caused”. Alternatively, it is possible to base the action on 
Article 15(2) in conjunction with Article 18(5) of the Unfair Competition Law 3/1991 
of January10th.638 According to Article 15(2), any action that constitutes a violation of 
legal provisions regulating competition is considered as unfair competition. Therefore, a 
damages action can be brought for infringements of the national as well as the EU 
competition rules when the unfair act has been carried out with willful misconduct or 
negligence.639 Standing to bring such an action has any person who participates in the 
market whose economic interests are directly affected or threatened by the conduct 
amounting to unfair competition.640 
 
As a consequence of CAMPSA, there was, in general, little private enforcement of 
competition rules in Spain. Nonetheless, actions have instead been brought based on the 
Unfair Competition Law.641 Moreover, courts have tended to apply competition law as 
defense against contractual claims in order to declare the contract in question null and 
void, and apply consequential remedies, for example, in the form of damages. All, 
except one case have also been business to business claims,642 which could indicate that 
consumers might not have effective remedies in order to obtain compensation. Another 
interesting fact is that research shows that there has been a significant increase in private 
litigation in Spain in the period between 2009 and 2012.643 
 
Furthermore, a significant number of damages claims have related to exclusive supply 
contracts of oil products concluded between gas stations and oil companies. The gas 
stations considered that the contracts were null and void because they breached Article 
638 While Competition Law 16/1989 of July 17th was in force, the courts accepted that damages claims for 
antitrust damages could be based on Article 5 and/or 15 of the Unfair Competition Law 3/1991 of 
January10th. (Article 5 defines unfair competition as conduct objectively contrary to good faith). See 
CALLOL, P., “The Genesis of a New Legal and Regulatory Framework for Competition Enforcement in 
Spain”, E.C.L.R., Volume 28, Issue 2, 2007, p. 75-83, at p. 83. 
639 Article 18(5) of the Unfair Competition Law. 
640 Article 19 of the Unfair Competition Law. 
641 Article 15(2) and 18(5) of the Unfair Competition Law. 
642 See MARCOS, P., “Competition Law Private Litigation in Spanish Courts (1999-2012)”, G.C.L.R., 
Issue 4, 2013, p. 167-208, at p. 171. 
643 Although the research includes also other private litigation actions than antitrust damages claims, the 
finding also applies to damages claims. See MARCOS, P., “Competition Law Private Litigation in 
Spanish Courts (1999-2012)”, G.C.L.R., Issue 4, 2013, p. 167-208, at p. 170. 
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101 TFEU. As some commentators have noted, the diverse outcomes of the 
Commercial Courts’ rulings are striking.644 For instance, some of the courts considered 
the contracts as agency agreements, thus being outside the scope of application of the 
competition rules, whereas others concluded that the gas stations were not agents, but 
resellers.645 This shows that the knowledge of competition law of some of the judges of 
the Commercial Courts leaves room for improvement.646 Most of the claims have been 
unsuccessful, and in those cases in which damages have been awarded, the amount of 
compensation has been left to be determined in the execution of the judgment.647 
 
To date, damages for breach of antitrust rules have only been awarded a few times. The 
first time that a Spanish court awarded damages for an infringement of the competition 
rules – although it did not specify the quantity of the damages – was in Eléctrica Curos, 
S.A. v. Hidroeléctrica de l’Emporda, S.A.648 The plaintiff, Eléctrica Curos, brought an 
action for damages based on the Competition Law 16/1989 and the Unfair Competition 
Law 3/1991 after the Spanish Competition Tribunal had found that Hidroeléctrica de 
l’Emporda had abused its dominant position. The Court of First Instance No. 4 of 
Figueres hearing the damages claim held, in turn, that the defendant Hidroeléctrica de 
l’Emporda had committed an act of unfair competition when it gave away for free 
electrical appliances to each client of its competitor Eléctrica Curos in order to persuade 
these clients to switch their energy supplier to Hidroeléctrica de l’Emporda. The Court 
of First Instance ordered Hidroeléctrica de l’Emporda to compensate the damage that it 
had caused to Eléctrica Curos by capturing 6,3% of its clients by using unfair 
644 See SANTOS LORENZO, S. and TURNER-KERR, P., “¿En estado de total subdesarrollo? La 
aplicación privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia en España”, GJ, Nº 245, 
September/October 2006, p. 42-56, at p. 45, and FERNÁNDEZ LÓPEZ, J.M., “La reforma del sistema 
española de defensa de la competencia. Aplicación por los jueces nacionales de la legislación en materia 
de competencia en el Proyecto de Ley”, Documento de Trabajo, Serie Política de la Competencia, 
Número 23 / 2007, at p. 15. 
645 See FERNÁNDEZ LÓPEZ, J.M., “La reforma del sistema española de defensa de la competencia. 
Aplicación por los jueces nacionales de la legislación en materia de competencia en el Proyecto de Ley”, 
Documento de Trabajo, Serie Política de la Competencia, Número 23 / 2007, at p. 15. 
646 See SANTOS LORENZO, S. and TURNER-KERR, P., “¿En estado de total subdesarrollo? La 
aplicación privada de las normas de defensa de la competencia en España”, GJ, Nº 245, 
September/October 2006, p. 42-56, at p. 46. 
647 See MARCOS, P., “Competition Law Private Litigation in Spanish Courts (1999-2012)”, G.C.L.R., 
Issue 4, 2013, p. 167-208, at p. 171. 
648 See GUTIÉRREZ, A. and GARCÍA SANZ, J., “La indemnización por daños y perjuicios ocasionados 
por infracciones de las normas de defensa de la competencia: desarrollo en España e hitos recientes”, 
Actualidad Jurídica Uría Menéndez, nº 12, September-December 2005, p. 84-86, at p. 85.  
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practices.649 On appeal, the Provincial High Court of Girona upheld the judgment but, 
referring to the decision of the Competition Tribunal, added that the conduct of 
Hidroeléctrica de l’Emporda also constituted an abuse of a dominant position, as it 
breached Article 6(2) of Competition Law 16/1989.650  
 
In Antena 3 v. Professional Football League,651 Antena 3 brought a follow-on action for 
damages after the Spanish Competition Tribunal had found that the Spanish Football 
League had abused its dominant position by awarding broadcasting rights of football 
games only to certain companies and by excluding access to two (Antena 3 and Tele 5) 
of the three new entrants from the market, and had held that the contracts which the 
Spanish Football League had concluded with other television channels limited 
competition in breach of Article 1 of Competition Law 16/1989. The decision of the 
Competition Tribunal had been upheld by the National Court of Appeals as well as the 
Supreme Court.  
 
The Spanish Football League had called for private bids with respect to certain rights 
related to professional football games, in particular, the retransmission rights of the 
competitions organized by it during the following five seasons. Antena 3 presented a 
bid, but it was rejected. Furthermore, in 1990, the Spanish Football League concluded 
contracts with the televisions of the Autonomous Regions (Televisiones Autonómicas) 
and with Canal Plus related to the retransmission of football games in television during 
the following eight years, excluding the access of other entities to those rights.652 
 
In its damages claim, Antena 3 alleged that the conduct of the Spanish Football League 
impeded it from obtaining advertising revenues deriving from the retransmission of 
football games, and asked for damages amounting to €34 million. As to the existence of 
an infringement satisfying the requirement of fault, the Court of First Instance No. 4 of 
Madrid referred to the decisions of the Competition Tribunal and the courts without 
conducting its own analysis. Similarly, it held that the causal relationship between the 
infringement and the damage could be derived from the decision of the Competition 
649 Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 4 of Figueres No. 118/1996, of July 7th, 2001. 
650 Judgment of the Provincial High Court of Girona No. 495/2001, of April 16th, 2002. 
651  Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 4 of Madrid No. 1438/2004, of June 7th, 2005.  
652 Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 4 of Madrid No. 1438/2004, of June 7th, 2005.  
180 
 
                                                 
Tribunal finding an abuse of dominance, which impeded Antena 3 from acceding to the 
broadcasting of the games.653 Nevertheless, the fact that the conduct of the Spanish 
Football League impeded Antena 3 from obtaining broadcasting rights does not seem 
sufficient to prove that the economic results of the latter were a direct consequence of 
the lack of broadcasting rights, but the court should have examined this separately.  
 
With regard to the quantity of the damage suffered, the Court of First Instance No. 4 of 
Madrid started by referring to Article 1106 of the Civil Code, according to which 
damages do not only include the value of the loss suffered, but also the loss of profit. 
The Court of First Instance noted that compensation for the loss of profit can only be 
awarded if a certain objective possibility exists, which flows from the normal course of 
events and the circumstances particular to the concrete case, and only if the likelihood 
of profits is very probable in the absence of the events that occurred in the case at issue. 
The role of the television, and especially the football games, in today’s society led the 
Court of First Instance to conclude that the exclusion of the possibility of Antena 3 of 
retransmitting football games, in all likelihood, had caused it a loss of profit. Moreover 
the Court of First Instance relied on the judgment of the National Court of Appeals, 
pursuant to which Antena 3 was deprived of “a substantial source of income through 
advertising”.654  
 
In deciding the amount of the damage, the Court of First Instance analyzed expert 
reports presented by Antena 3 as well as the Spanish Football League. The expert report 
by Antena 3 based its calculation of the loss suffered on the reasonable price for 
football, which consists of the price an investor could pay with an expected profitability. 
It compared, inter alia, the difference between the advertising income, which Antena 3 
was deprived of, after subtracting the costs that the retransmission of football games 
entailed, with the income, which Antena 3 actually made on the transmission of 
alternative programs. The Court of First Instance concluded that the expert report 
provided by Antena 3 on the estimation of its loss was reasonable and fair, except that it 
found that losses made during seasons 96/97 and 97/98 should not be taken into account 
as Antena 3 retransmitted football games once a week during that period. Therefore, 
653 Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 4 of Madrid No. 1438/2004, of June 7th, 2005.  
654 Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 4 of Madrid No. 1438/2004, of June 7th, 2005 and 
Judgment of the National Court of Appeals, of July 17th, 1998. 
181 
 
                                                 
Antena 3 was only awarded €25.5 million in damages plus interest from the date on 
which it filed its claim.655 
 
However, the Spanish Football League appealed the decision of the Court of First 
Instance, and the Provincial High Court of Madrid upheld the appeal finding that the 
proof of damage was insufficient. In particular, the Provincial High Court held that the 
costs of broadcasting rights of football games employed to prove the damage could not 
be hypothetical or theoretical, but had to be real. Instead of basing the proof of 
profitability of football games on purely theoretical propositions, the profitability could 
have been estimated by comparing the profitability of football games obtained by other 
channels which were awarded contracts and broadcasted those games, with the 
profitability of the alternative programs of Antena 3 during that period. Consequently, 
the Court rejected the claim of Antena 3 in its entirety, and absolved the Spanish 
Football League of all claims.656  
 
In Conduit Europe, S.A. v. Telefónica de España S.A.U.657 damages were awarded for 
the first time in Spain for a breach of the EU antitrust rules, namely Article 102 
TFEU.658 Conduit, an Irish communication services provider, brought an action for 
damages based on Article 18(5) of the Unfair Competition Law claiming that Telefónica 
had infringed Article 15(2) of the Unfair Competition Law by supplying defective or 
incomplete information to Conduit on the telephone numbers of its subscribers. The 
Commercial Court upheld the claim that Telefónica had abused its dominant position 
because the information provided to Conduit was not of the same quality or as complete 
as the information that Telefónica provided to its own directory inquiry services. As the 
information was essential for gaining access to the related market for subscriber 
directory inquiries, the conduct of Telefónica made it difficult for Conduit to enter that 
655 Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 4 of Madrid No. 1438/2004, of June 7th, 2005. 
656 Judgment of the Provincial High Court of Madrid No. 130/2006, of December 18th, 2006. 
657 Judgment of Commercial Court No. 5 of Madrid No. 85/2005, of November 11th, 2005, which was 
upheld by the Provincial High Court of Madrid in its judgment No. 73/2006, of May 25th, 2006. 
658 See MONTESA LLOREDA, A. and GIVAJA SANZ, A., “Private actions for damages derived from 
antitrust law infringements in Spain (Conduit / Telefónica – Antena 3 / Spanish Football League)”, e-
Competitions, Damages, Vol. I, No 469. 
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market. Furthermore, Conduit was obligated to pay for alternative sources of 
information and, consequently, it suffered additional costs.659  
 
As to the quantity of the damage caused to Conduit, Conduit provided the Commercial 
Court with an econometric analysis of what its market share would have been were it 
not for the abuse of Telefónica. Since it was impossible to recreate the market situation 
in Spain, such as it was when the abuse occurred, Conduit looked at its market 
performance in the UK market where the competition conditions were similar to what 
they had been when Conduit launched its services in Spain. As Conduit was competing 
in the United Kingdom without being harmed by any abusive conduct, the Commercial 
Court accepted this method for calculating the damage. But it noted that other factors, 
together with that abuse, might have contributed to the loss of Conduit’s market share, 
and therefore no loss of profit could be awarded. Consequently, the Commercial Court 
ordered Telefónica to pay compensation of €639,000 to Conduit for the additional costs 
that the latter had paid for alternative sources of data as well as for treatment of data. 
Telefónica appealed the decision, but the Provincial High Court of Madrid rejected its 
appeal.660 This case exemplifies the difficulty in obtaining compensation for loss of 
profit in Spain which, arguably, often constitutes the main type of damages in antitrust 
cases. 
 
The Provincial High Court of Valladolid reached a different conclusion regarding the 
quantification of damages in the Sugar Cartel.661 This was a follow-on damages claim 
which was brought once the decision of the Competition Tribunal finding that several 
sugar producers had operated a price-fixing cartel between 1995 and 1996 had become 
final.662 A number of food producers which had suffered harm as a result of the cartel 
sought damages from ACOR before the Court of First Instance, but their claim was 
rejected.663 The claimants appealed the decision, and on appeal the Provincial High 
Court of Valladolid ruled in their favor and awarded damages to them. It held that the 
assessment of the damage caused was difficult, but despite this, it was possible to 
659 Judgment of Commercial Court No. 5 of Madrid No. 85/2005, of November 11th, 2005. 
660 Judgment of the Provincial High Court of Madrid No. 73/2006, of May 25th, 2006. 
661 Judgment of the Provincial High Court of Valladolid No. 214/2009 of October 9th, 2009. 
662 Judgment of the Competition Tribunal of April 15th, 1999 (426/1998). 
663 Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 11 of Valladolid No. 571 /2007 of February 20th, 2009. 
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consider the quantification of damages by the expert testifying on behalf of the 
claimants as appropriate according to which the harm suffered by the claimants was the 
difference between the price of sugar actually paid by the claimants to ACOR and the 
price they should have paid under normal competitive market conditions.664 The ruling 
was upheld by the Supreme Court.665 
 
Related to the same Sugar Cartel, some confectionary manufacturers also brought an 
action for damages for loss that they had suffered from the price-fixing agreement 
against another cartelist, Ebro Foods. The Court of First Instance of Madrid, taking into 
consideration the discrepancies between the economic evidence about the harm caused 
presented by the parties’ experts, partially upheld their claim.666 However, the claim 
was dismissed on appeal as the Provincial High Court of Madrid considered that the 
prices resulted from individual negotiations between Ebro Foods and each of the 
applicants.667 This ruling was quashed by the Supreme Court, which found that the facts 
of the case had already been established in the public enforcement proceedings and, 
therefore, the principle of res judicata impeded the Provincial High Court of Madrid 
from assessing the facts differently.668 In analyzing the passing-on defense invoked by 
Ebro Foods, the Court concluded that the defendant had not succeeded in proving that 
the price increase applied by the direct purchasers had not caused them any loss in the 
form of decreased sales. As the defendant had not adduced evidence of the price 
increase having been fully passed on to their customers, the injured parties obtained 
€4.1million in damages.669 As these cases demonstrate, the judges are not necessary 
ready to assess complex economic reasoning, which renders private enforcement more 
difficult.670 
664 Judgment of the Provincial High Court of Valladolid No. 214/2009 of October 9th, 2009. 
665 Judgment of the Supreme Court No. 5462/2012 of June 8th, 2012. 
666 Judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 50 of Madrid No. 59/2010 of March 1st, 2010. 
667 Judgment of the Provincial High Court of Madrid No. 370/2011 of October 3rd, 2011. 
668 Judgment of the Supreme Court No. 65172013 of November 7th, 2013. The coherence between public 
and private enforcement relating to the same conduct is necessary in order to ensure a minimum right to 
effective judicial protection. See ORDÓÑEZ SOLÍS, D., “La acción de indemnización en la aplicación 
judicial privada del Derecho europeo de la competencia” Noticias de la Unión Europea, 330, July 2012, 
p. 3-16, at p. 16. 
669 Judgment of the Supreme Court No. 65172013 of November 7th, 2013.  
670 See DÍEZ, F., “Recovery of Damages in Antitrust Enforcement: the Next Important Topic? Analysis of 
Recent Case Law?” in VELASCO SAN PEDRO L.A, ALONSO LEDESMA C., ECHEBARRÍA SÁENZ 
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 The most recent ruling relating to an antitrust damages action in Spain was decided in 
May, 2014 in relation to the Decennial Insurance Cartel. The Commercial Court No. 12 
ordered several insurance companies and a reinsurance company to pay damages 
exceeding €3.5 million for boycotting another insurance company due to the Decennial 
Insurance Cartel.671 In 2009, the Spanish Competition Authority CNC had imposed a 
fine on five insurance companies and reinsurers for their participation in a cartel which 
prevented the insurance company Mussat from offering cheaper insurance contracts to 
customers.672 However, this ruling was subsequently overruled by the National Court of 
Appeals, which found that the existence of an anti-competitive agreement on 
commercial premiums had not been proven.673 An appeal is currently pending before 
the Spanish Supreme Court. The issue of whether there has been a cartel is therefore 
questionable. Most noteworthy of the ruling is the refusal to award damages for loss of 
profits. Instead, the Court only awarded actual damages.674 Once again, this judgment 
shows the difficulty in obtaining compensation for this important type of harm which 
undertakings that are victims of an antitrust violation often suffer.  
 
3.5.2. Main Obstacles to Private Enforcement 
The main obstacles to private enforcement in Spain are similar to those that exist in 
other Member States. Access to evidence is, arguably, the biggest obstacle for 
competitors, undertakings that are active at other levels in the distribution chain, and 
consumers.675 These potential claimants can thus mainly bring follow-on actions once 
the competition authorities have established the existence of an anti-competitive 
agreement or conduct, whereas a co-contractor might be able to bring a stand-alone 
action, since it has participated in the illegal practice and is likely to have at least some 
J.A., HERRERO SUÁREZ C., and GUTIÉRREZ GILSANZ J. (eds.), Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2011, p. 215-228, at p. 221-228. 
671 Judgment of the Commercial Court of Madrid No. 12 of May 9th, 2014. 
672 Decision of the National Competition Commission of November 12th, 2009. 
673 Judgment of the National Court of Appeals of December 18th, 2012. 
674 Judgment of the Commercial Court No. 12 of May 9th, 2014. 
675 See LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case 
of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), 
Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Volumen VIII, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76, at 
p. 72-73. 
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evidence of the infringement. It is also feasible that actions for damages based on abuse 
of a dominant position or a vertical restraint might in some cases be brought as stand-
alone actions. 
 
As to the burden of proof, the party invoking a fact and claiming a benefit based thereon 
has to prove the fact in question.676 The task of adducing evidence is eased thanks to the 
possibility under Article 328 of Civil Procedure Law 1/2000 of requesting the 
production by other parties of documents not in the requesting party’s possession, which 
relate to the issue in question in the proceedings or to the strength of the evidence.677 
However, even so, the requesting party should still indicate as accurately as possible the 
content of the requested document so that the document can be identified.678 
Consequently, it might still be impossible for potential claimants to take full advantage 
of this possibility.679 Furthermore, it could be a risky strategy to rely on Article 328 to 
obtain documents, because those documents could turn out not to be favorable to the 
claimant’s case. Even worse, the claimant would not be able to object to their use in the 
proceedings. 
 
Alternatively, if the claimant brings its action based on Article 15(2) in conjunction 
with Article 18(5) of the Unfair Competition Law 3/1991, it can, pursuant to Article 24 
of that law, request the judge that proceedings be held to ascertain those facts which are 
objectively indispensable for preparing the judgment.  
 
Another difficulty is the requirement that the claimant must be able to quantify the 
actual loss suffered because damages are only awarded as compensation for the real loss 
suffered by the injured party.680 This is particularly challenging in a situation involving 
several intermediaries, and the purchaser that has paid an overcharge for a product or a 
service has passed that overcharge (or a part of it) on to other levels in the distribution 
676 Article 217 of Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure of January 7th, BOE No. 7, of January 8th 2000. 
677 Article 329 of Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure.  
678 Article 328(2) of Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure. 
679 See LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case 
of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), 
“Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Volumen VIII”, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76, 
at p. 57. 
680 Article 1106 of the Civil Code. 
186 
 
                                                 
chain, since the amount that has been passed on must be taken into account and reduced 
from the amount of compensation awarded to the purchaser. 
 
But also in other cases, the quantification of damages is difficult, since the criteria for 
calculating damages are vague and uncertain.681 In particular, the loss of profit may 
only be compensated if the claimant can demonstrate the damage with a certain degree 
of likelihood.682 As the economic analysis needed in competition cases tends to be 
complex, it is difficult to precisely quantify damages.683 Moreover, the courts in Spain 
have in general been unwilling to award damages for the loss of profit in antitrust 
damages cases. Instead, they tend only to order the general harm to be compensated as 
have been seen, for instance, in the cases Conduit and Antena 3.  
 
Furthermore, as the party which loses the case will normally be obliged to pay both 
parties’ costs684 since the “loser pays” rule normally applies, potential claimants might 
be dissuaded from bringing damages claims due to the risk of losing the case. This risk 
is more pronounced when the incentive to bring an action is not very big in the first 
place, such as when the loss suffered is small, since a successful party will at best only 
be able to recover the economic loss that it has suffered,685 and not, for example, 
punitive damages. Only if the court finds that the case raised serious legal or factual 
doubts in the light of case law in similar cases, may it decide to depart from the “loser 
pays” principle. In case the claim is only partly successful, each party bears its own 
costs and shares the common costs incurred, except if one of them has acted 
recklessly.686  
681 See HITCHINGS, P., “The Conduit Case” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and ENTRENA ROVERS, J. 
(eds.), Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Curso de iniciación, Volumen VII, Dykinson, S.L., 
Madrid, 2007, p. 157-176, at p. 174. 
682 Judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 896/2002, of September 26th, 2002, and 
judgment of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court No. 727/2003, of July 14th, 2003.  
683 See HITCHINGS, P., “The Conduit Case” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and ENTRENA ROVERS, J. 
(eds.), Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Curso de iniciación, Volumen VII, Dykinson, S.L., 
Madrid, 2007, p. 157-176, at p. 174. 
684 Article 394 of Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure. However, if the court finds that the claim was rejected 
because the case presented serious doubts of facts and law, the claimant is liberated from paying the costs.  
685 See LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case 
of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), 
Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Volumen VIII, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76, at 
p. 68. 
686 Article 394 of Law 1/2000 on Civil Procedure. 
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 There is also a limitation on the amount which the losing party must pay for the fees of 
lawyers and other professionals; the maximum amount is a third of the value of the 
action, unless the party has acted recklessly.687 The actual costs for court proceedings 
depend on the specific characteristics of the case as well as the complexity of the issues 
involved.688 But as a minimum, the claimant must pay a judicial fee with the exception 
of non-profit organizations, legal entities (partly or wholly) exempted from company 
tax, individuals or small companies.689 
 
As to lawyers’ fees, contingency fees are allowed. This was clarified by a judgment of 
the Spanish Supreme Court in November 2008.690 The judgment departed from what the 
General Council of the Spanish Bar had decided earlier. Until this Supreme Court 
Judgment, the Deontology Code of the Spanish Bar prohibited agreements between 
lawyer and client by which they agreed that the lawyer would only charge for a part of 
the awards granted as a result of the litigation. Nevertheless, the lawyer and client could 
agree that the lawyer would charge a part of the amount recovered in order to increase 
the fee so as to cover the costs incurred by the lawyer.691 In its ruling, the Supreme 
Court rejected the argument made by the General Council of the Spanish Bar that the 
prohibition of contingency fees was a measure of general interest aiming to guarantee 
the independence of lawyers and found that if that was the real aim of the prohibition, it 
would also have prohibited lawyers from charging a part of the amount recovered in 
order to increase their fee. Accordingly, the Court held that the prohibition of 
contingency fees resulted in fixing minimum prices for lawyers’ fees.692  
 
The existing collective actions do also not appear to be sufficiently effective to ensure 
the compensation of consumers in particular. In fact, to date, consumers have not been 
687 Idem. 
688 See FOLGUERA CRESPO, J. and MARTÍNEZ CORRAL, B., “Spanish National Report on ‘The 
judicial application of European competition law’ for the FIDE Congress Madrid 2010”, at p. 33. 
689 Article 35 of Law 53/2002 of December 30th, on Fiscal, Administrative and Social Measures.  
690 Judgment of the Supreme Court No 5837/2005 of November 4th, 2008. 
691 See VÉRGEZ MUÑOZ, C. and PÉREZ GUERRA, M.A., “Comentario a la Sentencia del Tribunal 
Supremo de 4 de noviembre de 2008, las implicaciones de la cuota litis desde la perspectiva del Derecho 
de la competencia”, Gazeta Jurídica de la Unión Europea y de la Competencia, March/April 2009, No 8, 
p. 107-115, at p. 107.  
692 Judgment of the Supreme Court No 5837/2005 of November 4th, 2008. 
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awarded any damages for antitrust violations and, as stated above, to date only one 
collective action for antitrust damages has been brought. 
 
Under Article 11 of Civil Procedure Law 1/2000, consumer and user associations can 
bring actions to protect the rights and interests of their members and the association as 
well as the general interests of consumers and users. Article 11 distinguishes between 
the situation where the members of the group of consumers and users having suffered 
loss is fully identifiable or easy to identify, and where there is a plurality of consumers 
or users, or it is impossible or difficult to identify the group that has suffered harm. 
When the members of the group are identified or are easily identifiable, both consumer 
and user associations and legally formed entities whose purpose is the defense or 
protection of consumers and users as well as the affected groups are entitled to bring 
actions for damages. However, when the group consists of consumers or users who are 
not identified or are difficult to identify, only consumer and user associations which 
represent general consumer interests are entitled to bring damages actions. 
 
Only consumer and user associations, which belong to the Council of Consumers and 
Users (Consejo de Consumidores y Usuarios) may bring collective actions for damages. 
The most representative consumer and user associations, taking into account their 
territorial scope of activity, number of members, performance in the field of consumer 
protection, and programs of activity to be developed, are admitted to the Council of 
Consumers and Users.693 
 
It is also possible for other interested parties, who were not original parties to the 
proceedings, to be admitted as claimants in the proceedings as long as they prove that 
they have a direct and lawful interest in the outcome of the proceedings. In particular, 
any consumer can intervene in any proceedings brought by the entities legally entitled 
to defend their interests.694 There are two ways of informing potential claimants about 
an action. If the injured parties are identified or can easily be identified, the claimant or 
claimants must give prior notice of the filing of the claim to all those parties that may be 
693 Articles 22 and 22 bis of the Law for the improvement of consumer and user protection 44/2006, of 
December 29th. 
694 Article 13(1) of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
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interested in joining the action.695 If they are not identified or easily identified, the 
advertisement of the claim will stay the proceedings during a period not exceeding two 
months, decided in each case depending on the circumstances and complexity of the 
facts and the difficulty in identifying and locating the injured parties.696 The 
advertisement of the claim must be made in the media available in the territory where 
the rights or interests were injured.697 As the Civil Procedure Law does not provide how 
this advertisement shall be made, it is for the court to decide in each case.698 Any 
consumer who has responded to the advertisement within the time limit decided by the 
court will become party to the proceedings.699 
 
Any award following a collective or class action is made in respect of each individual 
claimant, not the whole group. As a consequence, after a favorable judgment has been 
given, each claimant must apply to the court in order to be recognized as a member of 
the group and for individual damages to be quantified.700 As Article 11 of Civil 
Procedure Law 1/2000 only concerns consumers and users, competitors, and 
undertakings active at different levels in the production or distribution chain cannot rely 
on that provision in order to bring a collective action.701 
 
The collective action provided for by the Civil Procedure Law is usually used in large-
scale consumer claims that affect a significant number of consumers, but it is also 
applied to many consumer contracts. Since the action can be brought to claim 
compensation for damages caused by the consumption or use of products and to 
determine the contractual and non-contractual liability of the professional,702 it can also 
695 Article 15(2) of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
696 Article 15(3) of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
697 Article 15(1) of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
698 See TORRES, E., “In unity, is there strength? Representative claims – overview of some European 
developments”, I.C.C.L.R., 12(6), 2001, p. 178-182, at p. 181. 
699 Article 15(3) of Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
700 See National Report on Spain prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages 
in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 7. 
701 See FERNÁNDEZ, C., “La eficacia real del derecho de la competencia: la indemnización de los 
daños causados” in MARTÍNEZ LAGE, S. and PETITBÒ JUAN, A. (eds.), La modernización del 
derecho de la competencia en España y en la Unión Europea, Fundación Rafel del Pino, Marcial Pons, 
Ediciones jurídicas y sociales, S.A., Madrid, 2005, p. 171-185, at p. 184. 
702 See Spain – National Report, November 15th, 2006, prepared for the Consumer Redress Study, at p. 16. 
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be used to bring a collective antitrust damages action.703 It has been suggested that the 
affected consumers could be identified, for instance, by the purchase receipts.704  
 
Nevertheless, to date, no successful collective action for damages based on an antitrust 
violation has been brought in Spain. An attempt was made by Ausbanc Consumo which 
brought a collective antitrust damages action against Telefónica España in October 
2007. It was based on the decision by the Commission to impose a fine on Telefónica 
for the margin squeeze on ADSL prices charged to competing wholesale companies.705 
Ausbanc sought compensation in order to indemnify users for the overcharge for 
broadband Internet access. It was granted leave to proceed in respect of the action by 
Commercial Court No. 4 of Madrid,706 but the case is still pending. 
 
One of the main problems with the Spanish style collective action is that it is limited to 
consumers. Also competitors and customers other than consumers, small and medium-
sized enterprises in particular, may lack incentives to bring an individual stand-alone 
damages action. Moreover, the claimant must apply to the court in order to be 
recognized as a member of the group and for individual damages to be quantified.707 
The former requirement could discourage consumers from opting in, since they must be 
active as opposed to an opt-out class action, in which the judgment will be binding on 
all class members, if they have not opted out. If their claim is very small, some 
claimants might not bother to take the steps necessary to join the action. The need to 
apply to the court so as to quantify damages might, in turn, constitute a supplementary 
hurdle for the individual claimant to actually obtain compensation for the loss that it has 
703 See ASOCIACIÓN ESPAÑOLA PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA COMPETENCIA, “Observations to 
the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, at p. 8. 
704 See FERNÁNDEZ, C., “La eficacia real del derecho de la competencia: la indemnización de los 
daños causados” in MARTÍNEZ LAGE, S. and PETITBÒ JUAN, A. (eds.), La modernización del 
derecho de la competencia en España y en la Unión Europea, Fundación Rafel del Pino, Marcial Pons, 
Ediciones jurídicas y sociales, S.A., Madrid, 2005, p. 171-185, at p. 184. 
705 Commission Decision of July 4th, 2007 in Case COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v. Telefónica. 
706 See “La Audiencia Provincial de Madrid ordena reanudar el juicio contra Telefónica, demandada por 
458 millones”, available at: http://www.ausbanc.com/index0.htm. 
707 See National Report on Spain prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages 
in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 7. 
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suffered, as quantum is often difficult to calculate, as the review of Spanish antitrust 
case law has shown.708  
 
Finally, the principle of res judicata is partly interpreted differently in Spain than in 
other countries, especially Common Law jurisdictions, regarding the possibility of 
bringing individual actions after a representative action has been brought. 
Consequently, although res judicata normally affects the parties to the proceedings, 
Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Law provides that in collective actions res judicata 
also affects individuals, who are not parties to the dispute even though they are holders 
of the rights that grant legal standing to the parties. This means that in Spain, the res 
judicata effect also extends to parties who have not participated in the collective action 
brought by an association, which defends their interests. Thus, in Spain consumers 
would be barred from bringing an individual action, if a consumer association has 
already brought a collective action.709  
 
However, in general, the legal doctrine outside Spain seems to consider that the 
principle of res judicata can only be applied to impede those consumers bringing 
actions who joined the collective action brought by the association because in that case 
there would be an identity of parties. On the contrary, a collective action could not bar 
those individuals who did not participate in that action from bringing claims 
individually. This right to individual action would also be in compliance with the right 
to due process of law that is recognized by the constitutions of the Member States.710 In 
contrast, the extension of the res judicata effect by Article 222 of the Civil Procedure 
Law to all consumers whose interests are defended by a consumer association appears 
to be incompatible with the constitutional principle of right to due process of law, unless 
the consumers are allowed to bring an individual action instead of the consumer 
association bringing a collective action on their behalf. 
 
708 See e.g. the Judgment of the Provincial High Court of Madrid No. 130/2006, of December 18th, 2006 
and the Judgment of Commercial Court No. 5 of Madrid No. 85/2005, of November 11th, 2005. 
709 See GARCÍA CACHAFEIRO, F., “Las asociaciones de consumidores ante el abuso de posición 
dominante de la Unión Europea”, Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, No. 38/2008, p. 155-175, at p. 161. 
710 Ibid., at p. 160-161. 
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In assessing antitrust damages actions in Spain, on the positive side, the creation of the 
Commercial Courts allows for more expertise (at least over time) in the application of 
the competition rules. Moreover, it is welcome that also under national law, these courts 
may apply directly both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and their Spanish equivalents, and 
that the same procedures apply in both cases. The possibility of bringing stand-alone 
damages actions reduces the time of proceedings in those cases where the victims have 
sufficient evidence of the infringement, or can gain access to such evidence, although it 
is acknowledged that not all types of infringements may realistically be brought without 
an infringement decision by the competition authorities (most notably this limitation 
would apply to cartel cases). 
 
Nevertheless, the rules governing the bringing of antitrust damages actions still leave 
room for improvement. For instance, the burden of proof is high and the assessment of 
evidence is often difficult, as has been seen regarding the quantification of damages. In 
addition, the access to evidence is currently rather burdensome, and the existing 
collective actions have proved insufficient in ensuring redress of consumers. These 
issues are likely to explain why damages claims have not been successful very often. 
 
3.6. Sweden 
3.6.1. General Overview 
In Sweden, the Competition Act has included an express provision about a right to 
damages for an antitrust violation since 1993.711 Initially this right was limited to 
companies and contracting parties. An action could also only be brought based on 
infringements of the national competition rules. By amendments made to the 
Competition Act in 2005, inter alia, the right to bring antitrust damages action was 
expanded to all persons and entities having suffered losses. Therefore, today standing is 
in line with EU law. 
 
Under the current Competition Act (2008:579), the right to damages can be based on an 
infringement of the Swedish as well as the EU competition rules.712 The Swedish 
711 Competition Act (1993:20). 
712 Chapter 3, Section 25 of the Competition Act (2008:579).  
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competition rules713 prohibiting anti-competitive agreements or concerted practices and 
the abuse of a dominant position are virtually the same as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Anybody who has suffered harm as a result of such an antitrust violation may seek 
damages, provided that the violation was committed intentionally or negligently.714 This 
means that some kind of fault is required. Negligence is usually considered to exist 
based on the infringing act itself, especially in cases where the assessment from a 
competition law standpoint is comparatively clear. In addition, there must also be an 
adequate causal relationship between the violation and the harm caused by it.715 The 
limitation period for bringing an antitrust damages action is ten years from the day on 
which the damage occurred.716  
 
Antitrust damages actions are usually brought before the District Courts717 either where 
the defendant resides or has its seat, or where the infringement took place or the damage 
occurred. If the place where the infringement took place and the damage occurred in 
different places, an action can be brought before the competent court of either place.718  
Group actions can be brought before the competent district courts in each county 
designated by the Government.719  
 
It is also possible to decide a damages action together with an action for the imposition 
of fines if the Stockholm District Court decides that it is expedient to hear the two cases 
together. In other words, if the Competition Authority has brought a case in order to 
establish an infringement of the competition rules and a damages claim relates to that 
infringement, they can be tried together before the Stockholm District Court.720 
Moreover, private parties who wish to bring a damages claim also have a general right 
713 Chapter 2, Sections1 and 7 of the Competition Act (2008:579). 
714 Chapter 3, Section 25 of the Competition Act (2008:579). 
715 See BERNITZ, Svensk och europeisk marknadsrätt 1. Konkurrensrätten och marknadsekonomins 
rättsliga grundvalar, Third Edition, Visby, 2011, at p. 249. 
716 Act Modifying the Competition Act (2008:579), SFS 2010:642. This is an important increase 
compared to the 5-year limitation period that was in force under the 1993 Competition Act (1993:20) and 
which still applies to damages claims that have arisen before August 1st, 2005. 
717 See BERNITZ, Svensk och europeisk marknadsrätt 1. Konkurrensrätten och marknadsekonomins 
rättsliga grundvalar, Third Edition, Visby, 2011, at p. 249, n. 22. 
718 Chapter 10, Sections 1 and 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (1942:740). 
719 Section 3 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
720 Chapter 8, Section of the Competition Act (2008:579). 
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to intervene in a related public enforcement action if they can demonstrate that that the 
matter will affect their legal rights or obligations.721 
 
In addition, the Stockholm District Court is always competent to hear any antitrust 
damages action under the specific forum provision in the Competition Act.722 Appeals 
are heard by Courts of Appeal, and their decisions may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. Finally, arbitration tribunals may also consider the civil consequences of 
competition law between parties.723 
 
The aim of the damages award is both to compensate and deter. Purely economic 
damage may be compensated, e.g. encroachment on economic activity and loss of 
turnover and profit.724 The right to compensation also includes interest pursuant to the 
Interest Act.725 The damages awarded should be sufficiently significant so as to 
compensate for the damages caused.726 The amount must correspond to full 
compensation and may not exceed this.727 Apart from that, courts may use any method 
for calculating damages.728 If the claimant has contributed, by fault or negligence, to its 
injury, damages can be reduced.729 In case of difficulties in proving the quantity of the 
harm, courts may assess its quantity under Chapter 35, Section 5 of the Code on Judicial 
Procedure. Such an assessment is also allowed if adducing the evidence would entail 
costs or inconvenience not being reasonable in relation to the size of the damage, and 
the claimed compensation concerns a small amount.730 
 
721 Chapter 14, Section 9 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (1942:740). 
722 Chapter 3, Section 26 of the Competition Act (2008:579). 
723 Section 1 of the Arbitration Proceedings Act (1999:116)). 
724 See BERNITZ, Svensk och europeisk marknadsrätt 1. Konkurrensrätten och marknadsekonomins 
rättsliga grundvalar, Third Edition, Visby, 2011, at p. 250. 
725 Interest Act (1975:635). 
726 See BERNITZ, Svensk och europeisk marknadsrätt 1. Konkurrensrätten och marknadsekonomins 
rättsliga grundvalar, Third Edition, Visby, 2011, at p. 250. 
727 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHRC Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 2. 
728 See ÖBERG, U. and LUNDSTRÖM, J., “Swedish National Report on ‘The judicial application of 
European competition law’ for the FIDE 2010 Congress Madrid”. 
729 Chapter 6, Section1, paragraph 2 of the Tort Liability Act (1972:207). 
730 Chapter 35, Section 5 of the Code on Judicial Procedure.  
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However, damages actions are still scarce, although some cases have been settled.731 
The first case in which an antirust damages action resulted in damages was Europe 
Investor Direct et al. v. VPC (currently Euroclear). VPC is a central securities 
depository and has a monopoly on information on the registers of shares in Swedish 
limited companies. From the end of 1998 during a period of approximately five years, 
VPC refused to supply this information to Europe Investor Direct and the other 
claimants. The Stockholm District Court held that VPC had abused its dominant 
position due to this refusal and there was no objective justification for it. As a result, it 
was sentenced to pay approximately SEK 3.9 million in damages.732 Upon appeal, the 
Svea Court of Appeal upheld the ruling of the Stockholm District Court as to the 
existence of a dominant position, but found that the abuse had already terminated in 
October 2001. Therefore, it assessed that the overall damages to be compensated were 
SEK 1.9 million.733 The Supreme Court did not grant leave to appeal. 
 
To date, antitrust damages actions have been brought in cartel cases or cases alleging 
the abuse of a dominant position.734 Overall, antitrust damages actions have been scare, 
especially in the 1990’s. Before 1993, cartels were allowed provided that they were 
entered in the national cartel register, which explains the lack of damages claims. Also, 
only few antitrust cases have directly involved consumers either as customers to an 
undertaking abusing its dominant position, or as direct customers of undertakings 
participating in cartels.735 Arguably, consumers would in other cases face the 
accentuated difficulties of third parties bringing antitrust damages actions. Other 
possible reasons for the scarcity of damages claims suggested are a general low 
tendency to go to court and reluctance to bring law suits.736    
 
731 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 395.  
732 Joined Cases T 32799-05 and T 34227-05, Europe Investor Direct AB et al. v. VPC AB, Judgment of 
November 20th, 2008. 
733 Case T 10012-08, Euroclear v. Europe Investor Direct AB et al., Judgment of January 19th, 2011. 
734 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 397. 
735 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHRC Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 7-8. 
736 Ibid., at p. 7. 
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Nevertheless, in the past few years several damages actions based on cartel violations 
have been brought. For instance, a number of local communities brought follow-on 
actions after the Market Court had given its final ruling in the Asphalt cartel case. But 
the District Court removed these cases and the claims were settled.737 In addition, some 
damages claims have been brought on the basis of abuse of a dominant position. For 
example, the petroleum company Preem brought an antitrust damages action against a 
port operator in the city of Gävle as it had allegedly been subject to price discrimination 
since it was charged a higher tariff than other companies in Gävle harbor. But on May 
2012, in the Stockholm District Court dismissed the action since Preem was not active 
on the same market as those companies, and had not shown that it had suffered a 
competitive disadvantage.738 Two follow-on actions have also been brought against 
TeliaSonera claiming damages for harm resulting from the abuse of TeliaSonera’s 
dominant position between 2001 and 2003 by applying a margin-squeeze in the 
Swedish ADSL market.739 Because these cases, it is to be expected that private 
enforcement is on the rise in Sweden.740 
 
However, no actions by consumers or collective antitrust damages actions been brought 
to date,741 although the Swedish legislation provides for a comparatively extensive 
group action. The group action was introduced by the Group Proceedings Act 2002:599, 
which entered into force on January 1st, 2003. The Group Proceedings Act provides for 
three different forms of group actions: a private group action, an organization action or 
a public group action.742 For the purpose of this thesis, the private group action is of 
737 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHRC Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 17. 
738 Case T 5995-09, Preem Aktiebolag v. Gävle Hamn, Judgment of May 12th, 2012. 
739 See HANSSON, P. and KARLSSON, K., “Sweden: Overview”, The European Antitrust Review, 2014, 
available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/53/sections/179/chapters/2122/sweden-
overview/. 
740 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 395. 
741 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHCR Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 7. 
742 Section 1 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
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most interest in that it allows a natural person or a legal entity to bring a group action on 
behalf of other persons (i.e. group members), who are not parties to the case.743  
 
The private group action is based on an opt-in model, i.e. only group members who, 
within the period determined by the court, have given notice in writing about their wish 
to join the group action will be considered group members.744 Once the group member 
has notified its wish to opt in and the period for opting in has expired, the group 
member can no longer withdraw its notice. In order to withdraw his notice, the group 
member must intervene in the proceeding.745  
 
The court must notify the group members about the group action in an appropriate 
manner.746 In general, the service of process should be issued if the notification contains 
an obligation for group members in the proceeding, and the omission of the obligation is 
penalized somehow. If the potential group members are unknown, the notification is 
done by the means of a public notice. This is also possible if a large group shall be 
notified and it would entail more costs and efforts than what is reasonable taking into 
account the aim of the service of process to hand the document to each of them.747  
 
There are special preconditions for bringing a group action. The circumstances on 
which the action is based must be common or similar for the claims of the entire group. 
Moreover, a group action must not be inappropriate due to the fact that the grounds of 
some claims of the group members differ substantially from other claims. It must also 
not be possible for the group members to pursue the larger part of their claims equally 
well by individual actions than by a group action. The group, taking into consideration 
743 Sections 1and 4 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). According to Section 5, an organization 
action may in turn be brought by a not-for-profit association protecting consumer or wage-earner interests 
in disputes between consumers and a business operator regarding any goods, services or other utility 
offered by the business operator to consumers. The public group action may be brought by an authority 
which is suitable to represent the members of the group. Such authorities are decided by the Government 
(Section 6 of the Group Proceedings Act).  
744 Section 14 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
745 THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, DS 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 66. 
746 Section 13 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
747 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 75-76. 
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its size, ambit and otherwise must also be appropriately defined.748 Finally, the plaintiff 
taking into consideration his interest in the substantive matter, its financial capacity to 
bring a group action,749 and the circumstances generally, should be appropriate to 
represent the members of the group in the case.750  
 
Moreover, the general rule is that the affected group must be named,751 and the parties 
must be represented by a lawyer, who is an advocate.752 Only the group claimant 
becomes a party to the proceedings. The passive group members will have an extensive 
right of information and limited participation rights, but are mainly represented by the 
group claimant.753 The passive members do not, as a general rule, have any obligation 
to pay legal costs in case the defendant is successful since they are not parties to the 
proceeding.754 The rationale is that group members have a right to have their claims 
heard without incurring any cost risk.755 On the contrary, the group claimant must pay 
the winning party’s cost if it loses the action.756  
 
Costs that must be reimbursed include, if the value of the dispute exceeds half of the 
basic amount pursuant to the Act on Public Insurance, the costs for the preparation of 
the proceeding and the proceeding itself as well as the fees of representatives, provided 
748 Section 8 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). Factors that may influence on the definition of the 
group include the geographical domicile of the group members, the availability of client registers, 
statistical data and the possibilities of transmitting information rapidly and efficiently. See THE 
SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 2008:74, 
October 28th, 2008, at p. 86-87. 
749 This prerequisite does, however, not exclude that the plaintiff obtains financial support in the 
framework of the public legal aid or takes advantage of a legal insurance available within the group. See 
THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 2008:74, 
October 28th, 2008, at p. 88.  
750 Article 8 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
751 Section 9 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
752 Section 11 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
753 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, 1473-1503, at p. 1494.  
754 Section 33 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
755 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 131. 
756 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 54. 
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that the costs have been reasonably necessary in order to enforce the rights of the party.  
The work and lost time of the party must also be compensated.757 
 
However, if the defendant loses the case, but is not able to pay the litigation costs of the 
plaintiff, the concerned group members must reimburse these costs. This cost rule is 
designed to prevent that the winning plaintiff would have to bear its own litigation 
costs.758 But the group members must only reimburse the costs of the plaintiff to the 
amount that each of them has won in the proceeding.759 The cost rule is not applicable 
when the court gives its decision in the case, but can be relied on in an agreement 
between the plaintiff and the group members or a later claim of the plaintiff against each 
group member once it has become evident that the defendant will not be able to pay for 
the plaintiff’s litigation costs.760 
 
The Group Proceedings Act also provides the possibility to pay an increase in the 
normal remuneration to the lawyer if the action is successful, thus introducing a 
moderate form of contingency fee into the Swedish legal system.761 The risk agreement 
is an agreement between the claimant and an attorney according to which the fees for 
the attorney depends on what extent the claims of the members of the group are 
successful.762 Nevertheless, the defendant is never responsible for paying for the costs 
that exceeds a normal remuneration.763 Instead, the passive group members can be 
obligated to reimburse these costs to the plaintiff, but only up to the amount that he has 
won in the group action.764 
 
757 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 156. 
758 Ibid., at p. 131. 
759 The passive group members can also be obliged to reimburse costs because he has caused an 
unnecessary court proceeding or other costs that have incurred due to its negligence or omission. See THE 
SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 2008:74, 
October 28th, 2008, at p. 132. 
760 Ibid. 
761 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, 1473-1503, at p. 1495. 
762 Section 38 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
763 Chapter 18, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. 
764 Section 34 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
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The court maintains a comparatively strong position during the proceedings. It must 
control whether the group claimant represents the interests of the group members not 
immediately involved in an adequate way. Regarding a possible settlement of the case, 
all members must be given the opportunity to express their opinions about the proposed 
settlement agreement, and it must be then admitted by the court in order to be binding 
on all group members.765 
 
Contrary to fears that a collective action would result in numerous lawsuits in Sweden, 
only few collective actions have been brought.766 The practical experience of group 
actions is accordingly limited. However, even though the number of group actions 
brought in Sweden is much lower than expected, the first group action in which a 
judgment was given involved approximately 15,000 group members. It has been 
estimated that it is probable that most of them would not have brought any individual 
claim, had the group action not been possible. 767 
 
But on the other hand, the efficiency of the Swedish group action may be questioned 
since overall few such actions have been brought, and none have been brought in order 
to claim compensation for harm caused by anti-competitive conduct.768 This question 
will be analyzed in more detail in the next section on the main obstacles to private 
enforcement of the antitrust rules in Sweden. 
 
As to the costs of damages actions, lawyers’ fees must be reasonable. This is assessed 
based on a number of factors, such as the scope, nature degree of difficulty and 
importance of the assignment, the skills and proficiency of the lawyer in question, and 
the results of his work. The general rule is that fees must be based on an hourly rate or a 
765 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, 1473-1503, at p. 1493-
1494. 
766 During the first two and a half years after the introduction of the group action only five such actions 
were brought. See MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal 
Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, 1473-1503, at 
p. 1493. 
767 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 57-58. 
768 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHRC Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 7. 
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fixed fee.769 Contingency fees are usually not allowed since the Swedish Bar 
Association considers them as disproportionate.770 Nevertheless, risk sharing 
agreements may be allowed if they can be justified by “particular reasons”. For 
example, if effective access to justice would be difficult without such an agreement or 
the agreement has been concluded in a cross-border dispute for dealings outside Sweden 
and it is the prerequisite for the lawyer’s assignment.771 In these cases, the remuneration 
of the lawyer will depend on the extent to which the claims have been successful.  
 
In addition, risk agreements are permitted under the Swedish Group Proceedings Act 
provided that they have been approved by a court.772 A prerequisite for approval is that 
the risk agreement is reasonable considering the nature of the case. It must be made in 
writing, and it must specify how the fee will differ from the standard fee in case the 
claim of the group members is upheld or rejected. If the fee is calculated only based on 
the value of the claim, a risk agreement cannot be approved.773 
 
The Assessment Report on the Group Proceedings Act,774 which was conducted in 2008 
in order to assess the Group Proceedings Act, found that “no win, no fee” agreements 
should be approved as such, but there should be a limit on the percentage of the value of 
the litigation at issue which the lawyer may claim if the case is successful. This 
percentage should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and should not exceed 30%.775  
 
769 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 396. 
770 See National Report on Sweden prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for 
damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 12. 
771 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 396. 
772 Section 38 of the Group Proceedings Act 2002 (2002:599). 
773 Section 39 of the Group Proceedings Act 2002 (2002:599). 
774 THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008”. 
775 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 178-179. 
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The “loser pays” principle generally applies to the allocation of costs in court 
proceedings,776 but it is also possible to apportion the costs between the parties 
depending on the success of their claims.777  
 
The costs in court proceedings mainly comprise the costs for preparation778 and 
presentation of the case as well as lawyer’s fees779 since court fees are negligible and 
only include a small fee for filing an application for a writ to the civil court.780 As to 
lawyers’ fees, they are only compensated to the extent that the costs have been 
reasonably incurred to enforce the party’s rights. The effort and time of the party 
involved in the litigation must also be compensated. The compensation of litigation 
costs also includes interest accrued pursuant to the Interest Act781 from the day the case 
is decided until the interest is paid.782 However, additional costs which have incurred 
due to a risk agreement are not considered as reimbursable litigation costs.783 
 
3.6.2. Main Obstacles to Private Enforcement 
Due to the low number of group actions brought in Sweden,784 it is questionable 
whether the Swedish group action device is efficient. In June 2007, the Swedish 
Ministry of Justice commissioned an assessment of the Group Proceedings Act. The aim 
of the assessment was to evaluate whether the objectives underlying the introduction of 
that law had been met, and whether the legal provisions aiming at safeguarding the 
interests of the defendant can be considered as expedient. The assessment also intended 
to examine the effects of the introduction of a group action on small and other 
enterprises, for instance, with regard to the risk of abuse. The assessment included an 
776 Chapter 18, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. 
777 Chapter 18, Section of the Code of Judicial Procedure.  
778 Preparation refers to negotiation aiming to settle the matter in dispute. 
779 Chapter 18, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. 
780 See ÖBERG, U. and LUNDSTRÖM, J., “Swedish National Report on ‘The judicial application of 
European competition law’ for the FIDE 2010 Congress Madrid”. 
781 Section 6 of the Interest Act (1975:635). 
782 Chapter 18, Section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, Act Amending the Code of Judicial 
Procedure (1987:328). 
783 Section 41 of the Group Proceedings Act 2002 (2002:599). 
784 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 34. 
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analysis of the group actions that have been heard by courts and an examination of 
possible settlements. It also attempted to examine to what extent threats of initiating a 
group action have been used as a means to exert pressure defendants, and whether 
companies’ desire to invest in Sweden has been influenced as a result of the Group 
Proceedings Act. Finally, the task included the submission of proposals on amendments 
to the law if appropriate.785  
 
The assessment report on the Group Proceedings Act was presented May 31st, 2008. 
The report found that the examination of procedural impediments is too time-
consuming, which renders the Act less efficient. The fact that the group representative 
bears a significant risk of being liable for litigation costs serves as a probable 
disincentive to bringing a group action in the first place.786 Moreover, the special 
preconditions for bringing a group action are too general, which makes it difficult to 
assess them and takes too long. The Group Proceedings Assessment Report suggested 
that the special preconditions should be modified so that the action must be founded on 
circumstances that are common or essentially of a similar nature for the claims of the 
group members. The plaintiff must also define the group more precisely, following the 
Finnish group action model in order to eliminate any doubt about who forms part of the 
group.787  
 
In addition, the precondition that the plaintiff be appropriate to represent the members 
of the group should be amended by abolishing the reference to its interest in the 
substantive matter, its financial capacity to bring a group action,788 and the 
circumstances generally since this has resulted in difficulties of interpretation. Instead, 
the court should be able to assess the appropriateness of the plaintiff as a representative 
of the group by examining a new precondition, i.e. whether the group action can be 
decided in an efficient and expedient manner. In case of any abuse by the plaintiff, the 
785 Ibid., at p. 34-35. 
786 Ibid., at p. 61-63. 
787 Ibid., at p. 102-108. 
788 This prerequisite does, however, not exclude that the plaintiff obtains financial support in the 
framework of the public legal aid or takes advantage of a legal insurance available within the group. See 
THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 2008:74, 
October 28th, 2008, at p. 88. 
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court could thus in the future dismiss an action on the ground that it cannot be decided 
in efficient and expedient manner.789 
 
The Group Proceedings Assessment Report also found that it would be important that 
the court would decide on the admissibility of the group action at an early stage of the 
proceedings. Representatives of the parties have claimed that it is problematic that a 
clearer certification process would be needed in order to decide the preconditions for the 
group action before the subsequent trial.790 The Report suggests thus that an initial 
compulsory examination of whether there are any procedural impediments to the group 
action should be required. In the decision of admissibility, the frameworks of the 
proceeding could then be defined and the scope of the group could be determined. The 
examination would be based on the information in the application for summons made 
by the plaintiff,791 which the plaintiff could complement in case necessary information 
is missing. In order to avoid costly and time-consuming notifications before the 
admissibility of the group action has been examined, the group may only be notified 
once the group action has been admitted. Should, due to changed circumstances, the 
preconditions for a group action no longer exist later in the proceeding, the court could 
ex officio, or following an objection of the defendant, still dismiss the action pursuant to 
Chapter 34 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.792  
 
In its decision on admissibility, the court shall determine the group and establish the 
time period for opting in. The court may also establish certain requirements for the 
notice of opt-in, which enables the court to direct the proceedings more from the start. 
789 THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 108-111. 
790 Ibid., at p. 118-119. 
791 The application for a summons must contain the common circumstance or circumstances of the group 
members as well as possible differences between their claims which could give cause for dividing the 
group into subgroups. The group must be clearly determined and the plaintiff shall provide the names and 
addresses of the members of the group who have already communicated their interest in participating in 
the group action. In case the names and addresses of potential group members are not provided, their 
approximate number must be indicated and the plaintiff shall inform the court how they can be reached in 
order to be notified about the group action. In addition, the plaintiff’s application must include an 
explanation of why the group action is the best procedural alternative in the case in question and what 
process economic advantages it would entail. See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, 
“Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 123. 
792 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 121-123.  
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However, the court must not extend the group action to other group members unless the 
plaintiff has approved this.793 
 
The notification procedure in group actions is perceived as cumbersome. Judges 
involved in group actions have commented that it requires a significant number of 
human resources, and sometimes the District Court has been forced to hire personnel in 
order to send the notifications, and even so, it still took 1-2 months to carry it out. 
Another problem concerns the approval of the settlement since the case has normally 
taken so long that the addresses of group members may be out of date. In addition, it is 
administratively demanding to conduct the proceeding because the active and interested 
group members require much information about what is going on. This is challenging 
for an individual group representative.794 
 
Therefore, the Group Proceedings Assessment Report suggested that the plaintiff should 
play a more significant role in the notification process. The court could thus decide that 
the plaintiff shall notify the group members. If the court decides to do so, it must 
prescribe how the plaintiff shall report about the notification. As a consequence, the 
plaintiff will be responsible for classifying the communications, and present the result to 
the court in clear manner. This extended responsibility for the plaintiff is considered to 
be in accordance with the prerequisite that the plaintiff be represented by a lawyer and, 
as a result, it should be able to carry out this task well. The plaintiff will be entitled to 
request a compensation for the costs of the notification from public funds as it generally 
rests on the court to handle the notification.795 
 
With regard to the choice between an opt-in and an opt-out model, several 
stakeholders,796 which were heard in the context of the assessment of the Group 
Proceedings Act, maintained that an opt-out model would be preferable, at least in 
certain situations. This is the case when the claims are of lower value. The National 
Board for Consumers Complaints suggested that the choice of opt-in or opt-out should 
793 Ibid., at p. 125-126. 
794 Ibid., at p. 77-78. 
795 Ibid., at p. 80-81. 
796 For example, house owners, the National Board for Consumers Complaints and Consumer 
Ombudsman. 
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be possible on a case-by-case basis taking into account the field of law that the dispute 
concerns. The Consumer Ombudsman found that in cases involving a large number of 
consumers, the workload required for defining the group is disproportionally big and it 
would thus be desirable that the Consumer Ombudsman could bring a declaratory action 
without defining the group further. The representatives of the parties were divided. On 
the one hand, they found that foreign companies contemplating establishing themselves 
in Sweden considered it a disadvantage that collective actions were available in 
Sweden, but felt more reassured once they learned that it is based on an opt-in model. 
On the other hand, they found the current law toothless because of the opt-in model, and 
believed that an opt-out model would significantly facilitate the possibilities of the 
plaintiff.797 
 
The Group Proceedings Assessment Report concluded that there are reasons against the 
introduction of an opt-out model. Above all, there is a risk that a person can be involved 
in legal proceedings without having any knowledge thereof, which is contrary to the 
principle that everyone decides over his legal relationships. In practice, it could also be 
difficult to submit specified claims and, for example, decide the amount of damages. 
However, the Report also found that taking into consideration that Norway and 
Denmark provides for an opt-out group action in certain circumstances, there is a call to 
follow up the development of those systems. The Report also suggested that the 
definition of group members shall be decided by the court when it authorizes a group 
action, and its decision shall include the deadline within which the potential group 
members must opt in in order to join the group action. If the court so requires, the 
potential group members must include in their communication their specified claims, 
the concrete grounds for the claims and circumstances which are relevant for the 
division of group members into subgroups. In order to make the group action more 
efficient, the possibility of using conventional  calculation of damages and obtaining 
evidence from the counterparty by the use of discovery (ordering the counterparty to 
disclose information) or in another appropriate manner have been suggested.798 
 
797 See THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, Ds 
2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 68-69. 
798 Ibid., at p. 63 and 71-72. 
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Initially, when the introduction of a group action in Sweden was proposed, it was 
estimated that there would be up to 20 group actions a year and 5-8 thereof would be 
private group actions. It was also believed that that legal aid and legal insurances would 
be of importance and most of the cases brought as private group actions would fall 
within the scope of legal insurances. However, contrary to these expectations, it would 
appear that legal aid has not been granted in any group actions to date. Similarly, it 
would seem that legal insurance has generally not been granted either to cover the costs 
of group proceedings. Instead, only once has legal protection been granted through 
insurance for a group action. The advantage of legal insurance is that it will cover also 
the costs of the opposing party that the insured party is obligated to compensate. 
However, the cap for the compensation is usually SEK 120,000 and, therefore, it will 
not be sufficient to cover the costs that incur in group actions of a certain size.799  
 
One possible interpretation of the low number of group actions brought would be that 
the group action device is not necessary in the Swedish legal system. Nevertheless, the 
Group Proceedings Assessment Report found it more likely that more time is required 
for it to become commonly known and considered a worthwhile alternative. On the 
other hand, the Assessment Report did not found any evidence that group actions would 
have been used in order to blackmail the defendant to unfair settlements. Neither has it 
had any negative effects on foreign investments in Sweden, since potential investors 
feel reassured when they realize that the Swedish group action is based on an opt-in 
model.800 
 
Other obstacles to full compensation include, as argued by some commentators, the 
resistance among undertakings to bring antitrust damages actions against other 
undertakings, although there are some signs that this is changing. Other disincentives 
are the risk of incurring high costs due to the “loser pays” principle and the difficulty in 
adducing evidence.801 Although courts can order anybody to disclose relevant material 
799 Ibid., at p. 137-143 and 158-159. 
800 Ibid., at p. 59-61. 
801 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 412. 
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in its possession,802 in practice this is challenging for the claimants since they must 
specify the document and what it is intended to prove. An additional difficulty is the 
fact that destruction of evidence is not penalized and, therefore, there is a risk that the 
defendant destroys the specified documents803. Business secrets and documents subject 
to legal privilege are also excluded from the disclosure obligation. In case of follow-on 
actions, the situation is somewhat easier in that once the Swedish Competition 
Authority has ended its investigation, any individual has a right to request material 
gathered, created, received or held by the authority.804 The only limitations are 
information protected as confidential under the Publicity and Secrecy Act,805 such as 
business secrets. However, for instance other kind of material provided by a leniency 
applicant could only be protected if the disclosure of the information would 
considerably harm the individual or undertaking in question.806 Leniency applicants 
must therefore be aware that information submitted under a leniency application may 
eventually become public once the public enforcement action has come to an end.807 
This could consequently have implications for potential applicants’ willingness to apply 
for leniency in the first place. 
 
Moreover, although the limitation period for bringing an antitrust damages action is ten 
years from the day on which the damage occurred.808 Arguably, this could sometimes 
be problematic, if the potential claimant learns about the infringement and the damages 
which it has sustained close to the end of the limitation period, as the limitation period 
can only be interrupted by bringing a legal action. Other ways, such as serving the 
802 Chapter 38, Section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (1942:740). 
803 SOU 2004:10, at p. 100. 
804 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 408. 
805 Chapter 3, Section 1 of the Publicity and Secrecy Act (2009:400). 
806 Chapter 3, Section 3 of the Publicity and Secrecy Act (2009:400). 
807 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 409. 
808 Act Modifying the Competition Act (2008:579), SFS 2010:642. This is an important increase 
compared to the 5-year limitation period that was in force under the 1993 Competition Act (1993:20). 
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debtor with a written demand, do not serve to interrupt the limitation period,809 because 
the submission of an application for a summons to a court is required in order for an 
action to be considered to be brought.810 The calculation of the limitation period from 
the day on which the damage occurred can also have implications if damages arise later 
than the infringement and in cases of continuous infringements. In the first case, it plays 
in the favor of the claimant, while it may give rise to uncertainty for the defendant. In 
the second case, new losses may arise later, which may complicate the calculation of the 
amount of damages and interest as well as the bringing of the claim, especially if there 
have been legislative changes in the meantime.  
 
3.7. Finland 
3.7.1. General Overview 
Since the adoption of the Finnish Competition Act in 1992, the Act has been subject to 
several amendments, some of which are also of relevance with regard to private 
enforcement of competition rules and damages claims. The first substantial amendment 
entered into force in May 2004 and aimed to adapt the national legal framework to the 
modernization of the EU competition rules. The second important overhaul took place 
in 2011.811  
 
Until May 2004, there was only an express legal basis in the Competition Act for 
damages actions based on a violation of the domestic competition provisions.812 In other 
cases, the claimants could only base their claim on the Tort Liability Act if the claim 
was a non-contractual claim. Conversely, if there was a contractual relationship between 
the claimant and the infringer, the right to compensation was determined by contract 
law principles. This had implications for the compensation that could be claimed, since 
economic loss should in principle be compensated in contractual relationships whereas 
pursuant to the Tort Liability Act, economic loss is only compensated in exceptional 
809 See GLADER, M. and ALSTERGREN, P., “Sweden” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.V. (eds.), 
International Handbook on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA USA, 2010, p. 395-413, at p. 398. 
810 Government Bill 1979/80:119, at p. 56. 
811 In addition, the Competition Act (480/1992) has also been emended by Law 303/1998 and Law 
1529/2001. 
812 See Section 18a of the Competition Act 480/1992 as amended by Law 1529/2001. This specific legal 
basis had been introduced in 1998 by Law 303/1998. 
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circumstances. As the loss resulting from anti-competitive conduct is usually economic 
loss, victims of an antitrust violation could generally only claim compensation if there 
was a contractual relationship between them and the infringer. This resulted in a 
difference in treatment of undertakings depending on the nature of their claim.813  
 
This different treatment was abolished following the amendment of the Competition Act 
in 2004,814 since it extended the specific legal basis for antitrust damages actions to loss 
caused by antitrust infringements in both contractual and extra-contractual relationships. 
In other words, economic loss caused by an anti-competitive conduct must also be 
compensated in extra-contractual relationships. However, regrettably, the specific legal 
basis only applied to undertakings, since the Competition Act governs relationships 
between business undertakings.815 The exclusion of consumers from the group of 
claimants benefitting from the specific legal basis seems to contradict the obligation to 
pay special attention to consumers when the Competition Act is applied.816 
 
Moreover, the amendment in 2004 also extended the specific legal basis for damages 
actions contained in Section 18a of the Competition Act to include breaches of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. The aim was to clarify that the national rules on tort liability also 
applied to infringements of the EU competition rules.817 As a result, “a business 
undertaking, that, either intentionally or negligently, violates the prohibitions 
prescribed in Article 4 or 6 [of the Competition Act] or [Article 101 or 102 TFEU], is 
obliged to compensate the damage caused to another business undertaking. The 
compensation for damage shall cover compensation for the expenses, price difference, 
lost profits and other direct or indirect economic damage resulting from the competition 
restriction”.818 
 
813 Government Bill 243/1997 to the Parliament on laws amending the Act on Competition Restrictions 
and certain laws related to it. 
814 Act amending the Act on Competition Restrictions (318/2004). 
815 Government Bill 243/1997 to the Parliament on laws amending the Act on Competition Restrictions 
and certain laws related to it. 
816 See NYSTRÖM, J., “Konkurrensrättsligt skadestånd” in SUOMEN KILPAILUOIKEUDELLINEN 
YHDISTYS RY, Kilpailuoikeudellinen vuosikirja 2004, Helsinki, 2005, p. 233-256, at p. 243. 
817 Government Bill 11/2004 to the Parliament on laws amending the Act on Competition Restrictions and 
certain laws related to it. 
818 Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992), incl. amendment (318/2004). 
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But it was still necessary to distinguish between third party business undertakings and 
other third parties since the specific legal basis was still limited only to business 
undertakings.819 A business undertaking is defined as “a natural person, or a private or 
public legal person, who professionally offers for sale, buys, sells, or otherwise obtains 
or delivers goods or services (product) in return for compensation”.820 Nevertheless, it 
is liberally interpreted so, for instance, the State, the municipalities and undertakings 
owned by them (e.g. municipal water and power utilities) may be regarded as “business 
undertakings”.821 The possibilities of consumers and other persons (e.g. the State and 
other public entities when they are acting in their capacity as public organs and not as 
economic actors)822 who did not fall within the definition of “business undertaking” 
bringing a claim for damages for breach of EU or Finnish competition rules, continued 
to depend on the general rules of tortious liability. 
 
Under the Tort Liability Act, the loss has been caused deliberately or negligently.823 
This requirement is usually no obstacle do bringing a claim for damages in antitrust 
violation cases, since undertakings are presumed to know the law.824 More difficult is it 
for a third party to demonstrate that there are “especially weighty reasons” for 
compensation for economic loss that is not connected to personal injury or damage to 
property825 as pure economic loss is only exceptionally compensated under the Tort 
Liability Act. At least hard-core cartels should be considered as a sufficiently weighty 
reason, since they are normally committed intentionally and it is clear that they are 
prohibited. In any case, they would constitute infringements contrary to good practice, 
819 See LESKINEN, C., “The possibility of third parties bringing EC antitrust damages actions – the case 
of Spain and Finland” in ORTIZ BLANCO, L. and MARTÍN DE LAS MULAS BAEZA, R. (eds.), 
Derecho de la competencia europeo y español. Volumen VIII, Dykinson, S.L., Madrid, 2008, p. 35-76. 
820 Section 3(1) of the Act on Competition Restrictions (480/1992), incl. amendment (318/2004). 
821 See JOUTSIMO, M., SARASTE, T. and SILASKIVI, V., “Seuraamukset kilpailunrajoituksista: 
sanktiot, leniency, myötävaikuttaminen ja vahingonkorvaukset”, Defensor Legis, No. 5/2005, p. 1051-
1076, at p. 1067.  
822 However, as stated, if the State or a municipality has suffered harm when acting on the market through 
an economic entity, it is considered as an undertaking and may bring an antitrust damages action under 
Section 18a of the Finnish Competition Act. 
823 Chapter 2, Section 1(1) of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974). 
824 See JOUTSIMO, M., SARASTE, T. and SILASKIVI, V., “Seuraamukset kilpailunrajoituksista: 
sanktiot, leniency, myötävaikuttaminen ja vahingonkorvaukset”, Defensor Legis, No. 5/2005, p. 1051-
1076, at p. 1069. 
825 Chapter 5, Section 1 of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974). 
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which has been accepted as an “especially weighty reason” justifying compensation for 
economic loss.826  
 
The use of these different legal bases is illustrated by the Asphalt Cartel.827 Most of the 
municipalities were not considered as business undertakings since they had purchased 
the product in order to fulfil a statutory obligation. Therefore, the claims brought under 
Section 18 of the previous Competition Act were rejected. Some of the municipalities 
succeeded in claiming damages based on a breach of a contractual relationship because 
the District Court found e.g. that the illegal infringement as such constituted a breach of 
the contract. Moreover, in those cases where the claimant also sought damages jointly 
and severally from infringers other than the contracting party, the Court applied the Tort 
Liability Act. It considered the harm to constitute pure economic loss, but the 
requirement of “especially weighty reason” justified its compensation.828 
 
The latest substantial reform of the Finnish Competition Act829 entered into force on 
November 1st, 2011. Under Section 20 of the new Competition Act, a business 
undertaking or an association of business undertakings must compensate the damage 
caused to anyone by a violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU or their domestic 
equivalents (Articles 5 and 7 of the Competition Act) which it has committed either 
intentionally or negligently. This means that fault is a requirement for liability to incur, 
although it is sufficient that the infringer has been negligent in breaching the 
competition rules. Regarding the burden of proof, it is also relevant if a contractual 
relationship exists between the claimant and the infringer. If there is such a relationship 
and the antitrust violation also constitutes a breach of contract, the infringer has to prove 
that he did not behave negligently in violating the domestic or EU competition rules so 
as not to be obliged to compensate for the harm caused by the antitrust violation. 
Conversely, if there is no contractual relationship, the burden to prove the existence of 
negligence falls upon the claimant.830 The degree of fault is also of relevance for the 
826 See ROUTAMO, E., STÅHLBERG, P. and KARHU, J., Suomen vahingonkorvausoikeus, Talentum 
Media Oy, Helsinki, 2006, at p. 307. 
827 41 Judgments, see e.g. 13/64901 (Valtio).  
828 See KALLIOKOSKI, T. and VIRTANEN, P., ”Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingonkorvaus 
asfalttikartelllin valossa”, Defensor Legis, No. 1/2014, p. 29-46, at p. 34. 
829 Competition Act (948/2011). 
830 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 10. 
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amount of damages to be paid because if the damage has been caused deliberately, the 
general rule is the award of full damages. Only exceptionally could special reasons 
justify a reduction in the damages.831  
 
More importantly, the new Competition Act eliminates the distinction between business 
undertakings and other victims of a competition infringement. As a result, consumers 
who have been harmed by an antitrust violation can now rely on Section 20 of the 
Competition Act in order to claim damages from the infringer. This amendment is in 
line with the ECJ’s decision in Courage, according to which anybody who has suffered 
harm as a result of an antitrust violation should have a right to damages, and is also 
more compliant with the principle of effectiveness than the previous legal framework. 
 
However, the provisions that were effective when the new act entered into force (e.g. 
Section 18(a) of Competition Act (480/1992)) must be applied to competition law 
violations committed prior to the entry into force of the new Competition Act,832 so in 
those cases standing based on the old Competition Act is still limited to undertakings.833 
With regard to infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the obligation for 
consumers under the old act to base their claim on the Tort Liability Act, which requires 
“especially weighty reasons” in order to be able to claim compensation for economic 
loss, appears to breach the principle of effectiveness834 because it constitutes an 
additional obstacle to obtaining compensation. 
 
Antitrust damages actions may be brought before the ordinary courts, but very few 
damages actions have been brought both for violations of the national and the EU 
competition rules.835 With the exception of one case from 1993,836 antitrust damages 
831 Section 1(2) of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974).  
832 Section 50(3) of the Competition Act (948/2011). 
833 Consumers could therefore only base their damages claims for infringements committed before 
November 1st, 2011 on the Finnish Tort Liability Act or the general principles of contract law. See AINE, 
A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 10-11.  
834 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 11. 
835 Approximately a dozen cases (counting the claims brought based on the number of infringements, i.e. 
there would be many more claims if all the individual claims related to the Asphalt Cartel were counted 
separately) have been brought, including actions which have been settled or withdrawn. Nevertheless, as 
judgments of District Courts are not electronically available, it becomes more difficult to obtain 
comprehensive information about relevant cases. For an extensive examination of antitrust damages 
actions brought in Finland, see HAVU, K., KALLIOKOSKI, T., and WIKBERG, O., 
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actions have only been brought since 2002.837 This is likely to be explained by the lack 
of case law, the risk of high legal costs, the difficulty in proving the infringement and 
the extent of the damage, and the previous limitation of the specific legal basis in the 
Competition Act to business undertakings.838 Other reasons include lack of incentives839 
and difficulties in the application of tort rules, such as how remote, indirect harm is to 
be compensated.840 Most of the actions brought in the District Courts have been 
settled841 while others are still pending before the courts.842 Moreover, most cases have 
been brought based on infringement of Finnish competition law. Only one, Qvist Oy v. 
John Crane Safematic Oy,843 was also alleged to have breach the EU competition rules. 
Damages have to date only been awarded by judgment in the Asphalt Cartel Case, 
although the amount awarded was significantly lower (€ approximately 37 million) than 
what the claimants had claimed (€ 122 million).844 In addition, three cases which all 
Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingonkorvaus, Edita, Helsinki, 2010, at p. 129. In addition, there are numerous 
claims relating to the Timber Cartel pending before the District Court of Helsinki. 
836 Suomen yrittäjäin keskusliitto v. Tampereen kaupunki, District Court of Tampere, No. S 93/91. 
837 See HAVU, K., KALLIOKOSKI, T., and WIKBERG, O., Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingonkorvaus, 
Edita, Helsinki, 2010, at p. 130. 
838 See THE FINNISH MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE, Comment by the Finnish Ministry of 
Industry and Trade to the Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules, at p. 2. 
839 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 9. 
840 See HAVU, K., KALLIOKOSKI, T., and WIKBERG, O., Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingonkorvaus, 
Edita, Helsinki, 2010, at p. 132. 
841 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 1. For instance, Saunalahti v. Elisa, 
District Court of Helsinki, No. 02/15593 and Radio Nova v. Gramex, District Court of Helsinki, No. 
05/25107. 
842 Cases that are pending include a number of damages claims relating to the Timber Cartel Case. The 
District Court of Helsinki rejected other 13 damages claims on March 28th, 2014 on the grounds that they 
were brought after the limitation period had expired. The Court concluded that inter alia, thanks to the 
statement on the timber cartel by Finnish Competition Authority issued on May 25th, 2005, the claimants 
had sufficient information about whether the cartel had caused them harm. However, one of the judges 
disagreed, and held that the limitation period had only started to run once the cartel decision had become 
final by the decision of the Market Court on January 4th, 2010. Therefore, the claims were brought within 
the 5-year limitation period. This later interpretation is more in line with EU law because it acknowledges 
that claimants often need to rely on an infringement decision by the competition authorities in order to 
bring a claim for damages, and the infringement is not definitively established until the decision had 
become final. 
843 Qvist v. John Crane Safematic, The District Court of Central-Finland, No. 05/631. 
844 41 Judgments, see e.g. No. 13/64901 (Valtio). 
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concerned price discrimination and were settled, also resulted in damages for the 
claimants.845   
 
Most cases have concerned the abuse of a dominant position on the market. The most 
significant exception is the Asphalt Cartel Case, in which the Finnish State and a 
number of municipalities claimed damages for the overcharge they had paid due to a 
bid-rigging cartel. The District Court of Helsinki held that the ring-leader 
Lemminkäinen and six other undertakings were jointly and severally liable to pay 
damages. The claims of the Finnish State were rejected because, on the basis of new 
evidence, the Court found that some of its employees involved in laying asphalt had 
been aware of the existence of the cartel and had participated in it at least during a part 
of its existence. As a result, the State had not suffered any harm from the cartel because 
it had approved, participated in, and benefitted from the anti-competitive conduct. 
 
It is also worth noting that the claims for damages have mainly been brought in cases 
where a contractual relationship exists between the parties, although the claimants in 
these cases have relied on the specific legal basis for antitrust damages actions in the 
Competition Act.846 
 
Stand-alone actions are permitted as no prior decision of the Finnish Competition 
Authority or Market Court is required before a claim for damages may be brought. 
However, the damages actions brought so far have mostly been follow-on actions, 
which could be explained by the existing obstacles to bringing antitrust damages 
actions. The only exceptions are VPT v. Stora Enso847 and Qvist v. John Crane 
Safematic848 which were first brought as stand-alone actions, but which led to the 
845 See Saunalahti v. Elisa, District Court of Helsinki, No. 02/15593, Saunalahti v. Länsilinkki, District 
Court of Turku, No. 03/4556, 761/1, and Radio Nova v. Gramex, District Court of Helsinki, No. 
05/25107. 
846 See HAVU, K., KALLIOKOSKI, T., and WIKBERG, O., Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingonkorvaus, 
Edita, Helsinki, 2010, at p. 132. 
847 VPT v. Stora Enso, District Court of Imatra, No. 04/597. 
848 Qvist v. John Crane Safematic, District Court of Central-Finland, No. 05/561. 
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Finnish competition authority opening an investigation following a request by the 
claimants after they had faced significant obstacles in bringing the claims.849  
 
In Qvist v. John Crane Safematic the claimant invoked that some conditions introduced 
by the defendant into their distribution agreement regarding central oiling systems for 
different vehicles (in force between February 22nd, 2002 and December 31st, 2004) 
constituted an abuse of a dominant position, which restricted its possibilities of 
competing on the market and, therefore, resulted in lost profits, and infringed both the 
national and EU competition rules. According to the claimant, these conditions 
restricted it from determining its sale price, using components and oiling systems of 
competing brands, and selling central oiling systems to new vehicles without the 
authorization of John Crane Safematic.850  
 
The Finnish competition authority did not find that John Crane Safematic had a 
dominant position on the relevant market, and decided not to investigate the complaint 
due to the minor significance of the case (inter alia, because the competition restrictions 
did not significantly affect the workable competition in the sector, there were a number 
of undertakings offering the same services, and consumers also had a number of other 
competing brands to choose from). Nevertheless, in the reasoning of its decision, the 
Competition Authority stated that there had been an infringement of the then Article 4 
of the Competition Act due to resale price maintenance and Article 4 of the Competition 
Act which entered into force on May 1st 2004.851 It is important to note that the 
applicable national competition rules had changed (on May 1st, 2004) during the 
duration of the competition restrictions, which explains why the prohibition of active 
and passive sales was not found to constitute a breach of the Competition Act. Indeed, 
under the old Competition Act such a prohibition was only infringing the competition 
rules if it had harmful effects. In the assessment of the effects of the competition 
restriction, attention had to be paid to the effects of the conduct on the competition 
conditions in the whole sector/industry, and competition restrictions which did not 
849 See HAVU, K., KALLIOKOSKI, T., and WIKBERG, O., Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingonkorvaus, 
Edita, Helsinki, 2010, at p. 131. 
850 Qvist v. John Crane Safematic, District Court of Central-Finland, No. 05/561. 
851 Qvist v. John Crane Safematic, No. 139/61/2006, Decision of the Finnish Competition Authority of 
June 6th, 2008. 
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significantly reduce competition, but could be classified as minor, would not give cause 
to action by the competition authorities.852 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU were not applied 
to the case because the case was not found to be capable of having an appreciable effect 
on trade between Member States.853 
 
The defendant appealed this decision, but the Market Court rejected its appeal on the 
grounds that the appeal related to the reasoning of the decisions, not to the decision 
itself. It would only be possible to request an appeal of the reasoning if it were of 
particular significance for deciding the case at a later stage of the proceedings or in 
deciding another issue. The Market Court did not find this to be the case, since the 
reasoning of the decision by the Finish Competition Authority do not have a binding 
effect in other proceedings. As a result, the Market Court held that the decision in 
question had not settled the issue of whether or not the defendant had breached Section 
4 of the Competition Act, and the appeal had to be rejected.854  
 
As to the action for damages brought before the District Court of Jämsä, the Court 
rejected the claim that the conditions in the distribution agreement infringed Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU since the conduct was not considered to appreciably restrict trade 
between Member States due to only a minor part of the business activities of the 
claimants being of international nature. It also found that Section 4 of Competition Act 
1992 had not been breached as the distribution agreement had not been held by the 
Market Court to have harmful effects on competition. However, it held that Section 4 of 
the amended Competition Act had been breached between May 1st and December 31st, 
2004. Despite this, the claim for damages was rejected because the Court found that the 
claimant had not been able to prove that it had suffered any harm based on the 
competition infringement between May 1st and December 31, 2004.855 On appeal, the 
Vaasa Court of Appeal held that there had not been any infringement at all of the 
competition rules since in light of the evidence heard, the defendant had not fixed the 
852 This rule was modified by the Act Amending the Act on Competition Restrictions (318/2004) in order 
to bring the Finnish competition rules in line with the EU competition rules. 
853 Qvist v. John Crane Safematic, No. 139/61/2006, Decision of the Finnish Competition Authority of 
June 6th, 2008. 
854 The Finnish Market Court, Judgment of April 3rd, 4.2009, No. 351/08/KR. 
855 This period of the infringement was governed by the Act Amending the Act on Competition 
Restricitons (318/2004). 
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resale price, but the prices indicated by it had been used as guidelines in determining the 
offers, and the final price depended on a number of factors. Moreover, the Court found 
that the prohibition of passive sales had in turn not been applied in practice, and the 
prohibition on active sales had not had any significant effect on the competition on the 
market. It therefore rejected the damages action.856 
 
In another case initially brought as a stand-alone damages action, Vuoksen Paperituote 
v. Stora Enso, the claimant also filed a complaint before the Finnish Competition 
Authority regarding the conduct of the defendant. The claimant and the defendant had 
concluded a supply contract for paperboard rolls, according to which the claimants 
could purchase paperboard rolls from the defendant on the condition that it only used 
them in its own production, i.e. it was not allowed to resell them to third parties. When 
the claimant breached the contract, the defendant brought an action against it claiming 
compensation for the breach of contract. The claimant then raised a counter-claim 
demanding damages for the loss that it has suffered as a result of their agreement, which 
it claimed constituted an abuse of a dominant position. The District Court of Imatra 
requested a statement from the Finnish Competition Authority concerning the relevant 
competition law issues. The Authority held that Stora Enso did not have a dominant 
position, and there was also no evidence of any harmful effects on the workable market 
conditions, which the Court stated had a significant influence on its decision, and it 
found the statement more credible than statements made by two witnesses. 857 One 
possible conclusion from this case and Qvist v. John Crane Safematic is that the 
statements of the Finnish Competition Authority have a considerable influence on the 
outcome of antitrust damages actions,858 and without an infringement decision or its 
assistance, claimants face great hurdles in proving the existence of an infringement. 
 
In analyzing the possible obstacles to bringing antitrust damages actions in Finland, the 
issue of burden of proof and access to evidence is similar as in many other civil law 
jurisdictions, such as Sweden and Spain. The general rule is that the burden of proof lies 
856 Vaasa Court of Appeal, Judgment of December 9th, 2011, No. S 10/311. 
857 District Court of Imatra, Judgment of January 19th, 2007, No 04/597. 
858 See HAVU, K., KALLIOKOSKI, T., and WIKBERG, O., Kilpailuoikeudellinen vahingonkorvaus, 
Edita, Helsinki, 2010, at p. 140. 
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on the claimant,859 but if a party so requests, the courts may order another party to 
disclose a specified document, which the court considers relevant for deciding the 
case.860 The claimant must show that the person requested to disclose the document in 
question has it in its possession, and must state the allegation(s) which the document 
will be used to prove. It must be specified so accurately that the court can order its 
disclosure under the threat of a penalty payment. For instance, the type of the document 
must be identified, and the time when it was drafted must be indicated.861 Usually, 
injured parties, unless they have participated themselves in the competition 
infringement, are not likely to have such detailed information about the documents in 
the possession of the infringers and, therefore, in practice they will not easily be able to 
request disclosure of evidence. 
 
However, the situation of injured parties is facilitated somewhat by the Finnish Act on 
the Openness of Government Activities which allows access to the public to public 
documents held by the authorities.862 If the documents are secret or contain confidential 
information, access will be granted to part of the documents in question.863 Relying on 
these provisions, injured parties could obtain access to documents held by the Finnish 
Competition Authority related to an infringement case, except trade secrets and other 
confidential information. 
 
Once claimants have proved the existence of a competition infringement, they must also 
prove that it has caused them harm (i.e. the causal relationship) and the extent of the 
harm that they have suffered. This is often challenging in practice, especially for 
indirect purchasers. For instance, claimants bringing an action for damages caused by a 
cartel would have to show that the higher price that they have paid is actually a result of 
the cartel activity and not the market situation or market structure.864 There is no 
859 Chapter 17, Section 1(1) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734) as amended by law 571/1948. 
860 Chapter 17, Section 12(1) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734) as amended by law 571/1948. 
861 See KANNIAINEN, V., SARASTE, T. and TAMMELIN, K.: “Kartellivahingon ja sen määrän 
toteennäyttäminen vahingonkorvausoikeudenkäynnissä”, Defensor Legis No. 3/2006, p. 419-440, at p. 
426-427. 
862 Article 9 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities (621/1999). 
863 Article 10 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities (621/1999). 
864 See KANNIAINEN, V., SARASTE, T. and TAMMELIN, K.: “Kartellivahingon ja sen määrän 
toteennäyttäminen vahingonkorvausoikeudenkäynnissä”, Defensor Legis No. 3/2006, p. 419-440, at p. 
423. 
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express legal provision regarding the passing-on defense, but as damages should 
constitute full compensation, and may not result in unjust enrichment,865 passing-on 
seems to be accepted since if it were not, the claimant would be unjustly enriched. It is 
also very difficult to demonstrate the temporal and geographical scope of the cartel, and 
the scope of the product market covered by the cartel. 
 
Since October 2007, when the Act on Class Actions866 entered into force, collective 
actions are also in principle possible, but they are limited to the Consumer Ombudsman 
bringing a collective action on behalf of a group of consumers in mass consumer 
disputes between consumers and a trader867 when those matters come within the 
jurisdiction of the Consumer Ombudsman. The jurisdiction of the Consumer 
Ombudsman is wide, including disputes relating to the terms of an agreement between 
consumers and business undertakings. The Act on Class Actions is silent on matters 
related to antitrust infringements, so it would depend on each individual case whether it 
falls within the competence of the Consumer Ombudsman. But it would seem that the 
Consumer Ombudsman could bring an antitrust action on behalf of a group of 
consumers in civil matters between consumers and cartel members, or between 
consumers and an undertaking which has abused its dominant position on the market.868 
Nevertheless, to date, the Consumer Ombudsman has not brought any antitrust class 
actions.869 
 
Moreover, the claims of the consumers must be based on the same or similar 
circumstances, the hearing of the case as a class action must be expedient taking into 
account the size of the class, the subject-matter of the claims and the proof offered in it, 
and the class must be defined with adequate precision.870 The Finnish class action is 
based on an opt-in model, and the decision of the court is binding on the group members 
865 See ROUTAMO, E., STÅHLBERG, P. and KARHU, J., Suomen vahingonkorvausoikeus, Talentum 
Media Oy, Helsinki, 2006, at p. 371.  
866 Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
867 Section 1 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
868 See KANNIAINEN, V., SARASTE, T. and TAMMELIN, K.: “Kartellivahingon ja sen määrän 
toteennäyttäminen vahingonkorvausoikeudenkäynnissä”, Defensor Legis No. 3/2006, p. 419-440, at p. 
421.  
869 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 12. 
870 Section 2 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
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who have joined the action by sending a letter of accession to the group within the time 
limit set by the court871 and the court has designated as class members in its decision.872  
 
With regard to the group, it is not necessary to include the names and addresses of the 
group members already in the application for a summons. It rests on the court, before 
the summons is issued, to inform the parties by mail or electronically that the handling 
of the group action has been initiated, which judge is in charge of the preparation, and 
within what timeframe the notification to the group members must take place. It 
corresponds then to the plaintiff to notify the group members, who are known to him. If 
it is not possible to reach the group members by mail or electronically, it is also allowed 
to give notice of the group action in a newspaper or several newspapers or by using 
another appropriate means. The plaintiff must also notify the defendant about the group 
action.873  
 
All group members who have informed the plaintiff in writing about their desire to 
belong to the group within the prescribed time are considered group members. A group 
member may opt out from the group until the case is transferred to the main proceeding. 
After the main proceeding has been initiated, opt-out is only possible with the consent 
of the defendant.874  
 
Within one month from the expiration of the time for opting into the group, the plaintiff 
must submit a supplemented application for a summons to the court. This must include 
the names and addresses of the group members, their individualized claims and, if 
necessary, the specified grounds.875 The court then issues a summons requesting the 
defendant to submit his written rejoinder.876  
 
Alternatively, the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman may choose to bring a group claim 
before the Consumer Dispute Board, which is an independent expert out-of-court body 
871 Section 8 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
872 Section 16 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
873 Section 6 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
874 Section 15 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
875 Section 9 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
876 Section 10 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
222 
 
                                                 
whose activities are fully financed by the Finnish State.877 The conditions for submitting 
a group claim are that several consumers have the claims against the same trader and 
they may be solved by one single decision.878 The Consumer Ombudsman must define 
the group of consumers, for instance, to cover all consumers who have brought a 
defective consumer product.879 The group claim is an opt-out action in that it is possible 
for consumers to opt out if a more individual treatment is called for due to the higher 
economic loss which they have suffered. However, the decisions of the Consumer 
Dispute Board are only recommendations, so they cannot be enforced if the traders do 
not comply with them.880   
 
The threshold for bringing an action in Finland is generally high because the liability for 
costs in civil law matters is based on the principle of full compensation.881 This means 
that the losing party must bear all reasonable legal costs incurred by the necessary 
measures of the winning party.882 Moreover, if the claimant wins the case in the District 
Court but then loses in the Court of Appeal, he will be liable for also paying the costs of 
the other party incurred during the handling of the case in the District Court. The 
underlying idea behind the principle of full compensation of costs is that, in addition to 
other sanctions for not complying with one’s contractual or other obligations, the risk of 
having to fully bear the litigation costs of the other party would have a preventive effect 
of reducing disputes and ensuring the fulfillment of material law. However, as one 
commentator has pointed out, the effect in cases where the outcome is uncertain is that 
the threshold for bringing the action has risen considerably.883 
 
877 See CIVIC CONSULTING, “Country report Finland”, prepared by K. VIITANEN, 7.3.2008, at p. 9, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/fi-country-report-final.pdf. 
878 Section 4 of the Consumer Dispute Board Act. 
879 Government Bill 115/2006 on the Consumer Dispute Board Act, at p. 18. 
880 See CIVIC CONSULTING, “Country report Finland”, prepared by K. VIITANEN, 7.3.2008, at p. 11, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/fi-country-report-final.pdf. 
881 See VIITANEN, K., “Oikeudenkäyntikulut ja oikeuksien saatavuus”, Defensor Legis, 87, No 4, 2006, 
p. 614-632, at p. 620. 
882 Chapter 21, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure 4/1734, as amended by law 368/1999. 
883  See. VIITANEN, K., “Oikeudenkäyntikulut ja oikeuksien saatavuus”, Defensor Legis, 87, No 4, 2006, 
p. 614-632, at p. 621. 
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In order to mitigate the effects of the principle of full compensation, the cost rules were 
amended in 1999.884 Thus, if the legal issues of the case are so unclear that litigation by 
the losing party is justified, the court can decide that both parties must fully or partly 
bear their own litigation costs.885 The problem with this provision is that it is not 
applicable when the facts of the case are unclear, which arguably would frequently be 
the case in a claim for antitrust damages since the scope and amount of the damage are 
usually some of the most difficult issues to prove, in particular, when the claimant is an 
indirect purchaser. In addition, the court may ex officio reduce the amount that the party 
must pay if, taking into account the circumstances that gave cause to the litigation, the 
position of the parties, and the significance of the case, it would be very unreasonable to 
oblige the party to bear the costs of the opposing party.886 But since the provision is 
very ambiguous, and it will not be possible to predict whether or not the court in 
question will apply it in a concrete case, its significance will, in practice, probably not 
be important.887  
 
Contingency fees are allowed, but they are seldom used, at least as the sole basis for 
calculating the legal fee. Instead, lawyers’ fees in cases involving litigation in court are 
usually charged using hourly fees. This is due to the fact that the value of claims in 
disputes are usually so low that the percentage of the lawyer’s contingency fee would 
have to be considerably high compared to the value of the claim before a contingency 
fee system would be economically attractive from the lawyer’s point of view. What is 
more, the use of contingency fees would only liberate the losing party from paying the 
fee to his counsel but he would still be responsible for bearing the costs of the winning 
party. In addition, legal aid does not, in principle, cover costs that have been ordered to 
be paid to the opposing party and, therefore, does not foster the use of contingency 
fees.888  
 
884 Ibid., at p. 621. 
885 Chapter 21, Section 8a of the Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734). 
886 Chapter 21, Section 8b of the Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734). 
887 See VIITANEN, K., “Oikeudenkäyntikulut ja oikeuksien saatavuus”, Defensor Legis, 87, No 4, 2006, 
p. 614-632, at p. 622. 
888 See VIITANEN, K., “Oikeudenkäyntikulut ja oikeuksien saatavuus”, Defensor Legis, 87, No 4, 2006, 
p. 614-632, at p. 616-620. 
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As to damages, under Section 20 of the new Competition Act, the compensation for loss 
shall cover compensation for the expenses, price difference, lost profits and other direct 
or indirect economic loss resulting from the competition restriction. The damages are 
therefore limited to economic loss. Punitive damages are not available. If the claimant 
has participated in the antitrust violation, this can be taken into account in calculating 
the amount of the damages.889 Civil courts also have the power to assess a reasonable 
amount of damages if no evidence is available or if evidence can only be presented with 
difficulty,890 which should somewhat facilitate the bringing of antitrust damages 
actions. 
 
Infringers are in principle jointly and severally liable for the damage caused by an 
antitrust violation. But if a person has not been rendered liable in full damages, he must 
only pay the amount of the award he is liable for.891 The liability in damages must be 
allocated depending on “the guilt apparent in each person liable, the possible benefit 
accruing from the event and other circumstances”.892 Anybody who has paid damages 
beyond his allocated share has a right to contribution from the other infringers liable for 
the damages paid on their behalf. However, if a person liable for damage is insolvent or 
his whereabouts are unknown, the other infringers must compensate for their share of 
the shortfall.893 
 
The limitation period for bringing antitrust damages claims has been clarified by the 
new Competition Act. For stand-alone actions, the claims must be brought within ten 
years of the date on which the violation occurred, or within ten years of the date on 
which a continuous infringement ended. For follow-on actions, the limitation period 
cannot expire until one year has passed from the date that the decision finding an 
antitrust violation becomes final.894 These limitations period are therefore in line with 
the minimum limitation period laid down in the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions 
(and even more generous for stand-alone actions). Importantly, the new limitation 
889 Chapter 6, Section 1 of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974). 
890 Chapter 17, Section 6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734 (as amended by law 571/1948)). 
891 Chapter 6, Section 2 of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974). 
892 Chapter 6, Section 3(1) of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974). 
893 Chapter 6, Section 3(2) of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974). 
894 Section 20(3) of the Competition Act (948/2011). 
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periods no longer start to run from the date on which the business undertaking was 
informed or should have been informed of the occurrence of the harm, which is not 
always easy to determine,895 as could be seen in the first claims for damages related to 
the Timber Cartel which were decided in March 2014. 
 
3.7.2. Main Obstacles to Private Enforcement 
There is very limited case law on antitrust damages actions in Finland. Some of the 
obstacles can be explained by the previous legal framework. For instance, the previous 
Competition Act only provided for an express legal basis for competitors and other 
undertakings to bring antitrust damages actions,896 which made it more difficult for 
consumers and other non-business undertakings to bring a claim for damages, since they 
had to resort to general tort law. As a result, they had also to justify that there was an 
especially weighty reason for compensating economic loss.897 Therefore, this distinction 
between different categories of claimants constituted an additional obstacle for non-
business undertakings bringing a damages action. This distinction was not justified 
taking into account especially the fact that competitors and other undertakings that have 
suffered loss as a result of an antitrust violation can pass on the overcharge to their 
customers, whereas consumer have to bear the whole loss themselves. In fact, 
consumers usually suffer the most from antitrust violations either by the higher prices 
that they must pay to the infringers, or indirectly if other undertakings that have suffered 
harm as a result of an antitrust violation pass on their losses to the consumers.898 
 
The new Competition Act will reduce some of the obstacles for those competition 
infringements which have been committed after the new act entered into force in 
November 2011. Most importantly, consumers can now rely on the specific legal basis 
laid down in Section 20 of the Competition Act, and no longer need to prove the 
existence of an especially weighty reason in order to claim compensation for economic 
loss. Moreover, uncertainty about the limitation periods has been reduced by stipulating 
895 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 12. 
896 Section 18a of the Competition Act (318/2004). 
897 Chapter 5, Section 1 of the Tort Liability Act (412/1974). 
898 Comment by the Nordic Consumer Ombudsmen to the Commission Green Paper on “Damages 
Actions for Breach of the Community Competition Rules” as laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC 
COM(2005) 672 final, Brussels, 19.12.2005, at p. 1. 
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more exactly from which moment the limitation period will start to run. By providing 
for a new limitation period for follow-on actions, injured parties should in such cases in 
principle be able to bring their claim within the limitation period. However, for 
competition infringements which were committed before the new Competition Act 
entered into force, the former limitation period may remain problematic as case law has 
shown because of uncertainty about the moment from which the claimant can be 
considered to have had sufficient knowledge about its claim. 
 
Another factor explaining the lack of antitrust damages claims brought by consumers is 
that the Finnish class action can only be brought by the Consumer Ombudsman for a 
group which can be determined in advance, and the Consumer Ombudsman has not 
brought any antitrust class actions to date. This indicates that consumers do not have an 
effective remedy to claim damages. On the other hand, it is true that group claims 
before the Consumer Dispute Board could be a possibility since it is based on the opt-
out model. However, it is problematic that the Board only issues recommendations, so 
the incentives of infringers to follow those recommendations are debatable. Another 
difficulty could be that the Consumer Dispute Board might not have the sufficient 
expertise in competition law and in assessing economic evidence required in order to 
prove the harm and in particular to quantify it.   
 
Access to evidence as well as the difficulties in proving the causal relationship between 
the infringement and the harm suffered, constitute the main obstacles to antitrust 
damages actions in Finland. The possibility of requiring the infringer to disclose 
documents in its possession proving the existence of a competition infringement is also 
limited because the documents have to be accurately specified, including the time when 
the documents was drafted.899  
 
Due to the prohibition of unjust enrichment, the claimant must demonstrate exactly 
what part of the overcharge resulting from the antitrust violation has been passed on to 
the next level in the distribution chain, and ultimately to him. Therefore, it is very 
899 See Chapter 17, Section 12(1) of the Code of Judicial Procedure (4/1734) as amended by law 
571/1948, and KANNIAINEN, V., SARASTE, T. and TAMMELIN, K.: “Kartellivahingon ja sen määrän 
toteennäyttäminen vahingonkorvausoikeudenkäynnissä”, Defensor Legis No. 3/2006, p. 419-440, at p. 
426-427. 
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challenging for others than direct purchasers to meet the burden of proof in order to 
bring damages actions. Even more difficult is it for consumers, because they usually 
have less of resources to defend their interests and are at the bottom of the distribution 
chain. It is thus particularly challenging for them to prove the causal relationship. 
 
Follow-on actions are the most realistic possibility of consumers bringing damages 
claims, although in practice due to the often limited individual amount of harm suffered, 
even follow-on actions would only be viable if they were brought as class actions 
allowing for sharing the costs of the action and pooling the evidence and information 
available to the whole group. The lack of opt-out collective actions coupled with low 
incentives and high risks in the form of legal costs and risks as well as the high burden 
of proof explain why only undertakings and municipalities have brought damages 
claims.  
 
In general, also undertakings have had to resort follow-on damages actions. The only 
few actions initially brought as stand-alone actions ultimately had to be stayed in order 
to wait for the Finnish Competition Authority to consider the matter and issue a 
statement. The role of the competition authority seems to be significant as courts tend to 
give more value to its statements than other type of evidence brought in the case.900 
Consequently, under the existing system, its involvement either in the form of an 
infringement decision or as amicus curiae appear to be a prerequisite for the claimant to 
overcome at least some of the initial hurdles in bringing a claim for damages. There are 
also numerous follow-actions in the making relating to the Timber Cartel Case which 
implies that there will be an increase in private enforcement.901 However, again the 
claimants are municipalities, and actions by consumers are not to be expected.  
 
3.8. Conclusions 
In spite of the established Union right to damages for antitrust violations and an 
increase in antitrust damages actions brought in the past years, the number of actions 
brought in the EU is still comparatively low. There has been some development 
regarding the types of actions brought. In 2006, the Impact Study found that although 
900 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 13. 
901 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 1. 
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the situation seemed to be somewhat better with respect to actions based on vertical 
restraints and abuses of dominance, the former type of actions did not usually result in 
damages being awarded, and the latter tended to be successful only in approximately 
half of the cases. It also found that especially damages actions based on hardcore cartels 
were seldom brought, and were often not successful.902 However, the more recent 
AHRC Research Project on Competition Law: “Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-20122” found that the relative success rate for 
damages across the EU during the research period was relatively high, amounting to 
45.5%, if both successfully and successfully actions are considered together.903 But the 
success rate in a particular case will vary depending on in which jurisdiction it is 
brought. The scarcity of antitrust damages actions is common for some of the Member 
States, which are the object of the analysis in this thesis, particularly Finland and 
Sweden, although there have recently been a number of follow-on actions. In addition, a 
number of other Member States seem to be facing similar obstacles.904 Also Member 
States where antitrust actions are brought fairly frequently, such as the United Kingdom 
and Germany, damages are seldom awarded in hardcore cartels,905 and actions are rarely 
brought by consumers.906 Finally, Impact Assessment Report on Damages Actions of 
2013 has found that follow-on actions based on Commission Decisions are concentrated 
to only seven Member States.907 
 
It is particularly striking that damages actions are not often brought by victims of 
hardcore cartels. It is understandable that this type of damages claims are not brought as 
stand-alone actions, as it is already difficult for competition authorities, which have 
wide powers of inspection at their disposal to detect these secret agreements. Therefore, 
it is virtually impossible for victims of cartel agreements to adduce sufficient evidence 
to prove the infringement and the damage that they have suffered as a result of it. But, 
902 See Impact Study, at p. 38-40. 
903 See RODGER, B.J., (ed.), Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress 
across the EU, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2014, at p. 154. 
904 E.g. Poland, the Czech Republic and Malta. See RODGER, B.J., (ed.), Competition Law Comparative 
Private Enforcement and Collective Redress across the EU, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2014, 
at p. 126. 
905 See Sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
906 See RODGER, B.J., (ed.), Competition Law Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress 
across the EU, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2014, at p. 300. 
907 Impact Assessment Report on Damages Actions, at p. 19. 
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in the light of the numerous Commission Decisions between 200-2012908 imposing 
fines on cartel members, one would imagine that follow-on actions for damages would 
be more frequent, especially since the claimant could refer to the Commission Decision 
in order to establish the existence of an infringement of the EU competition rules. 
 
One explanation for this is that many potential actions for damages are settled. This 
appears to be quite common especially in the United Kingdom,909 but damages claims 
are also settled in other Member States.910 But the most plausible explanation is that too 
many obstacles to bringing antitrust damages actions currently exist in the Member 
States. The Commission Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules listed numerous of them which existed at that time. Based on the brief analysis in 
this thesis of the situation in the United Kingdom, Germany, France Spain, Sweden and 
Finland, one could highlight a few of them which still seem to be problematic. High 
legal costs and the uncertainty of the outcome of the action seem to serve as 
disincentives to bring damages claims. The burden of proof is high, requiring claimants 
not only to establish the infringement of the competition rules and demonstrate the 
causal relationship between the infringement and the harm that they have suffered as a 
result of it, but also to quantify the exact amount of damage suffered. This could be 
particularly demanding in cases involving price-fixing for intermediary products if the 
injured parties are indirect purchasers.  As access to evidence is, in general, limited – 
except in the United Kingdom911 were discovery rules considerably alleviate this task – 
most claimants are probably deterred from initiating proceedings, since the proceedings 
are often lengthy and costly, and the claimants may lack both financial resources and 
the expertise required to bring an antitrust damages claim. 
 
For consumers, in particular those who usually have comparatively small claims in 
comparison to the potential high cost, the task is virtually impossible and stand-alone 
actions are unthinkable. But also small and medium-sized undertakings might face the 
908 See Statistics on cartel cases decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf. 
909 See RODGER, B.J., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law, the Hidden Story: Competition 
Litigation Settlements in the United Kingdom, 2000-2005”, E.C.L.R., Volume 29, Issue 2, 2008, p. 96-
116, at p. 97. 
910 See, for instance, the cases of Sweden and Finland in Sections 3.6 and 3.7. 
911 Also Ireland has more generous discovery rules than those in the civil law jurisdictions. 
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same hurdles, especially in situations where they are indirect purchasers and would be 
required to show the exact amount of the overcharge that has been passed on to them. 
Consequently, for consumers and small and medium-sized businesses it would be 
important to be able to bring a collective action together with other victims in order to 
reduce the costs and risks of the action, and to actually have an incentive to bring a 
claim.  
 
But the availability of collective actions in the EU leaves much to wish for. Of the six 
Member States analyzed in this thesis, only the United Kingdom912 and France913 
expressly provide for representative actions/collective actions for damages based on a 
breach of the national or the EU competition rules. Nevertheless, these actions can only 
be brought as follow-on actions (although the new collective action in the UK will also 
be possible as a stand-alone action), after a decision by the European Commission or the 
national competition authority establishing the infringement in question. Furthermore, 
these actions are limited to consumers, even though soon SMEs will also be able to 
bring collective actions in the United Kingdom.914 It is also important to note that the 
French collective action may only be brought by French consumer associations,915 
which impedes other consumer associations from bring a collective action on behalf of 
consumers from different Member States in France. 
 
In principle, Sweden also provides for a potentially extensive collective action, a so-
called private group action, which can either be brought by a natural person or a legal 
person on behalf of the affected group. What makes this type of action attractive, at 
least in theory, is that it is possible to use a modified version of contingency fees, a so-
called risk-agreement, to bring the action. However, the group action is based on the 
opt-in model, and so far no such actions have been brought in order to claim 
compensation for antitrust violations. 
 
912 Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998. 
913 Articles L. 423-1 and L. 423-17 of the Consumer Act. 
914 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 31. 
915 Articles L. 423-1 of the Consumer Act. 
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Although there is no specific collective action for antitrust claims in Spain, consumer 
(and user) associations could bring collective actions for damages caused by an 
infringement of the competition rules. Furthermore, if the members of the affected 
group are identified or are easily identifiable, also the affected group can bring 
collective actions for damages.916 It is possible to advertise the claim in order to locate 
all injured parties, if they are not identified or easily identified.917 If the injured parties 
are identified or can easily be identified, the claimant has the obligation of informing 
that he has filed the claim to all those parties that may be interested in joining the 
action.918  
 
However, the problem with the Spanish collective action is, first, that any award is 
made with respect to each individual claimant, and not the whole group, so each 
claimant must apply to the court in order to be recognized as a member of the group and 
for individual damages to be quantified.919 If the claim is very small, the claimant might 
not bother to take the steps necessary to join the action because it is often difficult to 
calculate the exact amount of the damage that he has suffered. Instead, it would be 
preferable to be able to bring the action as an opt-out action and once the liability and 
total harm caused have been established, proceed to identifying the individual claimants 
and their quantum. Second, the collective action is only available to consumers, which 
makes it difficult especially for small and medium-sized companies to enforce their 
rights if they have been victims of an antitrust violation. 
 
The Finnish collective action is even more limited since it can only be brought by the 
Consumer Ombudsman for a group determinable in advance.920 Finally, in Germany, 
collective actions are limited to applying for injunctions or to order the infringers to 
transfer their illegal proceeds to the Treasury, and damages claims may thus not be 
brought under such actions.921 But a German court has allowed several claims to be 
916 Article 11 of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
917 Article 15(3) of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
918 Article 15(2) of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
919 See National Report on Spain prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages 
in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 7. 
920 Section 1 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
921 Section 34a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
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bundled into one legal person by allowing the Belgian company, Cartel Damage Claims 
SA, to bring in its name damages claims that it had bought from several customers, who 
had allegedly been harmed by the concrete cartel.922 So this could sometimes be an 
alternative for numerous injured parties to bring their claim, but it is limited to 
situations where their costs will be lower than the expected damages awards, so again 
consumers are not likely to benefit from this type of action.923 
 
The current situation in the EU regarding collective actions is fairly unsatisfactory. In 
practice this means that the potentially only truly effective redress mechanism for 
consumers harmed by an antitrust violation is not generally an alternative since the 
existing collective actions have many flaws. In those jurisdictions where such actions 
are available, they are seldom brought and their success is very limited as experience 
from the six jurisdictions studied show. The opt-in model is insufficient in many cases 
as the group of claimants tends to be too small for the action to pay off, and leads to 
administrative complexity and high costs. 
 
Spanish law has provided for collective actions for almost ten years, but so far only one 
collective action for antitrust damages has been brought. This would imply that either 
there is no need for a collective action for victims of antitrust violations, or the action is 
not sufficiently efficient for claimants to make use of it. The first explanation is unlikely 
because, as has been seen in the section on Spain, there have been, and still are, several 
obstacles to private enforcement in Spain, which make it challenging in particular for 
consumers to bring an action for damages. Until the DISA ruling only follow-on actions 
were possible for breaches of the EU competition rules, and stand-alone actions based 
on the Spanish competition rules have been permitted only since the new Competition 
Law 15/2007 entered into force. These restrictions made the process of bringing a 
damages claim even longer (e.g. the various proceedings in Antena 3 lasted 15 years in 
total!), so it is not surprising that harmed consumers have not attempted to bring a 
collective action for damages. 
 
922 See THOMAS, S., “De facto class action for cartel damages in Germany? A German Court rules on 
procedural key issues for cartel damages suits (Cartel Damage Claims SA), e-Competitions, February 
2007-II, No 13224. This would also be possible under Finnish law. 
923 See WAGNER, G, “Collective redress – categories of loss and legislative options”, L.Q.R., 127(Jan), 
2011, p. 55-82, at p. 75. 
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Similarly, in Finland, until November 2011, when the new Competition Act entered into 
force, consumers could not benefit from the specific legal basis for bringing antitrust 
damages actions, but had to rely on the general tort rules, which would require them in 
addition to demonstrate the existence of especially weighty reasons in order to claim 
compensation for economic loss. This additional requirement therefore added to the 
other existing obstacles to bringing antitrust damages claims in the first place. 
 
Apart from the lack of effective collective actions, there are also other reasons 
explaining why consumers do not often bring antitrust damages actions. Consumers are 
not necessarily aware that they have been victims of a cartel, because cartels are 
normally secret and detecting and proving their existence is demanding even for public 
enforcers of competition rules despite their wide powers of investigation. Since access 
to evidence for private litigants is limited and the burden of proof is high, proving the 
existence of an anti-competitive conduct is very difficult. For instance, in Spain the 
obligation to quantify damages and the unwillingness of courts to award compensation 
for the loss of profit renders private antitrust litigation complicated. Furthermore, the 
risk of losing, associated with the obligation to pay the costs of litigation of the other 
party, serve as disincentives for claimants with small damages claims to initiate 
proceedings. In other words, it would seem that there should be a need for a collective 
action that would reduce the costs and risks of litigation and make economies of scale 
possible. 
 
Consequently, one could assume that the reason why collective actions have not been 
used is, at least partly, that it is not perceived as an efficient redress mechanism among 
consumers and that consumer associations either do not have any interest in pursuing 
antitrust damages actions, or that they simply do not have the required expertise and 
resources. Finally, as in most jurisdictions only consumer and user associations and/or 
affected groups of consumers can bring a collective action for damages, competitors and 
other undertakings, which could have a better knowledge of the existence of 
competition infringements and of competition rules, are barred from bringing such an 
action.  
 
Another possible explanation suggested at least as far as Sweden is concerned, is that 
the possibility of claiming injunctions would be sufficient to address the problem in that 
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it addresses the anti-competitive conduct. Such claims for injunctions may be brought 
before the Market Court once the Swedish Competition Authority has decided not to 
proceed with an investigation. It has been concluded that since follow-on actions for 
damages have not been brought after the Market Court has found an infringement 
resulting in an injunction, there might not be a particular need for damages.924 Another 
possible reading is, however, that at least in some cases damages claims have not been 
brought due to the challenges in bring such actions. Moreover, applications for 
injunctions have been brought by other undertakings, not consumers. 
 
But since a number of Member States have in the past decade introduced collective 
actions and have envisaged improving those actions, it would nonetheless appear as 
there would be a political will to enhance the redress mechanisms of victims of antitrust 
violations. Germany is the only Member State that excluded the possibility of bringing 
collective damages actions when it amended its Competition Act, probably because it 
feared that this would result in excessive litigation and unmeritorious claims being 
brought. Even in its latest amendments to the German Competition Act, consumer 
associations were only given power to request injunctions or the transfer of illegal 
profits to the Treasury.925 But, for instance, the Spanish and Swedish experience has 
shown that these fears are not necessarily justified. 
 
Another common theme in light of the analysis of the six Member States is the high 
costs and risks of bringing antitrust damages actions. The “loser pays” rule applies in all 
jurisdictions, although some courts (e.g. the CAT) have more discretion in deciding on 
the allocation of the costs of the proceedings. More flexible cost rules are also available 
for certain types of claims (e.g. antitrust damages claims in Germany if the financial 
situation of the claimant would otherwise impede him from bringing a meritorious 
action).926 There are still also a number of limitations on the use of contingency fees, 
although increasingly more Member States seem to be willing to allow them in certain 
cases. 
 
924 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHRC Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 9. 
925 Section 34a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
926 Section 89a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
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Coupled with limited possibilities of ordering disclosure of documents/information in 
the possession of the other party or third parties, the only realistic possibility of bringing 
an antitrust damages action would often be a follow-on action. Again, consumers would 
need an effective collective action even in most of these cases. It is acknowledged that 
in some jurisdictions stand-alone actions appear to be more common, but they are 
usually brought based on the abuse of a dominant position or vertical restraints.  
 
All of the above is likely to explain why – despite an increase in the past 5-10 years – 
damages claims are still not often brought successfully and why they are hardly brought 
at all by consumers. A common solution to make the enforcement of the Union right to 
damages effective is therefore required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
PART II: THE FLAWS AND MISSING PIECES OF THE CURRENT 
REFORM 
4. DIRECTIVE ON ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS
4.1. Background and General Overview 
The Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions proposed by the Commission in June 
2013 was rather different from the unpublished Failed Draft Directive of 2009 and the 
measures proposed in the White Paper on Antirust Damages Actions. This is likely 
partly explained by the reactions of stakeholders to the Failed Draft Directive, and 
probably by lobbying on the part of businesses. It is recalled that some of the measures 
(e.g. collective actions) excluded from the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions were already criticized in the consultation on the White Paper, although they 
were included in the Failed Draft Directive. Also, it should not be forgotten that the 
Competition Commissioner changed in 2010 (Commissioner Joaquín Almunia replaced 
Commissioner Neelie Kros), which might have had an influence on the final draft. 
Moreover, as will be analyzed below, the Draft Directive proposed by the Commission 
has also been subject to a number of amendments in the European Parliament. The 
Parliament adopted the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions on April 17th 2014 after 
negotiating its content with the Council, but the Directive still requires the final 
approval of the Council. Given that the Directive has to be adopted in the ordinary 
legislative procedure, the will of both the Parliament and the Council has shaped its 
content. 
In comparing the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions to the Failed Draft 
Directive, the aim of the former is to ensure the effective enforcement of the EU 
competition rules by optimizing the interaction between public and private enforcement 
of competition law and ensuring that victims of EU antitrust violations can obtain full 
compensation for the harm that they have suffered.927 It therefore highlights the 
compensatory function of antitrust damages actions, an approach for which the Failed 
Draft Directive had already found practically full support amongst stakeholders. But the 
Failed Draft Directive did recognize that more effective damages actions would also 
927 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, at p. 2-3. 
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result in a deterrent effect.928 Conversely, measures having a clearer potential deterrent 
effect, such as opt-out class actions and punitive damages, have been excluded from the 
new Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, which demonstrates that the Union 
legislator does not intend antitrust damages actions to specifically pursue an objective 
of deterrence. Moreover, after the amendments introduced by the European Parliament, 
the specific objectives of the Directive include the establishment of rules concerning 
damages actions for infringements of EU competition law in order to ensure the full 
effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and the proper functioning of the internal market 
for undertakings and consumers.929  
 
As to the scope and specific measures proposed, the Failed Draft Directive contained 
provisions relating to collective redress, disclosure of evidence, passing-on defense, 
effect of national decisions, fault, and limitation periods. Conversely, the Draft 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions proposed by the Commission specifically 
stated that it should not require the Member States to introduce collective redress 
mechanisms for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.930 Similarly, it did not 
contain any rules on the fault requirement. It also modified the rules suggested in the 
Failed Draft Directive relating to disclosure of evidence, passing-on defense, effect of 
national decisions, and limitation periods,931 which have further been amended by the 
Parliament in the first reading of the Draft Directive.932 On the other hand, the Directive 
on Antitrust Damages Actions includes provisions regarding consensual dispute 
resolution, something which was not foreseen by the Failed Draft Directive. 933 
 
Moreover, the harmonized rules will not only apply to damages actions for breaches of 
EU competition rules, but also breaches of national competition rules when they are 
928 Explanatory Memorandum on the Failed Draft Directive, at p. 3-4. 
929 Recital 49 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
930 Recital 11 of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
931 These modifications will be examined in the following sections of this chapter. 
932 See the amended text available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0089+002-002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
933 It only highlighted the usefulness of consensual dispute resolution and that parties on behalf of which 
representative actions are brought should be able to effectively use them. See Recital 10 of the Failed 
Draft Directive. 
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applied in parallel with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.934 The Commission justified this 
modification by the need for legal certainty and a level playing field in the internal 
market, which requires that the same rules must apply to breaches of EU competition 
rules and national competition rules if these rules are applied in parallel.935 This 
extended scope has implications for the legal basis of the Directive.  
 
The Failed Draft Directive was based on Article 103 TFEU [ex Article 83 EC] as its 
objective was to give effect to the principles laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
by defining the relationship between national rules on civil liability and the application 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This was considered necessary because the unequal 
level of judicial protection of the Union right to damages for antitrust violations 
between Member States despite the fact that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are public 
order rules that affect trade between Member States and the functioning of the internal 
market and the competitive environment for undertakings.936 Measures at Union level 
were deemed necessary since individual initiatives at national level could increase the 
existing differences and the negative effects of forum shopping, as well as result in 
unequal protection for victims. The proposal was considered to comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity937 as its objectives could not be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States. Similarly, it was deemed to only include the measures necessary to 
comply with its objective (i.e. ensuring effective redress for obtaining full compensation 
of victims) and imposing costs on undertakings and citizens proportionate with this 
objective, thereby also complying with the principle of proportionality.938 
 
However, the Failed Draft Directive did not take into account situations in which the 
conduct constitutes a breach of both EU competition rules and national competition 
rules. In such cases, a damages claim relating to the same conduct could be brought on 
the basis of EU competition law as well as national competition law. This situation has 
nevertheless been taken into account in the new Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions, which is based both on Articles 103 and 114 TFEU. The Commission has 
934 Recital 10 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
935 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, at p. 10. 
936 Ibid., at p. 5-6. 
937 Article 5(3) TEU. 
938 Explanatory Memorandum on the Failed Draft Directive, at p. 6. 
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justified this dual legal basis by the fact that the Directive pursues two objectives: 
giving effect to the principles laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and ensuring a 
more level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market, as well as 
facilitating the enforcement by citizens and undertakings of rights derived from the 
internal market.939 Given that the Directive will also alter the applicable national rules 
concerning the right to bring damages actions for infringements of national competition 
rules when they are applied in parallel to the EU antitrust rules and therefore goes 
beyond giving effect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, Article 103 TFEU alone was not 
deemed as the proper legal basis for the Directive, but it had also to be based on Article 
114 TFEU.940 The Parliament and Council did not change the legal bases for the 
Directive, but it has been adopted based on Articles 103 and 114 TFEU according to the 
ordinary legislative procedure.941 
 
As to the correctness of the legal bases chosen, it should first be noted that Article 103 
TFEU indeed empowers the Council to lay down the appropriate regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Although the provision does not expressly provide for the harmonization of national 
procedural rules, an extensive interpretation of it based on the need for an effective and 
more efficient application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the European Union would 
be justified since the private enforcement of the prohibitions laid down in these articles 
is currently not as effective as would be desirable.942 Given the need for an increased 
effect of these provisions by means of a legislative instrument at Union level, the 
adoption of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions on the basis of Article 103 
TFEU is justified. 
 
Second, it has to be analysed whether the Directive had to be adopted based on both 
Articles 103 and 114 TFEU since it also harmonizes certain national rules concerning 
the right to bring damages actions for infringements of national competition rules when 
939 Recital 49 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
940 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, at p. 10. 
941 Although formal acceptance by the Council is still required, the content of the Directive is the result of 
negotiations between the Council and the European Parliament. 
942 See also Chapter Three of the thesis regarding the obstacles to private enforcement in the Member 
States. 
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the infringement affects trade between Member States and those national rules are 
applied in parallel to the EU competition rules. The Commission contended in its 
proposal that the aim of the Directive is also wider than giving effect to Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU because it aims to address the uneven playing field for antitrust damages 
actions, which are the result of discrepancies between national rules and make 
undertakings subject to different levels of risk of being held liable for antitrust 
violations depending on in which Member State they are established. Therefore, without 
harmonizing the rules applicable to breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and 
national competition rules when they are applied in parallel to the EU rules, the current 
situation risks to lead to an appreciable distortion of the the internal market.943  
 
Admittedly, the harmonization of the national rules concerning the right to bring 
damages actions for infringements of national competition rules goes beyond merely 
giving effect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, although the issue is closely link to the 
need to apply the same rules in the same procedure in order to ensure legal certainty. 
However, it must be borne in mind that Article 114 TFEU is a residual provision and, 
hence, may only be applied when there are no other, more specific Treaty provisions 
that could serve as a legal basis. If there is a doubt with respect to which one of two 
possible legal bases is the correct legal basis, the Court of Justice has held that regard 
should be had to the nature, aim, and content of the act in question.944 If the measure 
would still be concerned with several areas of the Treaty, the measure in question might 
have to satisfy the requirements of two Treaty Articles.945  
 
The use of Article 114 TFEU is also limited to situations where its objective is indeed 
the elimination of competition distortions. In other words, the adopted measure must 
genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Conversely, the mere finding of disparities between 
national rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms or of distortions of competition due to those disparities is not sufficient.946 
943 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, at p. 9-10. 
944 See for instance Judgment in Commission v Council, C-300/89, EU:C:1991:244, paragraph 10 and 
CRAIG, P. and DE BÚRCA, G., EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 5th edition, Oxford, 2011, at p. 590.  
945 Judgment in Commission v Council, C-165/87, EU:C:1988:458.  
946 Judgment in Germany v European Parliament and Council, C-376/98, EU:C:2000:544, paragraph 84. 
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The measure adopted must thus in fact pursue the objectives stated by the Union 
legislature,947 and any distortion of competition must be appreciable.948  
 
Given the current discrepancies between national rules governing antitrust damages 
actions, when an anti-competitive conduct has effect on trade between Member States, 
the outcome of a damages action related to that infringement will vary depending on in 
which Member State the claim is brought. Common rules are therefore a necessity in 
order to achieve a level playing field in the EU. Moreover, if national competition rules 
are applied in parallel to the EU antitrust rules to the conduct in question, but only the 
rules applicable to a damages action based on EU competition law are harmonized, the 
same action would be subject to different procedural rules in cases of parallel 
application of the EU and national competition rules, which would complicate the 
examination of the case and jeopardize legal certainty. This would infringe the principle 
of equal treatment, since claimants and defendants who are in a similar situation should 
be treated in a similar manner regardless of whether EU or national law is being applied, 
if their content is essentially the same.949 In addition, the discrepancies concerning rules 
governing antitrust damages actions are significant: by way of example, some Member 
States provide for collective actions for damages while others do not.950 Similarly, some 
legal systems provide for “pre-trial discovery”, whereas in other legal systems the 
claimant must present evidence of the competition infringement without having access 
to this means rendering it much more difficult for it to prove the infringement and to 
obtain compensation for the loss that it has suffered.951 Undertakings in countries where 
the procedural conditions governing antitrust damages actions make it more difficult for 
victims to obtain damages might also be encouraged to continue their anti-competitive 
practices, thus distorting the competition in the internal market. 
947 Judgment in Germany v European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2000:544, paragraph 85. 
948 Judgment in Germany v European Parliament and Council, EU:C:2000:544, paragraph 106. 
949 See VAN GERVEN, W., “Substantive Remedies for the Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Rules 
Before National Courts”, in EHLERMANN, C-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European Competition 
Policy Annual: 2001 Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003, 
p. 53-89, at p. 81-82. Especially the content of Article 101 TFEU and its national equivalents has largely 
been approximated in the last decade following the modernization of the EU competition rules. 
950  For instance, the United Kingdom, France and Italy do, while Germany does not. See Section 2.2. 
951 For instance, in the United Kingdom, parties have a general disclosure obligation which covers 
documents that they are relying on or which are either supporting or adversely affecting their case. See 
Civil Procedure Rules 1998 r. 31.6. On the contrary, for example the German Code of Civil Procedure 
does not contain any such general pre-trial discovery. 
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 It is consequently evident that one of the objectives of the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions is genuinely to eliminate appreciable distortions of competition in the 
internal market and to remove obstacles to its proper functioning. Considering its 
second objective of giving effect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, for which there is a 
more specific legal basis in the Treaty – but which is not appropriate to serve as a legal 
basis for the harmonization of national competition rules – it can be concluded that the 
legal bases of the directive are justified. 
 
4.2. Disclosure of Evidence 
4.2.1. Scope of and Limits on the Disclosure Obligation 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions provides for a minimum level of 
disclosure of evidence under certain circumstances,952 which will signify a modification 
of the existing legislation on access to evidence in most Member States. The initial 
provision proposed by the Commission was essentially the same (with some minor 
modifications) as what the Failed Draft Directive provided. However, the disclosure 
obligation has been significantly amended during the ordinary legislative procedure, as 
will be explained below. 
 
The Failed Draft Directive proposed disclosure of evidence building on the approach 
adopted in Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights,953 
which was designed to guarantee in all Member States a minimum level of effective 
access in antitrust damages actions to the evidence necessary to prove the claims of 
victims of antitrust violations.954 The victim was to first present reasonably available 
facts and evidence demonstrating plausible grounds for having suffered harm as a result 
of an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU by the defendant.955 It was considered 
not to create excessively costly disclosure obligations in the form of undue burdens for 
the parties concerned and risks of abuse. In order to respect the different legal traditions 
952 Article 5 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
953 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30.4.2004, p. 45–86. 
954 Explanatory Memorandum of the Failed Draft Directive, at p. 7. 
955 Article 7(1) of the Failed Draft Directive. Also the defendants were to be given the right to disclosure 
of evidence in antitrust damages actions. 
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of the Member States, the Failed Draft Directive required an order by a judge to impose 
the disclosure of evidence held by the other party or third parties, and subjected the 
disclosure obligation to strict and active judicial control with regard to its necessity, 
scope and proportionality. The aim was to respect the central function of the court 
seized with an action for damages in line with the existing majority tradition in the 
Member States.956   
 
Therefore, disclosure was only to be ordered once the party requesting it had shown that 
the evidence in question was relevant to substantiate the claim or defense; had specified 
either pieces of that evidence or as precise and narrow categories of it as possible on the 
basis of reasonably available facts; and had demonstrated that it was unable to produce 
the evidence by applying reasonable efforts.957 These conditions were therefore the 
same as those suggested in the White Paper. The Failed Draft Directive also added 
further conditions for courts to consider in assessing the proportionality of the 
disclosure obligation. These included, in particular, taking into account the value of the 
claim; the likelihood that the addressee of the disclosure order had infringed Article 101 
or 102 TFEU; the scope and cost of the disclosure (especially for third parties); and 
whether the evidence to be disclosed might contain confidential information, which 
should be protected to the greatest extent possible whilst ensuring the availability of 
relevant evidence in antitrust damages actions.958 In addition, it imposed an obligation 
to hear the addressee of the disclosure order before adopting a disclosure order, except 
in cases of particular urgency.959 The Failed Draft Directive also provided for a 
possibility of maintaining or introducing rules providing for wider disclosure of 
evidence.960 
 
Moreover, the Failed Draft Directive laid down exceptions from the disclosure 
obligation,961 and contained provisions on sanctions.962 It imposed an obligation on 
956 Explanatory Memorandum of the Failed Draft Directive, at p. 8. 
957 Article 7(2) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
958 Article 7(3) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
959 Article 7(4) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
960 Article 7(6) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
961 Article 8 of the Failed Draft Directive. 
962 Article 9 of the Failed Draft Directive. 
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Member States to ensure that national courts would not order the disclosure of corporate 
statements or settlement submissions.963 Also, national competition authorities should 
be able to request the court not to order disclosure if they had demonstrated that 
disclosure would undermine an ongoing investigation concerning an infringement of the 
EU competition rules.964 Full effect had also to be given to all legal privileges and other 
rights not to be compelled to disclose evidence based on existing EU rules.965 Sanctions 
were to be imposed on parties, their legal representatives and third parties if they failed 
or refused to comply with a court’s disclosure order; destroyed evidence relevant to 
substantiate an antitrust damages action for which it had been invoked or a competition 
authority had started an investigation in relation to the infringement underlying such an 
action; failed or refused to comply with obligations imposed by a court order protecting 
confidential information; and abused the rights relating to disclosure of evidence 
provided for by the Failed Draft Directive, and evidence and information obtained 
thereunder.966 The sanctions imposed were to be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.967 
 
The provisions of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions in respect of 
disclosure of evidence were quite similar to those of the Failed Draft Directive, and it 
continued to build on the approach adopted in Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights. It introduced a minimum level of disclosure of evidence 
if the claimant has presented reasonably available facts and evidence showing plausible 
grounds for harm suffered from an antitrust violation.968 During the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the European Parliament added a requirement that a claimant in proceedings 
relating to an antitrust damages action who requests disclosure of evidence must present 
a “reasoned justification” containing reasonably available facts and evidence “sufficient 
to support the plausibility of its claim for damages”.969 National courts can then order 
the defendant or third party to disclose the evidence. The evidence must be relevant in 
963 Article 8(1) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
964 Article 8(2) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
965 Article 8(3) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
966 Article 9(1) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
967 Article 9(2) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
968 Article 5(1) of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
969 Article 5(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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terms of substantiating the claim or defense and the party requesting disclosure of 
evidence must specify either pieces of this evidence or relevant categories of this 
evidence defined as precisely and narrowly as possible on the basis of reasonably 
available facts.970  
 
The Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions maintained the requirement that 
disclosure of evidence had also to be limited to that which was proportionate. It 
provided that there had to be effective measures to protect confidential information and 
to give full effect to legal privileges and other rights not to be compelled to disclose 
evidence.971 Moreover, national courts could never order the disclosure of leniency 
corporate statements and settlement submissions.972 Member States were also to provide 
for sanctions for failure or refusal to comply with a disclosure order, the destruction of 
relevant evidence, failure or refusal to comply with an obligation to protect confidential 
information, or abuse of the rights relating to disclosure of evidence.973  
 
Nevertheless, the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions proposed by the 
Commission also contained some minor differences and some additions to the Failed 
Draft Directive. For example, in order to assess the proportionality of a request for 
disclosure of evidence, the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions no longer 
mentioned the value of the claim for damages as one of the criteria to take into 
consideration.974  It also did not provide for an obligation to hear the addressee of a 
disclosure order before the order was adopted, but merely restricted the possibility of 
imposing penalties for non-compliance with a disclosure order to an addressee who had 
been heard.975  
 
However, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Act adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council does substantially amend these provisions. As to the proportionality of 
a disclosure request, the only issues specifically included in the adopted directive are the 
970 Article 5(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
971 Article 5(2) of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
972 Article 6 of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
973 Article 8 of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
974 Article 5(3) of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
975 Article 5(6) of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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following: national courts must consider the extent to which the claim or defense is 
supported by available facts and evidence justifying the requests to disclose evidence; 
the scope and cost of disclosure, especially for third parties concerned, also to prevent 
non-specific search of information which is unlikely to be of relevance for the parties in 
the procedure; whether the evidence contains confidential information, especially 
concerning third parties, and the arrangements for protection of such confidential 
information.976 Moreover, national courts must be able to order the disclosure of 
evidence concerning confidential information if they consider it relevant to the action 
for damages, but they must have effective measures to protect such information.977 
Similarly, Member States must ensure that when national courts order the disclosure of 
evidence, they give full effect to applicable legal professional privilege under EU or 
national law.978 With regard to addressees of a disclosure obligation, the Directive 
reintroduces an obligation to give them an opportunity to be heard before a national 
court orders disclosure,979 which was already foreseen by the Failed Draft Directive, but 
which was limited in the Commission’s proposal on a Draft Directive.  
 
Another important difference between the Failed Draft Directive and the Draft Directive 
on Antitrust Damages Actions was the imposition by the latter of additional limits on 
disclosure of certain evidence from the file of a competition authority in order to ensure 
that more enhanced private enforcement would not have negative effects on the public 
enforcement of EU competition rules. Courts would only be able to order a disclosure of 
information prepared by a natural or legal person specifically for the proceedings of a 
competition authority or information drafted by the authority in the course of its 
proceedings after the competition authority has closed its proceedings.980 This Article 
has been entirely revised and amended by the adopted Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions. Therefore the following analysis will rather focus on the content of its 
provisions. 
 
976 Article 5(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
977 Article 5(6) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
978 Article 5(5) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
979 Article 5(7) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
980 Article 6(2) of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions imposes an obligation on national courts 
assessing the proportionality of a request for disclosure of information included in the 
file of a competition authority to consider whether it has been formulated specifically 
with regard to the nature, object or content of documents submitted to a competition 
authority or held in its file; whether the request is in relation to an action for damages 
before a national court; and the need to safeguard the effectiveness of public 
enforcement of competition law.981 In assessing the proportionality of a request for 
disclosure, the Directive highlights the need to prevent so-called fishing expeditions, 
where requests for non-specific information are made in the hope of discovering which 
documents form part of the file of a competition authority and thereby gain insight into 
the investigation strategy of that authority.982 This is why such requests should be 
deemed disproportionate, and there must always be an obligation on the party 
requesting disclosure to specify the evidence or at least categories of evidence. 
Moreover, certain categories of evidence may only be disclosed after a competition 
authority has closed its proceedings: information that was prepared by a natural or legal 
person specifically for the proceedings of a competition authority; information that the 
competition authority has drawn up and sent to the parties in the course of its 
proceedings; and settlements submissions that have been withdrawn.983 Leniency 
statements and settlements submissions cannot be subject to a disclosure order at any 
time.984 If a claimant presents a justified request, it may be granted access to these 
documents solely in order to ensure that their contents fulfil the description given in 
Article 4 (1) (16) and 4 (19) (18) regarding leniency statements and settlements.985 In 
addition, it should be noted that disclosure of evidence from a competition authority 
should only be ordered if it cannot be reasonably obtained from another party or a third 
party.986 
 
981 Article 6(4) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
982 Recital 20-21 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
983 Article 6(5) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
984 Article 6(6) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
985 Article 6(7) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
986 Recital 26 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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The rest of the requested documents, which are not protected by the provisions laid 
down in Article 6 of the Directive, can be subject to disclosure orders at any time.987 
National courts must also be able to request the disclosure of evidence from the 
competition authority if a party or third party is unable to or cannot reasonably provide 
the evidence requested.988 Through the amendments relating to disclosure of evidence 
included in the file of a competition authority made during the ordinary legislative 
procedure, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions aims to protect the effectiveness 
of public enforcement so as to avoid that information necessary to incentivize leniency 
applications and settlement submissions will be used in antitrust damages actions 
related to the same infringement.989 Furthermore, the EU legislator wishes to ensure that 
information obtained thanks to a disclosure order would not affect negatively on-going 
investigations of competition authorities by sensitive information ending in the hands of 
persons for whom they were not intended. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the provisions on disclosure of evidence included 
in the file of a competition authority will not affect the rules and practices on public 
access to documents under Regulation 1049/2001,990 or the rules and practice under EU 
or national law on the protection of internal documents of competition authorities and 
correspondence between competition authorities.991 But to date the Commission has 
interpreted requests based on Regulation 1049/2001 relating to competition proceedings 
restrictively.992 
 
In addition, it is recalled that under Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003, national courts 
may ask the Commission to transmit to them information in its possession or its opinion 
on questions concerning the application of the EU competition rules. The claimants 
themselves do not have a right to directly do so (unless the national procedural rules 
987 Article 6(9) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
988 Article 6(10) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. The competition authority may submit 
observations to the national court before whom a disclosure order is sought. See Article 6(11) of the 
Directive. 
989 Recital 24 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
990 Regulation 1049/2001of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43-48. 
991 Article 6(2) and 6(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
992 See KELLERBAUER, M., “The recent case law on the disclosure of information regarding EU 
competition law infringements to private damages claimant”, E.C.L.R., 2014, 35(2), p. 56-62, at p. 57. 
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provide for this possibility), but they may encourage the court to request the 
Commission to provide information needed in the antitrust damages action. But such 
requests for information are only useful once the claimant has been able to gather 
sufficient evidence to merit bringing the antitrust damages action in the first place. 
Moreover, it will depend on the national courts whether they will make such a request, 
which might encourage forum shopping concentrated to those jurisdictions where the 
national courts more easily request transformation of information.993 The new rules on 
disclosure will therefore serve to reduce such national divergences, although the 
Directive also imposes important limits on what type of information the courts can order 
to be disclosed.994 Thus, it is contribution to enhancing private enforcement actions may 
be limited. 
 
Furthermore, the use of evidence obtained solely through access to the file of a 
competition authority is limited. Leniency statements and settlement submissions which 
are obtained by a natural or legal person solely through access to the file of the 
competition authority will either be considered inadmissible in damages actions or will 
be protected under the national rules in order to ensure that the use of evidence is 
limited to that provided by Article 6(6) of the Directive.995 The same consequence 
applies to evidence falling within one of the categories listed in Article 6(5) which is 
obtained solely through access to the file of a competition authority until that 
competition authority has closed its proceedings.996 Other evidence which is obtained 
solely through access to the file of a competition authority can only be used in an 
antitrust damages action by that person (or the person who succeeded his rights).997 
 
As to sanctions, they have been renamed to “penalties” in the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions. National courts have to be able to effectively impose penalties on 
parties, their legal representatives and third parties if they failed or refused to comply 
with a court’s disclosure order; destroyed evidence; failed or refused to comply with 
obligations imposed by a national court order protecting confidential information; or 
993 Ibid., at p. 60-62. 
994 See Article 6 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
995 Article 7(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
996 Article 7(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
997 Article 7(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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breached the limits on the use of evidence provided for by the directive.998 The main 
difference to the Failed Draft Directive is that the obligation to impose penalties is no 
longer limited to those who have abused the rights relating to disclosure of evidence 
provided for by the directive and evidence and information obtained thereunder, but the 
mere fact that such a person has breached the limits of the use of evidence is sufficient 
to warrant the imposition of penalties. 
 
4.2.2. Critical Assessment 
Overall the introduction of a disclosure obligation of evidence – albeit a minimum 
obligation – is a very welcome legislative development considering the information 
asymmetry which generally exists between the infringers of competition rules and their 
victims. Limited access to evidence is arguably one of the biggest obstacles to bringing 
antitrust damages actions and the possibility of requesting disclosure of such evidence 
should contribute to facilitating lodging damages claims, provided that other main 
obstacles (such as reducing the costs of damages actions and facilitating claims by 
consumers through collective redress mechanisms) are also properly addressed. 
 
The minimum disclosure obligation does also not appear excessively costly, which 
could otherwise constitute an impediment to the well-functioning of the competition 
enforcement in the EU. Extensive disclosure obligations might result in significant costs 
for the parties concerned and, in some cases, also for third parties. In addition, the 
proceedings could be unduly delayed thus making it less attractive to bring antitrust 
damages actions in the first place. As the disclosure obligation will entail modifications 
to the legal traditions in most Member States, and an excessive disclosure obligation 
could have the aforementioned negative effects, it seems reasonable to start with a more 
modest reform of the rules concerning access to evidence and, if it proves not to help 
facilitating damages claims satisfactorily, then consider making the necessary 
adjustments when the Directive will be reviewed.999 
 
However, although the provisions regarding disclosure of evidence represent a step in 
the right direction, there are still issues that need to be addressed. One of the notable 
998 Article 8(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
999 See Article 20 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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difficulties with the approach adopted in the directive is that certain types of documents, 
namely leniency statements and settlements submissions, are entirely excluded from 
disclosure without any obligation to first conduct a proportionality test of whether they, 
or at least a part of the information contained in them, should be disclosed to the 
claimant in order to make the bringing of an antitrust damages action possible, 
especially when this would be impossible without access to some of that information.  
 
The balancing of the needs of public and private enforcement, respectively, has been 
established by the Court of Justice in Pfleiderer and Donau Chemie. In the former 
ruling, the Court of Justice held that national courts must weigh the usefulness of 
leniency programs for detecting cartels against the contribution of damages actions for 
the maintenance of effective competition. The limits for refusing access to documents 
relating to a leniency procedure would largely be decided by the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness in the absence of common EU rules.1000 In the latter 
ruling, the Court of Justice confirmed the need to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether disclosure is called for. It also seems to have tightened somewhat the 
possibilities of refusing access to documents relating to leniency proceedings by injured 
parties since access can only be refused if the disclosure of documents would actually 
undermine the effectiveness of leniency programs.1001 A mere possibility of doing so 
might no longer be sufficient in order to comply with EU case law. But by excluding 
leniency statements and settlement submissions from the scope of disclosure orders, the 
Directive modifies existing EU law. 
 
Nevertheless, in practice, the principles laid down by the Court of Justice in its case law 
have been applied differently in different Member States. In the United Kingdom, in the 
National Grid ruling, the judge followed more closely the balancing test established in 
Pfleiderer by making a case-by-case analysis of whether proportionality and procedural 
fairness required the documents to be disclosed. He conducted a document-by-
document review and considered whether the access to them was necessary in order to 
decide the case fairly, considering how difficult it could be for the claimant to access the 
information from other sources and how relevant it was for the claim. As a result, the 
1000 See Judgment in Pfleiderer, EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 30. 
1001 See Judgment in Donau Chemie, EU:C:2013:366, paragraphs 47-48. 
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claimant was granted access to some of the information contained in the documents 
requested.1002  In Germany, the outcome was rather different since the court gave more 
importance to the wide exceptions to disclosure of information included in the 
investigation file of an authority which exist under German law, which provides that 
access to evidence may be refused if it will put the purpose of the investigation in 
another criminal proceeding at risk.1003 Such proceedings also include proceedings in 
which an administrative fine may be imposed on the parties,1004 i.e. the exception can 
also apply to investigations by the competition authorities. Following the Pfleiderer 
ruling, the German court held that the leniency applicants’ interests prevailed over the 
claimant’s interest, and rejected the request to access the leniency material.1005 This 
shows that the context of the national legal systems and procedural rules play a 
significant role in how national courts decide requests for disclosure of evidence. In the 
United Kingdom, the rules are more generous and, therefore, it is easier to assess 
individually the pieces of information contained in the documents in question.1006  
 
As a result, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions should include provisions 
enabling the national courts to genuinely consider the implications of granting or 
refusing the request of disclosure of evidence for both public and private enforcement. 
In the current Directive the focus is rather on protecting public enforcement more than 
necessary at the cost of private enforcement. Arguably, a more balanced approach 
would be called for in order to ensure that private enforcement could serve as an 
important complement to public enforcement, and not merely play a rather residual role 
as damages actions are concerned. Nevertheless, more guidance would be needed on 
how to reconcile public and private enforcement as the Court of Justice has only given 
1002 National Grid [2012] EWHC 869. However, it should be noted that the documents in question only 
quoted from the corporate statements and were not themselves corporate statements. 
1003 Section 406(e)(2) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. 
1004 Section 46(1) of the German Act on Regulatory Offences (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten). 
1005 Court of First Instance of Bonn, Case 51/Gs 53/09 AG v Bundeskartellamt, Judgment of January 18th, 
2012. It has been submitted that the emphasis of the German case law has been on the importance of 
protecting the leniency program by generally protecting leniency statements. See KUMAR, SIGNH, A., 
“Pfleiderer: assessing its impact on the effectiveness of the European leniency programs”, E.C.L.R., 2014, 
35(3), p. 110-123, at p. 114-115, and HARSDORF ENDERNDORF, N., “The Road after Pfleiderer: 
Austrian preliminary reference raises new questions on access to file by third parties in cartel 
proceedings”, E.C.L.R., 2013, 34(2), p. 78-83, at p. 78. 
1006 See GUTTUSO, L., “The enduring question of access to leniency materials in private proceedings: 
one draft Directive and several court rulings”, G.C.L.R. 2014, 7(1), p. 10-22, at p. 19. 
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very general indications about what national courts should take into consideration in 
deciding requests for access to information in leniency statements.1007 
 
Although leniency programs are important and a restricted liability of immunity 
recipients can be justified by ensuring the effectiveness of public enforcement, it does 
seem exaggerated to completely prohibit the disclosure of leniency statements and 
settlements submissions. Instead, the UK model of conducting a document-by-
document review of leniency statements should be adopted, and both considerations of 
proportionality and procedural fairness should be taken into account. As stated in the 
Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs, given the importance of evidence for 
exercising the rights of appeal, the approach should be not to exclude any categories of 
documents per se, but an assessment of whether or not the documents in question 
should be disclosed, should always be possible.1008 Moreover, different categories of 
documents contained in a leniency application may merit different level of protection. 
As one commentator has argued, in certain cases there are no justifications for denying 
access to leniency statements: this would be the case when the leniency applicant itself 
has revealed the content of its leniency applicant to a third party and other co-claimants 
request access to the statement.1009 The UK Government has stated that disclosure 
should only encompass documents specifically created for the leniency process, but 
should exclude pre-existing documents.1010  
 
In the case of settlement submissions, the need to ensure public enforcement of the 
competition rules is even less justified as they merely contribute to speed up the process 
of punishing the infringers since cartel members acknowledge their involvement in the 
1007 See SANDERS, M., JORDAN, E., DIMOULIS, C, SCHWEDT, K., DILUIGI, B. and VAN 
WISSEN, M., “Disclosure of leniency materials in follow-on damages actions: striking “the right 
balance” between the interests of leniency applicants and private claims?”, E.C.L.R., 2013, 34(4), p. 174-
182, at p. 175. 
1008 See Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 33. 
1009 See KOMNINOS, A.P., “Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement: quod Dei Deo, quod 
Caesaris Caesari” in the 16th Annual Competition Law and Policy Workshop “Integrating public and 
private enforcement of competition law: Implications for courts and agencies”, European University 
Institute, Florence, June 17-18th, 2001, at p. 21. 
1010 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 59. 
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cartel and their liability for it only after having seen the evidence in the Commission 
file. In return their fines will be reduced, but it is not warranted to in addition fully 
shield their settlement submissions from disclosure requests. Instead, the normal rules 
for assessing disclosure of evidence should apply. In other words, the national courts 
would have to examine if in a particular case the whole settlement submission or part of 
it should be protected because of the need to protect the effectiveness of public 
enforcement, or because the request is disproportionate or irrelevant to the damages 
claim. 
 
During the legislative procedure, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection also made an interesting suggestion that a provision guaranteeing the identity 
of a whistle-blower1011 should be introduced in the Directive since the identity of the 
whistleblower is not relevant to the damage or the value of the damage.1012 This 
provision has not been included in the adopted Directive, but admittedly it would be 
justified to protect the identity of the whistle-blower by refusing the disclosure of 
documents containing information which make it possible to identify the whistle-blower 
at least until the competition authority has been able to complete its investigation, if the 
whistle-blower has requested that its identity be kept confidential. This would 
contribute to equal protection at Union level as today the identity is protected under 
national law. 
 
Moreover, particular attention should also be paid to the difficulty in assessing antitrust 
harm. As has been proposed by the Committee on Legal Affairs, claimants should also 
be able to obtain pre-litigation information from national or EU competition authorities 
1011 A whistleblower is an informant within an undertaking participating in a cartel, who reveals the 
existence of the cartel and the participation of the undertaking in that cartel to the competition authorities. 
1012 See Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 57 and 77. 
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regarding the volume of damages or loss caused in order to facilitate fair settlements1013 
and arguably also in order to bring antitrust damages actions.1014 
 
4.3. Effect of National Decisions 
The Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions also proposed that final infringement 
decisions by NCAs would have a probative effect in subsequent damages actions as far 
as the finding of an infringement was concerned.1015 This probative effect of final NCA 
decisions was already envisaged in the Failed Draft Directive,1016 which in turn 
essentially built on the proposal in the White Paper.1017 The idea was to give the final 
decisions of the NCAs the same effect as Commission Decisions enjoy under Article 
16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. In other words, as far as the existence of an infringement of 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU is concerned, in deciding an antitrust damages action relating 
to the infringement in question, the national courts would be bound by final decisions 
by NCAs or by review courts. The Commission also proposed that the same probative 
effect would be extended to decisions establishing that national competition rules had 
been infringed if the EU and national competition rules were applied in parallel in the 
same damages action. In this manner, legal uncertainty could be avoided and no 
unnecessary resources would be dedicated to re-litigating the issue of whether the EU 
antitrust rules had been infringed, and both courts and parties would save costs.1018 
Instead, the court proceedings would focus on establishing that the claimant had indeed 
suffered harm as a result of the antitrust violation and the extent of the damage suffered. 
In any case, national courts would remain free to refer questions for a preliminary ruling 
to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU should they have any doubt regarding 
the compliance of the national decisions with EU law. Finally, the Commission 
1013 See Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 32. 
1014 Article 17 of the Directive merely provides that a NCA must be able, if it considers it appropriate, to 
assist the national court in the assessment of the amount of damages upon request of that court.  
1015 Article 9 of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1016 Article 12 of the Failed Draft Directive. 
1017 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 43-45. 
1018 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, at p. 15-16 and 
Recital 25 of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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emphasized that the rights of defense of undertakings would be protected under Article 
48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.1019 
 
However, the probative effect of final NCA decisions (regarding findings of an 
infringement of the EU antitrust rules and/or the national competition rules) was limited 
by the European Parliament and the Council. Therefore, the adopted Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions only grants such effect to final decisions by NCAs or review 
courts when the action for damages is brought in the Member State where the decision 
has been given. The binding effect will only cover the nature of the infringement and its 
material, personal and territorial scope.1020 If the antitrust damages action is brought in a 
Member State other than that where the decision originates, it must only be taken into 
account as prima facie evidence of the existence of an infringement of Article 101 or 
102 TFEU (although courts may arguably grant it higher probative effect), and it is also 
possible for the courts to assess it together with any other evidence adduced by the 
parties.1021   
 
The advantage of the final provision is that the binding effect of NCA decisions will in 
the future also apply to infringements of national competition law, and not merely 
decisions concerning breaches of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. On the other hand, a 
decision by a NCA of another Member State must no longer be given full probative 
effect, but is to be considered at least as prima facie evidence. This means that the issue 
of the existence of an infringement of competition law might have to be re-litigated 
when a claim for damages is brought before the court of another Member State, thus 
leading to a waste of time and resources, and increasing the costs of the action. 
Ultimately, this would however depend on the rules of the Member State in question as 
it may grant such binding effect anyway as is the case in Germany.1022 
 
1019 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. 
1020 Recital 31 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1021 Article 9 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1022 See Section 33(4) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition. As stated, this provision was 
criticized by the Monopolies Commission since the addressees of the decision are the only ones that can 
appeal the decision and, therefore, the binding effect should be limited to them. See 
MONOPOLKOMMISSION, “Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der Siebten GWB-Novelle”, 
Sondergutachten der Monopolkomission gemäss § 44. Abs. 1 Satz 4 GWB, at p. 24.  
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There are some arguments supporting the limitation of the binding effect of these 
decisions. Affording probative effect to final decisions of a NCA from another Member 
State could result in delay of justice because the probative effect of NCA decisions of 
other Member State are not accepted. Anyone wishing to challenge the decision of a 
NCA would have to do so in the Member State where the NCA is located. In addition, 
the legal remedies have to be exhausted before that decision would produce the effects 
initially envisaged in the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, thus leading to 
lengthy proceedings.1023 Moreover, Member States have adopted divergent approaches, 
for instance, regarding legal privilege and the scope of judicial review of NCA 
decisions,1024 which could render it difficult for national courts to accept the binding 
effect of decisions adopted by foreign NCAs. 
 
Finally, such a binding effect for administrative decisions could be difficult to justify if 
compared to judgments of national courts, the recognition of which in another Member 
State can be refused on the grounds of lack of sufficient notice of a claim to the 
defendant in respect of judicial proceedings.1025 But even in such cases, the national 
court could not give binding effect to a decision of a foreign NCA if that would breach 
Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention (“ECHR”)1026 or Articles 47 and 
48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In order to remedy 
these types of problems related to extending the binding effect of a NCA decision to 
civil proceedings brought in other Member States, one commentator has suggested that 
recognition “must depend on compliance with the requirements of a fair trial by the 
NCA in the country of origin” and should also consider whether possible geographical 
1023 See BASEDOW, J., “Recognition of Foreign Decisions within the European Competition Network” in 
BASEDOW, J., FRANCQ, S. and IDOT, L. (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation. Conflict of Laws 
and Coordination, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012, p. 393-402, at p. 397. 
1024 See WISKING, S. and DIETZEL, K., “European Commission finally publishes measures to facilitate 
competition law private actions in the European Union”, E.C.L.R., 2014, 35(4), p. 185-193, at p. 191. 
1025 Article 34(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 012, 16.1.2001, p. 1-23 
(“Brussels I Regulation”). This regulation will be replaced by Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1-32 (“Brussels I bis 
Regulation”), Article 45(1)(b) of which contains the possibility of refusing recognition of a foreign 
judgment if a defendant has not been given sufficient notice of a claim in order to prepare its defense. For 
further details on this possibility, see FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C., and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., 
Derecho Internacional Privado, 7th Edition, Civitas, 2013, at p. 240-249. 
1026 Available at www.echr.coe.int/ECHR. 
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limitations of the NCA decision (i.e. it was limited to an investigation of the market in 
the Member State of the NCA) removes its relevance for the damages claim.1027  
Instead, a rebuttable presumption of binding effect is suggested.  
 
In deciding on whether NCA decisions from another Member State should have binding 
effect considering the issues outlined above, it should be borne in mind that for 
consumers follow-on actions will in practice be the only viable way (and often not even 
this will be feasible, unless there are some form of collective redress mechanisms 
available). Therefore, even if a final decision were required, affording probative effect 
to a NCA decision or a decision by a competition court of another Member State would 
still improve their possibilities of bringing a claim for damages as otherwise they would 
have to demonstrate the existence of the antitrust violation themselves. Consequently, 
final NCA and competition court decisions should be given a presumptive binding 
effect also in civil proceedings before the courts of other Member States, which the 
defendant could rebut in case it would breach the requirements of fair trial, or the 
geographical scope of the infringement would make it irrelevant with regard to the 
damages claim in relation to the market in the Member State in which it is brought. In 
addition, it could be possible to rebut the presumption of binding effect if there were 
manifest errors of facts in the investigation.1028 
 
4.4. Limitation Periods 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions provides that it is for the Member States to 
establish the rules applicable to limitation periods for bringing antitrust damages actions 
for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the national competition rules 
where they are applied in parallel to the EU competition rules. But the rules must at 
least lay down the moment from which the limitation period starts to run, the duration 
of the limitation period, and the circumstances under which it is interrupted or 
1027 BASEDOW, J., “Recognition of Foreign Decisions within the European Competition Network” in 
BASEDOW, J., FRANCQ, S. and IDOT, L. (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation. Conflict of Laws 
and Coordination, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012, p. 393-402, at p. 397 and 401-
402. 
1028 This last possibility was proposed in the report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs. See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY AFFAIRS, Draft report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (COM(2013)0404 – C7-
0170/2013 – 2013/0185(COD)), 3.10.2013, at p. 36. 
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suspended.1029 Furthermore, the limitation period must be at least five years from the 
moment when a victim became aware of, or can reasonably be expected to have the 
knowledge of, the infringement of competition law; the harm it has caused him; and the 
identity of the infringer.1030 Consequently, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions 
establishes a minimum duration for the limitation period, which was not specified in the 
Failed Draft Directive (or in the White Paper). On the other hand, the current Directive 
also allows Member States to maintain or introduce absolute limitation periods that are 
generally applicable, as long as their duration does not render practically impossible or 
excessively difficult the exercise of the right to full compensation.1031  
 
The Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions also provided that the limitation 
period for a continuous or repeated infringement could not start to run before the day on 
which the infringement would cease,1032 but this provision was deleted during the 
ordinary legislative procedure.1033 Possibly it was considered to be sufficient that 
Article 10(2) provides that the limitation period should not begin to run before the 
infringement ceases, although it would have been preferable to maintain a specific 
provision for continuous and repeated infringements for the sake of clarity.  
 
Pursuant to the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, the limitation period for a 
follow-on action must be suspended until at least one year after the decision by the 
competition authority in question is final or proceedings are otherwise terminated.1034 
This is also a modification of the two-year minimum limitation period for follow-on 
actions provided by the Failed Draft Directive.1035 It is likely that the length has been 
reduced due to the fact that in follow-on actions there is no need to establish an 
infringement of the EU competition rules as it has already been established by the 
competition authority and, therefore, the claimant can focus on demonstrating the extent 
of the harm which it has suffered and the causal relationship between the infringement 
1029 Article 10(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1030 Article 10(2) and 10(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1031 Recital 32 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1032 Article 10(3) of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1033 See the amended text available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+AMD+A7-2014-0089+002-002+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
1034 Article 10(4) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1035 Article 14(3) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
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and the harm sustained. Nevertheless, this only applies if the damages claim is brought 
in the same Member States in which the competition authorities have established the 
existence of an antitrust violation or the Commission has adopted an infringement 
decision, since the Directive only extends the compulsory binding effect to these kinds 
of decisions. Consequently, in cases where the claim is brought before the courts of a 
Member State other than that where the decision originates, the reduction of the 
limitation period could be problematic. Ultimately this will nonetheless depend on what 
evidentiary value the courts of the Member States before which the antitrust damages 
claim is brought will grant the NCA decision. 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions has also added an obligation to suspend 
the limitation period for bringing an action for damages for the duration of the 
consensual dispute resolution process in order to provide injured parties with a genuine 
opportunity to engage in consensual dispute resolution before bringing proceedings 
before the national court. However, the limitation period will only be suspended with 
regard to those parties which are or were involved or represented in the consensual 
dispute resolution.1036 The suspensive effect of consensual dispute resolution was not 
foreseen in the Failed Draft Directive, and reflects the emphasis on alternative dispute 
resolution which some of the stakeholders had called for in the legislative consultation 
process.1037 
 
In addition, the new Directive imposes an obligation on Member States to ensure that in 
cases where injured parties have not been able to obtain compensation from infringing 
undertakings other than the immunity recipient, the limitation period is reasonable and 
sufficient to allow victims to bring an antitrust damages action against the immunity 
recipient.1038 The obligation, in principle, to claim damages from other infringing 
parties than the immunity recipient might require a longer limitation period than in other 
cases, since it would seem that the injured parties would have to first assess whether 
they could gather sufficient evidence against the co-infringers and only if they could not 
1036 Recital 44 and Article 18 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1037 See e.g. Opinion of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee on the White Paper on 
Antitrust Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 
3.12.2008, at § 6. 
1038 Article 11(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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substantiate a claim against them, could they try to bring a damages claim against the 
immunity recipient. 
 
Establishing some common rules regarding limitation periods will contribute to 
increased legal certainty. It should also facilitate the bringing of damages claims 
especially in Member States the limitation periods of which are very short.1039 In this 
context, the requirement that the victim must have knowledge of the infringement and 
the harm that it has caused it before the limitation period begins to run is crucial as 
otherwise the limitation period might have expired even before the victim learned about 
the infringement. But it is not easy to establish from what point in time the claimant de 
facto has such knowledge. This will require a case-by-case assessment, and it has been 
suggested that appropriate factors to consider would include the applicable standard of 
care regarding the existence of a claim, the individual characteristics of the claimant, 
and especially whether it is a legal or natural person. The scope of the necessary 
knowledge would also depend on the infringement as not all antitrust violations do 
necessarily produce effects in the market. Moreover, an additional difficulty is that the 
publicly available information about antitrust violations are often not very detailed and 
comprehensive,1040 which makes it difficult for claimants to be certain that an antitrust 
violations has indeed been committed. 
 
On the other hand, by only providing for a minimum limitation period, and requiring 
Member States to ensure that the limitation period for bringing a damages claim against 
an immunity recipient is reasonable and sufficient to enforce such claims, the Directive 
respects the principle of procedural autonomy. For situations not specifically regulated 
by the Directive, the limitation periods would therefore have to respect the limits 
established by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
 
1039 See CRAIG, L., JAZRAWI, W., GARTAGANI, S., SIAKKA T. and FITZGERALD-FRAZR, K., “A 
summary of recent developments in antitrust damages claims, collective redress and funding in the EU 
and UK”, G.C.L.R., 2013, 6(3), R41-R47, at R43. 
1040 SOYEZ, V., “The commencement of the subjective limitation periods in private competition 
litigation”, G.C.L.R., 2013, 6(1), p. 7-11, at p. 8-11. 
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4.5. Joint and Several Liability 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions establishes that undertakings are jointly 
and severally liable for damage caused by their joint anti-competitive behavior.1041 This 
means that injured parties can bring a damages claim for full compensation against any 
of them. Such a right is in line with what is generally applicable in the Member 
States.1042  
 
Very recently, the Court ruled in ÖBB-Infrastruktur1043 that the civil liability of cartel 
members also covers loss resulting from so-called umbrella pricing where an 
undertaking not party to the cartel sets higher prices having regard to the practices of the 
cartel than it would have under normal conditions of competition on the market. Cartel 
members should take into account that their cartel could have such possible effects the 
resulting loss of which they will be obliged to compensate, provided that the injured 
party can establish that the cartel was “in the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular, the specific aspects of the relevant market, liable to have the effect of 
umbrella pricing being applied by third parties acting independently”.1044 The injured 
party has thus a right to claim compensation for the loss suffered from the cartel 
members even if it did not have contractual links with them. As a result, in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU, national legislation cannot categorically 
exclude civil liability of cartel members for the loss resulting from umbrella pricing by 
an undertaking not party to the cartel.1045 On the other hand, the claimant must still 
prove that causal relationship between the loss that it has suffered and the cartel, which 
arguably is more challenging when it is not even indirect purchaser of a cartel member, 
but of an independent party. Among other things, the injured party would have to show 
foreseeability of the damage and attributability. 
 
1041 Article 11(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1042 See CRAIG, L., JAZRAWI, W., GARTAGANI, S., SIAKKA T. and FITZGERALD-FRAZR, K., “A 
summary of recent developments in antitrust damages claims, collective redress and funding in the EU 
and UK”, G.C.L.R., 2013, 6(3), R41-R47, at R43. 
1043 Judgment in ÖBB-Infrastruktur, EU:C:2014:1317. 
1044 Judgment in ÖBB-Infrastruktur, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 34. 
1045 Judgment in ÖBB-Infrastruktur, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraphs 33 and 37. 
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However, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions limits the liability of certain 
small and medium-sized enterprises, provided that the right of victims to full 
compensation is not prejudiced. This limitation applies to SMEs the market share of 
which in the relevant market was below 5% during the competition infringement and 
the economic viability of which would be put at risk, and whose assets would lose all 
their value if the undertakings in question were held jointly and severally liable. Such 
undertakings must in principle only compensate their own direct and indirect 
purchasers. But they may only benefit from this restricted liability on the condition that 
they have not led the infringement or coerced other undertakings to take part in it.1046 
This limitation of liability of SMEs was introduced by the amendments made by the 
Parliament during the ordinary legislative procedure. No particular justification has 
been included in the recitals of the Directive, but it could be motivated by the fact that 
sometimes small market players have no choice but to join a cartel created by large 
undertakings in order to be able to continue their business activities without making 
significant losses. In such cases, it could be unreasonable if they had to pay damages 
which exceed their share of responsibility for the harm caused. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of immunity from fines granted to leniency applicants has also 
been taken into consideration. Immunity recipients will only be jointly and severally 
liable to their direct or indirect purchasers or providers and, only exceptionally, to other 
injured parties if the victims cannot obtain full compensation from other co-
infringers.1047 It should be noted that the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs 
stated that leniency programs should not absolve infringers from paying damages to 
victims and proposed the deletion of this provision.1048 Nevertheless, the reduced 
liability of immunity recipients has been justified by the importance which leniency 
programs play in uncovering secret cartels, and putting an end to such violations. If the 
immunity recipient were held jointly and severally liable, injured parties might choose 
to bring a damages claim against it instead of its co-infringers precisely because its 
cooperation with the competition authorities is likely to result in evidence proving its 
1046 Article 11(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1047 Article 11(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1048 See Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 32 and 51. 
264 
 
                                                 
participation in the cartel in more detail (thanks to the leniency statement) than the 
participation of other participants, and the decision by a competition authority 
establishing the infringement could become final for the immunity recipient before it 
becomes final for the co-infringers,1049 since it is not likely to appeal that decision. 
 
The provisions governing liability are a novelty which could not be found in the Failed 
Draft Directive. They aim to restrict the liability of an undertaking which has been 
granted immunity, but can only do so to a limited extent since victims’ right to full 
compensation must always be respected and, moreover, as the damages awarded are 
only single damages, the possibility of restricting the liability in damages is limited.  
 
Finally, the new Directive also regulates the issue of contribution. An infringing 
undertaking may recover a contribution from any other co-infringing undertaking which 
corresponds to their relative responsibility for the harm caused by the antitrust violation. 
Again, the obligations of immunity recipients have been limited by restricting their 
amount of contribution to the amount of the harm they caused to their own direct and 
indirect purchasers or providers. With regard to harm caused to other injured parties, the 
determination of the amount of contribution of immunity recipients will depend on their 
relative responsibility for the harm.1050 
 
The provisions concerning joint and several liability of co-infringers make it possible 
for injured parties to choose to bring damages actions against the defendant most likely 
to be able to pay the compensation. From the claimants’ point of view this simplifies 
litigation as they could obtain compensation for the whole harm suffered from one 
single defendant. It is also important to note that the claimants do not have to be direct 
customers of the defendant, but in line with ÖBB-Infrastruktur, as long as they can 
demonstrate that the defendant should have taken into regard that the anti-competitive 
conduct could result in the loss that the injured parties have suffered, the defendant 
could be held liable in civil damages. From the defendants’ point of view this could 
result in uncertainty about whether it would be able to seek contribution from its co-
infringers because some might no longer exist and the costs of determining the relative 
1049 Recital 34 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1050 Article 11(4) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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responsibility of each co-infringer for the harm caused to injured victims could be 
expensive.1051 
 
The restriction established on contribution for immunity recipients is easier to accept 
than the limitation on liability as it relates to the internal distribution of responsibility 
for the harm caused by each cartel member. Therefore, in order to ensure the right to 
full compensation of victims of cartels, it is crucial that the Directive provides that the 
limited liability of immunity recipients only applies in case the injured parties are able 
to claim damages from other cartel members. For the same reason, it is also appropriate 
that the limited civil liability has not been extended to other leniency applicants than 
immunity recipients. 
 
4.6. Passing-on of Overcharges 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions contains several provisions regarding the 
so-called passing-on of overcharges where a party which has paid an overcharge due to 
an antitrust violation passes on that overcharge to the next level in the distribution 
chain. As a result of the passing-on, that party might no longer have suffered harm from 
the infringement, provided that the entire overcharge has been passed on and the 
passing-on has not resulted in loss of profits in the form of decreased sales because of 
the increase in price of the goods sold or the services provided. 
 
The Directive provides, on the one hand, that the right to full compensation must be 
ensured but, on the other hand, the compensation shall not be greater than the actual 
harm suffered by injured parties.1052 The consequence is that anyone who has suffered 
harm must be entitled to full compensation, as has already been established by the case 
law of the Court of Justice.1053 In other words, both direct and indirect purchasers have 
a right to full compensation, which must include compensation for loss of profits.1054 
Similarly, victims who have supplied goods or services to the infringer will benefit from 
1051 HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for infringers 
and victims?”, E.C.L.R. 2014, 35(2), p. 51-55, at p. 54. 
1052 Article 12(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1053 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24. 
1054 Article 12(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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a right to compensation if they have suffered loss due to a competition infringement.1055 
The infringement could, for instance, have reduced the price that the supplier received 
for the supplies to the infringer. 
 
In order to ensure that antitrust damages actions will not result in over-compensation of 
victims, national procedural rules must be established which ensure that compensation 
for actual loss corresponds to the overcharge suffered at the respective level in the 
distribution chain.1056 National courts must also be given the power to estimate the 
amount of the overcharge which has been passed on.1057 This is considered important in 
order to remedy the asymmetry of information.1058 In addition, the Directive contains a 
new provision which urges the Commission to issue guidelines for national courts on 
how to estimate the amount of the overcharge, which was passed on to the indirect 
purchaser.1059 The guidelines should be “clear, simple and comprehensive”.1060 The 
Commission’s Practical Guide adopted on the same date as the Draft Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions includes guidance about this calculation.1061 
 
In order to ensure that damages claims do not result in over-compensation, the new 
Directive allows the infringer to rely on passing-on defense, but it has the burden of 
proof that the claimant has actually passed on the overcharge.1062 This was already 
provided for by the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions,1063 the Failed Draft 
Directive and the White Paper. However, the adopted Directive deleted the provision 
1055 Article 12(4) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1056 Article 12(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1057 Article 12(5) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1058 See Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 80. 
1059 Article 16 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions.  
1060 Recital 37 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1061 Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
SWD(2013) 205, 11.6.2013. 
1062 Article 13 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1063 Article 12 of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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contained in Article 12(2) of the Commission’s proposal for a directive which aimed to 
limit the defendant’s possibility of invoking the passing-on defense in situations where 
the overcharge had been passed on to the next level in the distribution chain, and it 
would be “legally impossible” for injured parties to claim compensation. The 
justification for this elimination was, first, the difficulty in assessing such a “legal 
difficulty”. Second, legal obstacles making it legally impossible for indirect purchasers 
to claim compensation for harm suffered as a result of an antitrust violation would be 
incompatible with ECJ case law. In addition, the fear was that the wording in question 
could result in unjust enrichment or overcompensation of claimants.1064 The Directive 
on Antitrust Damages Actions also adds a provision specifically allowing the defendant 
to require disclosure from the claimant and third parties when this can be held 
reasonable.1065 Moreover, it restates the right to claim compensation for loss of profit in 
cases where the claimant’s sales were reduced as a result of the pass-on of the 
overcharge.1066 For the sake of completeness and clarity, it would have been desirable 
that a reference to the right under EU law to interest1067  would have been added in this 
context.  
 
It should also be noted that the passing-on defense only applies to the overcharge which 
has been passed on to the next level in the distribution chain, but not to other types of 
harm which might have been caused, such as damage to a competitive market position. 
For these other types of harm, the defendant will have to contest the foreseeability and 
causation, which remain issues governed by national procedural rules even after the 
implementation for the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. As a result, national 
differences regarding these issues will continue to exist.1068 
 
1064 See Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 81. 
1065 Article 13 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1066 Recital 35 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1067 Judgment in Manfredi, C:2006:461, paragraph 95. However, it should be noted that the right to full 
compensation laid down in Article 2 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions contains a general 
codification of the right to full compensation, including interest. 
1068 See HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for 
infringers and victims?”, E.C.L.R. 2014, 35(2), p. 51-55, at p. 54. 
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The burden of proof relating to passing-on is different in cases involving indirect 
purchasers claiming compensation for damages resulting from an overcharge which has 
wholly or partly been passed on to the claimant. Indirect purchasers must demonstrate 
the existence of such pass-on, although reasonable requests for disclosure from the 
defendant and third parties will be allowed.1069 In order to satisfy the burden of proof, 
the indirect purchaser must have demonstrated that the defendant has committed an 
antitrust violation, which resulted in an overcharge for the direct purchaser of the 
defendant and he either purchased goods or services which were the subject of the 
antitrust violation or goods or services derived from or containing goods or services 
which were the subject of the violation.1070 Nevertheless, if the defendant can credibly 
show that the overcharge has not, or not entirely, been passed on to the indirect 
purchaser, the damages claim is considered not to have been proven.1071  
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions also attempts to avoid a multiple liability 
or an absence of liability of the infringer when antitrust damages actions are brought at 
different levels in the distribution chain. To this aim, national courts seized with a 
damages claim must, when they assess the burden of proof, be able to consider antitrust 
damages actions relating to the same infringement brought by claimants from other 
levels in the distribution chain, or judgments resulting from such actions. Moreover, 
they should take due account of relevant information in the public domain resulting 
from public enforcement cases.1072 In order to ensure that compensation for actual loss 
paid at any level in the distribution chain corresponds to the overcharge harm caused at 
that level, appropriate procedural means should be made available to national courts. 
National courts should, for instance, be able to join claims. These kinds of means should 
also exist in cross-border cases.1073 However, these provisions of the Directive are not 
to prejudice the rights and obligations of national courts under Article 30 of the new 
Brussels Regulation1074 to stay proceedings or decline jurisdiction in favor of the court 
1069 Article 14(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1070 Article 14(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1071 Article 14(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1072 Article 15(1) of  the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1073 Recital 39 of  the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1074 Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 
351, 20.12.2012, p. 1-32. Currently the relevant article is Article of Brussels I Regulation. 
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first seized of the case.1075 Similarly, the means available to national courts under 
national and EU law should not prejudice the fundamental rights of defense and to an 
effective remedy and fair trial of third persons to judicial proceedings, and the probative 
effect of related judgments.1076  
 
Allowing the passing-on defense could constitute an obstacle for antitrust damages 
actions, because indirect purchases and, especially consumers at the end of the 
distribution chain, will encounter large difficulties in proving the exact amount that has 
been passed on to them, particularly in situations involving several intermediaries. 
Although the possibility of making reasonable requests for disclosure from the 
defendant and third parties is allowed under Article 14(1) of the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions and could facilitate obtaining information needed to assess the 
amount of the overcharge that has been passed on to consumers, this would probably 
not be sufficient to incentivize damages claims by consumers. The only way to try to 
mitigate the effects of a passing-on defense would be to ensure a possibility of 
consumers joining forces in a collective or representative action together with other 
consumers who have suffered a loss in order to be able to share the litigation costs. 
 
4.7. Quantification of Harm 
As to the quantification of harm, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions contains a 
rebuttable presumption of harm resulting from a cartel.1077 This presumption is 
considered necessary because of the information asymmetry that usually exists between 
the parties and the difficulties in quantifying antitrust damages. Moreover, it would be 
difficult to ensure the effectiveness of antitrust damages actions in cartel cases due to 
the secretive nature of cartels, which renders it more difficult to adduce the evidence 
needed to prove the harm.1078 The rebuttable presumption of harm caused by a cartel 
means that the party which has the necessary evidence in its possession (i.e. the 
infringer) must meet the burden of proof – in this case, to show that the cartel has 
1075 For more details on the issue of lis pendens and related actions under Brussels I and Brussels I bis 
Regulations, see FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C., and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., Derecho Internacional 
Privado, 7th Edition, Civitas, 2013, at p. 93-99. 
1076 Recital 39 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1077 Article 17(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions.  
1078 Recital 42 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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exceptionally not caused any harm – which in turn facilitates the task of claimants 
proving an antitrust damages action.  
 
The presumption of harm has been criticized, since e.g. cartels of very short duration do 
not necessarily cause harm.1079 However, it is submitted that it is very unlikely that any 
damages claims would be brought in such cases and, in any case, the defendants would 
always have the possibility of rebutting the presumption of harm if a damages action 
was brought. Therefore, it is justified to ease the burden of claimants to prove that the 
cartel has caused harm. 
 
Although the Directive does not provide for a presumption regarding the scope of the 
harm, it provides that the burden and standard of proof required for the quantification of 
harm must also not be such as to make the bringing of antitrust damages actions 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult.1080 In other words, they must comply with 
the principle of effectiveness. This is why national courts must be empowered to 
estimate the harm. Contrary to the Commission’s initial proposal,1081 the possibility of 
estimating the amount of harm has been limited to situations where it has been 
established that a claimant has indeed suffered harm, but the precise quantification of 
that harm is virtually impossible or excessively difficult on the basis of available 
evidence.1082 As a result, usually the burden and level of proof applicable to the 
quantification of damages will depend on the national rules, and the Member States will 
enjoy great discretion in how to quantify harm.1083 
 
At the time-being, since there is no binding legislation at EU level, antitrust harm is 
quantified on the basis of national rules, which must comply with the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. The actual situation has to be compared with a 
hypothetical one, i.e. a situation that would have existed on the market, were it not for 
1079 See VANDENBORRE, I., HOFFMAN LENT, K. and GOETZ, T.C., “Actions for antitrust damages 
in the European Union: evaluating the Commission’s Directive proposal”, G.C.L.R., 7(1), 2014, p. 1-9, at 
p. 5.  
1080 Article 17(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions.  
1081 Article 16(2) of the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1082 Article 17(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions.  
1083 See VANDENBORRE, I., HOFFMAN LENT, K. and GOETZ, T.C., “Actions for antitrust damages 
in the European Union: evaluating the Commission’s Directive proposal”, G.C.L.R., 7(1), 2014, p. 1-9, at 
p. 5. 
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the competition infringement. Therefore, in order not to make the right to damages 
practically impossible or excessively difficult, the judge must be able to estimate the 
harm as the comparison can never be made with complete accuracy.1084 In other words, 
the assessment is required in order to comply with the principle of effectiveness. 
Another novel provision which aims to facilitate the assessment of harm provides that 
national courts must also be able to request that competition authorities assist in 
determining the amount of damages in antitrust damages proceedings.1085 
 
An interesting model regarding the estimation of damages was proposed by the 
rapporteur of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, who 
proposed that the assessment of damages should be based on the victim’s estimation. 
This would contribute to discouraging cartel participation since the cartel members 
would have less influence in court proceedings, while the victim’s voice would be 
stronger.1086 However, if the victim is to be given the power to estimate the damages, 
this would often require that the victim is assisted either by an expert in cartels, NCA or 
a law firm specialized in competition law. Otherwise the complex task of assessing the 
amount of harm suffered could result in unreasonable damages being awarded which do 
not reflect the real harm suffered. This could explain why the Parliament did not include 
this type of provision in the Directive. 
 
The Failed Draft Directive hardly mentioned the quantification of damages, but this can 
be explained that it followed the suggestion contained in the White Paper to codify in a 
Union legislative instrument the definition of damages and to issue guidelines for 
calculation of antitrust damages.1087 Article 2 of the adopted Directive codifies indeed 
that full compensation must include the compensation for actual loss, loss of profit and 
interest. Moreover, in June 2013, the Commission issued a communication 
accompanied by a Practical Guide on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
1084 Recital 41 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1085 Article 17(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1086 See Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the proposal for a 
directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages 
under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union , COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 57. 
1087 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 58-59. 
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breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU.1088 Although these measures are non-binding, it 
is still a positive development that the Directive has improved the assessment of harm 
by giving a greater role to national judges and making the involvement of competition 
authorities in the assessment of harm possible. This could at least somewhat facilitate 
the compensation especially of indirect purchasers and consumers which generally have 
the largest difficulties in proving the exact amount of harm that has been passed on to 
them. 
 
But problems still remain. For instance, no common rules are provided for causation, 
remoteness or quantification of loss, so national divergences will prevail. Furthermore, 
the burden of proof and the standard of proof with regard to quantification of harm will 
largely be determined according to the national rules, which must respect the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness. National courts will also have discretion to decide to 
what degree they will follow the non-binding guidelines for quantification of harm, so 
again the methods relied on may significantly vary from one Member State to 
another.1089 It is also to be expected that economic evidence will prolong and make 
litigation more expensive.1090 
 
4.8. Consensual Dispute Settlement 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions also aims to encourage consensual dispute 
resolution by suspending the limitation period during the consensual dispute resolution 
process. This suspension will be restricted to those parties which are involved or 
represented in the dispute resolution process.1091 Similarly, Member States are to ensure 
that national courts may suspend antitrust damages proceedings in case the parties to 
1088 See Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 167, 
13.6.2013, p. 19-21; and Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on quantifying harm in 
actions for damages based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union Accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in 
actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, SWD(2013) 205, 11.6.2013. 
1089 See VANDENBORRE, I., HOFFMAN LENT, K. and GOETZ T.C., “Actions for antitrust damages in 
the European Union: evaluating the Commission’s Directive proposal”, G.C.L.R., 2014, 7(1), p. 1-9, at p. 
5. 
1090 See HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for 
infringers and victims?”, E.C.L.R. 2014, 35(2), p. 51-55, at p. 53. 
1091 Article 18(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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those proceedings are involved in consensual dispute resolution concerning the same 
damages claim.1092 However, national courts should also consider the interest in an 
expeditious procedure when they decide on a possible suspension of the procedure.1093 
Also, it should be noted that national law in matters of arbitration will not be affected by 
this possibility.1094 
 
The amendments made during the ordinary legislative procedure introduced a maximum 
limit for the suspension of antitrust damages proceedings to two years. Moreover, when 
competition authorities take a decision imposing a fine on infringers, they could take 
into account compensation paid as a result of a consensual settlement as a mitigating 
factor, provided that the compensation has been paid before the decision imposing the 
fine.1095 
 
Overall, the EU legislator considers settlements resolving definitely the issue of 
damages desirable because they reduce uncertainty both for infringers and victims. The 
settlements should strive to cover as many injured parties and victims as possible and 
could take different form: out-of-court settlements, arbitration, mediation, and 
conciliation are specifically mentioned in the Directive. The provisions adopted aim to 
increase the effectiveness of consensual dispute settlement resolution mechanisms and 
facilitate their use.1096  
 
The resolution of antitrust damages actions by ADR could raise some concerns about 
e.g. arbitrators or mediators not acknowledging an antitrust violation.1097 However, in 
the EU, national courts are entitled to annul arbitral awards that infringe the EU 
competition rules.1098 In other words, it would be possible to challenge arbitral awards 
which have disregarded the existence of an antitrust violation. By treating mediators 
similarly as arbitrators, the concerns about disregard of competition law could be 
1092 Article 18(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1093 Recital 45 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1094 Article 18(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1095 Article 18(3) and 18(4) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1096 Recital 43 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1097 See HÖFT, J.C., “Alternative dispute resolution in antitrust cases? On the role of mediation in US 
antitrust and EU and German competition law”, E.C.L.R., 2013, 34(8), p. 434-442, at p. 441. 
1098 See Judgment in Eco Swiss, C-126/97, EU:C:1999:269, paragraphs 37-39.  
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addressed.1099 However, if the victims are consumers, the costs of challenging a 
settlement based on mediation on the ground of the existence of an antitrust violation 
could deter them from seeking redress. 
 
Finally, the claim of an injured party which settles is reduced with the settling co-
infringer’s share of the harm inflicted upon the injured party.1100 It is important to note 
that the whole share of harm of the settling co-infringer is reduced irrespective of 
whether or not the amount of the settlement is the same as its share of the harm. This is 
aimed to ensure that non-settling infringers are not unduly affected by the settlement to 
which they were not a party.1101 The remaining claim of the injured party can only be 
exercised against non-settling co-infringers who are not allowed to recover contribution 
for it from the settling co-infringer.1102 Nevertheless, if the non-settling co-infringers 
cannot pay the damages corresponding to the remaining claim of the settling victim, the 
latter can claim it from the settling co-infringer, unless the consensual settlement 
expressly bars this possibility.1103 These rules have been adopted in order to encourage 
consensual settlements.1104 
 
Damages which have been paid following consensual settlement must also be taken into 
account when the national courts determine the amount of contribution that a co-
infringer may recover from other co-infringers on the basis of their relative 
responsibility for the harm caused by the infringement.1105 This provision is necessary 
in order to avoid that the total compensation paid by the settling co-infringers is not 
greater than their relative responsibility for the antitrust harm. Issues to consider in 
1099 See HÖFT, J.C., “Alternative dispute resolution in antitrust cases? On the role of mediation in US 
antitrust and EU and German competition law”, E.C.L.R., 2013, 34(8), p. 434-442, at p. 442. 
1100 Article 19(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1101 Recital 46 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1102 This provision consolidates the situation existing today in which settling infringers try to reach that 
result, if possible through the terms of the settlement agreement. See WISKING, S. and DIETZEL, K., 
“European Commission finally publishes measures to facilitate competition law private actions in the 
European Union”, E.C.L.R., 2014, 35(4), p. 185-193, at p. 191. 
1103 Article 19(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1104 Recital 46 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1105 Article 19(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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determining the relative responsibility of co-infringers include their involvement in the 
substantive, temporal and geographical scope of the infringement, which might vary.1106 
 
The Draft Directive stated that it aimed to make it possible for victims of antitrust 
violations to obtain full compensation either through damages action in court or through 
consensual out-of court settlements between the parties.1107 However, given the 
advantageous provisions for settling co-infringers (e.g. suspension of antitrust damages 
proceedings, reduced liability, and limited contribution obligation), there could be a risk 
that the Directive would in practice rather result in increasing alternative dispute 
resolution at the cost of damages claims. This could be problematic because injured 
parties generally tend to be the weaker party and there will not be equality of arms since 
the infringers usually have access to most of the relevant evidence needed to prove the 
infringement and the extent of the damage. Admittedly, the rules on disclosure of 
evidence reduce this information asymmetry, but only to the extent that claimants are 
able to comply with the rather strict condition for identifying the exact documents the 
disclosure of which they wish to request.  
 
The amount of settlement is also likely to be lower than the actual harm suffered by the 
injured parties, precisely because the Directive only partly facilitates the bringing of 
damages claims, but has excluded opt-out collective actions which could make a 
significant different to victims possibilities of obtaining compensation. In addition, if a 
risk of efficient collective actions existed, it would also make the infringers more 
interested in trying to satisfy the claims of the injured parties in terms corresponding 
more closely to the actual harm suffered, as very low settlement offers could otherwise 
encourage the injured parties to have recourse to court proceedings instead of ADR. 
 
Finally, for consumers, and maybe also small-and medium-sized undertakings, ADR 
could however sometimes offer at least a possibility of obtaining some compensation 
since without effective collective redress mechanisms their current exercise of the right 
to compensation is limited in most Member States. This could, for instance, be the case 
in infringements involving a large number of consumers, if the infringers are concerned 
1106 Recital 47 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1107 Explanatory Memorandum of the Draft Directive, at p. 19. 
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about their reputation and would prefer to settle the issue of compensation quietly and 
more quickly. Moreover, mediation would make an amicable resolution of the dispute 
possible.1108 But again ADR will only offer a real remedy if there are effective antitrust 
damages actions to fall back on should the infringers not be willing to reach a fair 
settlement. 
 
4.9. The Missing Pieces 
The new Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions has certain positive value. First of all, 
it harmonizes certain rules governing antitrust damages actions, such as establishing 
certain minimum obligations for disclosure of evidence and the limitation periods for 
bringing antitrust damages actions, which reduces the existent divergences of the 
national procedural and tort rules. It also codifies some of the Union acquis concerning 
antitrust damages claims in one document (e.g. the right to full compensation and the 
scope of damages). The measures included in the Directive should contribute to 
facilitating somewhat the bringing of antitrust damages actions by reducing the 
information asymmetry between infringers and injured parties, introducing certain 
rebuttable presumptions which aim to ease the burden of proof of victims, and giving 
claimants sufficient time to bring their damages claim. 
 
However, the big losers are consumers, who will continue struggling with rather limited 
possibilities of proving the harm that they have suffered as well as high costs and risks 
of litigation, often in return for low compensation if the action is successful. Their 
limited opportunities of obtaining compensation do not fit well with the aim to ensure 
full compensation and to create a level-playing field for antitrust damages actions, and 
remove obstacles to the proper functioning of the internal market. In fact, consumers in 
Member States who facilitate the bringing of effective collective actions are more likely 
to obtain compensation and, as a consequence, undertakings established in such 
Member States will face a greater risk of civil liability for competition law 
infringements. 
 
1108 For the possibility of using mediation in private enforcement, see HÖFT, J.C., “Alternative dispute 
resolution in antitrust cases? On the role of mediation in US antitrust and EU and German competition 
law”, E.C.L.R., 2013, 34(8), p. 434-442. 
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This does not signify that competition law enforcement in the EU should be private-
enforcement driven, but it should be a credible and useful complement to public 
enforcement. The manner in which the provisions of the new Directive are drafted 
focuses considerably more on protecting the effectiveness of public enforcement on the 
cost of private enforcement, instead of allowing for a more balanced approach in line 
with the case law of the Court of Justice.1109 Moreover, enforcement of EU law 
generally builds on both public and private enforcement, which was exemplified already 
60 years ago by the seminal judgment in Van Gend en Loos.1110 Private claimants 
therefore have an important role to play in ensuring the effectiveness of the EU 
competition rules. 
 
A few more additional observations are appropriate before the main flaws with the new 
directive are analyzed below. Given that the legal instrument is a directive, it has to be 
implemented into the national legal systems before it becomes binding. The Member 
States will have two years from the entry into force of the Directive,1111 but they have 
certain discretion as to the form and means they choose in order to implement the 
provisions of the Directive. This means that some divergences between Member States 
will still exist even after the measures have been implemented at national level. This is 
especially the case with those provisions which do not contain very specific obligations, 
but refer, for instance, to the limits imposed by the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness. The implemented measures will also not apply to antitrust damages 
actions which have been brought before the Directive enters into force,1112 so it will 
take some additional time before the provisions start to have effect in the national legal 
systems. 
 
It is also important to note that the Directive does not include all the measures suggested 
in the Failed Draft Directive or in the White Paper and, finally, even some of the 
measures in the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions were amended during the 
1109 See Judgment in Pfleiderer, EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 30 and Judgment in Donau Chemie, 
EU:C:2013:366, paragraphs 47-48. 
1110 Judgment in van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1. 
 
1111 Article 21 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1112 Article 22 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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ordinary legislative procedure. For instance, it does not provide for collective redress or 
contain rules regarding the fault requirement, or costs of antitrust damages actions. The 
main issues arguably missing will be analyzed below, but a more detailed proposal for 
how the Directive should be amended in order to make antitrust damages claims a 
credible complement to public enforcement and to better ensure the full compensation 
of victims of antitrust violations. 
 
4.9.1. The Fault Requirement 
Neither the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions nor the adopted Directive 
contains any provision harmonizing the issue of the fault requirement, i.e. whether fault 
should be required or not. The Draft Directive did mention that the fault requirement 
had been discarded,1113 whereas the adopted Directive does mention that any condition 
relating, inter alia, to culpability must comply with EU case law, the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness and the Directive.1114 The Failed Draft Directive did not 
establish either whether fault should be a requirement, but it reiterated that in case a 
Member State were to require the proof of fault, once an infringement of Article 101 or 
102 TFEU had been proven, it would be presumed that the infringer had acted at fault, 
unless it was able to refute it.1115 The infringer could refute fault if it were able to show 
that it could not reasonably have been aware that its conduct distorted competition.1116 
 
It is worth noting that under EU competition law, in order to demonstrate that the EU 
antitrust rules have been violated, it is not necessary to prove fault.1117 In practice, the 
fault requirement would only be a potential obstacle to bringing antitrust damages 
actions in those Member States in which the claimant must prove this additional 
element either in relation to the antitrust violation or in relation to the effects of the 
violation, and negligence would not suffice to do so. It is therefore unlikely that the 
fault requirement existing in a relatively few Member States1118 would be one of the 
1113 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, at p. 12. 
1114 Recital 11 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1115 Explanatory Memorandum on the Failed Draft Directive, at p. 9. 
1116 Article 13 of the Failed Draft Directive. 
1117 Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions 
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 31. 
1118 In the other Member States, it is presumed that fault exists if the claimant demonstrates illegality or 
the infringement itself is considered to constitute fault. See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC 
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main reasons for why relatively few damages actions have been brought in the EU to 
date. At least as regards hard-core violations such as cartels, it could be presumed that 
the violation as such would be sufficient to demonstrate at least negligence (and hence 
fault in the Member States concerned) because the illegality of cartels is usually clear-
cut. Consequently, if the infringer had participated in a cartel, it must have known that it 
was illegal and it would at least have behaved in a negligent manner. On the other hand, 
the illegality of vertical restraints might be less obvious. In these cases, the requirement 
of fault could even be welcome since it would serve to distinguish meritorious damages 
claims from the unmeritorious ones. But it would be important to ensure that the burden 
of proof for negligence remains reasonable so that it will not constitute another obstacle 
to bringing a damages claim. The measure proposed in the Failed Draft Directive could 
have served to address this, since it made it possible to rebut the presumption of fault if 
the infringer could show that it could not reasonably have been aware that its conduct 
distorted competition. 
 
Apart from the fault requirement, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions also does 
not either clarify issues, which are relevant in order to assess if the standard of proof for 
an infringement has been met. Causation, remoteness, and foreseeability are not dealt 
with, but will continue to be regulated by national law, although they are subject to the 
limitations established by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.1119 Therefore 
differences in the standard of proof required for proving an antitrust violation are 
expected to prevail. 
 
4.9.2. Collective Redress Mechanisms 
The most noteworthy omission from the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions is the 
lack of any kind of collective redress mechanism. Instead, as stated earlier, the 
Commission limited itself to introducing non-binding recommendations on collective 
redress mechanisms.1120 
 
(2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM 
(2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 31. 
1119 Recital 11 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1120 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
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On the contrary, the Failed Draft Directive, provided for both group actions (similar to 
the opt-in action suggested in the White Paper) brought by two or more victims who had 
suffered harm caused by the same infringement,1121 and representative actions by 
qualified entities on behalf of victims who had suffered harm caused by the same 
infringement.1122 But with respect to representative actions, the Failed Draft Directive 
differed from the White Paper in that it provided that qualified entities should not be 
required to individually identify all the victims belonging to the represented group.1123 
In other words, they should be able to bring so-called opt-out collective actions. This 
would have improved access to justice for consumers, since their individual harm is 
generally too small to make the bringing of opt-in collective actions feasible as there is 
always a risk that too few consumers decide to opt in, which might make the group too 
small for the action to pay off in the first place. 
 
The conditions for qualified entities were similar to those proposed in the White Paper 
but, in addition, the Failed Draft Directive prescribed that Member States were to take 
measures necessary to ensure effective monitoring of the qualified entities in order to 
ascertain that they continued to fulfill the conditions for bringing representative actions, 
and to lay down a procedure for withdrawal of the designation if there was evidence of 
abuse or the entity in question was not acting in the best interest of those it 
represented.1124 
 
However, as stated above, collective actions were excluded from the Draft Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Action. Instead, the Commission opted for issuing a 
Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms which apply not only to 
compensatory collective redress, but also to injunctive collective redress. Moreover, the 
recommendations can be used for violations of rights granted under EU law in general 
which cause mass harm. The recommendations on common principles aim to facilitate 
access to justice, put an end to illegal practices, and allow the compensation of victims 
of violations of rights granted by EU law in mass harm situations.1125 One the one hand, 
1121 Article 4 of the Failed Draft Directive. 
1122 Article 5 of the Failed Draft Directive.  
1123 Article 5(2) and Recital 8 of the Failed Draft Directive.  
1124 Article 6(3) and 6(4) of the Failed Directive. 
1125 Point 1 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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representative entities and/or public authorities should be able to bring representative 
actions.1126 On the other hand, two or more natural or legal persons who have been 
harmed in a mass harm situation may bring a collective redress action.1127 These actions 
should, as a general rule, be based on the “opt-in” principle.1128  
 
These issues and other issues covered by the recommendations, such as the criteria of 
admissibility, funding, representation and lawyers’ fees will be dealt in more detail in 
Chapter Five. At the moment, the focus of the analysis is on the fact that the Directive 
(or any other binding EU legislative measure) will not provide for binding collective 
redress mechanisms in the near/medium-term future. This is problematic since one of 
the main objectives of the Directive of Antitrust Damages Actions, namely to ensure 
“the proper functioning of the internal market for undertakings and consumers”,1129 will 
be difficult to achieve without the possibility of opt-out collective actions being brought 
on behalf of consumers in situations involving in particular numerous, but small and 
dispersed, individual claims.  
 
As have been seen in Chapter Three, the existing collective actions in the Member 
States do not seem to work properly in order to safeguard the interests of consumers in 
the field of competition law. For instance, in Spain only one collective follow-on action 
by the consumer association Ausbanc has been brought to date, and the defendants have 
succeeded in suspending the proceedings several times.1130 In the United Kingdom and 
in France, the “opt-in” model resulted in turn in that neither representative action 
succeeded in building a group that would have represented a large part of the harmed 
consumers. On the contrary, merely a small fraction of the potential claimants decided 
to opt in.1131 
 
1126 Points 4 and 6 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1127 Point 3a) of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1128 Point 21 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1129 Recital 49 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1130 See MARCOS, F., “Competition Law Private Litigation in Spanish Courts (1999-2012)”, G.CL.R., 
2013, Issue 4, p. 167-208, at p.181. 
1131 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07, HODGES, C., The Reform of the Class and Representative 
Actions in European Legal Systems. A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 25, and http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
282 
 
                                                 
The costs of actions also constitute a large obstacle in particular for consumers who 
usually have comparatively small claims in comparison to the potential high costs. They 
therefore often lack sufficient incentives to bring a claim, and frequently bringing a 
following-on individual action is virtually impossible, while stand-alone actions are 
even unthinkable. But also small and medium-sized undertakings might face the same 
hurdles, especially if they are indirect purchasers and would be required to show the 
exact amount of the overcharge that has been passed on to them. For consumers and 
small and medium-sized businesses it would, consequently, be important to be able to 
bring a collective action together with other victims in order to reduce the costs and 
risks of the action, and to actually have an incentive to bring a claim. In addition, the 
possibility of derogating from the cost rules and/or encouraging contingency fees would 
be needed to facilitate effective collective actions. 
 
Nevertheless, the Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms 
also includes features which would be worth exploring in order to propose a binding EU 
legislative measure. For instance, it has a wider scope of application as it does not only 
apply to antitrust violations, but to situations caused by violations of rights granted 
under EU law in general. This is to be welcomed as consumers often face difficulties 
also in bringing claims in other fields than competition law, such as general consumer 
claims or environmental claims. The adoption of a new legislative instrument for 
different types of collective damages actions and collective injunctive relief actions 
would be a desirable development. However, the legislative instrument chosen must be 
a binding instrument if it is to genuinely improve access to justice of consumers.   
 
4.9.3. Cost of Actions 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions does not contain any specific provisions 
regarding the costs of antitrust damages actions. This issue was also not mentioned in 
the Failed Draft Directive. The White Paper did also not propose any legislative 
measures regarding cost rules, but merely encouraged the Member States to reflect on 
how they could adjust their cost rules and court fees to facilitate meritorious actions.1132  
 
1132 See Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 
165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 9. 
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However, the costs of damages actions often constitute a significant obstacle to bringing 
an antitrust damages claim, especially for consumers with small individual claims. In 
addition, the “loser pays” principle is applied in most Member States,1133 which 
increases the risks of bringing an antitrust damages action. The lack of opt-out 
collective actions in turn makes it practically impossible to bring any low-value claims. 
This is why some rules or, to start with, at least recommendations concerning the cost 
rules would be needed. Although there has been opposition to the introduction of 
contingency fees,1134 today they are allowed in some Member States, such as Spain1135 
and Finland,1136 and in certain limited situations, Germany.1137 Similarly, a modification 
of the “loser pays” principle should be considered in line with Directive 2004/48/EC on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights.1138 
 
4.9.4. The Question of Punitive Damages 
The issue of punitive damages has been addressed in the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions by excluding this possibility. Article 2 of the Directive provides that 
punitive or multiple damages must not be the result of full compensation, and it 
prohibits over-compensation in general. Similarly, the Recommendation on Collective 
Redress Mechanisms states that punitive damages should be prohibited.1139 Punitive 
damages are controversial and have been opposed by a number of stakeholders.1140 
 
1133 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, p 74. 
1134 See Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 33. 
1135 Judgment of the Supreme Court No 5837/2005 of November 4th, 2008. 
1136 See VIITANEN, K., “Oikeudenkäyntikulut ja oikeuksien saatavuus”, Defensor Legis, 87, No 4, 2006, 
p. 614-632, at p. 6. 
1137 Section 4a(1) of the Lawyers’ Remuneration Act. 
1138 This directive allows a derogation if the “loser pays” principle does not result in a fair outcome in the 
case. 
1139 Point 31 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1140 See e.g. Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 
COM(2013)0404, 27.1.2014, at p. 33, and Impact Assessment Report on the Directive, at p. 87. 
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Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the Court of Justice has not considered punitive 
damages to be contrary to European public order. Moreover, pursuant to the principle of 
equivalence, they must be available for an infringement of the EU antitrust rules if they 
are available for an infringement of national competition law, and are awarded in 
accordance with the general principles of EU law.1141 The prohibition of punitive or 
multiple damages at Union level therefore goes against existing EU law case and should 
be reconsidered. Instead, its usefulness for certain types of antitrust violations, namely 
hard-core cartels, should be examined since it could lead higher deterrence of the most 
harmful competition infringements. Moreover, the introduction of e.g. double damages 
for hard-core cartels would make it possible to offer further advantages to immunity 
recipients in liberating them from paying such punitive damages. 
 
4.9.5. Distribution of Damages 
As to the distribution of damages awarded in a representative action, the new Directive 
only mentions the need to ensure that compensation for actual loss paid at any level in 
the distribution chain corresponds to the overcharge harm caused at that level. The idea 
is therefore to only award damages that correspond to the actual harm of each victim. 
This is following the principles of the Failed Draft Directive and the White Paper that 
damages were to be distributed, so far as possible, to the victims. However, regarding 
representative actions, the Failed Draft Directive would have allowed Member States to 
use part of the award to cover reasonable expenses incurred in bringing the 
representative action.1142  
 
The issue of distribution of damages is important especially in cases involving 
claimants at different levels in the distribution chain and, in particular, in collective 
actions. There would therefore be a need to decide how damages which cannot be 
distributed among the victims should be distributed. Thus, rules concerning cy pres 
distribution should be provided. There is also a call for considering if it is in line with 
the common sense of justice that (due to the notable fear of over-compensation which is 
reflected in the new Directive) in situations where there might be some uncertainty 
about the exact amount of harm suffered, infringers are allowed to keep the part of the 
1141 See Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 93. 
1142 Article 5(5) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
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damages which cannot be exactly allocated instead of using it for a purpose benefiting 
the society, directly or indirectly. Arguably, a fairer solution would be to punish the 
infringers, not the injured parties, in such cases. 
 
4.9.6. Jurisdiction and Applicable Law 
The issues concerning jurisdiction and applicable law regarding antitrust damages 
actions are largely regulated by the Brussels I Regulation,1143 which is applicable to 
civil and commercial matters, and the Rome II Regulation,1144 which contains rules on 
conflicts of laws for non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. 
Moreover, the Rome I Regulation regulates the law applicable to contractual obligations 
civil and commercial matters.1145 The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions contains 
very few provisions relating to these issues, and the most relevant one is that national 
courts should have the possibility of consolidating claims in order to avoid multiple 
liabilities or avoid liability. But the provisions will not affect the obligations of national 
courts under Brussels I or, in January 2015, Brussels I bis.1146 Regarding the choice of 
forum, it should be noted that these provisions allow, on the one hand, the parties to 
include a jurisdictional clause in their contract. On the other hand, it also allows post-
claim consensual agreements to remove claims from the courts of the consumer’s 
domicile, which could lead to forum-shopping.1147 
 
An issue which might cause a problem is the so-called torpedo claims where, for 
instance, the infringing party initiates a defensive proceeding in an available 
jurisdiction, which is the most likely to decide in its favor or make the proceedings 
otherwise more difficult for the claimant. The lis pendens rules would then prevent the 
claimant from bringing concurrent proceedings before the courts of any Member State. 
Such torpedo actions are possible because there are several jurisdictions that could be 
1143 As stated, the Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001) will be replaced by Brussels I bis  
(Regulation 1215/2012). 
1144 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199, 31.7.2007. 
1145 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6–16. 
1146 Article 15 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1147 See HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for 
infringers and victims?”, E.C.L.R. 2014, 35(2), p. 51-55, at p. 55. 
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competent to hear antitrust damages claims as Brussels I and Brussels bis provide for 
general jurisdiction1148 and special jurisdiction.1149 
 
Also, the coordination of pending public and private enforcement actions in different 
Member States could be problematic following the exclusion of probative effect of 
decisions of a NCA or competition court when damages actions are brought in a 
different Member State. If the infringers and the geographical scope of the market 
affected by the competition infringement are the same, it would be difficult from the 
point of legal certainty to justify different outcomes as to the existence of an 
infringement. 
 
4.10. Conclusions 
The new Directive is a rather modest attempt to enhance private enforcement of the EU 
competition rules. Instead, it appears more concerned about preserving the role of public 
enforcement and only leaves a less important, subsidiary role to private enforcement. It 
does not in fact address the needs of arguably the largest group of victims of antitrust 
violations, namely final consumers. Although their individual claims might not usually 
be very significant, their overall losses may amount to considerable amounts, which the 
infringers will be able to keep, unless there is an effective redress mechanism available. 
It has already been demonstrated that at national level opt-in collective actions do not 
seem to work in cases involving consumers, as the final group of claimants tend to be 
too small for the collective action to pay off.1150 Therefore, larger incentives and 
improved financing of collective damages actions brought by consumers or on behalf of 
consumers would be required. 
 
It is not suggested that private enforcement should replace public enforcement, but it 
should indeed play a complementary, but significant enough, role. The rules on 
1148 Article 2 of Brussels I, i.e. Article 4 of Brussels bis, in antitrust damages actions. 
1149 Article 5(3) of Brussels I, i.e. Article 7(2) of Brussels bis, in antitrust damages actions. 
1150 E.g. a claim for damages brought by the consumers’ association Which? in the United Kingdom on 
behalf of only approximately 130 individual consumers against JJB Sports plc., although the number of 
victims was estimated to be approximately 2 million. See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim 
for damages under section 47B of the Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07 and HODGES, C., 
The Reform of the Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems. A New Framework for 
Collective Redress in Europe, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 25. 
287 
 
                                                 
disclosure of evidence in the Directive represent some improvement regarding access to 
evidence, which is one of the most important obstacles to bringing antitrust damages 
actions, but the absolute protection of leniency statements will excessively protect 
information needed by claimants as evidence so as to bring an antitrust damages action.  
Instead, a balancing test should be conducted in accordance with existing case law, 
which would consider the needs of both public and private enforcement. It would still 
be likely to protect the effectiveness of public enforcement, so the incentives for 
submitting leniency applications should not be considerably altered.  
 
It should also be borne in mind that an immunity recipient already benefits from various 
advantages (no fines and limited civil liability). Thus, any additional benefits should not 
be automatically made at the cost of injured parties. Instead, other ways of awarding 
cooperation in the context of leniency programs should be considered: e.g. the 
introduction of double damages for hard-core cartels for other infringers but immunity 
recipients. This would allow for an increased leverage to maintain the attractiveness of 
leniency programs and thereby to safeguard the effectiveness of public enforcement, but 
at the same time allowing better to consider the interests and rights of victims of 
antitrust violations. 
 
The most pressing reforms required to realistically bring about a significant change 
include efficient collective redress mechanisms including opt-out collective actions at 
least for cases involving scattered damages amongst numerous claimants (above all 
involving consumers), modification of the cost rules in order to make contingency fees 
available and/or to improve public financing and alternative funding. In addition, 
derogations from the “loser pays” principle should be modelled after Directive 
2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights,1151 which allows courts 
to derogate from the “loser pays” principle if its application does not lead to a fair result 
in the case at issue.1152 
 
1151 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30.4.2004, p.  
1152 See LESKINEN, “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 8(1), 2011, 87-121, at p. 199. 
288 
 
                                                 
Although the Directive has some merit in that it harmonizes some issues that in the past 
have created obstacles for private enforcement, and codifies some principles of EU law 
which governed damages actions, many of the measures to be introduced merely 
constitute minimum harmonization, and some of them have been even further watered 
down in the legislative procedure. This will result in national divergences being 
maintained in a number of areas, such the quantification of damages, collective redress 
and the costs of bringing antitrust damages actions. Therefore, the Directive is a missed 
opportunity to improve access to justice in cases involving infringements of the EU 
competition rules, and the common rules proposed will not be sufficient to ensure the 
effective and uniform enforcement of the Union right to compensation for infringements 
of Article 101 and 102 TFEU. It will also not significantly improve access to justice for 
consumers. 
 
These issues should be examined and remedied when the Directive is reviewed four 
years after it has been implemented, i.e. most probably in year 2020. 
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5. THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION ON COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
MECHANISMS 
5.1. Background and General Overview 
Collective actions generally enhance victims’ access to justice since they can take 
advantages of economies of scale and bundle their resources which, in turn, reduces the 
costs of the action. As concluded in the previous chapter, they could therefore serve to 
improve especially the redress of consumers who have suffered harm from antitrust 
violations. As demonstrated above, today consumers seldom bring damages actions, and 
the few that have been brought, have not been very successful.1153 In light of the limited 
case law of collective actions brought for antitrust damages, the existing collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States clearly suffer from a number of flaws, which 
make it both burdensome and expensive to bring collective claims. However, whether 
the introduction of new collective action mechanisms would increase the effectiveness 
of antitrust damages actions would depend on the type of collective actions introduced. 
In addition, there must be sufficient funding as well as incentives for collective actions 
to be brought.1154 
 
Nevertheless, as stated in the Chapter Four, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions 
does not provide for any kind of collective actions, but instead the Commission has 
introduced non-binding recommendations on collective redress mechanisms.1155 This 
represents a significant change from the Commission’s initial plans regarding collective 
redress. Originally, the Commission envisaged specific collective antitrust damages 
actions. Victims of antitrust violations were to be entitled to bring an opt-in collective 
action for damages, or be represented in a representative action for damages by 
qualified entities. The qualified entities were to be designated in advance by the 
Member States according to national procedures, representing legitimate and defined 
1153 See e.g. Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07 and http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
1154 See LESKINEN, C., “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and Cost Rules”, Comp. L.Rev. Volume 8(1), 
2011, p. 87-121, at p. 88, and LESKINEN, C., “Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU: The Opt-In v. the 
Opt-Out Model”, Working Paper IE Law School, WPLS10-03, 26.4.2010, at p. 29, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612731. 
1155 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
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interests. Alternatively, other existing entities could be certified in order to bring a 
representative action in relation to a particular infringement on an ad hoc basis. But the 
second option were to be limited to entities whose primary task is to protect the defined 
interests of their members, such as trade associations defending the interests of their 
members, active in a given industry. Qualified entities having standing in one Member 
State were also automatically to be granted standing in all other Member States. These 
collective redress mechanisms were to ensure a minimum level of protection, but 
Member States could decide to go beyond these types of actions conforming to their 
legal traditions.1156  
 
The Failed Draft Directive also provided both for group actions brought by two or more 
victims similar to the opt-in action suggested in the White Paper,1157 and representative 
actions by qualified entities, but the representative body would not have been required 
to individually identify all the victims belonging to the represented group.1158 It also 
provided for additional safeguards by prescribing that Member States were to take 
measures necessary to ensure effective monitoring of the qualified entities in order to 
ascertain that they continued to fulfill the conditions for bringing representative actions, 
and to lay down a procedure for withdrawal of the designation if there was evidence of 
abuse, or the entity in question was not acting in the best interest of those it 
represented.1159  
 
During the legislative procedure of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, the 
European Parliament and other bodies consulted were in general in favor of introducing 
collective actions, but stated that the admissibility of the action should be assessed by an 
appropriate national authorizing body,1160 and settlement through alternative dispute 
1156 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 18-20. 
1157 Article 4 of the Failed Draft Directive. 
1158 Article 5(2) and Recital 8 of the Failed Draft Directive.  
1159 Article 6(3) and 6(4) of the Failed Draft Directive. 
1160 See e.g. Opinion of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the White 
Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
(2008/2154(INI)), 3.12.2008, at § 6 and Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the White Paper 
on Antitrust Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 
22.1.2009, at § 4. 
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resolution should be encouraged.1161 The Committee on Legal Affairs found that any 
proposal in this area should be based on a model that could also be applied to other 
kinds of disputes in order to provide judicial protection for consumers in similar 
cases.1162 The European Parliament, in turn, highlighted that measures at Union level 
were not to lead to arbitrary or unnecessary fragmentation of national procedural 
laws.1163 
 
The first indication of a changed stance of the Commission was the launch of a public 
consultation concerning collective redress in the EU1164 in which the Commission 
suggested the adoption of a horizontal approach regarding collective redress. In other 
words, the under-lying idea was to adopt a common framework that would be 
applicable to different types of actions, such as competition law damages actions and 
consumer and environmental claims, because victims of antitrust violations, 
environmental damages or breaches of consumer rights often face problems that are 
common to them when they seek to enforce their rights. Moreover, collective redress 
mechanisms were considered necessary since otherwise it is very difficult and/or 
unattractive for consumers and SMEs in practice to bring a claim for damages.1165 The 
identification of common legal principles on collective redress was intended to serve as 
guidance for an EU-wide legislative initiative called “An EU framework for collective 
redress”, foreseen in the Commission Work Programme 20121166 and called for by the 
European Parliament.1167 
1161 See e.g. Opinion of the Committee on the  Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the White 
Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
(2008/2154(INI)), 3.12.2008, at § 9. 
1162 See Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions for 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 22.1.2009, at § 2c). See also 
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the White paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, OJ C 228, 25.3.2009, p. 40-46 at p. 44. 
1163 See European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)), at § 5. 
1164 See Commission Staff Working Document, Public consultation: Towards a coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress, SEC(2001)172 final, 4.2.2011. 
1165 See ALMUNIA, J., “Common standards for group claims across the EU”, speech delivered at EU 
University of Valladolid, School of Law, Valladolid, on October 15th, 2010. 
1166 Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work 
Programme 2012, COM(2011) 777 final, 15.11.2011, at p. 20. 
1167 See European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach 
to Collective Redress’ (2011/2089(INI)), 2.12.2012. 
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 The feed-back regarding the public consultation showed that, in general, consumers 
were in favor of the introduction of collective redress mechanisms, whereas businesses 
were against. Moreover, such mechanisms find support amongst academics. More 
lawyers were either skeptical about or opposed to collective actions, although there 
were different opinions. Similarly, Member States were divided. Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Latvia were in favor of introducing binding EU rules with 
regard to specific policy fields or issues, while others were strongly opposed to the 
introduction of collective actions. But overall, a majority of the stakeholders supported 
establishing common principles for collective redress at EU level, although on the 
condition that they should fit into the EU legal system and the legal orders of the 
Member States. In addition, the practical experience of existing national collective 
redress systems should be considered.1168 
 
The feed-back obtained during the legislative procedure, especially by the European 
Parliament, as well as the public consultation regarding collective redress results 
explain why the Commission decided to extend the scope for collective redress 
mechanisms to other situations than antitrust violations which have caused mass 
harm,1169 and not only suggested collective actions for damages claims, but also for 
injunctive relief. This extended scope is welcome because injunctive relief is also 
important for the victims of antitrust violations (and other mass harm situations). 
Similarly, it is justified to extend the redress mechanisms to other situations in which 
consumers have suffered mass harm due to violations of rights granted under EU law. 
However, it is unsatisfactory that the Commission has opted for merely issuing 
recommendations on collective redress mechanisms instead of providing for binding 
collective actions. 
 
1168 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 6. 
1169 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65, at Recital 5. Hereinafter, this document will 
be referred to as “The Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms” or “Recommendation”. 
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The following sections will analyze these recommendations in order to determine their 
main flaws, and the issues that should be modified in order to contribute to enhanced 
private enforcement. 
 
5.2. Purpose and Scope of the Recommendation 
The common principles laid down in the recommendations aim to facilitate access to 
justice, put an end to illegal practices, and allow the compensation of victims of 
violations of rights granted under EU law in mass harm situations. At the same time, 
their objective is to ensure appropriate safeguards to avoid abuse.1170 The Commission 
recommends that all Member States should provide for collective redress mechanisms 
for both injunctive and compensatory relief. These national mechanisms should respect 
the same common principles established in the Recommendation and different legal 
traditions, and these common principles should apply in all cases of collective 
redress,1171 with the exception of existing sectorial mechanisms of injunctive relief 
provided for by EU law.1172 The approach chosen is therefore horizontal, i.e. they 
should apply in all fields covered by the Recommendation. The procedures should be 
fair, equitable, timely, and not excessively expensive.1173 
 
The Recommendation establishes, on the one hand, principles common to injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress and, on the other hand, specific principles which 
relate to each of these forms of collective redress. Moreover, they contain some 
suggestions concerning the registry of collective redress actions, as well as 
recommendations on the supervision and reporting of the implementation of the 
principles laid down in the Recommendations. 
 
The Commission itself considers the horizontal Recommendation and the sector-
specific Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions as a "package" that reflects a balanced 
1170 Ibid., at point 1. 
1171 Points 2 and 3(e) of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1172 Recital 14 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1173 Point 2 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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approach, which it has deliberately chosen.1174 It has also expressly stated that the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions leaves it to Member States to decide whether or 
not to introduce collective redress actions for antitrust damages.1175  
 
This approach is regrettable, as the existing collective actions the Member States are not 
effective in order to safeguard the interests of consumers in the field of competition law. 
For instance, in Spain only one collective follow-on action by the consumer association 
Ausbanc has been brought to date,1176 and in Sweden1177 and Finland1178 there have 
been no antitrust collective actions at all. In the United Kingdom and in France, due to 
the “opt-in” model, merely a small fraction of the potential claimants joined the 
representative action in question.1179 In Germany and in Ireland, collective actions are 
not even available for claiming damages for antitrust violations.1180 At the other end of 
the spectrum, Denmark1181 and Portugal1182 allow for opt-out collective actions in 
certain situations, and the future UK collective action promises to ease mass consumers 
claims resulting from antitrust violations, as well as opens the door for collective 
actions by businesses.1183 There are thus significant differences between the availability 
of and forms of collective actions in the different Member States, although it seems that 
1174 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 4, Note 10. 
1175 Ibid., at p. 4. 
1176 See MARCOS, F., “Competition Law Private Litigation in Spanish Courts (1999-2012)”, G.CL.R., 
Issue 4, 2013, p. 167-208, at p. 181. 
1177 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHRC Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 7. 
1178 See AINE, A., AHRC Project, “FINLAND, National Report”, at p. 12. 
1179 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07, HODGES, C., The Reform of the Class and Representative 
Actions in European Legal Systems. A New Framework for Collective Redress in Europe, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, and http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
1180 Section 33(2) of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition only provides for injunctive 
collective actions. 
1181 In case the individual claims of the group members do not exceed 2,000 DKK, public authorities can 
bring an opt-out collective action in Denmark. See GAUDET, R., “Turning a blind eye: the Commission’s 
rejection of opt-out class actions overlooks Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch experience” E.C.L.R., 
Volume 30, Issue 3, 2009, p. 107-117, at p. 114. 
1182 Chapter 3, Section 14 of Participation and Popular Action Law 83/95 of August 31st, 1995. 
1183 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 32. 
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none of the opt-in collective actions are particularly efficient in compensating 
consumers.   
 
Also, comparing compensatory collective action to injunctive relief, it should be 
mentioned that there has been some harmonization regarding injunctive relief, i.e. 
Directive 2009/22/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests,1184 which 
is applicable to infringements of the EU directives listed in the Annex I of the directive 
the effect of which is to harm collective interests of consumers.1185 But the directive 
does not create a right to claim compensation. 
 
On the other hand, the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms intends to 
establish some common principles not only for injunctive collective redress, but also for 
compensatory redress, concerning standing to bring a representative action, 
admissibility of such actions, information about such actions, reimbursement of legal 
costs of the winning party, funding, and cross-border cases.1186 Regarding specifically 
compensatory collective redress, the Commission has issued recommendations relating 
to the construction of the group based on the “opt-in” principle, collective ADR and 
settlements, legal representation and lawyers’ fees, punitive damages, funding, and 
collective follow-on actions.1187 These are all important issues to consider in designing 
an optimal compensatory collective action but, arguably, the legal instrument chosen 
will fail to bring about a significant improvement of compensatory collective relief in a 
medium-term future. Instead, a directive would be a more efficient legal instrument 
since it imposes binding obligations on the Member States, while it still allows 
respecting different legal traditions, and leaves Member States some choice as to the 
form of the measures to be implemented. 
 
However, the Commission is right in believing that other areas where Union rights have 
been violated than the field of competition law should also be enforced uniformly 
throughout the EU. The horizontal approach to collective redress is therefore 
1184 Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions 
for the protection of consumers' interests, OJ L 110, 1.5.2009, p. 30–36. 
1185 Article 1 of Directive 2009/22/EC. 
1186 Part III of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1187 Part V of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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acknowledged to be correct. Given that injunctive relief for infringements of EU rights 
in the consumer field has already been provided for cross-border situations, arguably 
collective compensatory (and injunctive) relief in order ensure access to justice and stop 
infringements in mass harm situations would also require binding measures at EU level. 
In particular in cases where, for instance, an antitrust violation causes harm in another 
Member States, EU-wide collective actions would be needed in order to ensure the 
uniform and effective enforcement of the Union right to damages. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, there would also be a legal basis for adopting a Union 
legislative measure in this field.  
 
5.3. Standing to Bring Collective Actions 
The Commissions recommends the Member States to provide both for representative 
actions brought by representative entities and collective redress actions brought by two 
or more natural or legal persons who have been harmed in a mass harm situation to 
claim compensation (or an injunction).1188 It is welcome that not only representative 
actions should be provided for, but collective actions could also be brought by 
individuals. One of the main reasons is that, to date, even if representative actions are 
widely available in the Member States, they have not been brought extensively.1189 
Arguably, this shows that the existing forms of representative actions need 
improvements in order to make them work in practice. This inactivity of consumer 
associations in bringing representative actions is mainly due to the lack of sufficient 
financial means to fund the actions, or unwillingness to accept the risks of the costs of 
losing.1190 Because of the limited financial resources available to consumer associations 
and other representative bodies, they are forced to prioritize their action.1191 
 
Moreover, the incentives to bring representative actions are also smaller than for 
collective actions initiated by individuals or lawyers, since the financial gains will 
usually go to the victims (or sometimes to a fund established for the benefit of the group 
1188 Point 3a) of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1189 See HODGES, C., “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues”, C.J.Q., 26(JAN), 2007, p. 96-
123, at p. 115.  
1190 Ibid., at p. 115.  
1191 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 21. 
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or to finance future actions), and the representative entity will only obtain compensation 
for its legal costs if the action is successful. Similarly, the financial risks involved in 
bringing an action are likely to encourage the representative bodies to only bring actions 
that they would be certain of winning, while they would avoid bringing complex 
cases.1192 Because of all these reasons, the option for individuals or legal persons to 
bring themselves a collective action increases their access to justice, provided that they 
have access to funding, and the costs and other risks of the action can be kept in check. 
 
As to representative actions, criteria should be established in order to determine the 
eligibility of representative entities. This is particularly important because only the 
representative entity, not the group, is party to the representative action, so the 
representative entity must genuinely act in the best interest of the group.1193 The 
minimum criteria should include the entity having a non-profit character; that there is a 
direct relationship between its main objectives and the Union rights that have allegedly 
been violated in respect of which the action is brought; and sufficient capacity of the 
entity as regards financial and human resources, and legal expertise to represent 
multiple claimants acting in their best interest.1194 The representative entity should be 
required to prove that it meets these criteria.1195 Furthermore, the representative entities 
must at all times meet at least all these requirements.1196 In addition to representative 
entities which have been officially designated in advance in accordance to the minimum 
criteria, the national authorities or courts of the Member States should also be able to 
certify entities on an ad hoc basis for a particular representative action.1197  
 
1192 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Recommendations from the Office of Fair Trading, OFT916resp, November 
2007, at p. 23. 
1193 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 10. 
1194 Point 4 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1195 Recital 18 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1196 Point 5 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1197 Point 6 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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These two different ways of designating/certifying representative entities were also 
suggested in the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions1198 and the Failed Draft 
Directive.1199 It is crucial that it would be possible to certify an entity to bring a 
representative action on an ad hoc basis because entities designated in advance might 
not necessarily always be apt to act in the best interest of the claimants, be it because of 
the influence of political interests, or the lack of financial resources. Otherwise 
claimants might also be barred from seeking compensation in meritorious cases.1200 In 
this respect, the Recommendation will enhance the redress possibilities in some 
Member States where representative entities currently have to satisfy the conditions 
defined by law in order to be able to bring representative actions. But an issue to 
determine will still be the extent of discretion left to the court to certify a representative 
action on an ad hoc basis. 
 
Additionally, or alternatively, the Commission recommends that public authorities 
should be empowered to bring representative actions.1201 This possibility also exists 
already in some Member States (e.g. Denmark and Sweden) so it is important to 
maintain this option in order to take into account the legal systems and legal traditions 
of the Member States in designing EU-wide collective redress actions. 
 
As to the definition of the group represented in a compensatory representative action, 
the group is composed by individuals or legal persons who have been harmed by the 
same alleged infringement of a right conferred by Union law in a mass harm 
situation.1202 Collective actions brought by two or more individuals (or legal persons) 
will as a general rule, be based on the “opt-in” principle, thus requiring the express 
consent of any natural or legal person wishing to join the action. Exceptions to this 
principle are possible either by law or by court order, but in those cases they must be 
1198 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 18-20. 
1199 Article 4 of the Failed Draft Directive.  
1200 See LESKINEN, C., “Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU: The Opt-In v. the Opt-Out 
Model”, Working Paper IE Law School, WPLS10-03, 26.4.2010, at p. 25, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=161273. 
1201 Point 7 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1202 Point 3(d) of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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duly justified “by reasons of sound administration of justice”.1203 A member of the 
group should be free to opt out from the action at any time before the final decision by 
the court, or before it is otherwise validly settled. The conditions for opting out from the 
action should be the same as those which apply to withdrawal in individual actions. 
Therefore, members of the group should have the choice of pursuing their claims in 
another form, provided that it does not undermine the sound administration of 
justice.1204 Thus, the judgment will only be binding on those who have opted to join the 
collective redress action.1205 
 
It should also be possible for potential claimants to opt in the collective action at any 
time before the judgment is given, or it is otherwise validly settled, again as long as this 
does not undermine the sound administration of justice.1206 This opportunity is crucial 
in order to ensure that the group of claimants will be sufficiently large in order to merit 
the bringing of the collective redress action. 
 
The defendant should also be informed about the composition of the group of claimants 
and any changes in the group.1207 This requirement is necessary in order to respect the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial, and to comply with Article 6(1) of the European Human 
Rights Convention1208 and Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.1209 
 
Arguments often made in order to support the “opt-in” model include that it is less 
prone to abuse than “opt-out” collective actions, since the parties are free to choose 
whether to participate in the action. Another benefit mentioned is that it facilitates the 
determination of the value of the collective action, simply consisting of the sum of all 
individual claims, which makes it easier for the court to assess the merits of the case, 
1203 Point 21 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1204 Point 22 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1205 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 11. 
1206 Point 23 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1207 Point 24 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1208 Available at www.echr.coe.int/ECHR. 
1209 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. 
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and the admissibility of the collective action.1210 It is also considered compatible with 
Member States legal traditions because group members cannot be bound by a judgment 
resulting from the collective action against their will.1211  
 
On the other hand, “opt-out” collective actions are precisely accused of being 
unconstitutional or incompatible with national legal traditions, since a party does not 
necessary preserve the autonomy to choose whether to join the collective action.1212 
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that members should be provided with a 
possibility of opting out from the action. This problem would therefore only apply in 
those cases where all group members cannot be defined and reached in time in order to 
genuinely allow them to opt out. 
 
Some opposition to the “opt-out” model also exists because it is considered not to 
achieve the aim of collective redress, i.e. to obtain compensation for harm suffered, 
since the damages will not be distributed to the injured parties as they are not 
identified.1213 However, arguably, it would at least partly depend on how the opt-out 
collective action is designed, since in the U.S. class action,1214 if not all, at least a 
number of the class members will be identified, regardless of it being built on the “opt-
out” principle. 
 
But as has been demonstrated in Chapter Three, one of the fundamental problems with 
the “opt-in” model is that it often fails to ensure effective access to justice. Since 
claimants must take an active step to join the action, the number of claimants willing to 
do so could be too low. In fact, in the past, the participation rate of consumers in opt-in 
collective actions in general in the EU has been less than 1%, whereas the participation 
1210 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 11-12. 
1211 See e.g. THE SWEDISH JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, “Assessment Report on the Group Proceeding”, 
Ds 2008:74, October 28th, 2008, at p. 70. 
1212 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 11-12. 
1213 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 12. 
1214 See Chapter Six for more details on the U.S. class action. 
301 
 
                                                 
rate in opt-out collective actions has been significant.1215 The participation rate in opt-in 
collective antitrust damages actions has also tended to be merely a fraction of the 
potential group members.1216 Arguably, the “opt-in” model would not be possible for 
multiple, small, individual damages claims since the risk of losing, associated with the 
obligation to pay the other party’s costs of litigation, discourage claimants from opting 
in.1217 The “opt-in” model also has the disadvantage for the defendant that it will not 
know how many individual actions it might face later, since it will not know the total 
number of possible claimants. Similarly, courts risk having to deal with numerous 
individual claims being brought later, which will make the process burdensome.1218 
 
Instead, in cases involving numerous damages actions of low-value, the injured parties’ 
constitutional right of access to justice would be better guaranteed in the “opt-out” 
model.1219 In the worst-case scenario, the claimant would not receive any compensation, 
which would also have been the case if the action had not been brought on its behalf, 
because its individual claim would have been too small to be enforced individually, 
whereas, in the best-case scenario, it would receive at least some compensation for the 
loss that it has suffered. Moreover, thanks to technological progress, the increased 
possibilities of reaching potential claimants would often guarantee in these cases that 
the claimants would also have a possibility to opt out,1220 if they preferred not to pursue 
their claim, or to pursue their claim separately.  
 
1215 For example, the participation rate has been 97% in the Netherlands and almost 100% in Portugal. See 
BEUC, The European Consumers’ Association “European Group Action. Ten Golden Rules”, available 
at: http://www.euractiv.com/ndbtext/European_Group_Action_10_Golden_Rules.pdf and MULHERON, 
R. “Reform of collective redress in England and Wales: a perspective of need”, Civil Justice Council of 
England and Wales, 2008, at p. 153, available at 
http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/files/collective_redress.pdf. 
1216 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07 and http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
1217 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, p. 1473-1503, at p. 1499. 
1218 See MULHERON, R., “Some difficulties with Group Litigation Orders – and why a class action is 
superior”, C.J.Q., 24(JAN), 2005, p. 40-68, at p. 54. 
1219 For a more extensive analysis of the claimed advantages of the “opt-in” model over the “opt-out” 
model with regard to access to justice, see CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, “Improving Access to Justice 
through Collective Actions”, Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective 
Actions, A Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor, July 2008, at p. 133-134.  
1220 See LESKINEN, C., “Recent Developments on Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU”, 
G.C.L.R., Volume 2, No 4, 2011, p. 79-88, at p. 87.  
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It is submitted that the decision of whether a collective redress action should be brought 
based on the “opt-in” or “opt-out” model, taking into account the interests of all the 
parties (claimant(s) and defendant(s)) and the effective management of the action, 
should therefore be left for the courts to decide, at least in cases involving numerous 
damages actions of low-value. This seems as the only effective way of ensuring an 
“effective remedy” under Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union for consumers. When the Court of Justice and the national courts 
implement EU law, they have to ensure that effective remedies under Article 47 are 
available. This obligation therefore also applies when national court rule on antitrust 
damages actions. 
 
Regardless of the form of collective redress, effective dissemination of information 
about the action is vital in order to ensure that other victims of the same or similar 
alleged infringement learn of the action so that they can join and obtain easier access to 
justice.1221 According to the Recommendation, both the representative entity (including 
ad hoc certified bodies or public authorities) and the group of claimants should be able 
to disseminate information about the alleged violation of Union rights, the mass harm 
situation, and their intention to bring a compensatory collective action.1222 Apart from 
the representative entity and group of claimants, the court should also be involved in 
ensuring that potential group members learn about the collective redress action. The 
Union instrument should therefore include some provisions about the court’s role in this 
matter. 
 
But the Recommendation also sets certain limitations on the dissemination methods that 
should be used. Consequently, they should take into account the particular 
circumstances of the mass harm situation at issue, the freedom of expression, and the 
right to information. Also, the right to protection of the reputation or the company value 
of the defendant should be considered before its responsibility is definitely decided,1223 
since advertising and other means of trying to inform potential group members about 
1221 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 12. 
1222 Point 10 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1223 Point 11 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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the collective redress action could have negative effect on the defendant’s reputation 
and economic standing. A balance should therefore be found between freedom of 
expression and the right to access information, on one hand, and the protection of the 
defendant’s reputation, on the other hand. This is why the timing and the conditions for 
the dissemination of the information would need to be determined by the court.1224 
 
The Recommendation proposes the establishment of national registries of collective 
redress actions, which should be available free of charge to any interested person. 
Comprehensive and objective information on the available methods for obtaining 
compensation should be provided on websites publishing these registries.1225 It is 
suggested that these registries could also serve to notify potential members of the 
affected group about a collective action or representative action being brought and, 
depending on the type of action available, the conditions for joining the action, or the 
need to opt out in order not to be bound by the resulting judgment or settlement.  
 
The Recommendation also intends to establish common principles for collective follow-
on actions. In those areas of law in which a public authority can adopt a decision finding 
that there has been a violation of EU law (e.g. competition, environment, data protection 
or financial services), private collective actions should, in general, be brought only once 
the public action has been concluded definitively if the public action has started before 
the compensatory action.1226 The idea behind this recommendation is to protect the 
effectiveness of public enforcement. The problem with this approach, if applicable to 
antitrust damages actions, is that proceedings would automatically be prolonged, and 
stand-alone actions would be prohibited in cases involving public enforcement action. 
This would naturally not be a problem with regard to cartels, since it would be virtually 
impossible for injured parties to even bring a collective antitrust damages action without 
an infringement decision establishing the antitrust violation. But for other types of 
antitrust violations, obliging injured parties to wait for the public enforcement action to 
come to an end, and for the judgment to become final, would sometimes have the 
1224 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 12. 
1225 Points 35-36 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1226 Point 33 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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opposite effect than enhancing redress and access to justice. Instead, the possibility of 
public authorities participating as amicus curiae in the collective redress action should 
be considered. This possibility is already provided for in the field of antitrust damages 
actions.1227 In addition, national courts would always have the possibility of requesting 
a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Court of Justice if they have 
doubts about the interpretation of EU law.1228 
 
Nevertheless, in cases in which the collective action has been initiated before the public 
enforcement action, the Recommendations merely suggest that the court dealing with 
the collective action should avoid giving a decision conflicting with a decision 
contemplated by the public authority.1229 This would therefore be in line with 
Regulation 1/20031230 and the Delimitis and Masterfoods rulings with regard to 
decisions on infringements of the EU antitrust rules.1231 In order to avoid taking 
conflicting decisions, the court could stay the proceedings until the public enforcement 
action has been concluded.1232 But since this would potentially result in a significant 
delay in deciding the antitrust damages action, it is submitted that the national authority 
should be able to act as an amicus curiae instead in line with what is foreseen with 
regard to the coordination of private and public enforcement actions within the same 
Member State.1233 However, this would require the national courts to approve the 
intervention of the foreign NCA in the damages proceedings. 
 
In cases involving follow-on actions, the Recommendations also propose measures to 
ensure that limitation periods should not prevent claimants from seeking compensation 
before the conclusion of the proceedings of the public authority.1234 Again, this 
1227 Article 15(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of 
the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25. 
1228 Admittedly, the preliminary ruling procedure can take fairly long, but if a decision by a NCA is 
appealed to all instances, the public enforcement action would take much longer, see e.g. the Antena 3 
Case in Spain which lasted over 15 years, commented on in Section 3.5.1. 
1229 Point 33 of the Recommendations on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1230 Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. 
1231 See Judgment in Delimitis, C-234/89, EU:C:1991:91, paragraph 47, and Judgment in Masterfoods, 
EU:C:2000:689, paragraph 52. 
1232 Point 33 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1233 See Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003. 
1234 Point 34 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
305 
 
                                                 
recommendation seems to be modeled after competition law, since the Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions provides that the limitation period for follow-on damages 
actions must be suspended until at least one year after the decision by the competition 
authority in question is final, or the proceedings are otherwise terminated.1235 In this 
manner, the claimant can take advantage of the public decision establishing the 
existence of the infringement, and can focus on proving the causal relationship and the 
amount of the harm which it has suffered. 
 
However, one problem with follow-on actions for antirust damages is that the decision 
by the Commission or a national competition authority establishing an infringement 
does not necessarily demonstrate that the infringement has actually caused harm. The 
file of the competition authority might therefore be of limited value for proving the 
damage, since it has not been compiled for that purpose. This thus explains why 
consumers are currently not bringing cross-border cases. Moreover, it would be 
necessary to ensure the coherent and uniform application of the EU antitrust rules when 
proceedings are brought before an NCA of one Member State and, simultaneously, an 
antitrust damages action is brought before a court of another Member State.1236 It is 
suggested that the national registries proposed by the Commission in its 
Recommendation could serve for this purpose by containing information about 
envisaged and pending collective actions. The NCAs could then act as amicus curiae if 
their participation is required in order to ensure the coherent and uniform application of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
5.4. Cross-border Collective Actions 
The Recommendation also lays down principles concerning cross-border collective 
actions. In situations involving cross-border harm, national rules on admissibility, 
standing of groups of claimants or representative entities should not prevent a single 
collective action before a single forum. In other words, Member States should not 
require the representative entities to originate from their own national legal system, but 
they should allow any representative entity which has been officially designated in 
1235 Article 10(4) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1236 See DANOV, M. and BECKER, F., “The Way Forward: A Strong Case for Reform at EU Level” in 
DANOV, M., BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 407-420, at p. 416-417. 
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advance by a Member State to bring collective actions concerning a mass harm 
situation. Similarly, Member States should also not prevent foreign groups of claimants 
from bringing a collective action.1237 These recommendations are necessary in order to 
make cross-border actions feasible as precisely they involve foreign claimants, and may 
require a foreign representative entity to bring the claim if the national ones cannot, or 
will not, bring the claim. 
 
As to the rules of jurisdiction, the Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001) provides 
for different grounds of jurisdiction.1238 Collective claims by consumers can be brought 
before the court where the consumers are domiciled. It is also possible to bring such 
claims before the court where the defendant is domiciled.1239 There might therefore be 
some uncertainty about which jurisdiction would be appropriate in order to ensure the 
optimal way of dealing with the case. The Commission proposes that the report on the 
application of the Brussels I Regulation should also analyze the effective enforcement in 
cross-border collective actions, but does not recommend any specific jurisdictional rules 
for the time-being. Some stakeholders had suggested that the competent court should be 
the one in the jurisdiction of which most of the injured parties are domiciled, and/or the 
jurisdiction for consumer contracts should be extended to representative entities 
bringing a collective claim on their behalf. Other stakeholders preferred the court of the 
place where the defendant is domiciled in order to facilitate the identification of the 
competent jurisdiction and to ensure legal certainty.1240 But if this were the only 
available jurisdiction, it could lead to bias in favor of the defendant being tried before its 
“home” court. Moreover, it would limit cross-border collective actions, and it would 
also not be possible to sue several defendants before the same court under Article 6(1) 
of Brussels I.1241 Some stakeholders also suggested that a special judicial panel for 
cross-border collective actions should be created with the Court of Justice.1242  
1237 Points 17-18 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1238 Also the Brussels I bis Regulation (Regulation 1215/2012) which will replace the Brussels I 
Regulation provides for different grounds of jurisdiction. 
1239 Article 16 of the Brussels I Regulation and 18 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. 
1240 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 13-14. 
1241 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
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 In addition, regarding antitrust damage cases, it has been suggested that claimants 
should be allowed to centralize litigation against a group of the same companies (which 
form a single infringing undertaking) before the courts of their jurisdiction of choice. In 
other words, the claimant could establish jurisdiction against one of the subsidiaries, 
and then centralize litigation against the whole group of companies and other infringers 
of the EU antitrust rules before that jurisdiction. In this manner, consumer associations 
or direct purchasers could bring collective actions against undertakings in their 
preferred jurisdiction, which could increase the existing low mobility of individual 
consumers in the EU, which is due to the high costs of cross-border litigation.1243  
 
Since the Brussels I and Brussels I bis Regulations provide for different grounds of 
jurisdiction, the possibility of forum shopping causes uncertainty for the defendants, 
whereas the possibility of torpedo actions can undermine effective access to justice for 
claimants, especially if a defendant decides to bring an action for declaratory judgment 
before a jurisdiction where the existing procedural and tort rules make it challenging to 
obtain damages in practice. A Union legislative instrument should therefore provide for 
some kind of solution to the jurisdictional rules, by providing efficient mechanisms for 
coordinating private claims and public action. For instance, it has been suggested that 
the court first seized of the case could be allowed to decline jurisdiction if there were a 
more appropriate forum to deal with the case. However, in such cases, there should be 
common criteria which the courts would have to consider in assessing whether they are 
the best placed court to handle the collective action because otherwise this option would 
lead to more uncertainty.1244 It is suggested that the court should consider the adequacy 
of the representative entity bringing the representative action or of the claimants 
bringing the collective action to represent the injured parties. Nevertheless, the adoption 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 275-276. 
1242 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 13. 
1243 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 276-277. 
1244 Ibid., at p. 278-279. 
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of any binding measure changing the rules of lis pendens would be difficult to adopt in 
practice. 
 
Another potentially complex issue is the existing conflict of law rules. The Rome II 
Regulation applies to non-contractual obligations, such as antitrust damages actions. It 
provides for different grounds for determining the applicable law depending on the type 
of claim. As to antitrust damages actions, the applicable law is the law of the country 
where the market is (or is likely to be) affected.1245 If the market is affected in several 
countries, and the claimant sues in the court of the domicile of the defendant, it may 
choose to base its claim on the law of the court seized if the market in that Member 
State is directly and substantially affected.1246 In this case the claimant would have the 
opportunity to choose between more rights of action than in the previous situation, 
which could result in forum shopping.1247 The applicable law under Article 6(3)(b) will 
also be predictable, which allows the claimant to assess in advance its possibilities of 
obtaining compensation for the loss that it has suffered. If the claimant sues several 
defendants in the court seized of the case, it can only base its claim on the lex fori if the 
infringement directly and substantially affects the market in the Member State of that 
court.1248  
 
This means that sometimes different laws could be applicable to each group of 
claimants involved in the collective claim, which could make the litigation very 
complex. Moreover, a distinction must also be made between the law applicable to the 
substantive issues of the case and the law applicable to the procedural issues, since they 
are not determined according to the same rules. Procedural issues are usually governed 
by lex fori, the law of the court seized of the action, although EU procedural rules have 
become increasingly more common in some specific matters.1249 
 
1245 Article 6(3) (a) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 
July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199, 31.7.2007. 
1246 Article 6(3) (b) of the Rome II Regulation. 
1247 See TZAKAS, D-P.L., “Collective Redress Proceedings: Specific Issues Regarding Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law” in DANOV, M., BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition 
Law Actions, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 223-252, at p. 236. 
1248 Article 6(3) (b) of the Rome II Regulation. 
1249 See FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, J.C., and SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, S., Derecho Internacional Privado, 7th 
Edition, Civitas, 2013, at p. 275-276. 
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However, the Commission is not considering it necessary to introduce specific rules for 
collective claims obliging the court to apply a single law to the case, since this could 
result in uncertainty if the law is not the law of the country where the claimant is 
domiciled.1250  
 
5.5. Admissibility of Collective Actions 
The Recommendations also establish principles regarding the admissibility of collective 
redress actions. The admissibility of such actions should be verified as early as possible 
in the litigation procedure so as to discontinue collective actions which do not meet the 
required conditions, and manifestly unfounded actions.1251 The admissibility criteria are 
important in order to avoid abuse, and also to ensure the interest of the sound 
administration of justice.1252 They therefore act as safeguards which limit the cases in 
which collective actions may be brought. It should be borne in mind that the 
admissibility of collective redress mechanisms and standing to bring such actions are 
procedural questions, which will therefore be governed by lex fori. This will in turn 
limit the remedies available to those prescribed for domestic entities, until there is a 
binding Union legislative instrument harmonizing the criteria for admissibility of 
collective actions.1253 
 
The courts will have an important role in verifying the admissibility of collective 
actions since they should carry out the examination of their own motion.1254 Overall, the 
courts should be keys to protecting the rights and interests of the parties to collective 
redress actions and in managing them effectively.1255 This significant role suggested to 
be played by the courts in collective redress action differs from their current role in 
many Member States, where the basic conditions for the admissibility are established by 
1250 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 14. 
1251 Point 8 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1252 Recital 20 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1253 See TZAKAS, D-P.L., “Collective Redress Proceedings: Specific Issues Regarding Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law” in DANOV, M., BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition 
Law Actions, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 223-252, at p. 228-229. 
1254 Point 9 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1255 Recital 21 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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law. Also, in those Member States which currently leave discretion to the courts 
concerning the admissibility of collective redress actions, the extent of discretion 
varies.1256 
 
Issues which the court should arguably consider when deciding on the admissibility of 
the collective action – in addition to the ones listed in point 4 of the Recommendations 
– include whether the representative entity is genuinely able to act in the best interest of 
the injured parties, considering potential conflicts of interest, and whether the action 
should be based on the “opt-in” or “opt-out” model. For instance, when their members 
of a representative entity are both infringers and victims of an antitrust violation, or 
when subgroups of victims have different interests from the ones that the representative 
body decides to pursue, the entity might not be able to efficiently pursue the action on 
behalf of all parties due to conflicts of interest.1257 
 
In cross-border cases, it has been suggested that the certification criteria should allow 
the court to identify the countries where the representative entities or businesses, which 
have joined the action, operate so as to determine whether they can adequately represent 
the consumers from the countries in question. The volume of sales of the cartelized 
products of the large purchasers, which have opted in the collective redress action, has 
been proposed as the criterion for determining the adequacy of direct purchasers 
representing consumers from the countries concerned.1258  
 
The decision of whether the collective action should be based on the “opt-in” or “opt-
out” model should arguably be left to the courts of the Member States. The courts 
would have to verify that opt-out collective actions are not being used to bring frivolous 
suits, and should only allow them if it were possible to assure that no group member 
would have to bear the legal costs of actions that they were not aware of. The obligation 
1256 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 10. 
1257 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 21. 
1258 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 281-282. 
311 
 
                                                 
to pay legal costs could be limited to the group representative. Exceptionally, group 
members which can demonstrate that they had truly not been given notice of the action 
could be given an opportunity to opt out from the judgment and any related legal costs 
at a later stage. With these safeguards put in place, the opt-out collective action should 
not generally pose any constitutional problems. Ultimately, national legal traditions 
would also be respected as national courts would decide whether or not a collective 
action could be brought as an opt-out action.1259 
 
5.6. Costs of Collective Actions 
The main reason why collective actions are not frequently brought in the EU is the high 
litigation costs.1260 The costs constitute a large obstacle in particular for consumers who 
usually have comparatively small claims in comparison to the potential high cost. 
Therefore they often lack sufficient incentives to bring a claim. But also small and 
medium-sized undertakings might face the same hurdles, especially in situations where 
they are indirect purchasers, and would be required to show the exact amount of the 
overcharge that has been passed on to them. In fact, it should be noted that opt-in 
collective actions can be as expensive, or even more expensive, as opt-out collective 
actions. For example, the Swedish opt-in collective action requires two or more notices 
being issued during the litigation which increases the costs. In addition, when group 
members are allowed to join the collective action at any time, sufficient human 
resources are needed in order to receive communications, and to insert the names of 
group members into the register.1261  
 
In order to reduce the costs, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection proposed during the legislative process which led to the adoption of the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions that Member States should take appropriate 
measures to reduce costs associated with antitrust damages actions, for example, by 
1259 See LESKINEN, C., “Recent Developments on Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU”, 
G.C.L.R., Volume 2, No 4, 2011, p. 79-88, at p. 87. 
1260 See e.g. the Mobile Cartel in France. 
1261 See GAUDET, R., “Turning a blind eye: the Commission’s rejection of opt-out class actions 
overlooks Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Dutch experience” E.C.L.R., Volume 30, Issue 3, 2009, p. 
107-117, at p. 117. 
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limiting the level of court fees.1262 Similarly, the EESC found that the Commission 
should examine the existing cost rules, and that meritorious actions should be allowed if 
costs otherwise prevented these claims from being brought.1263 
 
However, the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms does not contribute 
much to reduce the costs of collective actions. Pursuant to the Recommendation, 
Member States should apply the “loser pays principle” to collective redress actions, 
according to which the losing party must reimburse necessary legal costs of the winning 
party. However, this principle will be subject to the conditions laid down in the 
applicable national law,1264 so Member States will be allowed to provide for more 
generous costs rules. The possibility of derogating from the cost rules is, arguably, key 
to ensure that meritorious collective actions can also be brought when there is some 
uncertainty about the outcome of the action, and the claimant might otherwise not be 
willing to bring the action. 
 
As stated above, it would also be necessary to avoid an obligation for group members to 
pay legal costs if they have not been reached in time to be able to opt out from the 
collective action. One possibility would be to design the “opt-out” model so that this 
obligation would be limited to the group representative and those members who have de 
facto had a possibility to exercise their right to opt out. Nevertheless, the 
Recommendation does not contain any principles governing the possible costs of the 
members of the group, so divergences at national level will continue to prevail until the 
European Union adopts a binding instrument establishing some common principles 
regarding the costs of collective redress actions. 
 
In addition, in order to ensure access to justice and an effective remedy for parties 
whose rights granted under EU law have been infringed in a mass harm situation, in 
particular consumers, contingency fees or other forms of third party funding should be 
encouraged, and/or sufficient public funding should be made available to consumer 
1262 See Opinion of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the White Paper on Antitrust 
Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 3.12.2008, at 
§ 7. 
1263 See Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions for 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 22.1.2009. 
1264 Point 13 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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associations. Similarly, there should be adequate incentives to bring collective actions, 
although they should also be subject to appropriate safeguards in order to avoid 
abuse.1265 
 
5.7. Damages 
The guiding principle in the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions as well as – as far 
as damages are concerned – in most Member States, is the principle of full 
compensation and the prohibition of unjust enrichment.1266 The Commission also recalls 
that the stakeholders consulted thought that public enforcement and private collective 
redress complement each other and, thus, collective damages actions should only ensure 
compensation of the damage suffered as a result of an infringement of a right conferred 
by EU law, whereas the role of public enforcement is to punish and deter 
infringements.1267 
 
As to claims brought by collective actions, the Recommendation therefore proposes that 
damages awarded to a claimant harmed in a mass harm situation should not exceed the 
compensation that would have been obtained if it had instead ben brought as an 
individual action. The Commission also believes that punitive damages should be 
prohibited.1268 The Commission maintains that, in addition to punitive damages, 
intrusive pre-trial discovery procedures and jury awards should be avoided in general. 
The Recommendation also points out that most of these elements are foreign to the legal 
traditions of the Member States.1269 
 
The issue of punitive damages is controversial because, as has been stated in Chapter 
Four, the ECJ has not considered punitive damages to be contrary to European public 
order and, according to the principle of equivalence, they must be available for an 
infringement of the EU antitrust rules if they are available for an infringement of 
1265 For more details, see Section 5.7 on “Damages” and Section 5.8 on “Funding” below. 
1266 Article 2 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1267 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 10.  
1268 Point 31 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1269 Recital 15 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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national competition law, and are awarded in accordance with the general principles of 
EU law.1270 The prohibition of punitive or multiple damages at Union level therefore 
goes against existing EU case law, and there is no foundation to completely rule them 
out for all collective actions. Instead of a general prohibition of punitive or multiple 
damages, a case-by-case analysis should be conducted to determine whether they would 
be justified for certain types of infringements of rights granted under EU law. In the 
field of antitrust damages actions, they could be useful for hard-core cartels in order to 
contribute to higher deterrence of this type of the most harmful competition 
infringements. 
 
As regards the distribution of damages in collective actions, the White Paper stated that, 
in case of representative actions, in principle, the damages should be used to 
compensate the harm suffered by those represented in the action. In an opt-in collective 
action the damages would therefore be awarded to the individually identified claimants 
according to the harm suffered by them.1271 Only exceptionally could it be necessary to 
reflect on the possibility to award damages to the representative entity which would 
distribute the damages to related entities or use them for related purposes.1272 This was 
suggested to be the case if it were not possible to reach all group members. In these 
cases, damages that had not been claimed could be used to the benefit of all group 
members, for example, to protect consumer interests in general, if the claimants were 
consumers. The so-called cy pres award could also be an appropriate alternative if the 
damages awards were too small for the distribution to each claimant to pay off.  
 
It is worth noting that the rapporteur of the report of the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs on the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions argued that the 
doctrine of cy pres would not be compatible with the principle of only compensating 
damage actually suffered since it would result in damage actually incurred not being 
1270 See Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 93. 
1271 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 21. 
1272 The distribution of damages would hence be a cy pres distribution meaning that the damages are not 
distributed directly to those injured to compensate for the harm that they suffered, but are used to achieve 
a result which is as close as possible. See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 
accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 
final, 2.4.2008, at p. 18-20. 
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compensated.1273 Consequently, the rapporteur objected that a principle of cy pres be 
introduced.1274 Nevertheless, the consequences of accepting this line of reasoning would 
be to allow the infringers to keep any unclaimed damages. 
 
The Recommendation does not lay down any principles regarding the distribution of 
damages among the members of the affected group, but merely mention that 
overcompensation should be prohibited. The issue of distribution of damages is, 
however, important especially in cases involving claimants at different levels in the 
distribution chain and, in particular, in collective actions. There would therefore be a 
need to decide on how damages which cannot be distributed among the victims should 
be distributed. Therefore rules concerning cy pres distribution should be provided. 
There is also a call for considering if it is in line with the common sense of justice that, 
due to the notable fear of over-compensation which is reflected in the new directive, in 
situations where there might be some uncertainty about the exact amount of harm 
suffered, infringers are allowed to keep the part of the damages which cannot be exactly 
allocated to the injured parties instead of using it for a purpose benefiting the society, 
directly or indirectly. Arguably, a fairer outcome would be, for example, to use 
unclaimed damages for the benefit of the injured parties in general or to fund future 
collective actions for damages.1275 
 
5.8. Funding of Collective Actions 
The costs of civil litigation involving multiple claimants could be comparatively high 
and could potentially impede access to justice if the injured parties do not have 
sufficient funds. In order to avoid this, there must be sufficient funding available. 
However, the Commission has some concerns funding mechanisms possibly creating 
incentives for abusive litigation. In particular, the Commission is concerned about direct 
third-party funding of collective redress actions, unless it is properly regulated. Such 
funding would include contingency fees or success fees for legal services, which also 
1273 See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, “Report on the White Paper on 
damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (2008/2154(INI)), March 9th, 2009, at p. 10. 
1274 See KORTMANN, J.S. and SWAAK, C.R.A., “The EC White Paper on antitrust damages actions: 
why the Member States are (right to be) less than enthusiastic”, E.C.L.R., Vol. 30, Issue 7, 2009, p. 340-
351, at p. 344. 
1275 This option has been chosen in the United Kingdom for the new collective redress mechanism to be 
introduced. 
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encompass preparatory action, gathering evidence, and general case management. The 
Commission prefers legal expenses insurance and “after-the-event” insurance, which it 
believes could contribute to collective actions.1276 
 
However, there are some drawbacks with the “after-the-event” insurance. If the 
premium is high and exceeds the litigation costs that must be paid up-front, it may 
discourage potential claimants from subscribing the insurance policy.1277 In addition, in 
practice, it can be difficult to enforce an “after-the-event” insurance since insurers are 
likely not to be willing to pay out compensation that constitutes large amounts if there is 
any possibility of avoiding this.1278 Due to the problems related to legal insurance1279 
and the need for litigation funding, third-party funding has been introduced in some 
Member States. 
 
The Recommendation lays down a principle according to which the claimant should 
have to declare to the court at the beginning of the proceedings the origin of the funds 
which will be used to fund the collective action.1280 The court, in turn, should be 
empowered to stay the proceedings in cases involving third-party funding if there is a 
conflict of interest between the third party and the claimant and group members; the 
third party’s resources are insufficient to meet its financial commitments to the 
claimant; or the claimant has insufficient resources to compensate the costs of the action 
if it fails.1281 The two first ones could be justified, but not the last one as such: the 
claimant would never be able to bring a collective action, even a meritorious one, the 
outcome of which is uncertain if his financial resources are insufficient to pay the 
possible adverse costs. In such cases, an adjustment of the cost rules should instead be 
possible, modelled after the German costs rules regarding antitrust damages actions,1282 
1276 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 15. 
1277 See PEYSNER, J., “The Costs and Financing in Private Third Party Competition Damages Actions”, 
CompLRev, Volume 3(1), 2006, p. 97, at p. 99-100. 
1278 See KOUTSOUKIS and O’SHEA, “Litigation funding in European antitrust cases: legal and practical 
issues”, G.C.L.R., 2009, 2(2), p. 74, at p. 78. 
1279 See MARTIN, “And then there were three”, Euro. Law, 81, 2008, p. 30, at p. 31-32. 
1280 Point 14 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1281 Point 15 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1282 See Section 89a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
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or Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, which 
provides an exception to the general rule that the “loser pays” rule if a deviation is 
justified by equity considerations.1283 
 
According to the Recommendation, the third party should be prohibited from seeking to 
influence the decisions of the claimant related to the proceedings, such as to accept or 
reject settlements. The third party should also not be allowed to finance a collective 
action brought against a defendant who is its competitor or on whom it depends. In 
addition, the interests charged on the funds should not be excessive.1284 The main 
reason behind the conditions on funding is to avoid abuse or a conflict of interest.1285 
 
With regard to compensatory collective redress actions, the Recommendation lays down 
additional requirements regarding funding. In order to ensure the interests of the parties, 
the remuneration given to private third-party funds should not be based on the amount 
of settlement reached or the compensation awarded, unless the funding arrangement is 
regulated by a public authority. The same applies to interest charged by the fund.1286 
These limitations seem reasonable since conflicting interests could limit the 
effectiveness of cases involving third-party funders. This would in particular be the case 
if several stakeholders are involved, since e.g. a litigant, funder and insurer do not 
necessary have the same incentives to settle or to pursue a case.1287 It would be 
appropriate that the court verifies that the share of a possible settlement which the third-
party will obtain in remuneration is reasonable. 
 
 Another important issue closely linked to the funding of collective actions is the 
lawyers’ fees as well as contingency fees. The principles laid down in the 
Recommendation reflect the Commission’s concern about abusive litigation. Therefore, 
the Commission recommends that the lawyers’ remuneration and the method by which 
1283 Article 14 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30.4.2004, p. 45–86. 
1284 Point 16 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1285 Recital 19 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1286 Point 32 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1287 See MARTIN, “And then there were three”, Euro. Law, 81, 2008, p. 30, at p. 33. 
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it is calculated should not create incentive to unnecessary litigation.1288 According to the 
Recommendation, contingency fees which risk creating such incentives should not be 
permitted. Thus, contingency fees should only exceptionally be permitted, and in 
collective redress actions cases they must be regulated by appropriate national 
regulation, which must in particular respect the right to full compensation of the 
claimant and the members of the group.1289 Nevertheless, without the availability of 
contingency fees or equivalent third-party funding, collective actions might not be 
brought due to the cost risks.1290 
 
The Commission’s recommendations on contingency fees are too restrictive. Since 
public funding is decreasing,1291 there is a need to ensure sufficient funding of collective 
actions by introducing contingency fees in the EU (or by finding other alternatives) to 
fund collective actions. Otherwise the introduction of an EU collective redress 
mechanism would not be sufficiently efficient in order to significantly increase access to 
justice. But the Commission is right in finding that contingency fees should be subject 
to judicial scrutiny or be regulated in another effective manner in order to reduce their 
possible negative effects.1292 It should also be noted that the study entitled “Collective 
Redress in Antitrust” did not find that contingency fees alone, without some other 
procedural mechanisms available in the United States, would automatically lead to 
excessive litigation.1293 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that the Commission does not find any need for the 
creation of public funds which would finance potential claimants in collective redress 
cases. Instead, the Commission finds it sufficient, given that in the end collective 
actions are brought in the context of a civil dispute between two parties, that the losing 
party will be obliged to compensate the party which has suffered harm, provided that 
1288 Point 29 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1289 Point 30 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1290 In the United States, practically all class actions are brought under contingency fee arrangements. See 
Chapter Six. 
1291 See HODGES, C., “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues”, C.J.Q., Issue 26 (JAN), 2007, 
p. 96, at p. 99-100. 
1292 Ibid., at p. 108. 
1293 See BUCCIROSSI, P., CARPAGNANO, M., CIARI, L., TOGNONI, M. and VITALE, C., 
“Collective Redress in Antitrust” Study, IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, June 2012. 
319 
 
                                                 
the court rules in favor of the claimant.1294 This view does not take into account the 
risks of high costs of bringing a collective redress action precisely due to the 
involvement of multiple parties and its complexity. Even meritorious claims might 
therefore risk failing, especially if they have to be brought based on the “opt-in” model, 
which might prevent the group of claimants from becoming sufficiently large in order 
for the action to pay off. As a consequence, the right of effective access to justice might 
thus not be ensured without providing for some sort of public funding.  
 
The Commission’s stance can be contrasted with the opinion of the Committee on the 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection which suggested the creation of a fund which 
would finance a first ruling of a case based on evidence adduced by a claimant, and 
which would be financed by fines from competition infringement cases.1295 This 
approach would facilitate bringing antitrust damages actions in meritorious cases, and 
would thus not entail any great risks for abusive litigation thanks to the obligation to 
present a plausible claim before the action could be financed from the fund. It is 
submitted that this option should be considered when a Union legislative instrument on 
EU-wide collective actions is adopted. 
  
5.9. Collective Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlements 
The Commission finds it important that parties to a dispute in a mass harm situation 
should be encouraged to settle their dispute either consensually or out-of-court.1296 This 
type of dispute resolution has the advantages of being fast, low-cost and a simple means 
of resolving disputes.1297 Collective ADR and settlements should be possible both at the 
pre-trial stage and during the court trial. The requirements of Directive 2008/52/EC on 
certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters should also be taken into 
1294 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 15. 
1295 See Opinion of the Internal Market and Consumer Protection on the White Paper on Antitrust 
Damages Actions for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2008/2154(INI)), 3.12.2008, at 
p. 57. 
1296 Point 25 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1297 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 14. 
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account.1298 Although the Member States should ensure the availability of collective 
ADR to parties, there is no obligation for parties to rely on such mechanisms, but their 
use should always depend on the consent of the parties.1299 The voluntary nature is 
important in order not to trigger unnecessary costs and delays, which could jeopardize 
the right of access to justice1300 granted under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. A requirement making ADR compulsory would also 
have the negative effect of prolonging the resolution in cases, which can clearly not be 
settled because of the lack of consent of the parties or some other reason.  
 
Moreover, ADR procedures should be available alongside judicial collective redress.1301 
Again, this is important in order to keep the length of the proceedings in check, and to 
provide an alternative for both parties in case they fail to settle. In addition, the fact that 
judicial collective redress could serve as a back-up in case settlement fails, makes it 
more likely that the defendant will have an incentive to settle the claim, and also to offer 
fairer terms of settlement as it might otherwise face litigation in court. 
 
However, in order to encourage ADR, the Recommendation suggest that the limitation 
period applicable to the claims concerned should be suspended from the moment when 
the parties decide to have recourse to ADR in order to attempt to solve their dispute 
until one or both of them expressly withdraw from the ADR procedure.1302  
 
The legality of any collective settlement reached by the parties should be verified and 
confirmed by the courts, which ensures that the protection of interests and rights of all 
the parties has been appropriate.1303 This recommendation aims to protect those 
members of the group which have not been able to participate in the consensual 
1298 Point 25 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1299 Point 26 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1300 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 14. 
1301 Recital 16 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1302 Point 27 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1303 Point 28 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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collective resolution of collective dispute.1304 This is vital in order to avoid that the 
defendant or defendants, who usually tend to be the stronger party, will not be able to 
force the claimant to accept a settlement for the fear of not obtaining any compensation 
at all unless they accept the terms of the defendant.  
 
Encouraging collective ADR and collective settlements can have a positive effect on the 
possibilities of injured parties obtaining at least some compensation since they possibly 
offer a faster and less expensive mechanism for solving the dispute. Nevertheless, this 
option is only likely to be an option worth considering for claimants if they have 
recourse to an effective judicial collective redress mechanism to fall back on if the 
defendant is trying to take advantage of the usually weaker position of the injured 
parties. 
 
5.10. Recognition and Enforcement of Collective Redress Judgments and 
Settlements 
Competition-related civil proceedings fall within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation1305 because they deal with civil and commercial proceedings for the purpose 
of Article 1. Judgments on damages actions can therefore be recognized and enforced in 
other Member States in accordance with Articles 33-34 of Brussels I (Articles 36, 45 of 
Brussels I bis). According to Article 33 (Article 36 Brussels I bis), a judgment given in 
a Member State must be recognized in the other Member States. But recognition may be 
refused if it would go against public policy.1306 
 
As mentioned above, the issue of whether punitive damages should be available is 
somewhat controversial. Brussels I is silent on whether punitive damages can be 
enforced. This can be considered as an implicit authorization of judgments awarding 
punitive damages, provided that one part of the foreign judgment would only be 
1304 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Towards a European Horizontal 
Framework for Collective Redress", COM(2013) 401 final, Strasbourg, 11.6.2013, at p. 14. 
1305 As from January 10th, the same will apply to the Brussels I bis Regulation when it enters into force. 
1306 Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 45(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation). Moreover, 
other grounds for refusal of recognition may be found in Article 34 of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 
45 of the Brussels I bis Regulation). 
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irreconcilable or contrary to public policy.1307 But this issue is currently decided by 
national law in the EU, although in the Manfredi ruling the Court of Justice held that 
punitive damages are compatible with EU law.1308 For instance, Germany considers 
punitive damages contrary to public policy if the amount is “not inconsiderable”. This is 
due to the fact that the claimant would become a private public prosecutor, which is 
incompatible with the State’s monopoly on punishment. This seems to imply that 
reasonable punitive damages could in certain circumstances possibly be recognized.1309  
 
Another possible ground for not recognizing foreign judgments rendered in the context 
of collective action proceedings relate to “opt-out” collective actions. In these cases, 
absent group members will also be bound by the resulting judgment, unless they have 
informed the court that they wish to opt out. The problem is that sometimes they may 
not be reached and, therefore, are not informed about the proceedings in time to opt out. 
In these cases it would go against the right to due process if they were bound. But as 
long as they have been informed, the settlement or the judgment should also be 
recognized and enforced outside the country of origin as they would not be bound by 
the outcome against their will. 
 
It should also be noted that defendants generally do not tend to settle unless the 
collective settlement has preclusive effect, since they wish to avoid having to re-litigate 
the case with non-settling parties. As the law stands, the recognition of the settlement 
(or collective action) could be questioned based on the public policy exception laid 
down in Article 34(1) or the right to a fair trial under Article 34 (2) of Brussels I 
(Article 45(1) and 45(2) of Brussels bis). The uncertainty of the preclusive effect is 
accentuated in opt-out collective actions or opt-out settlements. In fact, in case parallel 
collective actions are brought in different Member States, it might not always be clear 
by which of the actions would identifiable parties who have not opted in to one of the 
collective actions be bound. It has been suggested that there should be a presumption 
1307 See KESSEDJIAN, C., “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” in BASEDOW, J., 
FRANCQ, S and IDOT, L. (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation. Conflict of Laws and Coordination, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012, 245-256, at p. 252. 
1308 See Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:46, paragraph 93. 
1309 See KESSEDJIAN, C., “Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments” in BASEDOW, J., 
FRANCQ, S and IDOT, L. (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation. Conflict of Laws and Coordination, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2012, 245-256, at p. 252-253. 
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that the opt-out collective antitrust actions of other Member States comply with Article 
6(1) of the European Human Rights Convention and Article 47(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This presumption would be justified by the 
need to ensure an effective remedy to everyone “whose rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the law of the Union are violated” under Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, as consumers would otherwise generally fail to obtain 
compensation.1310 However, it should be limited to situations where the claims could 
indeed not be viably enforced individually or were the claimants have had a possibility 
to de facto opt out from the collective action. 
 
5.11. Conclusions on the Main Flaws of the Recommendation 
The principles laid down in the Recommendation should be implemented in the national 
collective redress systems by July 26th, 2015. Member States are also recommended to 
collect reliable annual statistics on the number of both out-of-court and judicial 
collective redress procedures as well as information about the parties, the subject matter, 
and outcome of the actions. This information should be communicated to the 
Commission annually starting from July 26th, 2015.1311 Within a year from this date, the 
Commission, in turn, should assess the implementation of the Recommendation on the 
basis of the practical experience. The issues to assess include in particular the impact of 
the Recommendation on access to justice, on the right to obtain compensation, on the 
need to prevent abusive litigation and on the functioning of the internal market, on 
SMEs as well as the competitiveness of the economy of the EU and consumer trust.1312 
The assessment should also consider whether further measures should be suggested in 
order to consolidate and strengthen the chosen horizontal approach. 
 
It is of course too early to know to what extent Member States will indeed implement 
the principles laid down in the Recommendation, but given that in some Member States, 
for example France, it took over a decade to introduce a new model of collective action, 
mere recommendations will probably not be sufficient to speed up the process. 
1310 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 278-280. 
1311 Points 38-40 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1312 Point 41 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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Moreover, although the Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress 
Mechanisms also include welcome features, such as its horizontal approach and the 
possibility of applying both for collective injunctive and compensatory relief, its main 
flaw is that no binding EU-wide collective redress mechanism is introduced in the EU.   
 
A binding instrument would be required in order to genuinely improve access to justice 
of consumers. As has been explored in the previous chapters, collective actions enable 
individuals to seek damages in situations where they would not be able to enforce their 
rights individually1313 by enabling claimants to take advantage of economies of scale 
thus reducing the costs and improving the access to the justice system.1314 They also 
complement the control of markets carried out by public enforcers1315 when they are 
used to seek damages for illegal conduct which public enforcement has not detected or 
has chosen not to pursue.1316  Collective actions also reduce the costs of actions. 
Similarly, all claims can be heard by a single judge,1317 which is likely to speed up the 
litigation for all claimants, and enhance the consistency and finality of rulings in that the 
same issue is resolved in an identical manner, and save the economic resources of courts 
and defendants by eliminating or reducing multiple claims.1318 
 
Moreover the Recommendation does not go far enough because the common principles 
laid down are generally based on encouraging a modest form of collective actions and 
conservative means of funding. For instance, some of the main problems of the existing 
1313 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., “Gruppenklagen auf Schadensersatz – offene Fragen und mögliche 
Lösungen” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND 
KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, Band I: Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente 
der Unterlassungsklage und der Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection 
Instruments of Actions for Injunction and Group Damages Actions, Conference on 24.2.2006 in Vienna, 
p. 92-103, at p. 93. 
1314 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions 
Are Introduced in France?”, 73 Def. Couns. J., July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 306. 
1315 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., “Gruppenklagen auf Schadensersatz – offene Fragen und mögliche 
Lösungen” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND 
KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, Band I: Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente 
der Unterlassungsklage und der Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection 
Instruments of Actions for Injunction and Group Damages Actions, Conference on 24.2.2006 in Vienna, 
p. 92-103, at p. 93. 
1316 See CONSEIL DE LA CONCURRENCE, “Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de 
l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles”, at p. 9. 
1317 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 21. 
1318 See The Consumer Redress Study, at p. 265-266. 
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collective redress mechanisms at national level include precisely the fact that they are 
commonly based on the “opt-in” principle, and the costs of the actions constitute as 
significant barrier at least with regard to antitrust damages actions. Examples of the 
limited efficiency of the “opt-in” model are the Football Shirts1319 and Mobile 
Cartel1320 cases in the United Kingdom and France which only resulted in the 
compensation of a small fraction of the injured parties in the first case and the failure of 
the second case. In fact, both cases eventually inspired these Member States to review 
their collective redress mechanisms, although eventually opting for divergent collective 
action models. The future UK collective action promises to be a frontrunner in the EU 
making both follow-on and stand-alone collective actions possible, and opening 
collective redress also for businesses as well as enabling the “opt-out” model in certain 
cases,1321 whereas the new French collective action will still be based on the “opt-in” 
model, although injured parties are allowed to opt in once the liability of the infringer 
has been determined.1322 
 
The Recommendation does admit exceptions to the “opt-in” principle either by law or 
by court order, but in those cases they must be duly justified “by reasons of sound 
administration of justice”.1323 Arguably, the only effective way of ensuring an 
“effective remedy” for consumers under Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union is to leave the decision of whether a collective redress 
action should be brought based on the “opt-in” or “opt-out” model to the courts, at least 
in cases involving numerous damages actions of low-value. In deciding on the 
appropriate model for bringing the action, the courts should take into account the 
interests of all parties and the effective management of the action. This would also 
allow Member States to provide for collective actions that are compatible with their 
legal traditions. However, appropriate safeguards, such as court scrutiny of legal fees 
1319 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07. 
1320 See http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
1321 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 32-34. 
1322 Article L. 423-3(1) of the Consumer Act. 
1323 Point 21 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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and settlements, must also be put in place in order to ensure the rights of unidentified 
group member.1324  
 
In addition, sufficient funding would be necessary to ensure the effectiveness of 
collective damages actions. The litigation costs constitute a large obstacle in particular 
for consumers who usually have comparatively small claims in comparison to the 
potential high cost, which are the main reason for why collective actions are not 
frequently brought in the EU.1325 A possibility of derogating from the “loser pays” 
principle would, arguably, be necessary in order to ensure that meritorious collective 
actions can also be brought when there is some uncertainty about the outcome of the 
action, and the claimant might because of its financial situation not be willing to bring 
the action. 
 
It would also be necessary to avoid an obligation for group members to pay legal costs 
if they have not been reached in time to be able to opt out from the collective action. 
One possibility would be to design the “opt-out” model so that this obligation would be 
limited to the group representative and those members who have de facto had a 
possibility to exercise their right to opt out.  
 
The Commission’s recommendations on contingency fees are also too restrictive. Since 
public funding is decreasing,1326 there is a need to ensure sufficient funding of collective 
actions by introducing contingency fees in the EU (or by finding other alternatives) to 
fund collective actions. Provided that contingency fees are subject to judicial scrutiny or 
regulated in another effective manner, their possible negative effects can be reduced.1327 
With these safeguards put in place, the opt-out collective action should not generally 
pose any constitutional problems. 
 
1324 See LESKINEN, C., “Recent Developments on Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU”, 
G.C.L.R., Volume 2, No 4, 2011, p. 79-88, at p. 88. 
1325 See e.g. the Mobile Cartel in France. 
1326 See HODGES, “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues”, C.J.Q., 26 (JAN), 96-123, at p. 
99-100. 
1327 Ibid., at p. 108. 
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The issue of distribution of damages is also important especially in cases involving 
claimants at different levels in the distribution chain and, in particular, in collective 
actions. There would therefore be a need to decide on how damages which cannot be 
distributed among the victims should be distributed. It is submitted that rules concerning 
cy pres distribution should be provided. 
 
Other issues which have not been considered in a satisfactorily manner in the 
Commission Recommendation includes the coordination of public and private actions in 
a cross-border situation and the jurisdictional rules. Regarding the coordination of 
actions in those areas of law in which a public authority can adopt a decision finding 
that there has been a violation of EU law, instead of obliging the court seized with the 
compensatory collective redress action to wait until the public enforcement action has 
been definitively concluded, or to stay the proceedings, it is submitted that the national 
authority should be able to act as an amicus curiae (provided that the national court 
approves its intervention in the proceedings) so as to not automatically prolong the 
collective redress proceedings or to impede stand-alone actions. This is justified 
especially in those cases where the decision by a national competition authority 
establishing an infringement does not assess whether the infringement has actually 
caused harm since, as a result, its file might be of limited value for proving the damage. 
Moreover, it would be necessary to ensure the coherent and uniform application of the 
EU antitrust rules when proceedings are brought before an NCA of one Member State 
and, simultaneously, an antitrust damages action is brought before a court of another 
Member State.1328  
 
In cross-border cases, the different jurisdictional rules under the Brussels I and Brussels 
I bis Regulations makes forum shopping possible and cause uncertainty for the 
defendants, whereas the possibility of torpedo actions can undermine effective access to 
justice for claimants. However, the Commission has not proposed any amendments to 
these rules, although there would arguably be a need for efficient mechanisms for 
coordinating private claims and public action. The only measure laid down in the 
Recommendation is the general obligation to stay private collective claims until public 
1328 See DANOV, M. and BECKER, F., “The Way Forward: A Strong Case for Reform at EU Level” in 
DANOV, M., BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 407-420, at p. 416-417. 
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enforcement has been concluded. It has been suggested that a more appropriate measure 
could be to modify the lis pendens rule by allowing the court before which a collective 
redress action is brought to decline jurisdiction of the case if there is a more appropriate 
forum available which could deal more efficiently with the case.1329 However, instead 
of modifying the lis pendens rule, which would be very challenging, a first step could be 
for the Commission to recommend that national courts should be able to request the 
opinion of the relevant public authorities even if they are not from the same Member 
State. 
 
In 2016, when the Commission is to assess the implementation of the Recommendations 
on the basis of the practical experience from the Member States, it should also address 
all the issues examined above, and propose a binding Union legislative measure 
introducing an efficient EU-wide collective action applicable in cross-border mass harm 
situations. In designing that collective action, the role of class actions in private antitrust 
litigation in the United States and Canada should be examined in order to learn how that 
model could be adjusted to the EU, and serve as a remedy to some of the difficulties 
that consumers and other victims of antitrust violations are currently encountering in the 
EU. 
 
 
 
1329 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 278-279. 
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PART III: ENHANCING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EU 
ANTITRUST RULES BY LEARNING FROM THE U.S. AND 
CANADIAN EXPERIENCES 
6. DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE U.S. AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCES 
6.1. Overview of Private Enforcement in the United States and Canada 
6.1.1. United States 
Contrary to the situation in the European Union, in the United States antitrust rules are 
predominantly enforced by private litigants. Private antitrust litigation is estimated to 
account for more than 90% of antitrust enforcement.1330 However, as private 
enforcement may also have an effect on public enforcement or vice versa, it is 
appropriate to briefly recall a few distinctive features of the US system of antitrust 
enforcement before turning to analyzing private enforcement. 
 
The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice enforces, civilly and 
criminally, §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, which principally correspond to Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) investigates and 
civilly prosecutes the same conduct under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.1331 
The Department of Justice and the FTC can also bring actions in federal courts seeking 
equitable relief for substantive, non-criminal antitrust violations. The equitable 
monetary remedies may include restitution and disgorgement, and the FTC has 
exercised this possibility in some cases in which it was likely that other remedies would 
not fully accomplish the purposes of antitrust laws.1332 In addition, the Department of 
Justice can seek damages for any antitrust injury that the United States has suffered in 
1330 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4.  
1331 See GINSBURG, D.G., “Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 2005, p. 427-439, at p. 428-429. 
1332 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 286.  
330 
 
                                                 
its business or property.1333 Generally, the federal agencies may, however, only bring 
private actions for injunctive relief regarding the infringer’s future conduct.1334  
 
Enforcement action by a federal agency does not preclude states or private litigants 
from bringing actions regarding the same issue challenging the conduct, or applying for 
injunctive relief or seeking damages.1335 If parallel actions are brought, federal courts, 
which have exclusive jurisdiction over federal antitrust laws,1336 usually allow the state 
proceedings to be resolved before the federal proceedings are continued. The courts 
may also transfer cases to each other to ensure that the best positioned court hears the 
case. In addition, the parties and district judges can request a special court, the Judicial 
Panel on Multi-District Litigation, to consolidate related cases from multiple districts 
for pre-trial proceedings in one US district court.1337 But it should be noted that parens 
patriae actions brought by state enforcers on behalf of the citizens of the state in order 
to seek compensation for the aggregate damage suffered by them are not governed by 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. In other words, parens patriae actions can be 
dealt by a state court, while private class actions may be removed to federal court.1338 
 
1333 15 U.S.C.15a. 
1334 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 298. 
1335 See MCCURDY, G.V.S., “The impact of modernization of the EU competition law system on the 
courts and private enforcement of the competition laws: a comparative perspective”, E.C.L.R., Volume 
25, Issue 8, 2004, p. 509-517, at p. 513. The US Supreme Court has nevertheless held that states are not 
entitled to recover damages for injury to their general economies. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of 
California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).  
1336 It should, however, be noted that decisions of one Federal Court of Appeals do not bind other Federal 
Court of Appeals (i.e. the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals). If there are conflicts on legal issues 
among the circuits, they are generally resolved by the Supreme Court granting a writ of certiorari. See 
JONES, C.A., “A New Dawn for Private Competition Law Remedies in Europe? Reflections from the US” 
in EHLERMANN, C-D., and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European Competition Policy Annual 2001: 
Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, Oregon, 2003, p. 95-108, at p. 100. 
1337 See MCCURDY, G.V.S., “The impact of modernization of the EU competition law system on the 
courts and private enforcement of the competition laws: a comparative perspective”, E.C.L.R., Volume 
25, Issue 8, 2004, p. 509-517, at p. 513.  
1338 See O’CONNOR, K.J., RENFRO, H.L. and BRIGGS, A.C., “Interaction of public and private 
enforcement” in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 240-263, 
at p. 255. 
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States have also enacted their own antitrust laws.1339 This is possible because federal 
antitrust laws are not intended to preempt state laws in this field.1340 Most of the state 
antitrust laws are comparable to §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Furthermore, the states 
must not allow conduct that is unlawful under federal antitrust law, but they may apply 
stricter state laws by prohibiting conduct that does not violate any federal law, and may 
interpret federal law more aggressively. As a consequence, different enforcement 
approaches have been adopted in certain issues at state level.1341 For instance, many 
states allow indirect purchasers to recover treble damages, whereas indirect purchasers 
lack standing under federal law.1342 Moreover, federal courts may certify questions to 
state courts, and are obliged to defer to states interpretation of state law.1343 However, 
significant conflicts between federal and state courts have been avoided, most likely due 
to the limited resources of the states, and thanks to the Executive Working Group for 
Antitrust, comprising the heads of the Federal Trade Commission and of the Antitrust 
Division, and five State Attorneys General, which promotes federal and state 
coordination, and shares information and resources.1344  
 
However, although the Department of Justice and the FTC as well as states have 
jurisdiction to bring antitrust suits, and exercise this right, actions brought by private 
litigants predominate, resulting in over 90% of the antitrust enforcement.1345 In fact, 
1339 See GINSBURG, D.G., “Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 2005, p. 427-439, at p. 429. 
1340 See California v. ARC America Corporation, 490 U.S. 93 (1989), and AREEDA, P., KAPLOW, L. 
and EDLIN, A., Antitrust Analysis, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2004, at p. 90. 
1341 See GINSBURG, D.G., “Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 2005, p. 427-439, at p. 429-430. 
1342 See MCCURDY, G.V.S., “The impact of modernization of the EU competition law system on the 
courts and private enforcement of the competition laws: a comparative perspective”, E.C.L.R., Volume 
25, Issue 8, 2004, p. 509-517, at p. 512. A majority of U.S. states permit indirect purchasers to bring 
actions in state courts. See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, April 
2007, at p. 269. 
1343 See MCCURDY, G.V.S., “The impact of modernization of the EU competition law system on the 
courts and private enforcement of the competition laws: a comparative perspective”, E.C.L.R., Volume 
25, Issue 8, 2004, p. 509-517, at p. 511. 
1344 See GINSBURG, D.G., “Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 2005, p. 427-439, p. 431-432. 
1345 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4. At its peak, private antitrust litigation 
accounted even for 95% of the antitrust enforcement. See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement 
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private enforcement of antitrust laws plays a significantly stronger role in the US than 
anywhere else in the world. The reason for this is mainly considered to be the 
availability of treble damages and litigation costs and attorneys’ fees to the successful 
plaintiffs, and the existence of a class action mechanism,1346 which incentivize private 
litigants to bring actions. 
 
Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act provides an extensive right to anybody injured in his business 
or property by an antitrust violation to recover treble damages, the cost of the lawsuit, 
and a reasonable attorney's fee. In addition to private litigants, i.e. undertakings and 
consumers, as mentioned above, the Department of Justice also has standing to sue for 
damages if the United States has suffered an antitrust injury in its business or 
property.1347 Similarly, a state, also in its capacity as a consumer of goods and services, 
is considered a “person” within the meaning of Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act.1348 
Consequently, states can recover damages for state entities if they have been directly 
injured.1349 Also foreign governments may have standing to sue for damages, but they 
may only recover actual, not treble damages.1350 
 
Moreover, State Attorneys General can bring parens patriae lawsuits on behalf of the 
citizens of the state in question to recover treble the aggregate damages suffered by 
these citizens.1351 If citizens wish to bring an independent action, they can opt out from 
the state suit. Any award to the state must exclude damages obtained by, or allocable to, 
citizens who have already sued, citizens who have opted out, and all business entities. 
Damages in price-fixing cases may be proved in the aggregate and, therefore, it is not 
of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer 
Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 41-60, at p. 44. 
1346 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 241. 
1347 Section 4A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a. 
1348 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
1349 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 241. 
1350 See JOELSON, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer. A Guide to the Operation of United States, 
European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy, third edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, at p. 36. 
1351 See GINSBURG, D.G., “Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 2005, p. 427-439, at p. 429. 
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necessary to separately prove the damage of each purchaser.1352 In accordance with the 
court’s directions, the state will either distribute the award as authorized by the court, or 
retain it as a civil penalty and deposit it in its general revenues. In either case, all injured 
parties must have been given the opportunity to receive an appropriate share of the 
monetary relief.1353 
 
Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act hence provides for extensive standing, but U.S. courts have 
limited standing for several reasons. For example, they have feared chains of recoveries 
resulting in multiple liabilities for the same injury that would make it difficult for courts 
to determine the amount and source of remote injuries. Furthermore, especially in cases 
brought by remotely injured plaintiffs, courts have been reluctant to punish a defendant 
when its infringement was minor or made in good faith, since they would be obligated 
to award treble damages if the defendant were found guilty. Courts have also not been 
willing to initiate a lengthy trial on elusive issues brought by remote plaintiffs.1354  
 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that not all injuries resulting from 
antitrust violations give cause to a remedy in damages under Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act. 
In order to have standing to bring a claim for damages, a two-step procedure is applied 
to assess the plaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing of the defendants, and the 
relationship between them.1355 The plaintiff must demonstrate that it has suffered a so-
called antitrust injury, and that it is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.1356 An 
“antitrust injury” is an injury or threatened injury caused by the defendant’s illegal 
1352 See AREEDA, P., KAPLOW, L. and EDLIN, A., Antitrust Analysis, Aspen Publishers, New York, 
2004, at p. 67. 
1353 15 U.S.C. § 15e. 
1354 See AREEDA, P., KAPLOW, L. and EDLIN, A., Antitrust Analysis, Aspen Publishers, New York, 
2004, at p. 60. For instance, if the immediate victim is a city, indirectly injured taxpayers have not been 
granted standing since the city would be in a better position to bring the damages claim itself. Ibid., at p. 
64. 
1355 See Associated General Contractors v. California State Council for Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
The damages action was brought by a labor union, which claimed that it had suffered harm as a 
consequence of a conspiracy among non-union builders to coerce property owners awarding building 
contracts and other general contractors to give some of their business to firms that did not belong to a 
union. The Supreme Court denied standing because “[t]he existence of an identifiable class of persons 
whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement 
diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party such as the Union to perform the office of a 
private attorney general”, at § 542. 
1356 See GOETZ, C.J. and MCCHESNEY, F.S., Antitrust Law: Interpretation and Implementation, 
Foundation Press, New York, 2006, at p. 786.  
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conduct, and “of the type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”1357 
Therefore, for example, a plaintiff cannot seek damages for an injury which results from 
lawful competition from the defendant since the purpose of the antitrust laws is not to 
prevent such competition.1358 
 
The aim of antitrust laws is also not to protect competitors.1359 Furthermore, according 
to the in pari delicto doctrine, the plaintiff is often not considered to have suffered an 
antitrust injury if it has participated in an antitrust violation, and it is co-initiator or 
equal participant in the defendant’s illegal conduct.1360 If a party to an agreement does 
not fulfill a contractual obligation because it is violating an antitrust rule, due to the so-
called dirty-hands defense, the other party cannot invoke legal and equitable claims 
arising from the unlawful provision.1361 
 
The purpose of the efficient enforcer requirement is to determine whether a party is a 
proper plaintiff in a specific case. In order to assess this, the directness or indirectness of 
the injury is considered since it takes into account the remoteness of the harm alleged by 
the plaintiff.1362 The plaintiff must also be able to enforce an antitrust judgment 
efficiently and effectively.1363 Because of this requirement, the Supreme Court held in 
Illinois Brick1364 that indirect purchasers do not have standing to bring damages actions 
for antitrust violations. It held that rules on passing-on, which generally deny the 
1357 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), at § 489. 
1358 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
1359 See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). In this case the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that resale price maintenance agreements could not be challenged in order to protect 
competing dealers, but breached § 1 of the Sherman Act because the dealers involved in the agreement 
could not decide the prices of their services, which caused harm to consumers by depriving them of the 
services they desired.  
1360 See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), and AREEDA, P., 
KAPLOW, L. and EDLIN, A., Antitrust Analysis, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2004, at p. 70-71. 
1361 See AREEDA, P., KAPLOW, L. and EDLIN, A., Antitrust Analysis, Aspen Publishers, New York, 
2004, at p. 71. It should be recalled that in the EU it would not be possible to limit standing to claimants, 
who have suffered an “antitrust injury” in the sense of the U.S. antitrust law, since Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU have direct effect and, consequently, the scope of the private remedy must be equal to the 
substantive reach of the Treaty provisions. See JONES, C.A., Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the 
EU, UK and the USA, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, at p. 192-193. 
1362 See Associated General Contractors v. California State Council for Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
1363 See Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F 2D 1438 (11th CIR. 1991). 
1364 See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
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passing-on defense except in certain limited circumstances,1365 must be applied equally 
to plaintiffs and defendants in order to avoid multiple liabilities for defendants. The 
prohibition to rely on passing-on defense aims to ensure the effective enforcement of 
antitrust laws by “concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct 
purchasers rather than allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to 
sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it”.1366 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that allowing all potential victims to sue for damages would entail the risk of 
undermining private enforcement due to the complexity of demonstrating the damage 
suffered by each purchaser involved.1367  
 
However, the result is that direct purchasers who have passed on the overcharge to their 
own customers may claim compensation, although they have not necessary suffered any 
harm since they have been able to recover the overcharge from their customers. 
Conversely, indirect purchasers, especially final consumers, who have been injured by 
the antitrust violation, would not be able to seek redress. It is debatable whether 
excluding indirect purchasers from seeking damages may be justified by the need to 
ensure “efficient” enforcement.1368 It is submitted that it should be examined how to 
also make indirect purchasers efficient enforcers as treble damages were principally 
meant to be a remedy for individuals, consumers in particular.1369 Taking into account 
that there have been technological advances since Illinois Brick, which makes it 
significantly easier, and less costly, to identify and compensate indirect purchasers,1370 
to categorically deny them standing to seek damages for antitrust violations does not 
1365 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
1366 See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), at § 735. 
1367 See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), 
Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 
44-60, at p. 46. 
1368 Conversely, in the EU, it is not compatible with EU law to exclude indirect purchasers’ right to seek 
damages if they have been harmed by an antitrust violation. As explained in Section 2.1, the Court of 
Justice held in Courage that the right to compensation is open to any individual injured by infringements 
of the EU competition rules. It explicitly justified this extensive Union right to damages as a requirement 
for the full effectiveness of the EU competition rules. See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, 
paragraph 26. Interestingly, it thus came to the exact opposite conclusion than the U.S. Supreme Court as 
regards the effective enforcement of antitrust laws, since indirect purchasers also have standing under EU 
law to bring antitrust damages actions. 
1369 See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), at § 754. 
1370 See RICHARDS, J.D., “What makes an antitrust class action remedy successful?: a tale of two 
settlements”, Tulane Law Review, 80, December, 2005, p. 621-658, at p. 624. 
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seem justified. This is exemplified by Relafen1371 in which databases maintained by 
retail pharmacies and pharmacy benefit managers served to establish that consumers 
had paid more than $60 million for Relafen and its generic equivalent, and to locate 
more than 900,000 purchasers.1372 
 
Nevertheless, ultimately the decision whether to allow indirect purchasers to bring 
antitrust damages actions will depend on whether the deterrent effect or the 
compensatory function of such actions is considered more important. 
 
Following the Illinois Brick ruling, many states enacted legislation allowing indirect 
purchasers to bring antitrust damages actions. In other states, courts interpreted existing 
state laws to permit indirect purchasers to seek damages. Today, a majority of the states 
grant indirect purchasers standing to bring damages actions under state law.1373 This has 
been considered lawful by the Supreme Court, since Illinois Brick only construes 
federal antitrust law and does not pre-empt state indirect purchaser statutes.1374 As a 
result, indirect purchasers might have standing at the state level.  
 
Because of Illinois Brick, direct purchasers usually sue in federal courts, and indirect 
purchasers in state courts, which gives rise to duplicative litigation regarding claims 
resulting from the same antitrust violation, which in turn wastes resources and increases 
the costs of the litigation. Moreover, there is a risk that defendants will be forced to pay 
multiple recoveries and the damages awarded are inconsistent.1375 
 
Today, defendants may under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) also 
remove certain indirect purchaser class actions to federal court, and to consolidate them 
with other actions under the multi-district litigation process1376 to pre-trial 
1371 See Relafen Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d. 
1372 See RICHARDS, J.D., “What makes an antitrust class action remedy successful?: a tale of two 
settlements”, Tulane Law Review, 80, December, 2005, p. 621-658, at p. 626-627. 
1373 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 268-269. 
1374 See California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 720 (1989). 
1375 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 266 and 271. 
1376 Ibid., at p. 269. 
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proceedings.1377 Once the pre-trial proceedings have concluded, the cases will be split 
up again and returned back to the originating courts for trial. But many actions may 
remain in state court because it is also possible for plaintiffs to object to removal of the 
case under the CAFA.1378 Moreover, the CAFA grants federal courts original 
jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the value of 
$5,000,000, and is a class action involving parties, or party members from different 
states or foreign states, or a party or party member who is a foreign state.1379  
 
Since divergent federal and state policies on indirect purchaser damages actions raise 
problems, the Antitrust Modernization Commission1380 recommended that Illinois Brick 
and Hanover Shoe should be overruled to the extent necessary so as to allow both direct 
and indirect purchasers to bring claims for damages resulting from violations of federal 
antitrust law. It found this justified taking into account the principles of federalism, the 
desire to compensate actually injured parties, and practical feasibility. Actions brought 
by indirect purchasers when direct purchasers are not willing to sue would serve to 
supplement enforcement by direct purchasers, thus providing additional deterrence.1381  
 
The Antitrust Modernization Commission also suggested that the aim should be to hear 
all claims arising out of the same alleged antitrust violation in one federal court, to the 
maximum extent possible, in order to make the direct and indirect purchaser litigation 
more efficient and fairer. Single proceedings to determine liability and damages and the 
allocation of damages would also make it easier to reach a global settlement. In order 
not to make class certification of purchaser classes more difficult, the degree of passing-
on should not be decided at the class certification stage, but only at trial. In other words, 
1377 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S.Ct. 956 (1998). The pre-trial 
proceedings deal with issues such as discovery, class certification, and summary judgment motions. 
1378 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 270-272. 
1379 Sec. 4(d)(2) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1332. It is also possible to remove the class action from a federal 
court to a state court when the class action shows particularly strong links to the state in question because 
a large number of the class members and primary defendants are citizens of that state. Sec. 4(d)(3) and 
4(d)(4) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1332. 
1380 The Antitrust Modernization Commission was established to examine whether the antitrust laws 
should be modernized, and to identify and study related issues. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION 
COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 2007, at p. 1. 
1381 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 270-275. 
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direct purchaser classes should be certified without assessing at that stage whether the 
damage has been passed on.1382 
 
6.1.2. Canada 
Canada has a much shorter tradition of private enforcement than the United States as it 
has only been possible to bring antitrust damages actions since 1976.1383 Damages 
actions were also not common before the introduction of class actions.1384 Today, class 
actions especially in cartel cases are more frequent.1385 The reason for the initial lack of 
private enforcement is believed to have been due to uncertainty about the initial 
constitutionality of the civil right to damages for antitrust violations,1386 the lack of 
multiple damages, and limited number of jury trials.1387 Similarly, class actions and 
contingency fees were generally not allowed, with the exception of few jurisdictions.1388 
 
Moreover, damages actions are limited to cases of criminal anti-competitive 
conduct,1389 i.e. under Canadian law it is not possible to sue for damages in cases 
involving abuse of dominance. Follow-on damages actions are possible provided that 
they are brought within two years from the date when the criminal proceedings 
1382 Ibid., at p. 275-278. 
1383 Combines Investigation Act, RSC 1970, c. C-23. Today the right to antitrust damages actions is 
provided by Subsection 36(1) of the Canadian Competition Act, R.S., 1985, c. C-34. 
1384 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 205. 
1385 See WRIGHT, C.M. and BAER, M.D., “Price-fixing Class Actions: A Canadian Perspective”, Loy. 
Consumer L. Rev., 16, 2004, p. 463-478, at p. 463, and HUTTON, S., “Chapter 3. Canada” in KNABLE 
GOTTS, I., (ed.), The Private Competition Enforcement Review, 2nd edition, Law Business Research, 
London, 2009, p. 30-49, at p. 30. 
1386 This doubt was eliminated by the Supreme Court in Canada in General Motors of Canada in 1989.  
See General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing, [1989] 1 SCR 641 [General Motors of 
Canada]. 
1387 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 205. 
1388 Quebec was the only Canadian province providing for class actions until 1992. See FACEY, B.A. and 
ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, P. and MARQUIS, M. 
(eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2014, p. 205-234, at p. 205. 
1389 This would include conspiracy and bid-rigging. See Section 36 of the Canadian Competition Act. 
339 
 
                                                 
regarding the antitrust violation have ended.1390 The record of the criminal proceedings 
can be used as evidence of the antitrust violation, although this presumption may be 
rebutted by the defendant.1391 Most damages claims in Canada have been initiated after 
a public enforcement action has started in Canada, the United States, and/or the 
European Union.1392 
 
Antitrust damages actions can be brought before the Federal Court or a provincial 
superior court. But since the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to decide common 
law torts, which include intentional interference with economic interests, especially 
class actions are often brought before the provincial superior courts. This makes it 
possible to invoke both a cause of action under Section 36 of the Competition Act and 
non-federal common law claims before such courts. The procedural rules applicable in 
the provinces are different – most notably only Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction1393  –
which makes the Canadian case interesting for the analysis of antitrust damages actions 
in the European Union as the EU Member States also apply divergent procedural rules 
for the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules.  
 
A Canadian provincial superior court will have jurisdiction over an antitrust damages 
action if there is a “real and substantial connection” between the province in question 
and the subject matter of the action. Since there is no equivalent to the U.S. multi.-
district litigation procedure, a defendant might have to litigate antitrust damages claims 
in all provinces and territories of Canada.1394 But in multi-jurisdictional class actions, or 
if a proposed multi-jurisdictional action has been initiated in another province of 
Canada, the class proceedings legislation of Saskatchewan requires the court, when 
1390 Subsection 36(4)(a)(ii) of the Competition Act. 
1391 Subsection 36(2) of the Competition Act. 
1392 See WRIGHT, C.M., “Canada” in in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, 
MA, 2010, p. 447-461, at p. 448. 
1393 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 214. 
1394 Ibid., at p.214- 215. 
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deciding on the certification of the class, to examine whether all, or some of the claims, 
or common issues of the class could more adequately be determined in that action.1395   
 
In general, the limitation period for bringing an antitrust damages action will be two 
years from the date of the impugned conduct, or the date on which criminal proceedings 
relating to the conduct were finally disposed of, whichever is later.1396 The Federal 
Court has held that the limitation period will start to run regardless of whether the 
claimant knew about the cause of action.1397 For continuing infringements, the 
limitation period will only start to run once there are no longer ongoing acts, which 
themselves constitute an offence under Part VI of the Competition Act.1398 Finally, it 
should be noted that the Crown’s ability to bring criminal proceedings is not subject to 
any limitation period. As a result, follow-on actions could potentially be brought much 
later than two years from the date when the violation has already ceased, if the Crown 
decides to initiate criminal proceedings.1399 
 
Although there has been some development, the procedural features that are distinctive 
for the U.S. private antitrust enforcement are still more limited in Canada.1400 For 
instance, Canada does not provide for treble damages, and the majority of antitrust cases 
are decided by judges, not juries.1401 Discovery rights are less extensive than in the 
1395 See WRIGHT, C.M., “Canada” in in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, 
MA, 2010, p. 447-461, at p. 453. 
1396 Subsection 38(4) of the Competition Act. 
1397 2010 FC 996 [Garford], paragraphs 31-33. 
1398 2010 FC 996 [Garford], paragraphs 39-45. 
1399 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 210. 
1400 See OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, COMPETITION 
COMMITTEE, Policy Roundtables, “Private Remedies”, 2007, DAF/COMP(2006)34, January 11th, 
2008, at p. 373. 
1401 See WATSON, G. D., “Class actions: the Canadian experience, Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L., 11, 
Spring/Summer 2001, p. 269-287, at p. 269 and FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for 
Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law 
Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts 
and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 212. 
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United States, 1402 and especially before the certification of the class, the claimant will 
have to rely on other sources for evidence.1403 Nowadays contingency fees are allowed. 
 
Other legislative amendments in the past few years are also likely to contribute to an 
increase in antitrust damages actions in Canada. Cartel enforcement is today considered 
a high priority,1404 and the Canadian Competition Act contains a per se cartel offence 
which is sanctioned by high fines, and 14-year imprisonment for individuals.1405 
Furthermore, indirect purchasers have sometimes been denied standing to bring antitrust 
damages actions and, instead, direct purchasers have been allowed to claim damages for 
the whole overcharge.1406 In other words, Canadian case law has adopted the same 
approach to antitrust damages actions by indirect purchasers as the U.S. Supreme Court 
did in Illinois Brick. The reasoning is similar to Illinois Brick; the aim is to avoid 
multiple recoveries, and the complexity of determining the exact amount of harm of 
each injured party. The positive effect of this approach is that it will be easier for direct 
purchasers to meet the burden of proof,1407 although the drawback is that the actual 
victims of the antitrust violation will not be compensated for the loss that they have 
suffered.  
 
But the issue of whether indirect purchasers have standing to bring antitrust damages 
actions is not completely clear, and it is also linked to the issue of whether the passing-
on defense is allowed. In Chadha, the Court still stated that an indirect purchaser class 
could be certified if the pass-on to indirect purchasers could be proven on a class-wide 
1402 See OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, COMPETITION 
COMMITTEE, Policy Roundtables, “Private Remedies”, 2007, DAF/COMP(2006)34, January 11th, 
2008, at p. 373. 
1403 See WRIGHT, C.M., “Canada” in in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, 
MA, 2010, p. 447-461, at p. 455-456. 
1404 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 206. 
1405 Canadian Competition Act, s 45(2). 
1406 (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 22 (CA) [Chadha]. 
1407 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 208. 
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basis,1408 i.e. in certain cases such claims would be possible. On the other hand, in 
Canfor the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the defendant cannot invoke the 
passing-on defense against a direct purchaser,1409 but in Pro-sys Consultants Ltd v 
Microsoft Corporation the Court held that the passing-on could be used offensively, i.e. 
as a sword by indirect purchasers, even if it could not be used as a defense.1410 As one 
commentator has submitted, it seems illogical, on the one hand, to deny the passing-on 
defense due to the complexity it might entail but, on the other hand, to allow indirect 
purchaser claims despite the same complexity involved in establishing the pass-on.1411 
The result appears to be that indirect purchaser class actions are permitted, provided that 
they meet the evidentiary burden of demonstrating a class-wide pass-on of the price 
overcharge to the indirect purchasers in question. 
 
The burden of proof in civil matters is the so-called “preponderance of evidence” 
standard. The claimant will have to prove the case by a preponderance of probability, 
and the degree of probability required will, in turn, depend on the subject-matter at 
issue. If the damage results from a criminal act, as would be the case for antirust 
damages actions based on Section 36 of the Competition Act, the degree of probability 
which has to be demonstrated will be higher.1412 
 
The Canadian class action is based on an “opt-out” model as the US class action.1413 All 
provinces also have either class actions or representative actions,1414 and the Supreme 
1408 (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 22 (CA) [Chadha], a § 56. 
1409 British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, [2004] 2 SCR 74 [Canfor]. 
1410 2011 BCCA 186 [Pro-Sys]. 
1411 MACLEAN, J., “Hannover Shoe, retreaded: economic complexity, judicial competence, and 
procedural purity in Canadian competition law (Part Two)”, G.C.L.R., 7(2), 2014, p. 79-93, at p. 89. 
1412 See [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oaks] and FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel 
Damages in Canada” in LOWE, P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 
Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 213.  
1413 See OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, COMPETITION 
COMMITTEE, Policy Roundtables, “Private Remedies”, 2007, DAF/COMP(2006)34, January 11th, 
2008, at p. 373. 
1414 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 205. 
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Court of Canada has held that courts in a province which merely provides for 
representative actions can adopt class actions procedures on an ad hoc basis.1415 
 
Interestingly, claimants’ lawyers in the United States and the Canada have also started 
to increasingly coordinate class actions.1416 
 
6.2. Lessons to Learn from the U.S. and Canadian Experiences 
6.2.1. General Observations 
Given that private enforcement of antitrust rules plays a remarkably more significant 
role in the United States, and is also increasing in Canada, the European Union could 
learn from the U.S. and Canadian experiences of private antitrust enforcement. In 
particular, the role of class actions, contingency fees, and discovery in strengthening 
private enforcement merit analyzing, since these features are distinctive of the private 
enforcement models in the United States and in Canada. The U.S. and Canadian 
experiences could serve to determine whether the class actions, or other forms of 
procedural devices available in the U.S. and Canadian legal systems, should be 
introduced in the EU in order to enhance private enforcement. 
 
Canada has also partly chosen a different private enforcement model, which is – from a 
European view point – a more moderate model of private enforcement. As stated, 
damages actions are limited to cases of criminal anti-competitive conduct. Moreover, 
the procedural features that are distinctive for the US private antitrust enforcement are 
also more limited in Canada.1417  
 
6.2.2. Discovery 
Access to evidence is one of the crucial prerequisites in order to bring an antitrust 
damages action as proof of a plausible claim is required.  In the United States, access to 
1415 See Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc v Dutton [2001] 2 SCR 534. 
1416 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 206. 
1417 See OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS, COMPETITION 
COMMITTEE, Policy Roundtables, “Private Remedies”, 2007, DAF/COMP(2006)34, January 11th, 
2008, at p. 373. 
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evidence is generally obtained through discovery, and the pre-trial discovery is very 
extensive. The reason for the extensive pre-trial discovery is the requirement that the 
trial must be a single, uninterrupted event, which can be concluded within a limited time 
since the trial is decided by jurors.1418 
 
In the United States, the trial in civil – as well as in criminal – cases is based on an 
adversary system, which requires each party to investigate and present the evidence it 
wishes to rely on. The judge’s role is merely to ensure that the rules of evidence are 
observed, and to decide the case based on the arguments and evidence submitted by the 
parties, but the judge must not him or herself play an active role in investigating and 
gathering evidence.1419  
 
As it falls upon each party to prove its claim, it could be burdensome if it were not for 
discovery. Discovery consists of an exchange of information between the parties the 
purpose of which is to enable both parties to obtain knowledge of the factual and legal 
issues involved in the case.1420 The requirements for accepted evidence are fairly lax.  
 
At federal level, the rules governing discovery in civil cases are laid down in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). In addition, the states have their own rules of civil 
procedure, although they are usually very similar to the FRCP.1421 When a plaintiff 
brings a claim, it must generally provide 1) a statement of the grounds for the court's 
jurisdiction; 2) a statement of the claim showing that it is entitled to relief; and 3) a 
demand for the relief sought.1422 This is usually followed by the so-called “notice 
pleading” where the plaintiff is required to give fair notice to the defendant of its claim 
and – in very general terms – the grounds upon which it is based. However, in some 
1418 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at 
p. 1335. 
1419 See BURNHAM, W., Introduction to the law and legal system of the United States, Fifth Edition, 
West, St. Paul, 2011, at p. 82-83. 
1420 Ibid., at p. 235. 
1421 Ibid., at p. 229. This is the case even in Louisiana, the Civil Code of which is based on French and 
Spanish civil law, since it also provides for contingency fees, jury trials, and discovery. See ZEKOLL, J., 
“Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at p. 1336. 
1422 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
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states, “fact pleading” is required instead of notice pleading.1423 This means that the 
claim must contain a detailed description of facts, which makes it possible to ascertain 
the legal grounds for relief. Similarly, with regard to certain issues, the FRCP require 
specific pleading.1424  
 
Moreover, in antitrust cases, following Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the plaintiff 
must now be able to demonstrate that there is a plausible ground for its claim by 
providing sufficient factual matter in support of its claim. The aim of this requirement is 
to avoid that defendants would be forced to an unreasonably high settlement by 
claimants with unfounded claims taking advantage of wide and expensive discovery.1425 
This requirement has now been extended also to other types of cases.1426  
 
Essentially the parties may rely on the following types of evidence to prove their case: 
depositions, written interrogatories, documents, requests for entry onto land for 
inspection, and requests for admission.1427 The rules of evidence tend to favor oral 
evidence over written evidence, since the presentation of opposing views of the 
evidence is more “immediate” regarding oral evidence and argument than written 
evidence and argument, thus better achieving the aim of the adversary system.1428  
 
After the parties have resolved preliminary defenses and pleadings, the next step is to 
investigate and develop the facts of the case. This is done by way of discovery, which is 
a pretrial process the aim of which is to prepare the parties on all aspects of the case 
before the trial by allowing them to familiarize themselves with the evidence and 
witnesses of the opposing party.1429 The FRCP provide for a wide range of discovery 
1423 See BURNHAM, W., Introduction to the law and legal system of the United States, Fifth Edition, 
West, St. Paul, 2011, at p. 230. 
1424 See e.g. FRPC 9(g) which requires the plaintiff to specifically state any item of special damage that it 
is claiming. 
1425 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), paras. 556-558. 
1426 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
1427 Fed. R. Civ. P. 27-36. 
1428 See BURNHAM, W., Introduction to the law and legal system of the United States, Fifth Edition, 
West, St. Paul, 2011, at p. 83. 
1429 Ibid., at p. 235.  
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devices for private litigants once the action has been brought.1430 During discovery 
parties will exchange information relevant to the case by responding to documents 
requests, interrogatories, and depositions.1431 They must disclose promptly to each other 
information that they may use to support their case. This includes copies or descriptions 
of relevant documents in their control, the identities of individuals likely to have 
discoverable information, and a calculation of damages claimed. The parties have to 
disclose the information without waiting for a discovery request.1432 It is possible to 
obtain discovery regarding any, non-privileged, matter which is relevant to the claim or 
defense of any party. “If discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence”, it may be obtained even if the relevant material is not 
admissible at the trial.1433 On the contrary, this is usually not possible in most EU 
Member States where only identified, specific documents being admissible as evidence 
may be requested.1434 
 
A person may be required to give oral and written answers to relevant questions.1435 
This can also be done in foreign countries by taking deposition by oral examination of 
persons.1436 But if those persons are not U.S. nationals or residents, the assistance of the 
foreign country concerned is necessary if they do not agree to the deposition 
testimony.1437  
 
Discovery is particularly important because the adversary system of the United Stated 
applies a single, concentrated, continuous trial, requiring the parties to prove and defend 
1430 See JOELSON, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer. A Guide to the Operation of United States, 
European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy, third edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, at p. 105. 
1431 See BRODER, D., U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement, A Practice Introduction, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford New York, 2012, at p. 234.  
1432 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). 
1433 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
1434 See JOELSON, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer. A Guide to the Operation of United States, 
European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy, third edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, at p. 106. This is e.g. the case in Spain, Sweden and Finland. 
See Sections 3.5-3.7 of the thesis. 
1435 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30-31. 
1436 Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b). 
1437 See JOELSON, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer. A Guide to the Operation of United States, 
European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy, third edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, at p. 108. 
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their case within a limited time frame which restricts the possibilities of rebutting 
possible surprising evidence presented by the opposing party.1438 
 
Discovery in Canada is much more limited. Before the certification hearing, plaintiffs 
would have to rely on evidence e.g. from settling defendants in exchange for discounted 
settlements, expert economists, discovery documents provided in related proceedings in 
the United States, former employees of the defendants, and possible related criminal 
proceedings. However, the information from criminal proceedings does not encompass 
information obtained through leniency or amnesty applications, and is generally limited 
to publicly available information.1439 Once the class has been certified, the parties must 
generally produce all relevant documents in their possession, power, or control.1440 Oral 
discoveries are typically limited to one corporate representative of each party,1441 and 
discovery of third parties requires leave of the court.1442 The documents and information 
obtained through discovery cannot be used for any other purpose, which will limit the 
possibilities of obtaining confidentiality protective orders. Because of the more limited 
discovery in Canada, claimants have started to request access to evidence given in 
discovery in related U.S. cases.1443 This has been allowed as it has been considered as 
consistent with facilitating access to justice, judicial efficiency, and behavior 
modification, which underlie the objectives of class proceedings. In addition, the 
significant reduction of litigation costs has been taken into account.1444 
1438 See BURNHAM, W., Introduction to the law and legal system of the United States, Fifth Edition, 
West, St. Paul, 2011, at p. 235. 
1439 See WRIGHT, C.M., “Canada” in in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, 
MA, 2010, p. 447-461, at p. 455-456. 
1440 Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg. 194, R. 30.03. However, it should be noted that in 
Quebec the parties must only produce those documents which they intend to rely upon or which are 
specifically requested by the other party during oral discovery. See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., 
“Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European 
Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – 
Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, 
at p. 220, Note 83. 
1441 Ibid., R 31.03. 
1442 Ibid., R 31.10. 
1443  See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 220. 
1444 Vitapharm v Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd [2002] OJ No 298 (SCJ). 
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 As the discovery devices available in civil proceedings are very generous, access to 
evidence is significantly facilitated for victims of antitrust violations and, as a result, 
bringing antitrust damages actions is considerably easier especially in the United States 
than in the EU. Once the class has been certified, the discovery rights are also much 
more extensive in Canada than in most EU jurisdictions. In addition, the fact that 
Canadian courts have allowed claimants to request access to evidence in discovery in 
related cases in the United States facilitates meeting the standard of proof for an 
antitrust damages claim. 
 
6.2.3. Class Actions 
One of the distinctive features of the U.S. legal system is the class action, which allows 
one party or a group of parties to bring an action as representatives of a larger class of 
unidentifiable individuals. It is defined as “any civil action filed in a district court of the 
United States under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any civil action 
that is removed to a district court of the United States that was originally filed under a 
State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or 
more representatives as a class action”.1445 
 
The class action facilitates the bringing of damages claims which would otherwise be 
too small to be enforced individually by allowing the victims to pool their resources, 
and save the costs and time of the proceedings. Moreover, it has a deterrent effect.1446 It 
is based on an “opt-out” model, i.e. any individual member of the class which does not 
opt out from the action will be bound by the judgment and any award resulting from the 
action will be made to the members of the class as a whole.1447 The whole class must 
also bear the costs of litigation.1448 
 
1445 28 USC § 1711. 
1446 See BLAIR, R.D. and BOYLSTON HERENDON, J., “Antitrust class actions – problems and 
prospects: introduction”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 48, Issue 2, Summer 2003, p. 449-450, at p. 449. 
1447 See WAELBROECK, D., SLATER, D. and EVEN-SHOSHAN, G., “Ashurst Study on the conditions 
of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules”, August 31st, 2004, at p. 43 
1448 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 288. 
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There are three kinds of class actions, but the most interesting one is the so-called 
“common question” class action, which can be used to seek damages1449 when 
“questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and […] a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”.1450 A 
considerable number of antitrust class actions are filed under Rule 23(b)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1451 
 
Class actions may also be brought under state laws, which are often modeled after the 
Federal rules.1452 As stated above, state attorneys general can also bring parens patriae 
claims,1453 but these claims have rather tended to result in coupon settlements,1454 or the 
awards have been directed to charitable causes instead of directly compensating 
consumers.1455 
  
Follow-on class actions can also be brought following a civil or criminal action by the 
government. The advantage is that claimants may use the resulting judgment as prima 
facie evidence of the antitrust violation when they seek damages.1456 A follow-on action 
can also be brought even if the statutory limitation period has expired, provided that it is 
brought within one year following the government action.1457 Follow-on class actions 
used to dominate, but stand-alone class actions increased in the 1980s. Whether class 
1449 The other two are “incompatible standards” or “impeding of interests” actions, and class actions for 
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 
SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in foreign 
legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1450 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
1451 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1452 See Consumer Redress Study, at p. 272.  
1453 15 U.S.C. §15c(a)(1). 
1454 A coupon settlement means a settlement in which the class members receive a coupon for a discount 
in purchasing another of the defendant’s products while the class counsels are paid fees in cash. 
1455 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 299. 
1456 Sec. 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16. 
1457 Sec 5(i) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16. The statutory limitation period for damages actions is 
usually four years from the cause of action accrued. See Sec. 4B of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15b. 
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actions are brought on “follow-on” or “stand-alone” basis is likely to depend on the 
types of government actions brought.1458  
 
A person or several persons can file an antitrust class action as class representative for a 
defined class. Usually class representatives are self-appointed, 1459 but today virtually all 
antitrust class actions are brought by a lawyer or a law firm under a contingency fee 
arrangement.1460 
 
Certification of Class Actions 
Once a person has sued or has been sued as a class representative, the court must decide 
whether to certify the action as a class action.1461 The object of the certification of the 
class is to ensure that the class is sufficiently cohesive to justify a class action, and it 
also determines who will be bound by the final judgment.1462 In order to be certified as 
a class action, the action must fulfill the four requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
These include 1) numerosity of parties so that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
2) the existence of questions of law or fact common to the class; 3) the claims or 
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 
and 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
 
The claims and defenses are considered “typical” if the interests of the class 
representative are sufficiently aligned with those of the class members. However, the 
plaintiffs can still be at different levels in the distribution chain.1463 In order to meet the 
1458 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 300-301. 
1459 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1460 See SITTENREICH, M.A. “The rocky path for private Directors General: Procedure, politics, and the 
uncertain future of EU antitrust damages actions”, Fordham L. Rev., 78, April, 2010, p. 2701-2750, at p. 
2735. 
1461 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(a). 
1462 See POLVERINO, F., “A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European 
Union”, August 28th, 2006, available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=927001, at p. 9-10. 
1463 See Sumitomo Copper Litigation, 182 F.R.D. 85, (S.D.N.Y., 1998) and POLVERINO, F., “A Class 
Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European Union”, August 28th, 2006, available at 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=927001, at p. 7. 
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requirement of adequacy, there can be no significant conflicts of interest between the 
representative party and the absent class members. Conflicts which are apparent, 
imminent, and concern an issue at the very heart of the action would therefore exclude a 
class action for damages. The class counsel must also have the knowledge of the 
applicable law and the experience required to successfully conduct the class action 
litigation, as well as sufficient financial means to bring the action.1464 In the past years, 
the courts have additionally required that the class be clearly ascertainable by using 
objective criteria.1465 This means that there must be sufficient data about the members 
of the class so as to identify the class members. 
 
Before the judge can certify the class in class actions for damages, additionally the case 
must meet the requirement that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the 
class predominate over questions affecting only individual members”.1466 This 
requirement is usually the key issue on which the litigation in the certification focuses 
on. In order to satisfy this criterion, litigants must focus most of their efforts on the 
common issues so that it is possible to conduct a single class trial with class-wide 
evidence without the necessity of numerous trials on issues and facts which are only 
relevant to individual class members.1467 The court will therefor assess a) the class 
members’ interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; b) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already 
begun by or against class members; c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and d) the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action.1468  
 
Courts have discretion in considering whether the certification criteria for class actions 
are met.1469 Nevertheless, there have been divergences in the courts’ decisions on class 
1464 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). 
1465 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1466 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
1467 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1468 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
1469 See POLVERINO, F., “A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European 
Union”, August 28th, 2006, available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=927001, at p. 10-11. 
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certification since some courts have also made considerations on the merits at the class 
certification stage,1470 whereas others have focused more on whether the claim satisfies 
the requirements of Rule 23.1471  
 
In antitrust cases, courts have generally certified classes more freely because in claims 
arising from antitrust violations the common questions are likely to predominate over 
questions affecting only individual members.1472 Most of the issues involved in such 
claims depend on the defendant’s behavior, which is common to all class members,1473 
and which can be proven by class-wide evidence.1474 For instance, the existence of an 
antitrust violation can be established in the class action procedure. Conversely, for 
example, causation, injury, and the amount of damages must, at least partly, be assessed 
individually as the injury suffered by different plaintiffs may vary.1475 But since there 
are both common issues as well as individualized issues, the case law on class 
certification in such cases is also divergent.1476 For instance, some courts have given a 
preferred status to antitrust cases which they generally consider suitable for class 
certification because of the important role of class actions in private enforcement,1477 
while other courts have treated antitrust damages actions just as any other case.1478  
 
Another issue treated divergently concerns the treatment of individualized damages 
questions. Some courts certify classes even though there are individualized damages, 
1470 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). 
1471 Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, (7th Cir. 1981). 
1472 See PAGE, W.H., “Introduction: Reexamining the Standards for Certification of Antitrust Class 
Actions”, Antitrust, Vol. 21, Issue 3, Summer 2007, p. 53-54, at p. 53. 
1473 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 292. 
1474 See POLVERINO, F., “A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European 
Union”, August 28th, 2006, available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=927001, at p. 24. 
1475 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, p. 294. 
1476 See KLONOFF, R.H., “Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts”, Stanford Journal of Law, 
Business and Finance, Vol. 11:1, Autumn 2005, p. 1-26, at p. 1. 
1477 See Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002). 
1478 See Windham v. American Brands, Inc. 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976), and KLONOFF, R.H., 
“Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts”, Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance, Vol. 
11:1, Autumn 2005, p. 1-26, at p. 2. 
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whereas others refuse.1479 It has, for instance, been accepted that as long as the common 
proof demonstrates some damage to each individual, proof of damages can be shown on 
a common basis.1480 Especially in cases involving numerous small claimants with low-
value claims, individual calculation and distribution of damages could be burdensome 
and, therefore, the courts have sometimes certified classes in order to determine liability 
in a common action and ordered damages to be determined later.1481 
 
The aggregate proof and assessment of damages is explicitly provided regarding parens 
patriae claims. Moreover, the courts have discretion to decide how the damages 
awarded shall be distributed.1482 This has also sometimes been accepted in antitrust 
class actions.1483 
 
Once the class has been certified, “the court must give to class members the best notice 
that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members 
who can be identified through reasonable effort”.1484 This is crucial as the members of 
the class must be given an opportunity to opt out from the class, so that they can, if they 
prefer, bring an individual claim instead. However, in most cases only a small number 
of the plaintiffs choose to opt out.1485 
 
Another challenge involved in the certification of the class concerns classes including 
foreign claimants. The Federal Rules on Civil Procedure does not contain any provision 
in this respect, but the judge must decide whether or not to allow foreign claimants to 
file a class action. Foreign claimants do in general have standing to bring antitrust 
damages actions in the United States, but their right is more limited than for U.S. 
1479 See KLONOFF, R.H., “Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts”, Stanford Journal of Law, 
Business and Finance, Vol. 11:1, Autumn 2005, p. 1-26, at p. 21. 
1480 Bogosian v. Gulf Oil. Corp., 561 F. 2d 434. 
1481 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1482 Sec. 4D of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15d and sec. 4E of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15e. 
1483 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 296. 
1484 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(b). 
1485 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
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claimants. Following the adoption of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act 
(“FTAIA”), which amended the Sherman Act, the latter only applies to conduct 
involving non-import trade or commerce with foreign nations when such conduct has a 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic trade and commerce, 
and gives rise to a claim under the Sherman Act.1486 
 
The meaning of this provision has been the subject of divergent rulings by U.S. lower 
courts,1487 but this issue was settled by the U.S. Supreme Court in F. Hoffman-LaRoche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.1488 In this case, five foreign purchasers of vitamins brought a 
follow-on action for damages alleging that they had suffered harm in the form of paying 
higher prices for vitamin products in the United States and in some other countries 
caused by the vitamins cartel operated by F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. The Supreme Court 
held that foreign plaintiffs may only sue in the U.S. courts if their injuries have been 
directly and proximately caused by the domestic effects of the anti-competitive action. 
In other words, if the adverse foreign effect of the anti-competitive conduct is 
independent of any adverse domestic effect, the Sherman Act does not apply to a claim 
based solely on foreign effect. The Court reasoned that the aim of the FTAIA was not to 
expand the scope of application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce by including 
independently caused foreign injury to its scope of application. It also held that the 
FTAIA had to be construed in such a way so as not to unreasonably interfere with the 
sovereign authority of other nations and, therefore, the scope of application of the 
Sherman Act had to be limited in cases in which there was a risk of interfering with a 
foreign nation’s ability to independently regulate its own commercial affairs.1489 
Following this ruling, it would appear that purchases made outside the United States 
from a seller outside the U.S. would probably not give rise to a claim under the 
Sherman Act, unless they can show that the harm caused to them by the price-fixing 
agreement is dependent on the harm caused by the agreement in the United States.1490 In 
1486 Sec. 7 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982). 
1487 See, for example, Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (C.A. 5 2001), and 
Kruman v. Christie’s International plc, 284 F.3d 384. 
1488 F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004). 
1489 F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004). 
1490 See RYNGAERT, C., “Foreign-to-Foreign Claims: the US Supreme Court’s Decision (2004) v the 
English High Court’s Decision (2003) in the Vitamins Case”, E.C.L.R., Volume 25, Issue 10, 2004, p. 
611-616, at p. 613. 
355 
 
                                                 
cases involving global cartel agreements, the domestic harm would not occur without 
the global cartel, so there are not likely to be many situations in which the harm will be 
truly independent.1491 
 
There are arguments in favor of allowing foreign claimants to bring class actions in the 
United States as well as arguments against it. Including foreign claimants in the class 
would increase the deterrent effect of that class action as the class would be larger.1492 
Moreover, foreign claimants might not have effective remedies available in other 
forums, or have access to evidence located in the United States, if they are excluded 
from the class.1493 
  
Nevertheless, when deciding on the certification of a class including foreign plaintiffs, 
the court must also consider the preclusive effect of the class action judgment in order 
to ensure that some foreign claimants could not later challenge the binding effect of the 
resulting judgment by bringing an action in a court of their home countries1494 where the 
preclusive effect of a US class judgment might not be clear. The preclusive effect could, 
for instance, be challenged because treble damages are contrary to public policy of 
many countries, and cannot be enforced in these countries. Similarly, the “opt-out” 
mechanism of the U.S. class action is often considered to violate the rights of absent 
class members. It can also be challenging to notify foreign class members if all are not 
identified.1495 This can, in turn, risk the binding effect of the class action, with the result 
that the class action will not contribute to achieving consistency and finality of the 
judgment.1496  
1491 See SPRIGMAN, C., “Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction over International 
Cartels”, University of Chicago Law Review, 72, Winter 2005, p. 265-287, at p. 276. 
1492 See BUSCHKIN, I.T., “The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy – 
Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts”, 
Cornell Law Review, 90, September, 2005, p. 1563-1600, at p. 1583. 
1493 Ibid., at p. 1596-1598. 
1494 See WALKER, J., “Crossborder class actions: a view from across the border” Michigan State Law 
Review, Fall 2004, p. 755-798, at p. 763. 
1495 See BUSCHKIN, I.T., “The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy – 
Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts”, 
Cornell Law Review, 90, September, 2005, p. 1563-1600, at p. 1577-1580. For example, linguistic and 
cultural barriers render it difficult for judges to identify the best way to notify potential claimants of the 
class action and their rights.  See op. cit. at p. 1582. 
1496 Ibid., at p. 1577 and 1582. 
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 But if the individual claims are so small that it would not be economically viable to 
bring those claims individually in another country due to the lack of effective access to 
justice, there would be little risk of the preclusive effect of the judgment being 
questioned.1497 In these cases the only reason not to certify a class including foreign 
claimants would be the possible difficulty in reaching them in time to allow them to opt 
out from the class. However, since they would in any case lack an effective remedy, 
arguably, they would not be any worse off even if a class action was brought on their 
behalf against their will in the United States, as they could only gain something if it 
were successful, and would not have any obligation to pay any adverse cost in case of a 
failure of the action. 
 
Some U.S. states, including New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, have attempted to 
ensure the preclusive effect of class actions by providing that non-residents must opt in 
to the class in order to be bound by the decision, while other class members must opt 
out. However, if non-residents constitute more than a small part of the claimants, there 
is still a risk that the class will be smaller, which reduces the preclusive effect of the 
resulting judgment or settlement.1498  
 
Another important feature of the U.S. class action is the significant role of the class 
action lawyer. Today it is no longer the class representative or the class as a whole, but 
the class action lawyer, who is the actual decision-maker of the class. Since there is a 
risk that the lawyer’s behavior might not always be dictated by the best interests of the 
class, but by the wish to ensure that he receives some form of payment for his services, 
it is particularly important who has the power to select and monitor the class counsel. 
Especially if the fee is not related to the interests of the client and the initial investment 
into the action, the lawyer might attempt to settle early before the costs of extended 
discovery become too high. There could hence be a risk that the lawyer accepts a 
1497 See WALKER, J., “Crossborder class actions: a view from across the border”, Michigan State Law 
Review, Fall 2004, p. 755-798, at p. 771-772. 
1498 See WALKER, J., “Crossborder class actions: a view from across the border”, Michigan State Law 
Review, Fall 2004, p. 755-798, at p. 767-770. 
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settlement that is lower than what would be in the interests of his clients.1499 This is 
avoided today by the requirement that all settlements must be approved by a judge, who 
has to assess the fairness of the settlement.1500 Moreover, the adequacy of the class 
counsel to represent the class must also be verified by the court at the certification 
stage.1501 
 
The role of the judge is more accentuated in class action litigation than in traditional 
two-party proceedings in the adversarial common law system in which the parties are 
required to provide the court with all the information that is necessary to decide the 
case. In class actions, the judge must play a more active role, for instance, by asking the 
parties more questions and appointing his own experts to examine certain issues of the 
dispute or the proposed settlement and, in general, direct the evidence gathering 
process. Consequently, the court cannot rely on the parties to present all the facts, but 
must exercise greater control over the proceedings and play a role similar to the 
inquisitorial role of judges in most civil law countries.1502 
 
The judge will also determine the amount of the successful plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. 
Usually there are two ways to calculate the lawyer’s fees: common fund cases and fee 
shifting cases.1503 In common fund cases the fee constitutes a percentage of the fund 
created for the benefit of the class. In fee shifting cases, fees are usually multiplied by 
the number of hours spent on the case, which is known as the lodestar method. The fee 
may be adjusted in order to reflect the hours reasonably spent on the litigation.1504 This 
latter method for calculating the fees is generally applied in antitrust actions, since 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for one-way fee shifting, i.e. the defendant must 
1499 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 291. 
1500 Sec. 3(e) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1712. 
1501 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1). 
1502 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 294. 
1503 Ibid., at p. 289. 
1504 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
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pay reasonable attorney’s fees of the successful claimant, and must pay its own legal 
costs in any case.1505  
 
As stated above, many certified class actions are settled. The parties agree on the class 
attorney’s fee, which requires the approval of the court.1506 This requirement is 
particularly important when the settlement comprises large amounts to be paid to the 
plaintiffs because class attorneys tend to settle more often in these cases. Moreover, the 
control exercised by the court is necessary due to the difficulties for plaintiffs in 
monitoring the conduct of the class attorney once the class has been certified.1507 
 
If a class action results in a judgment awarding damages, the court may establish a 
procedure for paying the awards to class members. Class members would be requested 
to return a claim form to prove the harm that they have suffered by the defendant’s 
conduct. However, when class actions are settled, the settlement agreements usually 
contain procedures also for paying the class members. The court may approve the 
proposed settlement if it finds it fair, reasonable and adequate.1508 It may refuse to 
approve a settlement unless it is possible for individual class members to opt out from 
the settlement that did not opt out at an earlier stage of the litigation.1509 Further, any 
class member has the right to object to the settlement proposal.1510 
 
Sometimes class members do not receive a damages award in cash, but are instead 
given a coupon for a discount if they purchase another of the defendant’s products. Such 
coupon settlements have often been rejected by courts as unfair if the class counsels are 
paid large fees in cash.1511 As stated, following the adoption of the Class Action 
1505 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 288-289. The lodestar method is admissible also in class actions. See Sec. 
3(b)(2) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1712. 
1506 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1507 See POLVERINO, F., “A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European 
Union”, August 28th, 2006, available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=927001, at p. 15. 
1508 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 
1509 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4) 
1510 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5). 
1511 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
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Fairness Act of 2005, the court may approve such settlements only after a hearing to 
determine whether, and making a written finding that, the settlement is fair, reasonable, 
and adequate for class members.1512 Furthermore, the portion of any attorney’s fee to 
class counsel must also be proportionate to the value of the recovery of the class 
members.1513 The court may also appoint an expert qualified to provide information on 
the actual value to the class of the coupons that are redeemed.1514 These measures aim 
to ensure that the class counsel does not agree to settle a case with the incentive of a 
large fee, while class members would receive little compensation. 
 
In Canada, the criteria for class certification will depend on the province. Most 
provinces apply similar criteria as Ontario, but Quebec applies different rules.1515 
Typically, the claimant must show that 1) there is a viable cause of action for the claim; 
2) a class of two or more persons can be identified who are willing to be represented by 
a representative plaintiff; 3) the claims of the class members raise common issue; 4) a 
class action would be the preferable procedure for resolution of the action; and 5) there 
is an appropriate plaintiff representative.1516 It is somewhat easier to meet the Canadian 
criteria for certification than the U.S. criteria because it is sufficient that a class action is 
the “preferable option”, i.e. it is not necessary to show that the common issues 
predominate over the individual issues. However, since there is no broad discovery 
available before the certification of the class, it could sometimes be challenging for 
claimants to meet the certification criteria.1517 
 
Regarding the cause of action, only if it is “plain and obvious” that the claim will not 
succeed will certification be denied on this ground. As a result, it is difficult for the 
1512 Sec. 3(e) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1712. 
1513 Sec. 3(a) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1712. 
1514 Sec. 3(d) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1712. 
1515 The criteria for certification in Quebec are significantly lower. The claimant has to demonstrate that 
1) the claims of the members raise identical, similar or related questions of law or fact; 2) the facts 
alleged seem to justify the conclusions sought; 3) the composition of the group makes the application of 
representative actions or joint actions difficult or impracticable; and that the representative will represent 
the members adequately. See Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, art 1003. 
1516 The Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992 SO 1992, c 6, section 5. 
1517 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 216. 
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defendant to impede certification arguing that there is no cause of action.1518 Contrary to 
some U.S. courts,1519 the Canadian courts do not generally make determinations on the 
merits during the certification hearing. The class must be capable of clear definition in 
order to be considered as identifiable. But this does not require that every class member 
must be named, or known at the beginning of the proceeding. Moreover, class members 
must share the same interest in the resolution of the common issues. These issues are 
common issues of facts or common issues of law that arise from common facts. In other 
words, the “common issues” do not have to be identical issues of fact or identical issues 
of law, as long as they are common. But the determination of the common issues must 
avoid the duplication of fact-finding and/or legal analysis, and the common issues must 
be necessary to resolve each class member’s claim; and a “substantial ingredient” of 
each member’s claim.1520 
 
Whether the class action is the preferable procedure will depend on whether it is the 
preferable procedure for determining the entire action, which is assessed by taking into 
account judicial economy, access to justice, and behavior modification. The class 
proceedings must also be fair, efficient, and manageable in order to satisfy this 
condition.1521 
 
In order to qualify as representative plaintiff, a plaintiff must fairly and adequately 
represent the interest of the class; provide a plan for the proceedings that sets out a 
workable method of advancing the action on behalf of the class and notifying the class 
of the proceeding, and its interest must not conflict with the interest of other class 
members on the common issues.1522 
 
Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia have opt-out class actions, 
whereas British Columbia and Newfoundland and Labrador have hybrid “opt-out” and 
1518 Ibid., at p. 217. 
1519 See e.g. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001). 
1520 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 217. 
1521 Idem. 
1522 The Ontario Class Proceedings Act, 1992 SO 1992, c 6, section 5(1)(e). 
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“opt-in” regimes: opt-outs apply to residents, while non-residents are subject to the 
“opt-in” principle.1523 This approach is therefore similar to the one adopted by some 
U.S. states.1524 In order for a Canadian court to be able to certify a class including non-
residents (either from other provinces or countries), there must be a real and substantial 
connection between the damages claims of non-residents and the forum is required.1525 
 
Settlement agreements also require certification so that all class members are bound. In 
order to be certified, the settlement has to be fair, reasonable and in the best interest of 
the class.1526 These criteria are therefore very similar to those ones applicable to class 
action settlements in the United States. 
 
6.2.4. Incentives and Costs 
United States is a particularly attractive forum for bringing antitrust damages claims in 
that its costs rules are beneficial to the claimant and if the claim is successful, the 
claimant will be awarded treble damages.1527 Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act provides for 
one-way fee-shifting; only the defendant must pay the costs and reasonable attorney’s 
fees to the successful claimant, and must always bear its own legal costs. In general, the 
claimant will therefore not be obliged to pay for the defendant’s litigation costs even if 
its claim fails, although there are some exceptions to this principle.1528 The reasoning 
behind the one-way fee shifting rule is to compensate claimants for undertaking risky, 
expensive litigation.1529 Moreover, in order to reduce the claimant’s own litigation costs 
in case its claim is unsuccessful, it can conclude a so-called contingency fee 
1523 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 222. 
1524 See WALKER, J., “Crossborder class actions: a view from across the border”, Michigan State Law 
Review, Fall 2004, p. 755-798, at p. 767-770. 
1525 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 225-226. 
1526 Ibid., at p. 227-228. 
1527 Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
1528 See e.g. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28 U.S.C. § 11(c). 
1529 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 251. 
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arrangement with its lawyer, which means that the lawyer will only receive a fee if he 
wins the case.1530 
 
Treble Damages 
Treble damages increase private enforcement, as they provide incentives for private 
litigants to bring damages actions, and ensure that victims of antitrust violations also 
obtain full compensation when the jury determinations are imprecise,1531 or when some 
damages, for example the pre-judgment interests, may not be recoverable. Furthermore, 
they serve as a deterrent against antitrust violations, and compensate for the fact that not 
all anti-competitive conduct is detected and pursued. Similarly, as antitrust violations 
reduce consumer welfare in general, which is not normally reflected in the damages, 
treble damages make the infringer pay damages that correspond more fully to the harm 
caused by the violation to society. They also remove the incentives of infringers to 
engage in anti-competitive conduct since they force disgorgement of unlawfully 
obtained gains from anti-competitive conduct.1532  
 
On the other hand, treble damages are an incentive for defendants to settle with the 
result that few cases reach trial.1533 This tendency is reinforced by the fact that 
defendants are jointly and severally liable for antitrust violations, but defendants may 
seek reduction of plaintiffs’ claims only of the amount that defendants, who have settled 
with the plaintiffs, have paid. The reduction may be sought only after total damages 
have been determined and trebled. In addition, defendants may not seek contribution 
from other defendants who have not settled. Consequently, one single defendant could 
1530 In fact, contingency fees are common in private antitrust litigation, including class actions. See 
WILDFANG and SLAUGHTER, “Funding Litigation” in FOER and CUNEO (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Uk – Northhampton, 
MA, USA, 2010, p. 220-239, at p. 234. 
1531 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 297. 
1532 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 246. 
1533 See YSEWYN, J., “Private enforcement of competition law in the EU: trials and tribulations”, 
International Law Practicum, 19-Spring, 2006, p. 14-19, at p. 15. 
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be responsible for most of the damage caused by the antitrust violation, which 
incentivize defendants to settle early in order to avoid excessive liability.1534 
 
In order to avoid the unfair outcome that less culpable defendants pay an excessive 
share of total damages while more culpable defendants escape all or a significant part of 
liability, the Antitrust Modernization Commission has recommended that non-settling 
defendants be allowed to reduce plaintiffs’ remaining claims against them by the ratable 
share of liability of the settling defendants, or the amount of the settlement, whichever 
is greater. In addition, non-settling defendants should be permitted to seek contribution 
from other non-settling defendants to the extent that the damages paid by the defendants 
seeking contribution are disproportionate.1535 In this manner, all defendants would be 
liable for the violation and would face an appropriate level of deterrence. The recovery 
of the plaintiffs would also only be reduced, if it decided to settle claims instead of 
pursuing them.1536  
 
In general, it is not so much the availability of multiple damages, which has been 
criticized, but rather the choice of the treble multiplier. It has been suggested that the 
multiplier should reflect the likelihood of detecting antitrust violations and that it should 
only be available where it is easy to hide the violation, such as in horizontal price-
fixing.1537 Because of treble damages, there is also a risk that companies abstain from 
conduct that is in the gray-zone between legal and illegal with the result that innovation 
is stifled.1538 Therefore, it has been proposed that treble damages should only be 
1534 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 252. 
1535 Ibid., at p. 252-253. The Antitrust Modernization Commission has recommended that the liability of 
each defendant should be equal to its market share or, if the market share would not be an appropriate 
basis for allocating liability, relative gain from the antitrust violation. See op. cit. at p. 254. 
1536 Ibid., at p. 252-253. 
1537 See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), 
Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 
44-60, at p. 52. 
1538 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 297. 
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awarded in cases of clear-cut per se anti-competitive conduct. Alternatively, it could be 
left to the judge’s discretion to award treble damages for flagrant antitrust violations.1539 
 
But these suggestions do not take into consideration that the aim of treble damages is 
not only to deter but also to compensate for the complexity and duration of antitrust 
cases, and the difficulty of proving antitrust infringements,1540 which is not 
characteristic only of price-fixing agreements.1541 In fact, the incentive of treble 
damages would be needed the most in meritorious antitrust class actions requiring 
significant investment of time and resources, but in which the outcome is uncertain and 
which would otherwise not be brought.1542 
 
In Canada, Section 36 of the Competition Act does not provide for treble damages, but 
merely for full compensation of the damage suffered. In addition, the injured party may 
recover the full cost of “any investigation in connection with the matter and of 
proceedings” under Section 36. Nevertheless, the recovery also includes pre-judgment 
interest,1543 so it is possible that the total recovery will still be more significant than 
treble damages without prejudgment interest would be. But in any case, the claimant 
will only obtain full compensation, and there are no punitive damages.1544 
 
In class actions, the possibility of assessing liability and damages on an aggregate basis 
for the whole class will depend on the province in question. In British Columbia, the 
B.C. Court of Appeal held in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Infineon Technologies AG that 
1539 See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), 
Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 
44-60, at p. 53-54. 
1540 See RICHARDS, J.D., “What makes an antitrust class action remedy successful?: a tale of two 
settlements”, Tulane Law Review, 80, December, 2005, p. 621-658, at p. 630. 
1541 See e.g. Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D.Md. 2001). 
1542 See RICHARDS, J.D., “What makes an antitrust class action remedy successful?: a tale of two 
settlements”, Tulane Law Review, 80, December, 2005, p. 621-658, at p. 633. 
1543 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 212, Note 38. 
1544 However, it should be noted that tort claims based on common law may also allow punitive damages 
which are not available under Section 36 of the Canadian Competition Act. See HOOD, J., KENT, D. and 
LOW, M., “Canada: Private Antitrust Litigation”, The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2011. 
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aggregate damages could be assessed in the case because some of the defendants had 
admitted in proceedings in the United States that they had engaged in a wrongful 
conduct, and had made illegal gains from that conduct. The claimants were therefore 
able to use statistical evidence to demonstrate that the illegal benefit was attributable to 
the class and its quantum.1545 Conversely, the Ontario Court of Appeal has required that 
liability must first be proven for the whole class before determining the amount of 
damages.1546 It is not possible to use aggregate damages to prove that there has been 
class-wide injury.1547 
 
The issue whether infringers have the right to seek contribution from co-infringers in an 
antitrust damages action is still to be settled in Canada.1548 
 
Contingency Fees 
Treble damages alone are not incentive enough for potential claimants to file antitrust 
class actions, especially if the claims of the individual plaintiffs are small. This is so 
because the prospect of the individual claimant to only recover its own damages, which 
is a modest amount even if trebled, is a very small incentive to initiate burdensome 
proceedings. Instead, the compensation of the class action lawyer is crucial, and one-
way fee shifting provides an important incentive to private antitrust litigation.1549 
 
Under U.S. law, it is possible to make a contingency fee arrangement, i.e. the lawyer 
will only be paid if the action is successful. It is consequently in the lawyer’s interest to 
achieve damages that are as large as possible. In order to maximize the gains, the 
lawyers will try to reduce the costs. Therefore, they are often active in fields where it is 
easier to detect possibly rewarding cases or engage in follow-on actions. Similarly, the 
lawyers tend to reduce the risk by making use of diversification in that they hold a 
1545 Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Infineon Technologies AG, 2009 BCCA 503, paragraphs 31-33, and 70. 
1546 (2003) 63 O.R. (3d) 22 (CA) [Chadha]. 
1547 Irving Paper v Atofina Chemicals Inc 2010 ONSC 2705 [Irving Paper v Atofina Chemical]. 
1548 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 213. 
1549 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 288-289 and 298. 
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portfolio of cases.1550 Several U.S. law firms have consequently specialized in antitrust 
class actions, and promptly bring follow-on action or stand-alone actions when there is 
public information about anti-competitive conduct.1551 
 
The rationale for awarding attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs is to help to guarantee 
that meritorious damages claims will be efficiently brought.1552 The incentive of making 
large gains is essential for the functioning of the class action mechanism in particular 
when the individual claims are small, since victims of antitrust violations do not have 
the particular knowledge of bringing damages actions, and would not be able to take 
advantage of economies of scale and diversification as the specialized lawyer can.1553 
The recoverability of attorneys’ fees also provides additional incentives for private 
litigants to pursue anti-competitive conduct.1554 Contingency fees also facilitate the 
alignment of lawyers’ and clients’ interests because both will receive a part of the 
damages awarded if the claim is successful. Moreover, since lawyers will only obtain a 
fee if the claim succeeds, they have an incentive to only accept cases which are likely to 
succeed.1555 
  
Since the purpose of attorneys’ fees is to provide an incentive to detect and prosecute 
anti-competitive conduct, the Antitrust Modernization Commission has recommended 
that fees should be appropriately reduced in follow-on actions. It argues that in cases in 
which much of the evidence used in the litigation has been developed as part of 
government investigation, it is less necessary to grant attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff due 
to the relative lack of risk and burden for the plaintiff to bring the action. The fees 
1550 Ibid., at p. 289-290. 
1551 See JOELSON, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer. A Guide to the Operation of United States, 
European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy, third edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, at p. 37. 
1552 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, p. 250. 
1553 See LANG, C., “Class Actions and the US Antitrust Laws: Prerequisites and Interdependencies of the 
Implementation of a Procedural Devise for the Aggregation of Low-Value Claims”, World Competition, 
24(2), 2001, p. 285-302, at p. 290. 
1554 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 250.  
1555 See SHAJNFELD, A., “A critical survey of the law, ethics, and economics of attorney contingent fee 
arrangements” N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev., 54, 2009/2010, p. 773, at p. 776. 
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should therefore reflect this.1556 This would reduce the negative effect of class counsels 
sometimes receiving excessively high awards at the cost of the defendant.  
 
However, it should be borne in mind that there are also other limitations to the use of 
contingency fees. A claimant is only likely to conclude a contingency fee agreement if 
its claim is significant enough to give an attorney the incentive to take the risk of 
possibly not recovering anything if the action should fail.1557 
 
In Canada, the provinces apply different cost rules what again makes its legal system 
interesting to analyze from an EU perspective, since the costs rules in the EU are mostly 
decided under national legislation. In British Columbia, costs will not be awarded 
against either the claimant or defendant for any aspect, whereas in Alberta the court has 
discretion to award costs. Ontario and Quebec apply the “loser pays” principle, but the 
court has discretion to reduce, or deny costs. Moreover, in Ontario, only the 
representative is responsible for adverse costs, but can obtain funding from the Ontario 
Class Proceedings Fund or indemnification from class counsel’s firm.1558  
 
Generous contingency fees are also available in Canada. They usually range from 20% 
to 30%, and in addition disbursements and applicable taxes will be compensated.1559    
The rationale behind such fees is to ensure access to justice.1560 In fact, almost all class 
actions in Canada are brought under contingency fee arrangements. But as in the United 
States, it is also possible to adjust the fees if they are not reasonable, or to use other 
methods for calculating the attorneys’ fees. The class counsel’s fees must also be 
approved by a court, which can award a lower amount if the fees would be excessive. It 
1556 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, at p. 251. 
1557 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at 
p. 1356. 
1558 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 222. 
1559 See WRIGHT, C.M., “Canada” in in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, 
MA, 2010, p. 447-461, at p. 460. 
1560 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 223. 
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has also become increasingly common that contingency fee arrangements include an 
obligation for the class counsel to compensate the representative plaintiff for any 
adverse cost award. Moreover, in Ontario, claimants can also apply for financing to a 
public fund in order to bring a class action. In case the action succeeds, they must repay 
the funding received and also pay a percentage of the settlement and/or award 
obtained.1561  
 
Finally, in spite of the prohibition of champerty, a funding arrangement by a litigation-
finance company has been approved in a class action, and was not considered to 
constitute evidence of the funder initiating the action. An Irish company engaged 
exclusively in providing litigation funding financed the action in question in exchange 
for 7% of any recovery in the litigation. Although such arrangements may raise 
questions regarding confidentiality, in this case the court found that it was acceptable 
that the plaintiff disclosed some degree of information to the funder of the class 
action.1562 
 
6.2.5. Significance of Other Features of the Civil Procedure for Private Enforcement 
The U.S. civil procedure contains features that do not exist in civil law systems, or at 
least not to the same extent as in the U.S. legal system. Permissive discovery rules, 
contingency fee arrangements, the award of costs and attorneys’ fees to the successful 
plaintiff, without the obligation for the unsuccessful plaintiff to pay these costs, and 
class actions, to name a few, are common features of the general system of civil 
procedure in the United States, whereas treble damages are specific to the antitrust 
law.1563 In addition, the fundamental role played by the class counsel in class actions 
must also be borne in mind. 
 
1561 See WRIGHT, C.M., “Canada” in in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, 
MA, 2010, p. 447-461, at p. 460-461. 
1562 [2011] OJ No 1239 (SJD) [Dugal]. 
1563 See GINSBURG, D.G., “Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 2005, p. 427-439, at p. 436-437. Treble damages were in fact 
already included in the Sherman Act of 1890. See YSEWYN, J., “Private enforcement of competition law 
in the EU: trials and tribulations”, International Law Practicum, 19-Spring, 2006, p. 14-19, at p. 15. 
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In the United States, both plaintiffs and defendants have a right to demand trial by jury 
in a treble-damage action. However, a trial by jury is not always demanded, since 
antitrust cases tend to be complex, and a jury might be unsuitable to resolve it. But 
courts disagree on whether a significant complexity of the case is a ground for denying 
a jury trial. Because of the possibility of jurors not being capable of handling antitrust 
cases well, parties with a weak case might wish to request a jury trial hoping to obtain a 
favorable outcome in the case.1564 The availability of jury trials thus increases the 
uncertainty of the outcome in antitrust cases. However, the existence of jury trials could 
also play in favor of the defendant precisely due to the uncertainty of the action. 
Moreover, in class actions the class has to pass the certification stage so it is not 
unlikely that a very weak case would be argued before a jury. Similarly, following 
Twombly, a plausible ground for the claim is required in order to bring the action, so 
claimants must provide enough factual matter supporting their claim,1565 which makes it 
easier for courts to reject unfounded cases. 
 
The features of the U.S. civil procedure, which foster private actions, have resulted in 
antitrust follow-on actions being almost automatic when the government has 
successfully pursued an anti-competitive conduct.1566 Private enforcement thus plays a 
very significant role in the United States, and reflects the goal of the antitrust policy 
chosen: “the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private 
action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior 
in violation of the antitrust laws.”1567 
 
Moreover, some features characteristic of antitrust litigation may contribute to the high 
level of private antitrust enforcement in the United States. For instance, the 
classification of a certain type of conduct as “per se” unlawful significantly increases 
the level of private enforcement, since claimants are not required to prove an actual 
1564 See AREEDA, P., KAPLOW, L. and EDLIN, A., Antitrust Analysis, Aspen Publishers, New York, 
2004, at p. 74. 
1565 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
1566 See JOELSON, M.R., An International Antitrust Primer. A Guide to the Operation of United States, 
European Union and Other Key Competition Laws in the Global Economy, third edition, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2006, at p. 37. 
1567 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), § 139. 
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anti-competitive effect of the conduct in question.1568 Furthermore, the provision that a 
final judgment or decree finding that a defendant has violated antitrust laws constitutes 
prima facie evidence against the defendant in subsequent private actions for 
damages,1569 has prompted defendants to settle their cases with public authorities, 
because this way they avoid a judgment or a decree that would make it easier for 
potential claimants to bring damages actions.1570 
 
Although Canada shares some of the features of the U.S. antitrust litigation procedure, 
antitrust enforcement in Canada was initially based on public enforcement, and private 
enforcement did not increase significantly until the Supreme Court confirmed the 
constitutionality of antitrust damages actions in 1989.1571  
 
6.2.6. Concluding Evaluation of the U.S. and Canadian Private Enforcement Models 
The existence of extensive discovery rights, treble damages, contingency fees, the one-
way fee shifting rule, and class actions based on the “opt-out” model, as well as the role 
played by the courts, class counsels and juries in antitrust damages actions in the United 
States makes the antitrust enforcement model very different from civil law jurisdictions. 
Canada, in which the civil and common law legal systems coexist, have in the past 
decades adopted some of these U.S. features, such as opt-out class actions and 
contingency fees. However, it does not provide for treble damages, although punitive 
damages are possible under common law torts, and does not generally apply jury-trials. 
Discovery rights are also less extensive. In addition, there is no federal equivalent to the 
provision in the CAFA of 2005 which would allow the removal of multi-jurisdictional 
cases to federal courts. 
 
1568 See GINSBURG, D.G., “Comparing antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics, 1(3), 2005, p. 427-439, at p. 437. 
1569 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27. 
1570 See YSEWYN, J., “Private enforcement of competition law in the EU: trials and tribulations”, 
International Law Practicum, 19-Spring, 2006, p. 14-19, at p. 16. 
1571 See General Motors of Canada Ltd v City National Leasing, [1989] 1 SCR 641 [General Motors of 
Canada] and FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in 
LOWE, P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and 
Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 205. 
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In spite of these differences, it appears that private enforcement has increased in Canada 
following the adoption of class actions, in particular in cartel cases. In this context, it 
should be noted that virtually all class actions are brought under contingency fee 
arrangements, which indicates the importance of the availability of contingency fees in 
order to fund class actions. 
 
Discovery 
The advantages of the generous discovery rules in the United States is that claimants 
can obtain access to evidence about facts and issues which would otherwise be 
impossible to learn about, in particular with regard to secret cartels. Also proof of other 
types of infringements or the scope of the harm suffered could be challenging to adduce 
without discovery rights. Moreover, discovery is also beneficial to the defendant since it 
will learn about all the factual and legal issues relevant to understand the claim, which 
facilitate the preparation for trial.  
 
Nevertheless, discovery can be very time-consuming and expensive. If the costs of the 
action increase, bringing the claim will only be attractive if contingency fees are 
available to the claimant. For costly cases, the willingness of a lawyer to accept such 
cases would depend on the probability of the claim being successful as he would have to 
bear the litigation costs of his client in case the claim fails. The size of the antitrust 
damages claim will therefore also be relevant, as small claims would not give a 
sufficient incentive to undertake the risks of litigation even if the damages will be 
trebled if the claim succeeds. It would seem that a balance would have to be struck 
between providing effective access to evidence through discovery, while at the same 
time keeping its costs in check. 
 
Canada has limited the discovery rights until the class has been certified. But claimants 
have sometimes alleged that this could make it difficult to meet the certification criteria. 
After the certification of the class, in most provinces, parties must produce all relevant 
documents in their possession, power, or control.1572 Since claimants in Canada have 
started to request discovery documents provided in related proceedings in the United 
1572 See e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg. 194, R. 30.03. 
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States,1573 it appears that the current Canadian discovery rules are not necessarily 
sufficient to allow them to bring antitrust damages class actions successfully. On the 
other hand, the fact that the Canadian courts allow this shows that the legal system 
works in those cases where there are indeed discovery documents available. In other 
cases, the discovery rules would sometimes fall short of ensuring access to justice. 
 
Class Ations 
The U.S. class action has many advantages when private antitrust litigants seek 
damages for the harm that they have suffered from an antitrust violation. The same 
advantages apply to the Canadian class action which can be brought on an “opt-out” 
basis in some provinces (or as a hybrid class action involving both class members to 
which the “opt-in” principle applies and those to whom the “opt-out” principle is 
applicable), whereas in the rest of the provinces the “opt-in” class actions would be 
subject to the same limitations as certain “opt-in” collective actions existing in the EU. 
 
First and foremost, the class action makes it possible to enforce claims that would be 
too small to be viably enforced individually, thus contributing to a larger number of 
victims receiving adequate compensation and an increasing over-all deterrence. The 
class action could be particularly helpful in informing other victims who might be 
unaware that they have suffered harm from an antitrust violation. This would in 
particular be the case of secret price-fixing agreements. As the class action in the United 
States is based on the “opt-out” model, all potential class members must be informed of 
the action as soon as the court has certified the class and they will, consequently, be able 
to seek redress. Consequently, a class action is often the only means to both inform 
victims of their rights, and provide a viable option for seeking damages for the loss that 
they have suffered.1574 
 
Even large purchasers who have suffered a significant loss might be dissuaded from 
bringing a stand-alone action due to its complexity, high costs, and burdensome 
1573 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 220. 
1574 See HAUSFELD, M., OLSON, S. and GASSMANN, S., “Antitrust Class Actions: Continued 
Vitality”, The Antitrust Review of the Americas, 2008, p. 71-73, at p. 71-72. 
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procedure. For instance, in the Microsoft case, the plaintiffs’ attorneys spent over five 
years on the litigation, and more than $10 million only on the cost of joint discovery and 
expert work.1575 Class actions are therefore often the only viable form of bringing an 
action. The ability of numerous small claimants to bring a class action will also 
reinforce the effect of the substantive antitrust rules, since potential infringers must 
when they are planning their market strategies take into account that they could be held 
liable also when the victims are claimants with limited economic resources to bring an 
individual action.1576 
 
The class representative also benefits from the class action, since the larger the class is, 
the greater his bargaining power towards the defendant or defendants will be, which 
could result in an advantageous settlement. The possibility of a successful outcome by 
judgment also increases because the other class members could have useful information 
and evidence in their possession that could facilitate proving the antitrust violation. The 
class action therefore makes it possible to take advantage of economies of scale, thus 
reducing the costs of the action, which usually constitutes an obstacle to private 
enforcement,1577 and improving the possibilities of succeeding. 
 
A private class action is also more efficient as public enforcement when it comes to 
compensation of the actual damage that the antitrust violation has caused to the 
economy.1578 Public enforcement merely puts an end to the infringement, and 
contributes through deterrence to the reduction of future antitrust violations, but it does 
not compensate victims of antitrust violations for the economic loss that they have 
already suffered. Class actions are therefore necessary to ensure that these victims can 
obtain adequate compensation.  
 
The class action saves resources in that it makes it possible to avoid deciding on the 
same issue several times in separate cases which also benefits the defendant. 
Furthermore, it ensures that similar cases are resolved consistently, since the outcome of 
1575 Ibid., at p. 71. 
1576 See POLVERINO, F., “A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European 
Union”, August 28th, 2006, available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=927001, at p. 33. 
1577 Ibid., at p. 35. 
1578 Ibid., at p. 34. 
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the litigation is binding on all class members,1579 unless some of the class members 
have decided to opt out. However, the number of class members who choose to opt out 
tends to be low.1580 Furthermore, even if some of the class members which have opted 
out decided later to bring an action against the defendant, it would still have to face 
fewer trials than if all or most of potential class members decided to sue it individually.  
 
The class action also makes the task of the court easier, although it can be challenging 
to manage a large class action case. But being obligated to decide on the same 
infringement multiple times would be even more burdensome, wasting both the time of 
courts and economic resources. In addition, the risk of divergent outcomes of actions 
brought in different courts also entails a risk of inconsistency, and reduced legal 
certainty. 
 
As regards evidence, the class actions serve to reduce costs and the administrative 
burden in follow-on actions since the public enforcer can hand the evidence to a single 
class representative instead of to several plaintiffs. The task of monitoring the use of the 
transmitted evidence that might contain confidential information is also facilitated, since 
the evidence will only be used in one trial. It has been suggested that class actions could 
also make it possible for the plaintiff to hire better legal and specialist advice thanks to 
the requirement of adequacy of representation for class certification. The judge would 
hence make sure that the counsel is an experienced lawyer, and the plaintiff has proper 
economic advice on what evidence needs to be provided, and how it should be 
interpreted.1581 
 
1579 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. However, the binding effect of the 
judgment or settlement would require that potential class members have been duly notified about the 
action in order to exercise their right to opt-out. As has been shown in Section 6.2.3, this could sometimes 
be problematic especially in cases involving foreign class members. Moreover, in such cases, there could 
also be a risk of the foreign class members later attempting to challenge the preclusive effect of the 
judgment or settlement by bringing a damages action before the courts of their home countries, before 
which a U.S. or Canadian decision might not be enforceable.  
1580 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
1581 See POLVERINO, F., “A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European 
Union”, August 28th, 2006, available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=927001, at p. 28-29. 
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Nevertheless, the class action is not unproblematic, and does not solve all issues related 
to private enforcement. For example, there is a risk that competitors bring frivolous 
class actions attempting to force the defendant to settle, as the defendant faces the 
prospect of paying treble damages if it is found guilty, and it may thus prefer to settle 
instead, sometimes even though its conduct is not anti-competitive.1582 But the risk of 
frivolous lawsuits is reduced by the requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
it has suffered an antitrust injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct.1583  The judge 
may therefore refuse to certify the class if this prerequisite is not satisfied. 
 
The perception in Europe that Americans are excessively litigious is also not necessarily 
completely correct at least as regards private antitrust enforcement, since antitrust class 
actions represent only a moderate number of federal class actions.1584 Moreover, this so-
called “litigation culture” already existed before private antitrust litigation significantly 
increased.1585 The possibility of bringing unfounded claims have further been reduced 
by the requirement that the claimant must show that there is a plausible ground for its 
claim by providing sufficient facts supporting its claim.1586 The judge also plays a 
fundamental role in class actions in certifying the class. He or she should only accept 
claims satisfying the certification requirements, and must ensure that the misuse of the 
class action procedure is prevented. The certification of the class by the judge is crucial 
since the possible award of damages is often decided by the jury. In addition, the fact 
that settlements and attorneys’ fees must be approved by the court1587  also contributes 
to limit unfair outcomes of class actions. However, it is worrying that the case law on 
certification in class action is very divergent in the United States in the United 
1582 Ibid., at p. 34. 
1583 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), at § 489. 
1584 Even when antitrust class actions were at their peak, they represented less than 8% of the total number 
of class actions. See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – 
of Optimal Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, 
J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
2007, p. 44-60, at p. 57-58.  
1585 Ibid., at p. 57-58. 
1586 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
1587 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
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States.1588 It would be desirable that a level-playing field would be established, as the 
courts currently interpret the certification requirements so differently. 
 
It must also be noted that abuse normally occurs in other types of class action cases, for 
examples securities actions and business tort cases. Unfounded antitrust class actions 
are essentially barred because the outcome is too uncertain, and they are too expensive. 
Furthermore, defendants are usually not willing to settle early because they can make a 
motion to dismiss the case, oppose class certification, and make a motion for a summary 
judgment. It is very difficult that an unfounded antitrust case will pass all these stages. 
Thanks to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, it has also become considerably more 
difficult to bring class actions in state courts in which abuses have usually occurred.1589 
Finally, under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanctions can be imposed 
on parties and their counsel bringing frivolous cases.1590 
 
The CAFA of 2005 has also reduced other potential drawbacks of class actions. For 
instance, the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless individual class members, 
who did not opt out at an earlier stage of the litigation, are given the opportunity to opt 
out from the settlement.1591 Although this reduces the preclusive effect of the judgment 
to class members who have not opted out, it is still necessary in order to prevent class 
counsels from accepting settlements that are not necessarily favorable to the class 
member. The possibility of removing cases that involve parties from several states to 
federal courts1592 will also increase the consistency of judgments, and benefit both 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
 
Nevertheless, if the interests of different class members are not sufficiently similar, the 
class action may result in a worse outcome for the class members and the defendant 
than if the cases had been decided individually. In order to avoid conflicts of interest 
1588 See KLONOFF, R.H., “Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts”, Stanford Journal of Law, 
Business and Finance, Vol. 11:1, Autumn 2005, p. 1-26, at p. 2. 
1589 See SCHNELL, G., “Class Action Madness in Europe – a Call for a More Balanced Debate”, 
E.C.L.R., Volume 28, Issue 11, 2007, p. 617-619, at p. 618. 
1590 28 U.S.C. §11(c). 
1591 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 
1592 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 269. 
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regarding the distribution of a settlement or award between the classes in cases 
involving several groups of class members, it could also be necessary that the different 
classes are represented by different attorneys. The drawback of this is, however, that it 
might become difficult to pursue such a class action effectively. One way of avoiding 
this which has been increasingly used is to appoint attorneys who are not associated to 
the class counsels to represent different groups. In case of a conflict of interest, these 
attorneys resolve the issues through negotiation amongst themselves.1593 
 
Another drawback of class actions is that they sometimes fail to compensate indirect 
purchasers efficiently, for instance, because they receive vouchers or products instead of 
monetary compensation. Indirect purchasers might not wish to collect them,1594 and 
such arrangements might also intensify the market effects of the antitrust violation 
concerned if they can only be used for purchases from the infringers.1595 Moreover, the 
identification of indirect purchasers and quantification of their claims could be difficult, 
especially in cases involving small claims. For larger claims defendants’ business 
records and computer databases as well as electronic technologies, e.g. the Internet, 
facilitate this task.1596 
 
These difficulties explain why the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Illinois Brick1597 to 
deny standing to indirect purchasers since they could not be considered as efficient 
enforcers. But it does not seem justified to exclude consumers, who have often suffered 
the largest loss as they cannot pass on the overcharge, whereas direct purchasers who 
might not have been injured at all can claim compensation. In addition, even if the 
individual claims of indirect purchasers are sometimes smaller than the amount of the 
compensation, such claims could be used to fund a cy pres award in order to use it for 
the benefit of uncompensated class members to the extent possible.1598  
1593 See RICHARDS, J.D., “What makes an antitrust class action remedy successful?: a tale of two 
settlements”, Tulane Law Review, 80, December, 2005, p. 621-658, at p. 646. 
1594 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, “Report and Recommendations”, April 
2007, at p. 273. 
1595 See RICHARDS, J.D., “What makes an antitrust class action remedy successful?: a tale of two 
settlements”, Tulane Law Review, 80, December, 2005, p. 621-658, at p. 655. 
1596 Ibid., at p. 638-640. 
1597 Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
1598 See RICHARDS, J.D., “What makes an antitrust class action remedy successful?: a tale of two 
settlements”, Tulane Law Review, 80, December, 2005, p. 621-658, at p. 644. 
378 
 
                                                 
 Taking into account that private antitrust enforcement represents over 90% of the 
enforcement of antitrust laws in the US, it is clear that the current system works. 
However, the class action may not be the only reason for this, although private 
enforcement increased significantly a few years after the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure were modified in 1966 to incorporate an effective class action 
mechanism.1599 It is clear that also permissive discovery rules, contingency fee 
arrangements, and no obligation for the unsuccessful plaintiff to pay the costs and 
attorneys’ fees to the defendant, and treble damages facilitate and provide huge 
incentives for bringing damages actions. Especially when the individual claims are 
small, the class action device will make it possible to enforce claims, which would 
otherwise not be enforced. In this context the potential large gains in the form of 
contingency fees available to the class counsel also serve as an important incentive, 
which is necessary for the functioning of the class action mechanism, since without 
them few, individually small claims would probably not be brought. 
 
The potential risks and drawbacks involved in the U.S. class action can also be 
significantly reduced by courts scrutinizing cases at the class certification stage, and 
only giving their approval to settlements that are fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
Furthermore, limiting jury-trials to straightforward cases would also prevent plaintiffs 
from abusing the class action mechanism through unmeritorious claims.  
 
To conclude, the advantages of the class action based on the “opt-out” model appear to 
outweigh the drawbacks, particularly if adequate safeguards such as rigorous scrutiny 
by courts are put in place. 
 
Incentives and Costs 
The U.S. and Canadian experiences show that the class action mechanism alone is not 
sufficient to increase private enforcement. This is due to the high costs of litigation, 
which are accentuated in the United States, where the extensive discovery rights raise 
the cost of antitrust damages action. Class action litigation tends to be especially 
1599 See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), 
Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 
44-60, at p. 45. 
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complex and expensive when there are different subgroups of class members. In 
addition, establishing the infringement and harm is also likely to require economic 
evidence and the use of expert economists. This may explain why virtually all class 
actions both in the United States and Canada are brought under a contingency fee 
arrangement. In Canada, antitrust damages actions only become more common once 
class action legislation had been adopted1600  and contingency fees were permitted. 
However, the use of litigation-finance companies to fund class action also seems to be 
increasing.1601 Moreover, in Ontario there is also a public fund to which claimants can 
apply for funding in exchange of repaying the funding received and a percentage of the 
settlement or award obtained.1602 
 
The costs of the claim must also clearly outweigh the possible damages awarded in 
order to incentivize litigation. In the United States, treble damages partly achieve this 
objective, but since pre-judgment interest is not awarded, antitrust violations which 
have caused harm during a long period without being uncovered may not necessary 
result in more than single damages. In Canada, pre-judgment interest is available, which 
helps the claimant to achieve full compensation.1603 On the other hand, punitive 
damages will only be available for common law tort claims.1604 The often smaller 
damages awarded in Canada could explain why damages claims are not yet as common 
as in the United States.  
 
The recoverability of attorneys’ fees provides an additional incentive to bring antitrust 
damages claims especially in the United States, where the one-way fee shifting rule 
1600 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 232. 
1601 See e.g. [2011] OJ No 1239 (SJD) [Dugal]. 
1602 See WRIGHT, C.M., “Canada” in in FOER, A.A. and CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International 
Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, 
MA, 2010, p. 447-461, at p. 460-461. 
1603 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 212, note 38. 
1604 See HOOD, J., KENT, D. and LOW, M., “Canada: Private Antitrust Litigation”, The Antitrust Review 
of the Americas 2011. 
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applies. In Canada, the recoverability of such fees will depend on the province.1605 The 
one-way fee shifting rule only existing in the United States is another feature which 
could explain the predominance of private enforcement in the United States.  
 
Regardless of the model of private enforcement chosen in the EU, the issues discussed 
in Section 6.2 must be taken into consideration. Furthermore, a political will among the 
Member States to adopt a collective action mechanism is an indispensable prerequisite. 
But this is a question that will be examined more in detail in Section 7.4.6. 
 
6.3. Relevance of the U.S. and Canadian Experiences for Private Enforcement in 
the EU 
The U.S. private enforcement model is the most advanced one of the existing legal 
systems, and builds on experience from over a century. It therefore serves as a useful 
reference point also in analyzing how to enhance private enforcement in the EU. In 
addition, the Canadian private enforcement model is particularly interesting for two 
reasons. Firstly, because it is a “more modest” version of the U.S. system, and could 
thus offer an alternative, if it is difficult to find acceptance in the EU for the procedural 
features of the U.S. enforcement model. Secondly, because the Canadian Competition 
Act applies in all Canadian provinces, although each of them apply their own procedural 
rules to enforce it, which reminds of the situation in the EU, where the substantive 
competition rules are enforced by national procedural rules. The coexistence of civil law 
and common law jurisdictions increases the relevance of the Canadian experience for 
the EU. 
 
However, the particular legal and cultural differences should be taken into account in 
analyzing why the rules work in a specific way as these features might limit the 
possibility of introducing similar procedural devices in the EU. As a result, the 
constitutional element of private EU antitrust enforcement has to be borne in mind: 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have direct effect, and can therefore be enforced by 
individuals before the national courts since they confer rights upon individuals.1606 
Individuals must thus be able to enforce the Union right to damages in order to ensure 
1605 See Section 6.2.4 of this thesis. 
1606 See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 11-12. 
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the effectiveness of the EU competition rules. Public and private enforcement 
consequently complement each other in the EU, and any modifications to the procedural 
framework must respect this. But this does not mean that it is impossible to seek 
inspiration from foreign (i.e. in this case U.S. and Canadian) procedural law, but this 
indeed happens, although modifications are made to ensure the compatibility with the 
existing national procedural framework.1607 
 
This section will first outline the main problems with regard to antitrust damages 
actions in the EU, and will then suggest how the U.S. and Canadian experiences could 
be built on in order to establish issues which need to be modified so as to enhance 
private enforcement in the EU, and especially access to justice for consumers. 
 
In the light of the analysis conducted in Chapter 3, it becomes clear that private 
enforcement is currently under-developed and under-used in the EU. In general, 
damages actions are mainly focused to a number of Member States, in particular to 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Furthermore, consumer claims are 
rare.1608 The main reasons for the relative lack of private enforcement are high legal 
costs, and the uncertain outcome of the action. Furthermore, the burden of proof is high, 
and the access to evidence is limited, which renders it difficult for claimants to prove 
the infringement and the causal relationship between it and their injury. In addition, 
quantifying the exact amount of the injury suffered is a complex exercise, especially in 
cases involving various categories of purchasers. Therefore, in particular consumers 
with small claims have few possibilities of bringing an action for damages.  
 
Moreover, the single-party model of adjudication is ill suited for deciding claims of 
many individuals that arise from the same conduct of a defendant. First of all, it is a 
waste of judicial resources to try the same issues over and over. Second, when the 
possible gains are smaller than the cost of bringing an individual action, the lack of a 
group litigation device may deprive the potential claimant of legal redress.1609   
1607 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1327-
1362, at p. 1357. 
1608 See Impact Assessment Report on Damages Actions, at p. 19. 
1609 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
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 The possibility of joining the claims of several parties in the same proceedings, which 
exists in all EU Member States,1610 does not seem to be an effective alternative to 
collective actions because all individuals must already have initiated proceedings 
against the infringer, and the court must treat all the plaintiffs’ claims separately and 
make awards individually, although it may make a single judgment. Therefore, the only 
advantage of a joinder of claims would be a reduction of the costs for hearing the 
evidence in a joint hearing for all claims.1611 
 
Moreover, today damages actions are usually brought as follow-on actions in the EU 
(the exception being e.g. Germany), although stand-alone actions could be a faster 
corrective mechanism since the action can be brought before the official investigation 
has been concluded.1612 But this is naturally only possible if there is an effective 
mechanism in place for bringing such actions in an economically viable manner. 
Furthermore, the public enforcement of competition rules in the EU focuses on hardcore 
cartels, and thus incentives would be needed for consumers and other victims to enforce 
other violations in order to increase deterrence, and achieve better general compliance 
with the competition rules. 
 
In addition, anti-competitive conduct is nowadays increasingly of international or even 
global character, signifying that victims could come from a number of different 
countries. Since not all EU Member States provide for some form of collective redress 
for consumers, consumers from different Member States might not be able to join a 
collective redress action in the Member State of the infringer, or be represented, for 
instance, by a public consumer association due to the fact that they come from different 
Member States. This, in turn, results in inefficiency and inequity.1613  
 
1610 See DEGOS, L. and MORSON, G.V., “Class system. The Reforms of Class Action Laws in Europe 
Are as Varied as the Nations Themselves”, Los Angeles Lawyer, 29-NOV, 2006, p. 32-38, p. 34. 
1611 See STADLER, A., “Collective Action as an Efficient Means for the Enforcement of European 
Competition Law” in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 195-213, at p. 202. 
1612 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 14. 
1613 See KUNEVA, M., “Healthy markets need effective redress”, speech at the Conference on Collective 
redress, Lisbon, November 10th, 2007, at p. 5. 
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Consequently, there would be a need for a mechanism that could eliminate, or at least 
reduce, the current obstacles to private enforcement. The above-mentioned reasons are 
but a few for examining the efficiency of the collective action in antitrust cases and its 
significance for private enforcement in the light of the U.S. and Canadian class action 
models. Moreover, thanks to the adoption of collective redress mechanisms in a number 
of Member States in the past decade, the time seems ripe to examine how to design a 
more effective, EU-wide collective redress mechanism. 
 
The possible advantages of introducing a collective action in the EU would depend on 
the action introduced. However, there are general benefits that are common to collective 
actions, regardless of the type of action. Collective actions contribute to efficiency in 
the administration of justice.1614 Although, in general, the possibility of a fair outcome 
in an individual proceeding might be greater with regard to the individual plaintiff – at 
least in cases which the courts would be able to effectively decide individually – a 
collective action increases the social fairness, i.e. it enables individuals to seek damages 
in situations in which they would not be able to enforce their rights individually.1615 As 
a consequence, the access to the justice system would be better.1616 In fact, already in 
2006, 74% of the consumers in 25 EU Member States stated that they would be more 
likely to enforce their rights in court if they could bring an action together with other 
consumers.1617 
 
Collective actions for damages also have a market regulating function in complimenting 
the gaps in the control of markets carried out by public enforcers,1618 decrease the 
1614 See HODGES, C., “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues”, C.J.Q., 26(JAN), 2007, p. 96-
123, at p. 118-119.  
1615 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., “Gruppenklagen auf Schadensersatz – offene Fragen und mögliche 
Lösungen” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND 
KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, “Band I: Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente 
der Unterlassungsklage und der Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection 
Instruments of Actions for Injunction and Group Damages Actions”, Conference on 24.2.2006 in Vienna, 
p. 92-103, at p. 93. 
1616 See LUTFALLA, E. and MAGNIER, V., “French Legal Reform: What is at Stake if Class Actions are 
Introduced in France?”, Def. Couns. J., 73, July 2006, p. 301-311, at p. 306. 
1617 Special Eurobarometer, Consumer protection in the internal market, published in September 2006, at 
p. 100, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs252_en.pdf. 
1618 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., “Gruppenklagen auf Schadensersatz – offene Fragen und mögliche 
Lösungen” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND 
KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, “Band I: Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente 
der Unterlassungsklage und der Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection 
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asymmetry between large companies and consumers with regard to the possibility of 
taking action,1619 and address the problem of potential litigation costs outweighing the 
individual loss of claimants in cases in which the total loss of consumers and 
undertakings may be very significant.1620 Apart from these and some other benefits 
analyzed Section 6.2., there are additional advantages of collective actions that depend 
on the type of action. 
 
The U.S. class action (and the opt-out class actions available in some Canadian 
provinces) offers more additional advantages than the existing representative and opt-in 
collective actions in the EU. No active steps are required by class members to benefit 
from the class action,1621 which reduces the risk of the number of plaintiffs being too 
small for the action to pay off due to potential claimants being too passive to take the 
required measures to join the action. The rights of individuals are also still safeguarded 
to a certain extent under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which provides that 
they are given the possibility to opt out from the class action when they are informed of 
its existence.1622 They may also decide to opt out even later in the proceedings when a 
settlement is proposed.1623 The obligation to opt out also serves to inform the defendant 
of the extent of the preclusive effect of the judgment or settlement. 
 
The greatest advantage of the class action is noticeable in cases involving small 
individual claims, as it is also possible to bring an action for the benefit of unidentified 
plaintiffs. This is likely to be the most efficient way to deter anti-competitive conduct, 
since the defendant will face a sufficiently large number of plaintiffs, the claims of 
which will constitute an important financial deterrent to breaching competition laws. 
 
Instruments of Actions for Injunction and Group Damages Actions”, Conference on 24.2.2006 in Vienna, 
p. 92-103, at p. 93. 
1619 See CONSEIL DE LA CONCURRENCE, “Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de 
l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles”, at p. 6. 
1620 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 13. 
1621 See MULHERON, R., “Some differences with Group Litigation Orders – and why a class action is 
superior”, C.J.Q., 24(JAN), 2005, p. 40-68, at p. 48. 
1622 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(b)(v). 
1623 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5). 
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The global Vitamins Cartel serves to show the efficiency of class actions over other 
redress mechanisms in recovering losses of a price-fixing agreement. In the United 
States, thousands of victims could recover approximately $2.4 billion in total, and the 
settlement of over €107 million was largest to that date in Canada. In Australia, the 
class recovered approximately €23.3 million. On the contrary, in the EU, fewer than ten 
victims recovered a total of less than €7.6 million.1624  
 
Possible drawbacks to the opt-out class action can also be significantly reduced in the 
United States and Canada since the courts must examine the adequacy of representation 
at the class certification stage, and approve a proposed settlement. This makes it 
possible to ensure that class counsels are not taking advantage of the potentially large 
benefits involved in antitrust class actions without ensuring an outcome that is also 
beneficial to the class members. Thanks to the certification criteria, it is also difficult to 
bring unfounded actions as proof of a plausible cause of action is required. 
 
Admittedly, numerous claims could, for instance, make the quantification of damages 
more complicated1625 and longer.1626 But arguably, a certain level of “complication” 
could be accepted in exchange for improved access to justice. Moreover, it would be 
necessary to ascertain that group members are informed throughout the proceedings 
about the initiation and development of different phases of the litigation. According to 
European legal understanding, it would fall to the judge to ensure that this information 
is sufficient. In general, the judge must play an active role in managing the case during 
the whole litigation. Similarly, the group counsel must also play a managing role, 
organize the litigation, keep the group members together, stay in contact with the judge 
etc.1627 In addition, a EU specific drawback in multi-state claims would be the need to 
1624 See HAUSFELD, M., OLSON, S. and GASSMANN, S., “Antitrust Class Actions: Continued 
Vitality”, The Antitrust Review of the Americas, 2008, p. 71-74, at p. 72. 
1625 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 22. 
1626 See The Consumer Redress Study, at p. 266. 
1627 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., “Gruppenklagen auf Schadensersatz – offene Fragen und mögliche 
Lösungen” in BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR SOZIALE SICHERHEIT GENERATIONEN UND 
KONSUMENTENSCHUTZ, Band I: Effektiver Rechtsschutz – Die Verbraucherrechtlichen Instrumente 
der Unterlassungsklage und der Gruppenklage. Effective Legal Redress – The Consumer Protection 
Instruments of Actions for Injunction and Group Damages Actions, Conference on 24.2.2006 in Vienna, 
p. 92-103, at p. 95-96. 
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provide translations of the notification of the action and the relevant trial material, 
which would result in additional costs and would delay the proceedings.1628 
 
Furthermore, in Europe it is often feared that U.S.-style collective actions would result 
in excessive litigation burdening courts, but in the light of experiences, for example, 
from Canada and Australia, there is no evidence of that.1629 Also, there is no evidence of 
the class action resulting in abuse in antitrust cases.1630 
 
Although collective actions could serve to foster private enforcement in the EU and, in 
particular, enable consumers with small claims to obtain compensation for loss caused 
by antitrust violations, they may not be sufficient to improve private enforcement. Other 
obstacles to private antitrust enforcement that currently exist also require a solution if 
private enforcement is to increase. These obstacles include limited access to evidence, 
the high burden of proof for establishing an infringement of competition rules, and the 
causal relationship between the infringement and the damage to the claimant, small 
incentives to bring actions due to high litigation costs and the financial risk involved in 
bringing an action, and low expected potential gains, short limitation periods etc.  
 
Access to evidence is the key to proving the existence of an antitrust violation and the 
scope of the harm. In the United States, the generous discovery rights facilitate this 
often costly and burdensome task. In Canada, such rights are considerably more limited, 
which has led claimant to request access to discovery document obtained in related U.S. 
actions.1631 How extensive discovery should be will depend on the degree of 
invasiveness that can be accepted, i.e. could discovery be requested against the other 
party or also against third parties, and what information could the party request? The 
limits to such rights should also be considered: to what extent could confidential 
1628 See MILUTINOVIC, V., “Private Enforcement. Upcoming Issues” in AMATO, G. and 
EHLERMANN, C-D, EC Competition Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2007, p. 725-
757, at p. 753. 
1629 See The Consumer Redress Study, at p. 267. 
1630 See AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, “The Next Antitrust Agenda: The American Antitrust 
Institute’s Transition Report on Competition Policy to the 44th President of the United States”. 
1631 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 220. 
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information and trade secrets be compromised? Finally, a balance must be found 
between ensuring justice and avoiding wasting resources.1632  
 
Currently, the possible gains of a successful damages action are not sufficient in the EU 
to incentivize claimants to bring actions. The introduction of an opt-out collective action 
would as such also not significantly improve this, although it would reduce the costs of 
bringing the action. If the individual claims are small, even though the aggregate 
damage might be considerable, the prospect of only receiving the amount which 
actually corresponds to the loss is not likely to be sufficient for the claimant to decide 
that initiating an action would pay off. Some kind of punitive damages for the most 
flagrant antitrust violations, i.e. hard-core cartels, could be considered in order to 
provide additional incentives. 
 
More urgently, the cost rules should be re-examined in order to find a balance between 
potential damages awards and the litigation costs. In the EU, the “loser pays” rule 
prevails and, therefore, there is always a financial risk in bringing an action since the 
unsuccessful plaintiff must pay the other party’s legal costs. In order to enhance private 
enforcement, it should be examined whether the “loser pays” rule could be modified to 
some extent to reduce the financial risk of bringing claims. A cap could be placed on the 
costs that claimants would be obliged to pay in case the claim is unsuccessful. This 
could be justified in complex cases when the outcome is uncertain, since otherwise 
certain harmful conduct, such as abuse of dominance, might not be pursued. 
Nevertheless, safeguards should be put in place to ensure that plaintiffs bringing 
unfounded actions would still be required to compensate the legal costs of the 
defendant. Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions may be 
imposed on parties bringing frivolous actions. 
 
Another way to incentivize damages actions would be to allow some form of 
contingency fee arrangements, since the lawyer could then act as a “driving force” in 
bringing the action when individual claimants do not have the expertise and experience 
needed to act as group representatives. Due to the costly nature of class actions, in the 
1632 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at 
p. 1354-1355. 
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United States and Canada, contingency fees (and sometimes third-party funding) appear 
to be the only effective way of funding class actions. Contingency fees would also 
encourage lawyers to achieve the best possible recovery for their clients, since their fees 
would depend on the success of the action. The risk of an increase in unjustified and 
uncontrolled litigation1633 could be decreased by establishing criteria that each action 
must satisfy before it can be brought, and by giving courts the necessary means to 
scrutinize the merits of group actions. This is also the case in the United States and 
Canada where class actions must meet the certification criteria, and judgments and 
settlements as well as attorneys’ fees must be approved by a court. Thus, it is likely that 
contingency fees would increase access to justice, but they must be regulated and 
proportionate to the sums and risks involved. 
 
Although contingency fees have generally been prohibited in many civil law systems in 
the EU,1634 there is a tendency to permit more flexible ways to reward lawyers. For 
example, Sweden has introduced a modified contingency fee in that it is possible to pay 
an increase in the normal remuneration in successful cases.1635 Moreover, they are 
permitted e.g. in Spain and Finland, and in certain cases in Germany.1636  
 
Another relevant issue is difficulties related to indirect purchaser actions. The ECJ has 
in Courage clarified that standing to bring antitrust damages actions extends to any 
individual that has suffered harm as a result of an infringement of the EU competition 
rules. Therefore, contrary to the United States, in the EU it is impossible to exclude the 
right to sue of indirect purchasers on efficiency grounds, if they can prove that they 
have suffered harm from an antitrust violation.1637 Since indirect purchasers have 
standing to bring antitrust damages actions, issues such as the passing-on problem, and 
calculation of damages are important to resolve. 
 
1633 See HODGES, C., “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues”, C.J.Q., 26(JAN), 2007, p. 96-
123, at p. 104. 
1634 See TARUFFO, M., “Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective”, Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law, 11, Spring/Summer 2001, p. 405-421, at p. 415. 
1635 See Section 38 of the Group Proceedings Act 2002 (2002:599). 
1636 See Sections 3.3, 3.5, and 3.7 of this thesis. 
1637 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24. 
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It would appear that the passing-on defense would in general be permitted in the EU, 
since most Member States provide that only the actual damages shall be compensated, 
and prohibit unjust enrichment. A system must, consequently, be established which 
makes it possible to calculate the amount that has been passed on from one chain to 
another in the distribution chain. A possible solution would be to split the establishment 
of an infringement and causation from the calculation and allocation of damages. Courts 
could then resolve the question of existence of an antitrust violation fairly quickly, and 
impose remedies on the defendant in order to put an end to that violation. After that, the 
calculation of damages would be decided in separate proceedings.1638 It has been 
suggested that, for instance, a more specialized body with the required expertise in pass-
on calculations could conduct the calculation of damages.1639 Arguably, the cy près 
distribution should also be considered in cases which result in some unclaimed damages 
so as to ensure that infringers cannot keep their illegal gains, and the injured parties 
would obtain some compensation, at least indirectly.  
 
Based on the U.S. and Canadian experiences of class actions, it should be examined 
what modifications would be required in order for it to serve as a model to create a 
collective action mechanism that is adapted to the European reality. In the field of 
antitrust enforcement, the advantages of the class actions seem to outweigh their 
drawbacks. As seen, private antitrust enforcement represents over 90% of the total 
enforcement of antitrust laws in the United States,1640 and some of it can be contributed 
to the existence of class actions, in that private enforcement increased significantly a 
few years after a more effective class action mechanism was adopted in 1966.1641 
However, the number of antitrust class actions of the total number of class actions 
1638 See MILUTINOVIC, V., “Private Enforcement. Upcoming Issues” in AMATO, G. and 
EHLERMANN, C-D, EC Competition Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2007, p. 725-
757, at p. 746. 
1639 See RÜGGEBERG, J. and SCHINKEL, M.P., “Consolidating Antitrust Damages in Europe: A 
Proposal for Standing in Line with Efficient Private Enforcement”, World Competition, 39(3), 2006, p. 
395-420, at p. 407. 
1640 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4. 
1641 See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), 
Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 
44-60, at p. 45. 
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brought is modest,1642 which would suggest that the class action device is not often 
being abused in antitrust cases. Moreover, as stated, there is also no evidence of such 
abuse.1643 
 
The class action mechanism is necessary in order to make vigorous private enforcement 
possible in the United States in that it enables private individuals to act as private 
attorneys general in cases where public enforcers are not willing pursue for several 
reasons. First, financial resources of public enforcement bodies are limited. Therefore, 
public enforcers tend to only pursue cases that are most likely to be successful, and thus 
avoid complex cases. Public enforcement is also dictated by politics, thus making 
private enforcement an important counterbalance when public enforcement is too lax. 
Without the class action device, private antitrust enforcement would often be perceived 
as too risky and expensive, and lacking incentives for individual consumers.1644 
 
Class actions thus also serve to bring stand-alone actions such as the Visa Check v. 
MasterMoney case. The class action, brought on behalf of five million merchants, 
resulted in $3.4 billion in damages as well as tens of billions of dollars in reduced 
pricing.1645 In addition, the U.S. Government could later bring its own action on a 
related issue against Visa and MasterCard by securing the evidence collected in the 
private action.1646 
 
Next, the possibility of introducing a more efficient collective action, and the 
harmonization and/or approximation of other procedural rules supporting such actions 
in the EU will be examined in order to determine the optimal design of private 
enforcement. 
 
1642 Ibid., at p. 58. 
1643 See AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, “The Next Antitrust Agenda: The American Antitrust 
Institute’s Transition Report on Competition policy to the 44th President of the United States”. 
1644 See SCHNELL, G., “Class Action Madness in Europe – a Call for a More Balanced Debate”, 
E.C.L.R., Volume 28, Issue 11, 2007, p. 617-619, at p. 617. 
1645 Visa Check v. MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F.Supp.2d 503, (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
1646 See SCHNELL, G., “Class Action Madness in Europe – a Call for a More Balanced Debate”, 
E.C.L.R., Volume 28, Issue 11, 2007, p. 617-619, at p. 619. 
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7. THE CASE FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE HARMONIZATION: A 
PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EU 
ANTITRUST RULES  
7.1. Justification for a More Comprehensive Harmonization/Approximation 
Although the European Parliament has adopted the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions and it only requires the formal approval of the Council, the issue of a 
harmonization of national procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions is 
somewhat controversial. Generally, the European Union establishes the substantive 
rules of EU law, whereas Member States establish the procedural rules necessary for the 
enforcement of Union rights. This principle is known as the principle of procedural 
autonomy.1647 Moreover, national civil procedure rules tend to apply across a number of 
different fields of civil law, i.e. the approach is horizontal. Traditionally there has 
therefore been some opposition from the Member States (and the European Parliament) 
to establishing specific procedural for antitrust damages claims. This is likely to explain 
the limited scope of the new Directive. 
 
However, in light of the finding in this thesis and in the doctrine, there is still, despite an 
increase in the past decade in some Member States, a certain level of under-enforcement 
of the Union right to damages, most notably by consumers. As demonstrated in Chapter 
Four, the Directive will arguably do little to improve the situation especially of 
consumers. Therefore, not only will injured parties not be able to obtain compensation, 
but the effective enforcement of the EU antitrust rules will also suffer. As stated, thanks 
to the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, individuals are the principal 
guardians of EU law. Private EU antitrust enforcement thus reflects the constitutional 
right of individuals enforcing the rights conferred upon them by EU law.1648 Moreover, 
national procedural rules which render the enforcement of the Union right to damages 
difficult or, sometimes virtually impossible, also breach the principle of effectiveness, 
the ultimate limit to the procedural autonomy. 
1647 See JACOBS, F.G., “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Rules: A Community Perspective” in EHLERMANN, C.-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European 
Competition Policy Annual: 2001, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford – Portland Oregon, 2003, p. 187-232, 214-215. 
1648 See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 11-12. 
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 Public and private enforcement of the EU competition rules are also complementary: 
both ultimately serve the public interest of effective competition since courts cannot 
ignore the public policy character of competition rules. Private enforcement also ensures 
that antitrust enforcement is not purely interventionist.1649 In addition, even if the main 
function of private enforcement is to compensate the harm suffered as a result from 
antitrust violations, it also has a deterrent function in that the obligation to pay damages 
increases the possible adverse consequences of competition law infringements. 
Sometimes civil damages may even be much higher than administrative sanctions as 
was the case in the Vitamins Cartel thanks to treble damages. There are thus a number 
of reasons which justify the enhancement of antitrust damages claims. 
 
Nevertheless, another question is how private enforcement should be enhanced and, 
more specifically, how particular procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions 
would be justified instead of general procedural rules on damages in the field of tort 
law.1650 The EU legislator has justified the need for sector-specific procedural rules by 
the negative effect of divergent national liability regimes for antitrust violations on 
competition and the functioning of the internal market.1651  
 
There are also other justifications. Antitrust violations diminish competition in the 
market and give rise to economic harm to market participants. Generally, they result in 
increased prices and/or loss of business opportunities for the competitors. In addition, 
there are other more indirect negative effects, such as deadweight losses, reduced 
innovation and loss of quality, which are more difficult to assess. Especially when direct 
victims of antitrust violations pass on the harm to indirect purchasers, the quantification 
of damages is challenging. Consequently, due to the spread and diffuse nature of the 
antitrust damage it is difficult to identify the victims who are entitled to damages.1652 
1649 Ibid., at p. 10-13. 
1650 See PAULIS, E., “Policy Issues in the Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law” in BASEDOW, 
J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
2007, p. 7-16, at p. 10. 
1651 Recital 8 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1652 See MARCOS, F. and SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, A., “Towards a European Tort Law? Damages Actions 
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules: Harmonizing Tort Law through the Back Door?”, European Review 
of Private Law, Volume 16, No. 3, 2008, p. 469-488, at p. 474-475. 
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This is particularly the case in infringements involving umbrella-pricing, where an 
undertaking not party to the cartel sets higher prices having regard to the practices of the 
cartel than it would have under normal conditions of competition on the market. 
Provided that an injured party can prove the causal relationship between the loss that it 
has suffered and the cartel, it has a right to claim compensation for the loss suffered 
from the cartel members even if it did not have contractual links with them.1653 Antitrust 
cases are hence generally of complex economic nature but also, for instance, tax fraud 
cases can be equally complex and require knowledge of economics.1654 This complexity 
alone could therefore not justify a sector-specific harmonization. 
 
Furthermore, it would, in general, be preferable not to adopt different procedural rules 
for different sectors, if this is possible to avoid. Such rules may be foreign to the legal 
systems in some Member States, which could render their application difficult for courts 
unfamiliar with these rules.1655 To the extent possible, any additional specific 
procedural rules for antitrust cases should therefore only be adopted if they prove 
absolutely necessary. Commentators have also emphasized the need for such rules to be 
linked to general civil and procedural law of the Member States in order to avoid 
contradictory valuations.1656 
 
However, to the extent divergent national rules on evidence, the burden of proof, 
collective actions, costs, etc. remain after the implementation of the Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions, they constitute barriers to victims of infringements of the 
EU antitrust rules to bring antitrust damages actions. Since it is difficult for the Union 
Courts to completely eliminate these differences by case law by setting aside national 
1653 Judgment in ÖBB-Infrastruktur, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraphs 33 and 37. 
1654 See LESKINEN, C., “The competence of the European Union to adopt measures harmonizing the 
procedural rules governing EC antitrust damages actions”, Working Paper IE Law School, WPLSO8-01, 
15.1.2008, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1138797, at p. 15. 
1655 See Joint Working Party of the Bars and Law Societies of the United Kingdom (“JWP”), Response to 
the Commissions Green Paper “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, May 2006, at p. 2. 
1656 See e.g. Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the Federal Cartel 
Office on the Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules”, 
at p. 2, and PAULIS, E., “Policy Issues in the Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law” in 
BASEDOW, J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 7-16, at p.10. 
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rules that impede the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU,1657 some 
form of further harmonizing measures are indispensable in order to guarantee effective 
private enforcement and uniform application of the antitrust rules despite the adoption 
of the new Directive. 
 
Moreover, the adoption of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions shows the 
feasibility of a sector-specific harmonization of procedural rules at the EU level. 
Furthermore, there are examples of other sector-specific harmonization in the field of 
public procurement,1658 and cases regarding discrimination based on sex.1659 As a 
consequence, a more comprehensive sector-specific harmonization of procedural rules 
governing antitrust damages actions would be justified since the new Directive fails to 
guarantee the effectiveness of the EU antitrust rules.  
 
Ultimately, the extent of a possible further harmonization of the rules governing 
antitrust damages actions will depend on which procedural changes are deemed 
necessary in order to enhance private antitrust enforcement, and which categories of 
claimants should principally benefit from the enhanced rules. For instance, if the aim is 
to improve only consumers’ possibilities of seeking damages, then it might well be 
feasible to implement some form of collective action that would be available for all 
consumers regardless of whether the harm that they have suffered arises, for example, 
from an antitrust violation, unfair competition, or product liability.  
 
Finally, access to justice aspects must be considered. In mass claims, on the one hand, 
the procedural rights and freedoms of all the parties involved must be protected. On the 
other hand, access to justice should also be reasonably effective for those who have 
1657 See JACOBS, F.G., “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Rules: A Community Perspective” in EHLERMANN, C.-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European 
Competition Policy Annual: 2001, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Oxford – Portland 
Oregon, 2003, pp. 187-232, at p. 223. 
1658 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts, OJ L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 114–240. 
1659 Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination 
based on sex, OJ L 14, 20.1.1998, p. 6–8. 
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small claims, which in turn also improves the compliance with the law.1660 The 
obligation to ensure access to justice in the EU flows from Article 47(1) of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights which prescribes the need to ensure an effective remedy 
to everyone “whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are 
violated”. When the Court of Justice and the national courts implement EU law, they 
must ensure that effective remedies under Article 47 are available.  
 
This obligation also applies when national courts rule on antitrust damages actions, 
which was evidenced by Otis. In this case, the Commission brought several antitrust 
damages actions before the Commercial Court in Brussels seeking compensation for the 
harm that it and other EU institutions had suffered as a result of cartels for installation 
and maintenance of lifts and elevators. The Commission had fined the four lift operators 
in February 2007 for an infringement of Article 101 TFEU for operating those cartels. 
The Court of Justice considered that the European Union, in its capacity of a customer, 
had a right to effective judicial protection under Article 47(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and could bring the damages claim even though it had itself 
decided on the existence of the infringement in question. The fact that the infringing 
companies had a right to judicial review of the validity of that decision, together with 
the fact that the Commission was not allowed to use information gathered during its 
investigation of the cartel for other purposes than that investigation, were sufficient to 
ensure an equality of arms. Moreover, the issues of loss and causal relationship would 
be assessed by the Court,1661 
 
As in particular consumers currently generally fail to obtain compensation for harm 
suffered as a result of antitrust violations, there seems to be a justification for improving 
access to justice for consumers by harmonizing those procedural rules governing 
antitrust damages actions which even after the implementation of the Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions create the greatest obstacles to effective redress. 
1660 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at 
p. 1358. 
1661 Judgment in Otis and Others, C-199/11, EU:C:2012:684. 
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7.2. Modifications to the Measures Included in the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions 
The new Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions harmonizes some of the national rules 
currently governing the conditions for bringing antitrust damages actions, which in the 
past have created obstacles to private enforcement. It also codifies some principles of 
EU law which govern damages actions. However, many of the measures that Member 
States must introduce are merely minimum harmonization measures, which means that 
even when the Directive has been implemented, national divergences will remain in a 
number of areas. This section will suggest how the issues included in the Directive 
should be modified in order to enhance private enforcement in a more significant way. 
 
Access to evidence is arguably one of the key factors for enhancing private enforcement 
in the EU. The claimant needs evidence not only to demonstrate the existence of an 
antitrust violation – unless the Commission or a national competition authority has 
already found a breach of the EU antitrust rules – but must also show the extent and 
quantity of the harm which they have suffered as a result of the antitrust violation in 
question. A particularity of antitrust damages actions is that the relevant evidence 
required in order to establish an infringement, the damage suffered, and the causal 
relationship between the antitrust violation and the harm suffered from it, is often held 
by the infringer or by third parties, which makes it challenging to meet the burden of 
proof.  
 
The introduction of a minimum disclosure obligation of evidence is therefore crucial 
considering the information asymmetry which generally exists between the infringers of 
competition rules and the victims. The extent of the disclosure obligation should strike a 
balance between the need to facilitate antitrust damages actions and the protection of 
confidential information, as well as the effectiveness of the public enforcement of the 
competition rules. It is submitted that the scope of the disclosure obligation provided for 
in the Directive should be modified in order to better achieve this balance.  
 
The Directive should not exclude any categories of documents as such from this 
obligation – currently leniency statements and settlement submissions are entirely 
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excluded from disclosure1662 – but courts should apply a proportionality test to 
determine whether the documents, or at least a part of the information contained in 
them, should be disclosed to the claimant in order to make the bringing of an antitrust 
damages action possible, especially when this would be impossible without access to 
some of that information. This is also the approach in the existing case law of the Court 
of Justice,1663 and there is no need to revisit this issue by limiting the scope of 
disclosure since, as a result of the proportionality test, only exceptionally would 
claimants be granted access to information in leniency statements. The risks of 
undermining public enforcement would thus not be important. Accordingly, national 
courts should genuinely be able to consider the implications of granting respectively 
refusing the request of disclosure of evidence for both public and private enforcement 
instead of protecting public enforcement more than necessary at the cost of private 
enforcement. The amendments to the Directive could build on the UK model of 
conducting a document-by-document review of leniency statements taking into account 
both considerations of proportionality and procedural fairness.1664 
 
Regarding the moment in which disclosure could be requested, it is justified to require 
the claimant to first present a “reasoned justification” containing reasonably available 
facts and evidence “sufficient to support the plausibility of its claim for damages”1665  so 
as to ensure that the disclosure obligation will not lead to an abuse and unfounded 
damages actions being brought. It is reasonable to require the evidence to be relevant in 
terms of substantiating the claim or defense, but the obligation to specify either pieces 
of this evidence or relevant categories of this evidence defined as precisely and 
narrowly as possible on the basis of reasonably available facts1666 should not be 
interpreted too strictly in order not to undermine the usefulness of the possibility of 
requesting disclosure of evidence. 
 
The minimum disclosure obligation does not appear excessively costly, which could 
otherwise constitute an impediment to the well-functioning of the competition 
1662 Article 6 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1663 See Judgment in Pfleiderer EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 30. 
1664 See Section 3.2.1 of this thesis. 
1665 Article 5(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1666 Article 5(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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enforcement in the EU. As is sometimes the case in the United States, extensive 
disclosure obligations might result in significant costs for the parties concerned and, in 
some cases, also for third parties. In addition, the proceedings could be unduly delayed, 
thus making it less attractive to bring antitrust damages actions in the first place. As the 
disclosure obligation will entail modifications to the legal traditions in most Member 
States, and an excessive disclosure obligation could have the aforementioned negative 
effects, it seems reasonable to start with a more modest reform of the rules concerning 
access to evidence and, if it proves not to help facilitating damages claims satisfactorily, 
then the European Union should consider making the necessary adjustments when the 
Directive will be reviewed.1667 In the latter case, a possibility would be to oblige the 
parties to produce all relevant documents in their possession and control as is the case in 
Canada and the United Kingdom.1668 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions only requires Member States to grant final 
infringement decisions by a national competition authority a probative effect, as far as 
the finding of an infringement is concerned, in subsequent damages actions brought in 
the same Member State.1669 By not granting probative effect to a NCA Decision 
regarding the nature of the infringement and its material, personal and territorial 
scope1670 in cases in which the damages claim is brought before the courts of another 
Member State, the issue of the existence of an antitrust violation might have to be re-
litigated. This will possibly result in a waste of time and resources, and an increase in 
the costs of the action, although it will depend on the rules of the Member State 
concerned as it may grant such binding effect under its national legislation.1671  
 
In order to facilitate follow-on claims by consumers or other injured parties, who would 
not be able to bring stand-alone actions, it is submitted that final NCA and competition 
court decisions should also be given a presumptive binding effect in civil proceedings 
before the courts of other Member States. The defendant should be allowed to rebut this 
1667 The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions will be reviewed within four years from its 
implementation. See Article 20 of the Directive. 
1668 See Sections 3.2.1 and 6.2.2. 
1669 Article 9 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1670 Recital 31 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1671 For instance, Germany grants binding effect to decisions of the NCAs of other Member States. See 
Section 3.3 of the thesis. 
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presumption if it would breach the requirements of fair trial, or the geographical scope 
of the infringement would make it irrelevant with regard to the damages claim in 
relation to the market in the Member State in which it is brought.1672 In addition, the 
presumption of binding effect could be rebutted if there were manifest errors of facts in 
the investigation. Finally, the national court cannot give binding effect to a decision of a 
foreign NCA if that would breach Article 6 of the European Human Rights Convention 
or Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions provides some common rules regarding 
limitation periods which will contribute to increased legal certainty and should facilitate 
the bringing of damages claims especially in Member States the limitation periods of 
which are currently very short.1673 The requirement that the victim must have 
knowledge of the infringement and the harm that it has caused him before the limitation 
period begins to run1674 is crucial as otherwise the limitation period might have expired 
even before the victim learned about the infringement. However, common guidelines 
should be provided on the criteria that should be assessed in order to determine whether 
the claimant had such knowledge, as it would otherwise result in uncertainty about the 
moment from which the limitation period starts to run. By only providing for minimum 
limitation periods, the Directive respects the principle of procedural autonomy, and a 5-
year minimum limitation period for stand-alone actions is sufficiently long to enable 
injured parties to bring damages claims. For situations not specifically regulated by the 
Directive, the limitation periods must respect the limits established by the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. 
 
The limitation period of one year for follow-on actions should be sufficient when the 
damages claim is brought in the same Member State from which the infringement 
decision originates. But if the claim is brought before the courts of a Member State 
other than the one where the decision originates, the limitation period could be too 
1672 See BASEDOW, J., “Recognition of Foreign Decisions with the European Competition Network” in 
BASEDOW, J., FRANCQ, S. and IDOT, L. (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation. Conflict of Laws 
and Coordination, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 393-402, at p. 397 and 401-402. 
1673 See CRAIG, L., JAZRAWI, W., GARTAGANI, S., SIAKKA T. and FITZGERALD-FRAZER, K., 
“A summary of recent developments in antitrust damages claims, collective redress and funding in the EU 
and UK”, G.C.L.R., 6( 3), 2013, R41-R47, at R43. 
1674 Article 10 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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short, unless the decision of the foreign NCA constitutes at least a rebuttable 
presumption of the existence of an infringement. A possible solution would be to 
impose a minimum limitation period of two years in such cross-border cases, as was 
initially suggested in the White Paper on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions establishes that undertakings are jointly 
and severally liable for harm caused by their joint behavior.1675 However, an 
undertaking which has been granted immunity under a leniency program will be liable 
to injured parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only if they 
were unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers. It is crucial that the 
limited liability of immunity recipients only applies in case the injured parties are able 
to claim damages from other cartel members as otherwise the right to full compensation 
of victims of cartels could be put at risk. For the same reason, the limited civil liability 
must not be extended to other leniency applicants than immunity recipients.  
 
The provisions governing liability aim to restrict the liability of an undertaking which 
has been granted immunity, but can only do so to a limited extent since victims’ right to 
full compensation must always be respected and, as the damages awarded are only 
single damages, the possibility of restricting the liability in damages is limited. It is 
submitted that in amending the Directive in the future, the possibility of imposing 
double damages for hard-core cartels should be reexamined as damages could then be 
used to grant immunity applicants additional incentives to reveal the existence of a 
cartel in exchange of only being obliged to pay single damages. A similar model 
operates in the United States where the successful immunity (amnesty) applicant will 
merely have to pay de-trebled damages.1676 
 
These provisions also make it possible for injured parties to choose to bring damages 
actions against the defendant which is most likely to be able to pay the compensation. 
From the claimants’ point of view this simplifies litigation as they could obtain 
compensation from one single defendant for the whole harm that they have suffered. 
The claimants do not have to be direct customers of the defendant, but in line with 
1675 Article 11 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1676 See YSEWYN, J., “Private enforcement of competition law in the EU: trials and tribulations”, 
International Law Practicum, 19-Spring, 2006, p. 14-19. 
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ÖBB-Infrastruktur,1677 as long as they can demonstrate that the defendant should have 
taken into regard that the anti-competitive conduct could result in the loss that the 
injured parties have suffered, the defendant could be held liable in civil damages. This 
would at least be the case in infringements giving cause to umbrella-pricing. For the 
defendant this could result in uncertainty about whether it would be able to seek 
contribution from its co-infringers because some might have ceased to exist, and the 
costs of determining the relative responsibility of each co-infringer for the harm caused 
to injured victims could be high.1678 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions permits the passing-on defense, but the 
infringer has the burden of proof that the overcharge has been passed on.1679 The burden 
of proof relating to passing-on is different in cases involving indirect purchasers 
claiming compensation for damages resulting from an overcharge which has wholly or 
partly been passed on to the claimant. Indirect purchasers must demonstrate the 
existence of such pass-on, although reasonable requests for disclosure from the 
defendant and third parties will be allowed.1680 Allowing the passing-on defense could 
constitute an obstacle for antitrust damages actions, because indirect purchasers and, 
especially consumers at the end of the distribution chain, will encounter large 
difficulties in proving the exact amount that has been passed on to them, particularly in 
situations involving several intermediaries. In order to mitigate the effects of a passing-
on defense, consumers should, arguably, have a possibility of joining forces in a 
collective or representative action in order to share the litigation costs. It could, for 
instance, be envisaged that a first proceeding would focus on the liability and aggregate 
damages in the case, and second proceeding would deal with the determination of 
individual damages.  
 
As to the quantification of harm, the Directive contains a rebuttable presumption of 
harm resulting from a cartel.1681 The Commission has also issued guidelines on the 
1677 See Judgment in ÖBB-Infrastruktur, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 37. 
1678 See HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for 
infringers and victims?”, E.C.L.R., Volume 35, Issue 2, 2014, p. 51-55, at p. 54. 
1679 Article 13 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1680 Article 14(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1681 Article 17(2) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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quantification of harm in antitrust damages actions.1682 Although they are not binding, 
the assessment of harm has been improved by giving a greater role to national judges, 
and by making the involvement of competition authorities in the assessment of harm 
possible.1683 This could at least somewhat facilitate the compensation especially of 
indirect purchasers which generally have the largest difficulties in proving the exact 
amount of harm that has been passed on to them. 
 
But other issues still need to be addressed.1684 There should be some common rules for 
causation, remoteness or quantification of loss in order to reduce national divergences. 
Furthermore, even after the implementation of the Directive on Antitrust Damages 
Actions, the burden of proof and the standard of proof with regard to quantification of 
harm will largely be determined according to the national rules, which must respect the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. National courts will also have discretion to 
decide to what degree they will follow the non-binding guidelines for quantification of 
harm, so again the methods relied on may significantly vary from one Member State to 
another.1685 It is also to be expected that economic evidence will prolong and make 
litigation more expensive.1686 Although the type and scope of harm will depend on the 
particular antitrust violation, and should therefore be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
the need for some binding minimum standards should be considered in light of the 
experience of the Member States when the Directive is reexamined. 
 
The Directive also aims to encourage consensual dispute resolution which could 
sometimes offer consumers, and maybe also SMEs, a possibility of obtaining at least 
some compensation since, without effective collective redress mechanisms, their current 
1682 See Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 167, 
13.6.2013, p. 19-21; and Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on quantifying harm in 
actions for damages based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union Accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in 
actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, SWD(2013) 205, 11.6.2013. 
1683 Article 17(3) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1684 See Section 7.3. for more details. 
1685 See VANDENBORRE, I., HOFFMAN LENT, K. and GOETZ, T.C., “Actions for antitrust damages 
in the European Union: evaluating the Commission’s Directive proposal”, G.C.L.R., 7(1), 2014, p. 1-9, at 
p. 5. 
1686 See HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for 
infringers and victims?”, E.C.L.R., Volume 35, Issue 2, 2014, p. 51-55, at p. 53. 
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exercise of the right to compensation is limited in most Member States. However, given 
the advantageous provisions for settling co-infringers (e.g. suspension of antitrust 
damages proceedings, reduced liability for settling co-infringers, and limited 
contribution obligation), there could be a risk that the Directive would in practice rather 
result in increasing alternative dispute resolution at the cost of damages claims. This 
could be problematic because injured parties generally tend to be the weaker party and, 
in that case, there will not be equality of arms since the infringers tend to have access to 
most of the relevant evidence needed to prove the infringement and the extent of the 
damage. In order to remedy this problem, a binding EU-wide collective action should be 
introduced which would serve as an alternative means of redress in case settlements 
result in unsatisfactory outcomes, or are otherwise not feasible or desirable. 
 
7.3. Additional Issues That Should Be Harmonized or Approximated 
The most noteworthy omission from the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions is the 
lack of any kind of collective redress mechanism. Instead, the Commission has chosen 
to introduce non-binding recommendations on collective redress mechanisms.1687 The 
Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress proposes some common 
principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress concerning standing to 
bring a representative action, admissibility of such actions, information about collective 
actions, reimbursement of legal costs of the winning party, funding, and cross-border 
cases.1688 For compensatory collective redress, it contains recommendations relating to 
the construction of the group based on the “opt-in” principle, collective ADR and 
settlements, legal representation and lawyers’ fees, punitive damages, funding, and 
collective follow-on actions.1689 These are all important issues to consider in designing 
an optimal compensatory collective action but, arguably, the legal instrument chosen 
will fail to bring about a significant improvement of compensatory collective relief in a 
medium-term. Instead, a directive would be a more efficient legal instrument, since it 
imposes binding obligations on the Member States, while it still allows the respect of 
1687 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
1688 Part III of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1689 Part V of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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different legal traditions, and leaves Member States some choice as to the form of the 
measures to be implemented. 
 
Moreover, the recommendations are not sufficiently extensive because the common 
principles laid down are generally based on encouraging a modest form of collective 
actions and conservative means of funding. In the next sections, a proposal will be made 
for how private enforcement should be enhanced by harmonizing/approximating 
collective actions and the costs rules governing antitrust damages actions. 
 
7.3.1 Collective Actions 
The design of the collective action will first and foremost depend on what the aim of 
introducing a collective action is, i.e. which legal problems it is supposed to solve. As 
injunctions can only have an effect on the infringer’s behavior in the future, whereas 
damages claims can also be used retroactively to deprive the infringer of the benefits 
gained as a result of the infringement1690 and ordering it to compensate victims, the 
improvement of private enforcement would require a collective action under which it is 
also possible to seek damages, and not only injunctive relief. 
 
In order to design a more efficient collective redress mechanism, at least the following 
fundamental issues have to be decided: the standing to bring an action, i.e. is there a 
need to allow both representative actions brought by qualified entities and collective 
actions brought by individuals; how possible qualified entities should be determined, 
and how the group of claimants should be defined (i.e. should the collective action be 
based on the “opt-out” or the “opt-in” principle); the quantification and distribution of 
damages; and the applicable cost rules and funding of such actions. In addition, issues 
such as safeguards against abuse must be considered.  
 
Regarding standing to bring a collective claim, it should be recalled that EU law confers 
standing to bring antitrust damages actions to any individual that has suffered harm as a 
result of an infringement of the EU antitrust rules. Accordingly, it would be justified 
that all injured parties should have a right to enhanced mechanisms for seeking 
1690 See MIEGE, C., “Modernisation and Enforcement Pluralism – The Role of Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law in the EU and the German Attempts in the 7th Amendment of the GWB”, in the 
Workshop “Remedies and Sanctions in Competition Policy”, Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics 
(ACLE), Universiteit van Amsterdam, February 17th, 2005, at p. 50. 
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compensation. This would also enhance the effectiveness of the EU competition rules, 
and increase deterrence, the other goal of competition law enforcement. But even if all 
categories of claimants are entitled to bring antitrust damages actions, it should be 
decided whether they should have the right to bring collective damages claims 
themselves, or whether representative bodies, such as consumer associations and trade 
associations defending the interests of their members active in a given industry, should 
bring actions on behalf of victims of antitrust violations. 
 
It is submitted that the introduction of both representative and collective actions would 
be appropriate. Actions brought by a representative body reduce the risk of frivolous 
actions since the representative body must usually be authorized to bring representative 
actions, such as consumer and user associations belonging to the Council of Consumers 
and Users in Spain. Moreover, the representative body does not have a financial interest 
in the outcome of the litigation, but acts in a quasi public interest capacity.1691 The 
financial risk for consumers is reduced, since consumers’ associations normally pay the 
trial costs, and consumers will be compensated if the action succeeds.1692  
 
The criteria for determining which bodies would be qualified to represent the victims 
must serve to limit the abuse of unfounded claims being brought. Nevertheless, these 
criteria should not create unnecessary hurdles that render it difficult to bring meritorious 
claims. The criteria established in the Commission Recommendation on Collective 
Redress seem justified since they establish that representative bodies should meet 
specific criteria laid down in the law, or be subject to ad hoc approval in a specific 
case.1693 This latter possibility is particularly important because entities designated in 
advance might not necessarily always be apt to act in the best interest of the claimants, 
be it because of the influence of political interests, or the lack of financial resources. 
 
It is also crucial that collective actions can be brought by individuals (both natural and 
legal persons) in order to ensure to a higher degree that injured parties also have an 
effective redress mechanism available if representative bodies, due to priority reasons or 
1691 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 24. 
1692 This is the situation, for example, in France. See France – National Report, 15 November 2006, 
prepared for the Consumer Redress Study, at p. 15. 
1693 Point 6 of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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other reasons, decide not to bring an action. In addition, the fact that representative 
actions have not been brought extensively despite that they are widely available in the 
Member States1694 also shows that sufficient financial means to fund the actions, and 
other improvements (e.g. allowing the representative body to base the action on the 
“opt-out” principle) would be indispensable for these actions to work in practice. 
 
The most controversial issue when designing a collective action regime is the choice 
between “opt-in” and “opt-out” mechanisms, since it decides whether a person’s legal 
rights can be determined without his express consent.1695 In general, the main opinion in 
the European doctrine appears to be that an individual should be free to choose whether 
to become involved in litigation and also who should represent him.1696 The possibility 
of not being bound by the outcome of the litigation would thus guarantee the right to a 
fair trial enshrined in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 6 
of the ECHR.  
 
However, one of the main problems of the existing collective redress mechanisms at 
national level is precisely that they are commonly based on the “opt-in” principle, and 
the costs of the actions constitute a significant barrier for bringing collective antitrust 
damages actions. The Football Shirts1697 and Mobile Cartel1698 cases in the United 
Kingdom and France illustrate the limited efficiency of the “opt-in” model. As stated, 
the first case only resulted in the compensation of a small fraction of the injured parties, 
and the second case failed.1699  
 
1694 See HODGES, C., “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues”, C.J.Q., 26(JAN), 2007, p. 96-
123, at p. 115.  
1695 See MULHERON, R., “Some differences with Group Litigation Orders – and why a class action is 
superior”, C.J.Q., 24(JAN), 2005, p. 40-68, at p. 50. 
1696 See e.g. MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, 1473-1503, at p. 1499, 
TARUFFO, M., “Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective”, Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, 11, Spring/Summer 2001, p. 405-421, at p. 416-417, and OFFICE 
OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business”, 
Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 20. 
1697 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07. 
1698 See http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
1699 See Sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.1 of this thesis.  
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Therefore, if the individual consumer’s loss is very small, he might not be interested in 
joining the collective action once he learns about it, and it is possible that the action will 
not be brought at all because there are not sufficient claimants to merit bringing the 
action. If the number of potential claimants is large, the total amount of loss not 
compensated to consumers might be significant even though the individual losses were 
limited.1700 Thus, it would be important to ensure that opt-out collective actions were 
possible in these cases. This would also be important in order to deter infringements, as 
the financial risks could be significant if the action could be brought on behalf of the 
maximum number of claimants.  
 
Nevertheless, the collective action model that is ultimately chosen must be compatible 
with the European legal systems and traditions, and the model chosen should actually 
work in practice. For example, constitutional limitations in certain Member States might 
diminish the possibility of introducing certain types of collective actions, and some 
constitutional changes could be required in addition to procedural changes. In Germany, 
the German Constitution restrains the possibility of an individual being bound by a 
judgment given in a proceeding in which he did not participate, or was not given the 
possibility to intervene.1701 In general, the traditional legal principle in the legal systems 
of the Member States is that the outcome of a case is binding only inter partes.1702 
Consequently, the “opt-in” model would correspond most closely to this legal 
understanding.1703  
 
However, an “opt-out” model should at least be available in cases involving numerous 
low-value claims in order to ensure access to justice, and an effective remedy compliant 
with Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Courts should be able to 
decide at the certification stage whether the collective action should be brought based 
on the “opt-in” or “opt-out” principle on a case-by-case basis. The obligation to give 
proper notice to potential group members about the claim would also reduce the risk of 
1700 See OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, “Private actions in competition law: effective redress for 
consumers and business”, Discussion Paper, OFT916, April 2007, at p. 20. 
1701 See Impact Study, at p. 272. 
1702 However, in Spain, it stems from Article 222 of the Civil Procedure Law that a collective action 
brought by a consumer association would also be binding on the consumers. See Section 3.5. 
1703 See Impact Study, at p. 272. 
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group members being bound by a judgment or settlement resulting from a collective 
action. Opt-out class actions have been claimed to deny a right to fair hearing because 
an individual must take active steps to avoid the legal effects of the action by opting out 
from it in time.1704 If he does not, he is barred from bringing an individual action if the 
action is unsuccessful, or his damages award is insufficient.1705 But as the individual 
claims would be too small to be enforced individually, in the worst-case scenario the 
claimant would be left without any compensation, which would have been the case also 
if the actions had not been brought on his behalf, while in the best-case scenario he 
would receive some compensation for the loss that he has suffered. In other words, he 
would not be seriously disadvantaged even if he did not learn about the collective action 
in time to opt out.1706 It should also be noted that in the United States, the number of 
class members who choose to opt out from the class is very low,1707 which implies that, 
at least in the United States, there is a general acceptance of this type of collective 
actions. But it would be important to ensure that group members which have not been 
notified about the collective action in time to exercise their right to opt out would not 
have to pay any adverse costs. 
 
Arguably, in certain cases it could be justified to certify subgroups on different grounds, 
for instance by applying the “opt-in” requirement to non-resident group members, and 
the “opt-out” principles to residents in order to ensure that non-residents, who it is 
possibly more difficult to notify properly about the action, would not be bound by the 
outcome of an opt-out collective action. Moreover, safeguards should be adopted to 
ensure that the same harm is not being compensated several times through various 
actions brought for instance before the courts of different Member States. This hybrid 
model should usually allow for ensuring the sufficient size of the group in order to merit 
the action, while it would avoid that non-resident group members would be bound by a 
1704 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, 1473-1503, at p. 1499. 
1705 See MILUTINOVIC, V., “Private Enforcement. Upcoming Issues” in AMATO, G. and 
EHLERMANN, C-D, EC Competition Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2007, p. 725-
757, at p. 752. 
1706 LESKINEN, C., “Recent Developments on Collective Antitrust Damages Actions in the EU”, 
G.C.L.R., Volume 2, No 4, 2011, p. 79-88, at p. 87. 
1707 See SHERMAN, E.F., “American class actions: significant features and developing alternatives in 
foreign legal systems”, 215 Federal Rules Decisions 130, 2003. 
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judgment against their will. This model is used in a few Canadian provinces,1708 and 
will also be applied in the United Kingdom when the new collective action enters into 
force.1709 
 
Criteria for certification of the group must be established both for “opt-in” and “opt-
out” collective actions. Guidance should also be provided on criteria to take into 
account in assessing whether the interests of the group members are adequately 
protected and the group representative is able to efficiently pursue the action. In 
particular in cross-border collective actions, the court seized with the case should ensure 
that the requirements of procedural fairness (such as adequate notice) are met.1710  
 
The quantification and distribution of damages can also be challenging in collective 
actions, and mechanisms for doing this should be included in the EU collective redress 
legislation. The issue of distribution of damages is important especially in cases 
involving claimants at different levels in the distribution chain. Although the main 
objective should be full compensation of the harm, unclaimed damages could be 
allocated on cy pres basis, or go to a fund for financing future collective damages 
claims. In order to take the most advantage of the collective action, an option would be 
to consolidate the claims of indirect purchasers with the claims of direct purchasers. In a 
first proceeding, the defendants’ total liability to all the claimants as a group should be 
established, whereas the allocation of damages among the direct and indirect purchasing 
claimants should be conducted in a second proceeding. The first trial would determine 
the total overcharge that the price-fixing has resulted in, while the second trial would 
allocate the damages between the various purchasers in the distribution chain.1711 In this 
manner, the risk of defendants being liable multiple times for the same infringement 
would be eliminated, and the allocation of damages awarded could be a question among 
1708 See Section 6.2.3 of the thesis. 
1709 See Section 3.2.1 of the thesis. 
1710 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 278-279. 
1711 See BAKER, D.I., “The Future of Private right of Action in Antitrust”, Loyola Consumer Law 
Review, 16, 2004, p. 379-408, at p. 394-396. 
410 
 
                                                 
plaintiffs. If the individual damages were too small, the award could be used for the 
common benefit of the claimants or groups of claimants, or some other related purpose. 
 
Once the preferred model for collective action has been chosen, it must be decided how 
the actions should be funded. The funding of collective actions is a crucial element for 
the success of the collective action, since funds are needed already at the initial stage of 
the action and, therefore, the funding question needs to be solved. Possible funding 
options include funding by the victims bringing the actions, representative bodies, legal 
aid mechanisms or other publicly or privately administered funds, lawyers contracted 
under contingency fee arrangements, insurance companies etc.1712 Again national legal 
systems may limit the funding options, for example, because contingency fees are 
prohibited in some Member States.1713  
 
Since public funding is decreasing,1714 there is a need to ensure sufficient funding of 
collective actions by introducing contingency fees in the EU to fund collective actions. 
Because the lawyers’ fees would depend on the success of the claim, they would have a 
strong incentive only to accept cases that are likely to succeed. Provided that 
contingency fees are subject to judicial scrutiny, or regulated in another effective 
manner, their possible negative effects can be reduced.1715 Also other ways of 
alternative funding, for instance by third-party finance institutions should be possible, 
provided that possible conflicts of interest are eliminated, and the amount of the 
damages is subject to court approval in order to ensure a fair outcome for the group. 
 
Furthermore, by limiting the obligations of group members to pay the legal costs to the 
group representative and to those members who have de facto had an opportunity to 
exercise their right to opt out, the opt-out collective action should not generally pose 
any constitutional problems. 
 
1712 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 17. 
1713 This is the case e.g. in France. See Article 10 of Act n°71-1130 of December 31st, 1971 on the reform 
of certain legal professions. 
1714 See HODGES, “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues” C.J.Q., 26(JAN), 2007, at p. 99-
100. 
1715 Ibid., at p. 108. 
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Moreover, courts should be able to adjust the “loser pays” rule in line with Directive 
2004/48/EC in order to encourage that damages claims are being brought. Courts could 
also be allowed to cap costs and adjust litigation costs by limiting them to what is 
considered reasonable and proportionate.1716 In addition, any reference to punitive 
damages being prohibited should be eliminated as the Court of Justice has held that they 
are not contrary to EU law.1717 
 
Other issues which have not been considered in a satisfactory way include the 
coordination of public and private actions in a cross-border situation, and the 
jurisdictional rules. In those areas of law where a public authority can adopt a decision 
finding that there has been a violation of EU law, the national authority should be able 
to act as an amicus curiae in the collective redress action so as to not automatically 
prolong the collective redress proceedings or to impede stand-alone actions. This is 
justified especially in those cases where the decision by a national competition authority 
establishing an infringement does not assess whether the infringement has actually 
caused harm, since its file might be of limited value for proving the damage. Moreover, 
it would be necessary to ensure the coherent and uniform application of the EU antitrust 
rules when proceedings are brought before an NCA of one Member State and, 
simultaneously, an antitrust damages action is brought before a court of another 
Member State.1718  
 
Most importantly, the EU-wide collective action for cross-border cases should be 
introduced by a directive in order to enhance access to justice. The directive should also 
regulate the distribution of damages, and the allocation of costs between group 
members. The courts should play a significant role in ensuring the fairness of the 
collective actions to all the parties by certifying the group or sub-groups, approving 
settlements and attorneys’ fees, and by being allowed to adjust the costs of the 
litigation, if necessary because of equity reasons.  
 
1716  See LESKINEN, C., “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 8(1), 2011, p. 87-121, at p. 119. 
1717 See Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 93. 
1718 See DANOV, M. and BECKER, F., “The Way Forward: A Strong Case for Reform at EU Level” in 
DANOV, M., BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 407-420, at p. 416-417. 
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7.3.2 Cost Rules 
High litigation costs are often one of the greatest obstacles to private enforcement in the 
EU regardless of whether the antitrust damages actions are individual or collective, 
especially for consumers with small individual claims. In addition, the “loser pays” 
principle applies in most Member States,1719 which increases the risks of bringing an 
antitrust damages action. However, the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions does 
not contain any specific provisions on the costs of antitrust damages actions. The White 
Paper, in turn, recognized the problem of high litigation costs, and encouraged the 
Member States to reflect on how they could adjust their cost rules and court fees to 
facilitate meritorious actions.1720  
 
When the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions is reviewed (within four years from 
its implementation), some modifications to the cost rules should be made regarding 
antitrust damages actions in general. To start with, a modification of the “loser pays” 
principle should be considered in line with Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights. That directive allows courts to derogate from the “loser 
pays” principle if its application does not lead to a fair result in the case at issue.1721 
This would enhance access to justice by reducing the costs for bringing antitrust 
damages actions. Due to the same reason, a capping of the costs might also be justified 
especially in situations necessitated by fairness considerations. 
 
The cost rules should also make contingency fees available, or improve public 
financing. The advantage of contingency fees is that they provide additional incentives 
to bring an action thanks to the right of the attorney to recover part of the damages 
award if the action is successful. Moreover, since lawyers’ fees depend on the success 
of the action, lawyers are more likely to accept cases that are expected to bring them 
large awards, so contingency fees serve to filter of meritorious actions. The same 
1719 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 74. 
1720 See Commission White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 
165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 9. 
1721 See LESKINEN, “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 8(1), 2011, p. 87-121, at p. 119. 
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objective is achieved by the fact that their reputation as lawyers is also at stake.1722 
Nevertheless, contingency fees would provide less incentive in jurisdictions which 
apply the “loser pays” rule, since the lawyer would have to pay any adverse costs of an 
unsuccessful case. In addition, in such cases he would not receive any fee, which 
increases the risks in spite of the contingency fee arrangement. It is therefore necessary 
to examine all the applicable procedural rules in a particular jurisdiction in order to 
assess what the effect of introducing contingency fees would be, and what other rules 
might have to be adjusted in order to enhance private enforcement.1723 
 
The possible damages must also be sufficiently large for contingency fees to work,1724 
because otherwise the possibility of obtaining a percentage of the recovery would not be 
sufficient to incentivize damages actions under a contingency fee arrangement. In the 
EU, it would be difficult to ensure this since most jurisdictions only award 
compensation for the actual damages.1725 If other adjustments are not made, any 
contingency fee agreement based on a share of the recovery would bar the claimant 
from obtaining full compensation. But even if the claimant will not obtain full 
compensation, it could still be better off under such an arrangement if its claim would 
not be economically viable to be enforced at all without the contingency fee 
arrangement.  
 
Moreover, in order to avoid possible abuse, appropriate safeguards should be adopted, 
which could, for example, consist in empowering courts to approve and adjust 
contingency fees. 
 
1722 See SHAJNFELD, A., “A critical survey of the law, ethics, and economics of attorney contingent fee 
arrangements” N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 54 (2009/2010), p. 773, at p. 776-777. 
1723 See SITTENREICH, M.A. “The rocky path for private Directors General: Procedure, politics, and the 
uncertain future of EU antitrust damages actions”, Fordham L. Rev., 78, April, 2010, p. 2701-2750, at p. 
2747. 
1724 Ibid.  
1725 Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2008) 404 accompanying the White Paper on Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules COM(2008) 165 final, 2.4.2008, at p. 56. But also in the 
United States, treble damages tend to be equivalent to single damages since they do not include 
prejudgment interest and other factors, such as allocative inefficiency effects felt by society, and the value 
of the time claimants have spent on litigation. See LANDE and DAVIS, “Of Myths and Evidence: An 
Analysis of 40 U.S. Cases for Countries Considering a Private Right of Action for Competition Law 
Violations”, at p. 16, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474804.  
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Another option to improve financing of antitrust damages action would be to allow for 
litigation-finance companies or other third parties to fund such actions. Nevertheless, in 
these cases sufficient safeguards must be put in place in order to avoid that they abuse 
their influence in the case, and to ensure that the percentage of possible damages awards 
which the claimant has to pay to the funders are reasonable. It should also be noted that 
litigation-finance companies generally require a rather high likelihood of success, at 
least 60%, in order to be interested in funding a case,1726 which could limit its 
usefulness in meritorious, but uncertain cases. 
 
If there is a lack of sufficient support for adopting certain rules governing the costs of 
antitrust damages actions, the Commission should at least issue recommendations 
concerning the cost rules for antitrust damages actions.  
 
7.4. Implementation of the Proposed Private Enforcement Model 
7.4.1. Preliminary Observations 
Until the new Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions has been implemented, antitrust 
damages actions in the European Union will be governed by national rules. This means 
that each Member State is able to decide on the conditions for bringing such actions, 
subject to the limits imposed by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness as well 
as the duty of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU.1727 As to collective actions, 
the Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms is already 
applicable, but since it is merely a recommendation, the Member States may decide to 
what extent they are willing to follow the various recommendations contained in it. 
 
As has been demonstrated in Chapter 3, many obstacles still remain in most Member 
States, and even in the Member States with more antitrust damages actions, consumer 
claims are seldom brought, and have to date had limited success. The finding of the 
Ashurst Study that the means of actions available in different Member States for 
bringing damages claims show a high diversity,1728 which is a result of a great 
1726 See MARTIN, E., “And then there were three”, Euro. Law, 81, 2008, p. 30, at p. 31. 
1727 See Section 7.4.2 for more details.  
1728 See Ashurst Study, at p. 1. 
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divergence between national procedural rules1729 still holds true. As has been explained 
in Section 7.2, although the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions will harmonize 
certain rules governing antitrust damages actions, often it will only result in minimum 
harmonization. Therefore the divergences will prevail, for instance, in respect of 
causation and quantification of harm. Most notably, collective redress and costs rules 
will be determined by national rules.  
 
Furthermore, already in its Green Paper on antitrust damages actions, the Commission 
underlined the importance of the same protection of the rights of European citizens 
across the whole EU.1730 This requirement also stems from Courage, pursuant to which 
any individual who has suffered harm as a result of an infringement of the EU 
competition rules has the right to seek compensation.1731  
 
Thus, it would appear that at least a certain level of additional harmonization or 
voluntary coordination of legislative measures is required in order to ensure the right to 
damages and to avoid forum-shopping, but the question is how such a harmonization 
should be implemented. For instance, legislative action at the Union level is needed at 
least regarding certain issues, which currently create the main obstacles to bringing 
antitrust damages claims. But, it could also be envisaged that for other issues which are 
more difficult to harmonize, only guidelines or recommendations would be issued by 
the Commission, while the decision on concrete measures would ultimately be left to 
each Member State.  
 
Regarding collective actions, 30 years ago, the Commission concluded that due to the 
diversity and complexity of the national systems it was not possible to propose a 
harmonization of national collective actions for consumers.1732 However, the picture has 
remarkably changed since then, because improved collective actions have been adopted 
1729 See HODGES, C., “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues”, C.J.Q. 2007, 26(JAN), p. 96-
123, at p. 10-11. 
1730 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 16. 
1731 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24. 
1732 See Memorandum from the Commission: “Consumer redress”, Commission of the European 
Communities, COM(84) 692, 12.12.1984. 
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in various Member States.1733 But obstacles to overcome remain. For example, the legal 
and cultural backgrounds of the Member States differ, the existence of a legal basis for 
introducing the action is debated, and some resistance by Member States is probable. 
 
However, what issues should be harmonized, and to what extent, as well as the 
instrument for achieving that harmonization will ultimately depend on what goals 
private enforcement aims to achieve. Arguably, these goals include both compensation 
and deterrence, although the focus is more on the compensatory function. But 
deterrence is an important “by-product” justifying why there is a need for effective 
private enforcement in the first place, since compliance with the EU antitrust rules 
requires a combination of effective public and private enforcement. In addition, there 
must be a legal basis for the envisaged measures. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that harmonization of procedural rules has increasingly been 
happening in the EU, and have usually been due to practical needs linked with market 
integration objectives.1734 
 
7.4.2. Soft-law Instruments v. Harmonization 
Soft-law could be used to achieve some more convergence in antitrust damages actions. 
The Commission could issue recommendations and/or guidelines on issues that it would 
find important for the enhancement of private antitrust actions. This is indeed what it 
has done so far in the field of antitrust damages actions: on the one hand, it has issued 
recommendations regarding collective redress mechanisms1735 and, on the other hand, it 
has issued guidelines about the quantification of damages in antitrust cases.1736 The 
advantage of this approach is that such recommendations and guidelines can quickly be 
elaborated, and they will not encroach on the legal systems of the Member States 
1733 This would be the case e.g. of the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Portugal. 
1734 See ZEKOLL, J., “Comparative Civil Procedure” in REIMANN, M. and ZIMMERMANN, R. (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, p. 1327-1362, at 
p. 1341. 
1735 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
1736 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches 
of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 
19-21. 
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because of their voluntary nature. However, a significant drawback of this option is that 
the soft-law instruments are not be binding on the Member States, so it is questionable 
if they could really serve for much more than to provide useful guidance on particular 
issues for national legislators and courts willing to take them into consideration. 
 
The adoption of a binding instrument, either a directive or a regulation, would have the 
advantages of obliging Member States to achieve a particular result. Specifically, a 
regulation laying down the procedural conditions governing antitrust actions would 
have the advantage of creating a level playing field in the EU, and would ensure that all 
individuals have the same right to compensation no matter in which Member State they 
decide to bring an action for damages. But the drawback would be that it would not be 
possible to take into consideration all the divergent legal traditions and cultures and, 
therefore, there might be a risk that the application of the regulation might not be as 
effective as desirable. It should thus be carefully considered, which issues indeed 
require uniform regulation, and cannot be resolved through other, less invasive, 
measures. Furthermore, the elaboration of a regulation would be a complicated, time-
consuming process, since sufficient political will among the Member States would be 
indispensable. Consequently, it would take years before the effects of the harmonization 
could be felt. 
 
A new directive would be a more flexible tool in that it would only establish the 
framework and the objectives that are to be attained, but would leave to the Member 
States to concretely design the procedural devices. This would enable them to adopt 
mechanisms that would be in compliance with their legal system and traditions, thus 
increasing the likelihood of effective application. Nevertheless, sufficient political will 
for the reform would again be required, so this instrument would also not provide any 
fast solution to the current under-enforcement of the competition rules. 
 
The choice of the legal instrument for the harmonization is closely linked to the 
envisaged effect of the harmonization, and to what extent it will be realized at the Union 
level, as well as what role Member States should play in the implementation process. 
The more uniformly a particular issue should be harmonized, the more intrusive must 
the legal instrument chosen be. Nevertheless, binding legislative measures require a 
competence of the EU to adopt the legislation concerned, and sufficient political will 
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amongst the Member States to agree on the harmonization, and to implement the 
principles in practice. 
 
In order to assess the feasibility of a further harmonization of the rules governing 
antitrust damages actions, the principle of procedural autonomy must be taken into 
consideration. The procedural autonomy stems from the judgment in Rewe, in which the 
Court of Justice stated that “in the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for 
the domestic legal systems of each Member State to designate the courts having 
jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law 
intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct effect 
of Community law”.1737 The Court held that, if necessary, Articles 100-102 EC [now 
114-117 TFEU] and Article 235 EC [now 352 TFEU] enabled measures to be taken to 
remedy differences between the procedural provisions in Member States, if these rules 
were likely to distort or harm the functioning of the internal market. Moreover, the 
Court emphasized that only when no harmonizing measures exist, must the rights 
conferred by EU law be exercised in accordance with the conditions laid down by 
national rules.1738  
 
Arguably, accepting that Member States could adopt procedural rules that would render 
the enforcement of Union rights difficult or even impossible would undermine the 
supremacy of EU law and, thus, the very essence of the EU legal order. In fact, it also 
follows from the case law of the Union courts that national procedural rules must be set 
aside if they do not comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.1739 
Consequently, Member States may determine certain procedural conditions for actions 
governing rights conferred by EU law as long as there are no Union provisions 
regarding the issue concerned, and the national rules comply with the requirements of 
EU law.1740  
 
1737 Judgment in Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, C-33/76, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 
5. 
1738 Idem. 
1739 See e.g. Judgment in Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, EU:C:1976:188, and 
Judgment in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio, C-199/82, EU:C:1983:318. 
1740 See LESKINEN, C., “The competence of the European Union to adopt measures harmonizing the 
procedural rules governing EC antitrust damages actions”, Working Paper IE Law School, WPLSO8-01, 
15.1.2008, at p. 8, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1138797. 
419 
 
                                                 
 
Since the “principle of procedural autonomy” may have negative effects both for the 
effective and uniform application of EU law,1741 the Court of Justice has imposed 
limitations to the application of national procedural rules: the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness.1742  
 
The principle of equivalence signifies that national procedural rules that govern actions 
based on a Union right may not be less favorable than rules governing similar domestic 
actions,1743 i.e. that claims based on Union law must be treated equally to claims based 
on national law.1744 As regards private enforcement, the enforcement of the EU 
competition rules may, therefore, not be less favorable than rules governing the private 
enforcement of national competition rules.1745 
 
The principle of effectiveness, in turn, requires that procedural conditions governing 
actions based on the direct effect of EU do not render the enforcement of rights 
conferred by EU law “virtually impossible or excessively difficult”.1746 In assessing 
whether a national procedural provision renders the application of EU law impossible or 
excessively difficult, each case must be analyzed by reference to the role of that 
provision in the procedure, its progress, and its special features, viewed as a whole, 
before the various national instances. In the light of that analysis, the basic principles of 
the domestic judicial system, such as protection of the rights of the defense, the 
principle of legal certainty, and the proper conduct of procedure must, where 
1741 See JACOBS, F.G., “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Rules: A Community Perspective” in EHLERMANN, C.-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European 
Competition Policy Annual: 2001, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford – Portland Oregon, 2003, p. 187-232, at p. 215. 
1742 See Judgment in Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, EU:C:1976:188. 
1743 See Judgment in Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, EU:C:1976:188, paragraph 5. 
1744 See LENAERTS, K., ARTS, D. and MASELIS, I., EU Procedural Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2014, at p. 118. 
1745 See JACOBS, F.G., “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition 
Rules: A Community Perspective” in EHLERMANN, C.-D. and ATANASIU, I. (eds.), European 
Competition Policy Annual: 2001, Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford – Portland Oregon, 2003, p. 187-232p. 217. For instance, in Manfredi the ECJ referred to the 
principle of equivalence when it stated that it must be possible to award particular damages, such as 
exemplary or punitive damages, pursuant to actions founded on EU competition rules, if such damages 
may be awarded pursuant to similar actions founded on national law. See Judgment in Manfredi, 
EU:C:2006:46, paragraph 93. 
1746 Judgment in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio, EU:C:1983:318, paragraph 7. 
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appropriate, be taken into consideration.1747 If the national provision impairs the 
effectiveness of EU law, the national court deciding on an action based on a right 
conferred by EU law, must refuse to apply the provision in question.1748  
 
 
Furthermore, under Article 4(3) TEU, Member States have a duty to cooperate, and 
must collaborate actively by adopting all general or particular measures to ensure the 
implementation of EU law. Moreover, Member States are obliged to abstain from all 
measures that could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties. 
 
In the field of private antitrust enforcement, the duty of sincere cooperation under 
Article 4(3) TEU would require Member States’ national courts to award damages for 
infringements of the EU competition rules, since national courts have an obligation to 
give effective protection to Union rights (principle of effectiveness). As the right to 
damages is a right conferred to individuals by EU law, it has primacy over national law. 
In resolving antitrust damages actions based on EU law, national courts must comply 
with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness by ensuring that those who have 
suffered harm from an infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU obtain adequate and 
sufficient compensation for their loss. Providing for sufficient damages also facilitates 
the Union’s task to ensure a working competition in the internal market. However, if the 
damages awarded are not sufficient, or antitrust damages actions are subject to unduly 
strict conditions, this might impede the victim of antitrust violations from seeking 
compensation and, hence, the obligation of sincere cooperation could not be considered 
fulfilled.1749 
 
Furthermore, the duty of sincere cooperation does not only apply to national courts, but 
to national legislators as well. Consequently, the procedural rules governing actions for 
antitrust damages should be framed in such a manner that it is possible for those upon 
whom the EU competition rules have conferred rights to enforce those rights in practice. 
1747 Judgment in van Schijndel v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, C-430/93 and C-
431/93, EU:C:1995:441, paragraph 19. 
1748 Judgment in Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio, EU:C:1983:318, paragraphs 
21-22. 
1749 See LESKINEN, C., “The competence of the European Union to adopt measures harmonizing the 
procedural rules governing EC antitrust damages actions”, Working Paper IE Law School, WPLSO8-01, 
15.1.2008, at p. 11available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1138797. 
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Nevertheless, even if the national legislator had failed to enact efficient and adequate 
rules, national courts must, under the duty of sincere cooperation, and in compliance 
with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, set aside those rules if they impede 
them from awarding damages for EU antitrust infringements.1750 
 
7.4.3. Sector-specific Harmonization v. Harmonization of Civil Procedural Rules 
It is possible to envisage several options for a more comprehensive harmonization of the 
national procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions depending on what other 
reforms are planned in other fields of law. The Directive on Antitrust Damages is based 
on a sector-specific harmonization which has considered the particularities of 
competition law, such as the information asymmetry which often exist between the 
infringer and the injured parties. The rules regarding access to evidence, the binding 
effect of infringement decisions of a NCA, etc. are specific rules designed for 
facilitating the bringing of antitrust damages actions. 
 
However, regarding collective redress mechanisms, the Commission has opted for a 
horizontal approach since its recommendations apply to victims of mass harm situations 
in general, and not only antitrust violations. Nevertheless, it will not result in a 
harmonization since it is a soft-law instrument, but at most it might lead to voluntary 
approximation between the national legislations if the Member States choose to follow 
the recommendations. Since the problems which consumers face in antitrust cases are 
often similar as in the fields of product liability and unfair trading, a common approach 
would be justified, and would create large synergies.  
 
The Commission has therefore chosen to provide for general collective redress for 
victims in mass harm situations in combination with specific redress possibilities in 
antitrust damages cases. This could also serve as a starting point for the modifications 
that are suggested in this thesis. Regarding collective actions, there is indeed a case for a 
general EU collective action for violations of rights granted under EU law based on a 
horizontal harmonization. However, if the measures proposed are not likely to achieve 
sufficient political support in order to be adopted, a sector-specific collective redress 
mechanism could first be introduced for antitrust damages and injunction cases and, 
1750 Idem.   
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when some experience has been gathered from the functioning of the redress 
mechanism, it could possibly be extended to other fields in which rights granted under 
EU law have been violated in mass harm situations. 
 
As to the cost rules, given the controversial nature of contingency fees and third-party 
funding in a number of Member States,1751 binding rules are even more likely to meet  
resistance from the Member States, and the reform should, at least first, be limited to the 
field of competition law by providing antitrust specific cost rules. 
 
7.4.4. Legal Basis for a Harmonization at Union Level 
The introduction of a binding Union collective action requires the existence of a legal 
basis for adopting such an action, since the EU only has competences, which have been 
conferred upon it by the Member States.1752 It would depend on the ultimate aim of the 
action, i.e. whether it is designed to be a horizontal mechanism available to all 
individuals whose right granted under EU law have been violated in a mass harm 
situation in order to improve consumer redress in general, or whether it will form part of 
a further sector-specific harmonization of national procedural rules aiming to enhance 
the effective and uniform application of the EU antitrust rules.  
 
Moreover, in areas of shared competences, the Union may only take action if action at 
the Union level is necessary, and the objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, but can be better achieved by the Union.1753 This requirement is met, 
since there is a need for an EU-wide collective action for damages based on a mass 
harm situation in which rights granted under Union law have been infringed as 
especially consumers might not be able to enforce their claims effectively in particular 
in cross-border cases. In addition, the measure must comply with the principle of 
proportionality, i.e. it should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives 
of the Treaties.1754 
 
1751 See e.g. Section 3.4 on France. 
1752 This so-called principle of conferral is laid down in Article 5(1) TEU. 
1753 This principle of subsidiarity is established in Article 5(3) TEU. 
1754 See Article 5(4) TEU. 
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An EU collective action could be adopted under Article 81(2)(f) TFEU, which allows 
the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings by promoting 
the compatibility of the rules on civil procedures applicable in the Member States when 
this is necessary in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. This 
legal basis would be justified by the necessity to ensure the effective enforcement of the 
substantive rights granted to individuals and companies under EU law, and the same 
protection of those rights across the EU. This would, in turn, avoid competitive 
advantages for companies established in Member States where it is difficult for 
consumers to enforce their rights. The introduction of an EU collective action would 
also enhance access to justice in cross-border situations since, currently, it is impossible 
in some Member States for consumer organizations to bring collective actions on behalf 
of consumers who are non-nationals.1755 Moreover, the importance of the right to 
effective judicial protection in the form of an effective remedy has been highlighted by 
the Court of Justice.1756 In short, the introduction of an EU collective action would 
arguably meet both requirements for the use of Article 81 TFEU: it would be 
“particularly necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market” and it would 
improve access to justice.  
 
Alternatively, a sector-specific collective action could be provided for antitrust damages 
cases, which could later be expanded to other fields in which mass harm has been 
caused. This option could be appropriate in case it is difficult to find sufficient support 
for a binding horizontal EU collective action, and if there are doubts about the need for 
such an action in other fields. Regarding antitrust damages actions, the need for an 
efficient collective redress mechanism has already been demonstrated, since currently 
consumers seldom obtain compensation for the harm that they have suffered, and the 
few collective antitrust damages claims brought to date have failed or had very limited 
success. The legal basis for a directive introducing a collective antitrust damages action 
would arguably be the same as for the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions (i.e. it 
could be based on Articles 103 and 114 TFEU), since the main objective to ensure the 
efficient and uniform application of the EU competition rules and the proper 
functioning of the internal market. 
1755 For instance, in France, only consumers associations which represent consumers at a national level 
may bring a representative action on behalf of consumers who have been injured as a result of the actions 
of the same professional. See Article L.422-1 of the Consumer Code. 
1756 Judgment in Otis and Others, EU:C:2012:684. 
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The modifications to the cost rules required in order to make the EU-wide collective 
action feasible, should be included in the same instrument which provides for such an 
action. However, if sufficient support cannot be found for modifying the costs rules on a 
horizontal basis, the possibility of amending the costs rules merely in the field of 
antitrust damages actions should be considered. The legal basis would arguably be 
Articles 103 and 114 TFEU.1757 
 
It is argued that the need to ensure that individuals can enforce their rights stemming 
from the Treaty in the same manner in any Member State would justify the adoption of 
harmonizing measures by the Council on the basis of Article 103 TFEU.1758 Admittedly, 
it would require an extensive interpretation of the wording of Article 103 TFEU, but it 
would be justified by the need for an efficient and uniform application of the EU 
competition rules throughout the EU, and the need to ensure the direct effect of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. 
 
7.4.5. Choice of Legal Instrument 
There is a need for an EU-wide collective action for damages based on a mass harm 
situation in which rights granted under Union law have been infringed. A further 
directive would appear as the most appropriate legal instrument by allowing to respect 
the legal traditions and cultural differences of the Member States and to solve 
constitutional problems in the most suitable manner while, at the same time, providing 
for sufficient uniformity.  
 
The drawback of choosing a directive for introducing an EU-wide collective action is 
that it has to be implemented into the national legal systems before it becomes binding. 
In the case of the recent Directive, the Member States will have two years from the 
entry into force of the directive,1759 but they have certain discretion as to the form and 
means they choose in order to implement the provisions of the directive. This means 
1757 It should be noted that Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of IPRs, which provides for a 
possibility of derogating from the “loser pays” principle in certain situations was adopted on the basis of 
Article 114 TFEU. 
1758 See LESKINEN, C., “The competence of the European Union to adopt measures harmonizing the 
procedural rules governing EC antitrust damages actions”, Working Paper IE Law School, WPLSO8-01, 
at p. 17-18, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1138797. 
1759 Article 21 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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that some divergences between Member States will still exist even after the measures 
have been implemented at national level. This is especially the case with those 
provisions which do not contain very specific obligations, but refer, for instance, to the 
limits imposed by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. It would therefore be 
necessary to find a wording which is specific enough, but which also allows for taking 
into account the differences in the national legal systems. 
 
A regulation would have the benefit of establishing directly applicable uniform rules, 
but it would be more difficult to take into consideration divergent legal traditions and 
cultures. The elaboration and negotiation of a regulation would also be a complicated, 
time-consuming process, and it would be more challenging to achieve sufficient 
political will among the Member States. Given that the possibility of also providing for 
opt-out collective actions at least for mass-claims of low value would be necessary in 
order for the collective redress mechanism to be effective, it is highly unlikely that a 
regulation could be agreed on. 
 
But whatever solution will finally be chosen, it should be possible to apply it effectively 
in practice. For certain cost rules, such as contingency fees, the directive might therefore 
not be a realistic option but, as a first measure, recommendations could be issued. 
However, a binding provision should adopted at least regarding the possibility for 
derogation from the “loser pays” principle in order to increase access to justice by 
reducing the costs litigation.1760 
 
7.4.6. Feasibility of the Proposed Measures 
The feasibility of introducing the changes outlined above has to be assessed against the 
legal and cultural background in the EU. The EU has made a different policy choice 
than the United States regarding who should enforce competition rules since public 
enforcement represents most of the overall antitrust enforcement, whereas the emphasis 
in the United States is on private antitrust enforcement. Favorable procedural rules that 
foster private enforcement, such as those in the US, do not generally exist in the EU. 
The challenge is that although the benefits of optimal deterrence would be felt at the EU 
level, Member States would bear the social costs. Furthermore, the required additional 
1760 See LESKINEN, C., “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 8(1), 2011, p. 87-121, at p. 121. 
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changes in procedural and remedial law would also have effects in other types of civil 
litigation, and these costs could be felt as excessive.1761 This is likely to explain why the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions is a bleak version of the reforms initially 
suggested. More significant changes to the Member States’ national procedural rules 
might therefore meet resistance. 
 
Since national procedural rules are very divergent in the EU, it is also difficult to 
consensus about how to design common procedural rules. Moreover, the EU differs 
from the United States in that it does not have a litigation culture to the same extent, but 
the barrier to initiate legal proceedings is much higher. In fact, there is a common, but 
unfounded, fear in Europe that class actions lead to abuses, with lawyers obtaining large 
fees at the cost of class members.1762 
 
But since various Member States have introduced or are thinking of introducing more 
effective collective actions,1763 it is understood that a sufficient political will exists to at 
least consider the introduction of a binding collective redress mechanism as long as it is 
compatible with the national constitutional rules. Furthermore, as to the modification of 
the “loser pays” rule in certain limited situations necessitated by fairness considerations, 
this already exists with regard to actions to enforce intellectual property rights, and 
should thus be feasible also in the field of competition law. 
 
7.5. Implications for Public Enforcement of the EU Competition Rules 
The harmonization and approximation of certain procedural rules governing antitrust 
damages actions and the introduction of collective actions for antitrust damages 
followed by an expected increase in private enforcement also have implications for the 
public enforcement of the EU competition rules. Some of them could be positive, while 
there is also a risk of negative effects, unless certain safeguards are put in place.  
 
1761 See BUXBAUM, H.L., “Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the United States – of Optimal 
Deterrence and Social Costs in Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, in BASEDOW, J. (ed.), 
Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 
44-60, at p. 57-58. 
1762 See SCHNELL, G., “Class Action Madness in Europe – a Call for a More Balanced Debate”, 
E.C.L.R., Volume 28, Issue 11, 2007, p. 617-619, at p. 617. 
1763 See Section 2.2. 
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A positive effect would be increased compliance with the competition rules, since the 
financial risk of paying damages would contribute to deter undertakings from breaching 
the competition rules. On the other hand, the risk of additional punishment in the form 
of private damages could also discourage cartel members from seeking leniency, since it 
is not possible to grant leniency from private damages claims. As leniency programs are 
an important tool for detecting and putting an end to harmful cartels, it would be 
necessary to ensure that increased private enforcement does not make leniency 
programs less attractive, since otherwise the risk is that the overall enforcement of 
competition rules would diminish instead of increase. 
 
As an undertaking applying for leniency will normally provide the competition 
authorities with documents incriminating itself1764 its participation in the infringement is 
usually described in more detail than the participation of other cartel members.1765 
There is hence a risk that if private litigants obtain access to these documents through 
discovery, they will seek damages from the leniency applicants since it is easiest to 
prove its participation in the infringement.1766 Therefore, to the extent that it is 
necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of leniency programs, it is also necessary to 
ensure the confidentiality of the declarations made by leniency applicants to the 
competition authorities, so that they could not be used for other aims than the public 
enforcement of competition rules.1767 But as has been submitted in Chapter Four, there 
should always be a balance between public and private enforcement, which are 
complementary goals of EU competition law, and public enforcement should not 
automatically be given priority in such cases, but a case-by-case analysis must be 
conducted. This is essentially what the ECJ has suggested in Pfleiderer where it held 
that national courts deciding requests for access to leniency documents should weigh 
1764 See BÖGE, U., “Leniency Programs and the Private Enforcement of European Competition Law” in 
BASEDOW, J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 217-226, at p. 221. 
1765 See SANDHU, J.S., “The European Commission’s Leniency Policy: A Success?”, E.C.L.R., Volume 
28, Issue 3, 2007, p. 148-157, p. 155. 
1766 See BÖGE, U., “Leniency Programs and the Private Enforcement of European Competition Law” in 
BASEDOW, J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 217-226, at p. 221. 
1767 See CONSEIL DE LA CONCURRENCE, “Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de 
l’action de groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles”, at p. 17. 
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the usefulness of leniency programs for detecting cartels against the contribution of 
damages actions for the maintenance of effective competition.1768 
 
In contrast, to maintain the attractiveness of its amnesty program, the U.S. approach 
since the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enactment and Reform Act 2004 is that damages 
for immunity applicants who cooperate with the plaintiffs in private damages actions 
can be de-trebled.1769 In the EU, it would in general not be possible to reduce leniency 
applicants’ civil liability, since treble damages are not available, and the damages 
provided in European legal systems must ensure full compensation for the actual loss. 
Consequently, if the leniency applicant’s liability is reduced, the victim might not 
obtain full compensation, which would be contrary to European legal understanding.  
 
Furthermore, increased private enforcement could also increase the number of parallel 
actions, i.e. where the same anti-competitive conduct is simultaneously subject for both 
public and private enforcement. There are at least two risks in this context. First, there is 
a risk that the proceedings result in different outcomes. But this risk is reduced thanks to 
the mechanisms provided for in Regulation 1/2003, which foresee cooperation between 
the Commission and the national courts.1770 Moreover, the national courts must not take 
a decision conflicting with a Commission decision, but should suspend the proceeding if 
there is a risk of such a conflict.1771 However, more coordination would be needed when 
a particular conduct is subject to public enforcement in one Member State, and antitrust 
damages proceedings in the courts of another Member State. 
 
Second, if the private action is initiated before the public enforcers have had a 
possibility to conduct an inspection in the premises of the alleged infringers, the cartel 
members might destroy evidence before the competition authorities have a possibility to 
1768 Judgment in Pfleiderer, EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 30. 
1769 See YSEWYN, J., “Private enforcement of competition law in the EU: trials and tribulations”, 
International Law Practicum, 19-Spring, 2006, p. 14-19. 
1770 See Articles 15 and 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 
4.1.2003, p. 1-25. 
1771 See Judgment in Delimitis, EU:C:1991:91, paragraph 47, and Judgment in Masterfoods, 
EU:C:2000:689, paragraphs 56-57. 
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secure the evidence. This would result in under-enforcement of the competition rules1772 
because private damages in the EU are not likely to outweigh the fines imposed by 
competition authorities and, consequently, the cartel members would not be deprived of 
all the financial gains that they have made by breaching the competition rules.  
 
However, as most actions are, and probably will be at least in the near future, follow-on 
actions, these risks will probably not materialize very often. It is therefore important to 
ensure that private enforcement does not make leniency programs less attractive with 
diminished public enforcement as a consequence. In other words, undertakings should 
not perceive that they would benefit economically if they did not participate in leniency 
programs.1773 A possible solution would be to consider the introduction of double 
damages for hard-core cartels and follow the U.S. approach of only imposing a 
successful immunity applicant an obligation to compensate actual damages. In this 
manner, undertakings cooperating with the competition authorities in uncovering cartels 
would obtain a 50% reduction regarding the civil liability in damages.  
 
7.6. Conclusions 
Some of the measures included in the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions would 
require adjustments in order to make private enforcement more effective. Most 
importantly, efficient collective redress mechanisms would also be required, and should 
be introduced by a new directive. However, the question of what types of collective 
actions could be introduced in the EU is closely linked to other measures aiming at 
fostering private enforcement of the EU competition rules, and the feasibility of 
adopting binding measures. Arguably, courts should be given discretion to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether a particular action should be brought based on the “opt-in” 
or “opt-out” principle. These forms of collective actions should ensure a minimum level 
of effective access to justice, but Member States could decide to go beyond these types 
of actions conforming to their legal traditions.  
 
1772 See Conseil de la Concurrence, “Avis du 21 septembre 2006 relatif à l’introduction de l’action de 
groupe en matière de pratiques anticoncurrentielles”, at p. 20.  
1773 See BÖGE, U., “Leniency Programs and the Private Enforcement of European Competition Law” in 
BASEDOW, J. (ed.), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law, Kluwer Law International, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2007, p. 217-226, at p. 220-222. 
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Moreover, the cost rules also require some modification in order to ensure the funding 
of collective actions, as the effectiveness of such actions would otherwise be 
significantly reduced.  National courts should be empowered to derogate from the “loser 
pays” principle if this is required of fairness reasons in order to incentivize meritorious 
antitrust damages actions. In addition, the use of contingency fees or other alternative 
means of funding should at least be encouraged. Preferably, if sufficient support for 
approximation could be found, alternative funding options should be made available. 
 
Apart from the expected implications for public enforcement outlined in the section 
above, the harmonization of some national procedural rules and the introduction of 
collective redress mechanisms should not only enhance private enforcement, and 
especially provide a more effective remedy for consumers, but is likely to result in a 
rapprochement of procedural rules in general. The establishment of common Union 
procedural rules in yet another field is also another step away from procedural 
autonomy. Nevertheless, this is justified since substantive EU rights should be 
efficiently and uniformly enforced in the EU regardless of in which Member State the 
injured party brings the action. Since these rights cannot be effectively enforced at 
national level, common procedural rules are the only way to bring about a general 
change. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. Summary of the Main Findings 
8.1.1. Private Enforcement of the EU Antitrust Rules at EU level 
In the EU, the policy choice for the enforcement of the EU antitrust rules has been 
public enforcement by the national competition authorities and, until the modernization 
of the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in May 2004, above all by the 
European Commission. The role of private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules, in 
particular through damages claims, has therefore played a much less significant role 
despite that the Court of Justice already held in BRT v SABAM that Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU produce direct effects in relations between individuals and “create direct rights 
in respect of the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard”.1774 
Until the modernization of the EU antitrust rules, this could partly be explained by the 
Commission’s previous monopoly to grant an individual exemption for agreements 
infringing Article 101(1) TFEU but satisfying the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU, 
which tended to paralyze private actions pending before the national court until the 
Commission had dealt with the notification for exemption.1775 Furthermore, the Treaty 
does not contain any explicit provision on liability in damages for infringements of 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU. Instead, this right has been deduced from Article 4(3) TEU 
and the principle of effectiveness,1776 and later explicitly recognized by the Court of 
Justice in its seminal ruling Courage.1777  
 
In Courage, the Court of Justice held that any individual could rely on a breach of 
Article 101(1) TFEU before the national courts, and that this right extended even to a 
party to a contract that is liable to restrict or distort competition.1778 Moreover, the right 
to seek damages is independent of whether or not the Commission is acting on a 
possible complaint. The Court thus expressly extended the principles giving rise to a 
remedy against Member States for breaches of EU law to liability for breaches of the 
1774 See Judgment in BRT v SABAM, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16. 
1775 See KOMNINOS, A.P., EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC 
Competition Law by National Courts, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2008, at p. 29. 
1776 See Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2005) 1732, Annex to the Green Paper on Damages 
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2005) 672 final, 19.12.2005, at p. 9. 
1777 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 26. 
1778 See Judgment in Courage, EU:C:2001:465, paragraph 24. 
432 
 
                                                 
EU antitrust rules by individuals in that it recognized an EU right to claim damages for 
antitrust violations, arguing that this right is necessary in order to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the antitrust rules. In other words, it created individual liability for 
breaches of the EU antitrust rules. In addition, it held that national courts are obliged to 
give effect to the EU right to damages regardless of national provisions.1779 
 
The fact that national courts are entrusted the enforcement of Union rights was already 
confirmed in van Gend & Loos, in which the Court of Justice established the 
complementary nature of public and private enforcement of rights derived from EU law, 
and that individuals are also entitled to participate in the vigilance of the compliance 
with Union obligations.1780 But, the vigilance of individuals of the compliance with the 
EU antitrust rules by enforcing their Union right to damages for antitrust violations has 
not worked very well in practice. The under-enforcement of antitrust rules through 
private actions in the EU was revealed by the Ashurst Study, which found that private 
enforcement in the EU showed an “astonishing diversity and total 
underdevelopment”.1781 Although, in light of more recent research, the numbers of 
damages actions found by the Ashurst Study may be questioned in particular with 
regard to Germany, Spain, France United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal and Sweden,1782 the Study still serves to demonstrate the overall insignificant 
level of private enforcement in the EU approximately a decade ago. 
 
Even though private damages actions are today brought more frequently, there are still 
comparatively few actions in the EU. The Commission has estimated that between 2006 
and 2012, only 52 actions for damages were brought as follow-on actions based on 
Commission Decisions. Moreover, these claims were only brought in seven Member 
States, and most of them were brought in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
1779 See JONES, C. A., Private Enforcement of Antitrust in the EU, UK and the US, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1999, at p. 74. It should be noted that EU law only provides a substantive right to 
damages for infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, whereas the rules governing the bringing of 
damages actions are determined by the Member States. 
1780 See Judgment in van Gend & Loos, EU:C:1963:1. 
1781 See Ashurst Study, at p. 1.  
1782 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012, Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, available 
at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf. However, this research project noted that in 
many of the cases undertakings have used the competition rules as defenses to breach of contract claims, 
so independent damages claims would probably still be comparatively few. 
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Netherlands. Conversely, in the rest of the Member States there appear to have been no 
follow-on actions based on a Commission Decision during the period in question.1783 
This indicates that damages actions are not working properly in a large majority of the 
Member States, and that private enforcement in the EU is still very divergent despite the 
existence of a Union right to damages. 
 
Furthermore, it is believed that more cases are settled out of court.1784 But claimants 
might be in a weaker position than the defendant, thus having little bargaining power, 
which could result in disadvantageous settlements for them, unless they have access to 
an effective judicial remedy which can incentivize the defendant to settle. In addition, 
when antitrust damages actions are brought in courts, the competition law rules are 
usually used as a defense by companies in commercial contract disputes,1785 and it 
appears that in many cases other remedies than damages are sought, or the damages 
claims are unsuccessful.1786 
 
Most notably, damages claims are hardly brought by consumers, and the few 
representative actions that have been brought on their behalf to date have had very 
limited success, failing to compensate the majority of the harm suffered by the injured 
parties.1787 This is concerning since, ultimately, the victims of antitrust violations are 
usually consumers, as purchasers in the previous levels in the distribution chain can 
pass on the overcharge that they have paid to the next level in the distribution chain, but 
consumers must bear the whole overcharge passed on to them. 
 
1783 See Commission Staff Working Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 19. 
1784 For the situation in the UK, see RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative 
Private Enforcement and Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 42. 
1785 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012, Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, available 
at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf.  
1786 See AHRC Project on Comparative Private Enforcement and Collective Redress, LSE, September 
15th, Conference Rapporteur Presentations: Matrix of competition private enforcement cases from the 24 
rapporteurs who presented at the conference, available at 
http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/LSEConferencePresentationNotes.pdf.  
1787 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07 and http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
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This under-enforcement of competition rules, especially by consumers, is all the more 
alarming in the light of the modernization of the EU competition rules, since the aim of 
the reform was, inter alia, to encourage private enforcement actions by giving national 
courts the right to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in full. The attempt to increase 
private enforcement could, in fact, be considered as a parallel to the creation of private 
attorneys general in the U.S. under Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act.1788  
 
8.1.2. Obstacles to Private Enforcement in the Member States 
The reason for the limited private enforcement can be explained by the fact that antitrust 
damages actions are currently governed by national procedural rules. Thus, in practice, 
the possibilities of bringing antitrust damages actions vary from Member State to 
Member State.1789 The analysis of private enforcement in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and Finland conducted in this thesis shows that 
injured parties still face a number of obstacles to bringing antitrust damages action in 
the EU. Even in Member States where antitrust actions are brought fairly frequently, 
such as the United Kingdom and Germany, damages are seldom awarded in hardcore 
cartel cases.1790 In particular consumers do not seem to have recourse to any effective 
remedy in the EU, since there have been almost no small value consumer mass claims 
for damages for antitrust violations.1791 
 
It is particularly striking that damages actions are not often brought by victims of 
hardcore cartels. It is understandable that this type of damages claims are not brought as 
stand-alone actions as it is already difficult for competition authorities, which have wide 
1788 Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act provides: “Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United 
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the 
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee […]”. 
1789 For instance, the limitation periods for follow-on actions for damages vary from six months to five 
years. See Commission Staff Working Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 16. 
1790 See RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 43, and PEYER, S., AHRC Project, 
“Germany. Comparative Private Enforcement & Consumer Redress in the EU”, at p. 23. 
1791 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: “Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-20122” Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, 
available at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf. 
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powers of inspection at their disposal, to detect these secret agreements. Therefore, it is 
virtually impossible for victims of cartel agreements to adduce sufficient evidence to 
prove the infringement, and the damage that they have suffered as a result of it. But, one 
would imagine that follow-on actions for damages would be more frequent, especially 
since the claimant could refer to the Commission Decision in order to establish the 
existence of an infringement of the EU competition rules. However, one explanation for 
the limited number of follow-on damages actions could be that the infringement 
decision does not necessarily demonstrate that the infringement has actually caused 
harm.1792 
 
Another explanation is that many potential actions for damages are settled. But the most 
plausible explanation is that too many obstacles to bringing antitrust damages actions 
currently exist in the Member States. High legal costs and the uncertainty of the 
outcome of the action serve as disincentives to bring damages claims. The burden of 
proof is high, requiring claimants not only to establish the infringement of the 
competition rules, and demonstrate the causal relationship between the infringement and 
the harm that they have suffered as a result of it, but also to quantify the exact amount 
of damage suffered. As access to evidence is, in most Member States, limited,1793  most 
claimants are probably deterred from initiating proceedings due to the length and costs 
of proceedings, since they may lack both financial resources and the expertise required 
to bring an antitrust damages claim. 
 
For consumers, in particular those who have comparatively small claims in comparison 
to the potential high costs of damages claims, the task is virtually impossible, and stand-
alone actions are unthinkable. But also small and medium-sized undertakings might 
face the same hurdles, especially in situations where they are indirect purchasers, and 
would be required to show the exact amount of the overcharge that has been passed on 
to them. Consequently, for consumers and SMEs it would be important to be able to 
bring a collective action together with other victims in order to reduce the costs and 
risks of the action, and to actually have an incentive to bring a claim.  
1792 See DANOV, M. and BECKER, F., “The Way Forward: A Strong Case for Reform at EU Level” in 
DANOV, M., BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 407-420, at p. 416-417. 
1793 The United Kingdom and Ireland have more generous discovery rules than civil law jurisdictions. 
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 The state-of-play of private enforcement demonstrates that measures are required in 
order to encourage victims of antitrust violations to bring damages claims, and in order 
to ensure the overall compliance with the EU competition rules. As consumers are 
likely to ultimately suffer most of the negative effects of antitrust violations in the form 
of increased prices, decreased quality and choice of products etc., especially their 
possibilities of seeking damages should be enhanced. Arguably, collective actions could 
be the appropriate remedy. 
 
The necessity to introduce some form of effective collective action device in the EU is 
particularly great with regard to consumers that have suffered a loss as a result of higher 
prices. Currently, the costs and uncertain outcome of litigation discourage them from 
claiming compensation, especially when the individual losses suffered are fairly low. 
On the other hand, the aggregate damage of all consumers and the financial gains of the 
cartel members could be significant. Therefore, only if consumers could join their forces 
in a collective action, would there be a realistic possibility in these cases for a great 
number of victims obtaining full compensation for their loss.  
 
The possibility to decide numerous small claims, the aggregate value of which could be 
considerable, in one proceeding would thus ensure access to justice. Similarly, the 
courts would not be obligated to decide numerous similar issues over and over, which 
would alleviate the burden on courts in general, thus resulting in a better administration 
of justice. Collective actions could also contribute to reduce the difficulties associated 
with indirect purchaser cases if the claims of indirect purchasers could be consolidated 
with those of direct purchasers, and then a first proceeding could determine the total 
overcharge that the price-fixing has resulted in, while a second proceeding would 
allocate the damages between the various purchasers in the distribution chain.1794 This 
would in turn eliminate multiple recoveries. 
 
In general, collective actions would mean reduced costs not only for claimants, but also 
for defendants. They would also foster increased legal certainty in that possibly all 
claims are resolved once. Further, they would reduce asymmetries between parties, 
1794 See BAKER, D.I., “The Future of Private right of Action in Antitrust”, Loyola Consumer Law 
Review, 16, 2004, p. 379-408, at p. 394-396. 
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particularly in situations where many low-value claims exist and, consequently, result in 
enhanced deterrence. 
 
However, there are certain risks related to collective actions. Unmeritorious claims 
could be brought, since lower legal costs for litigation would facilitate initiating 
proceedings. Defendants might also be inclined to settle in order to avoid court 
proceedings, even when their conduct did not breach the competition rules. But these 
risks could be significantly reduced by providing for appropriate safeguards. 
 
Nevertheless, the collective actions available in the Member States today do not, in 
general, provide sufficient and effective redress. Of the six Member States analyzed in 
this thesis, only the United Kingdom1795 and France1796 expressly provide for 
representative actions/collective actions for damages based on a breach of the national 
or the EU competition rules. However, currently these actions can only be brought as 
follow-on actions after a decision by the European Commission or the national 
competition authorities establishing the infringement in question.1797 Furthermore, these 
actions are limited to consumers, even though soon SMEs will also be able to bring 
collective actions in the United Kingdom.1798 It is also important to note that the French 
collective action may only be brought by French consumer associations,1799 which 
impedes other consumer associations from bring a collective action on behalf of 
consumers from different Member States in France. 
 
The situation in Germany is even more unsatisfactory, since collective actions are only 
possible for injunctions,1800 or to order the infringers to transfer their illegal proceeds to 
the Treasury. Damages claims may thus not be brought under such actions.1801 The 
1795 Section 47A of the Competition Act 1998. 
1796 Articles L. 423-1 and L. 423-17 of the Consumer Act. 
1797 But the envisaged new collective action in the United Kingdom can also be brought as a stand-alone 
collective action. 
1798 See DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION & SKILLS, “Private actions in competition 
law: a consultation for options on reform – government response”, January 2013, at p. 31. 
1799 Articles L. 423-1 of the Consumer Act. 
1800 Section 33(2) of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
1801 Section 34a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
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Finnish collective action is also comparatively limited, since it can only be brought by 
the Consumer Ombudsman for a group which can be determined in advance.1802  
  
In Spain, only consumer and user associations could bring collective actions for 
damages caused by antitrust violations, while companies lack this possibility. If the 
members of the affected group are identified or are easily identifiable, also the affected 
group can bring collective actions for damages.1803 However, any award is made with 
respect to each individual claimant, and not the whole group, so each claimant must 
apply to the court in order to be recognized as a member of the group, and for individual 
damages to be quantified.1804 If the claim is very small, the claimant might not join the 
action because it is often difficult to calculate the exact amount of the damage that he 
has suffered. In addition, the collective action is only available to consumers, which 
makes it difficult especially for SMEs to enforce their rights if they have been victims 
of an antitrust violation. 
 
In contrast, the Swedish private group action was at the time of its adoption considered 
as a potentially extensive collective action,1805 although it is based on an “opt-in” 
mechanism. The private group action can either be brought by a natural person or a 
legal person on behalf of the affected group.1806 Only the group claimant becomes a 
party to the proceedings and, as a general rule, the passive group members do not have 
any obligation to pay legal costs in case the defendant is successful.1807 What makes this 
type of action attractive, at least in theory, is that it is possible to use a modified version 
of contingency fees, a so-called risk-agreement,1808 to bring the action. However, so far 
no such actions have been brought in order to claim compensation for antitrust 
1802 Section 1 of the Act on Class Actions (444/2007). 
1803 Article 11 of the Civil Procedure Law 1/2000. 
1804 See National Report on Spain prepared for the Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims for damages 
in case of infringement of EC competition rules, at p. 7. 
1805 See MICKLITZ, H.-W., and STADLER, A., “The Development of Collective Legal Actions in 
Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure”, EBLR, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 2006, 1473-1503, at p. 1493-
1494. 
1806 Sections 1and 4 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
1807 Section 33 of the Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). 
1808 I.e. an increase in the normal remuneration to the lawyer if the action is successful. 
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violations,1809 so this type of group action based on the opt-in model does not seem to 
be the answer to enhancing consumer damages claims. 
 
The experience from the six jurisdictions demonstrates that the current situation in the 
EU regarding collective actions is fairly unsatisfactory. In practice, this potentially only 
truly effective redress mechanism for consumers harmed by an antitrust violation is not 
generally a worthwhile alternative, since the existing collective actions have many 
flaws. In those jurisdictions where such actions are available, they are seldom brought, 
and their success is very limited. Due to the opt-in model, in many cases the group of 
claimants tends to be too small for the action to pay off, and also leads to administrative 
complexity and high costs. 
 
Moreover, there are also other reasons explaining why consumers do not often bring 
antitrust damages actions. Consumers are not necessarily aware that they have been 
victims of a cartel, because cartels are usually secret, and detecting them is demanding 
even for public enforcers of competition rules despite their wide powers of 
investigation. Since access to evidence for private litigants is limited, and the burden of 
proof is high, proving the existence of an anti-competitive conduct is challenging. 
Furthermore, the risk of losing, associated with the obligation to pay the costs of 
litigation of the other party, serve as disincentives for claimants with small damages 
claims to initiate proceedings. The “loser pays” rule applies in all jurisdictions, although 
some courts (e.g. the CAT) have more discretion in deciding on the allocation of the 
costs of the proceedings. More flexible cost rules are also available for certain types of 
claims.1810 There are also still a number of limitations on the use of contingency fees, 
although increasingly more Member States seem to be willing to allow them in certain 
cases. 
 
Coupled with limited possibilities of ordering disclosure of documents/information in 
the possession of the other party or third parties, the only realistic possibility of bringing 
an antitrust damages action would often be a follow-on action. Again, consumers would 
1809 See HENRIKSSON, L., AHRC Project, “Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in Sweden 
1999-2012”, at p. 7. 
1810 E.g. it is possible to deviate from the “loser pays” principle in antitrust damages claims in Germany if 
the financial situation of the claimant would otherwise impede him from bringing a meritorious action. 
See Section 89a of the Act Against Restraints of Competition. 
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need an effective collective action even in most of these cases in order to reduce the 
costs and risks of litigation, and make economies of scale possible. 
 
Consequently, it can be assumed that the reason why collective actions have not been 
used is, at least partly, because in its existing form it is not perceived as an efficient 
redress mechanism among consumers, and that consumer associations either do not 
have incentives to pursue antitrust damages actions, or that they simply do not have the 
required expertise and resources. Finally, as in most jurisdictions only consumer and 
user associations and/or affected groups of consumers can bring a collective action for 
damages, competitors and other undertakings, which could have a better knowledge of 
the existence of competition infringements and of competition rules, are barred from 
bringing such an action. A common solution at EU level to make the enforcement of the 
Union right to damages effective is therefore required. 
 
8.1.3 The Solution Proposed by the EU Legislator and its Main Flaws 
The EU legislator intends to enhance antirust damages actions by two means: the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, which provides for the harmonization or 
approximation of certain procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions, and a 
Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. It is submitted that although these 
instruments have some merit since they are likely to contribute to harmonizing or 
approximating certain issues that have created obstacles to private enforcement in the 
past, and will codify some principles of EU law which govern antitrust damages actions, 
many of the measures to be introduced are merely minimum harmonization measures, 
or mere recommendations. Thus, national divergences will remain in a number of areas, 
and it is debatable if these instruments will improve access to justice in particular for 
consumers who have been harmed by antitrust violations. 
 
As to the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, its main contribution is that it 
provides for a minimum level of disclosure of evidence once the claimant has presented 
reasonably available facts and evidence showing the plausibility of its claim for 
damages,1811 and minimum limitation periods for bringing antitrust damages actions 
both on a stand-alone or follow-on basis. In addition, it contains provisions regarding 
1811 Article 5 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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the probative effect of infringements decisions of the NCAs, joint and several liability 
of infringers (including a right to contribution), the passing-on defense and 
quantification of harm, as well as provisions encouraging consensual dispute resolution. 
 
The introduction of a minimum disclosure obligation of evidence is a very welcome 
legislative development considering the information asymmetry which generally exists 
between the infringers and victims of competition rules. Arguably, limited access to 
evidence is one of the biggest obstacles to bringing antitrust damages actions, and the 
possibility of requesting disclosure of such evidence should contribute to facilitating 
lodging damages claims, provided that other main obstacles (such as reducing the costs, 
and facilitating claims by consumers through collective redress mechanisms) are also 
adequately addressed. 
 
However, the Directive still leaves issues that need to be addressed. One significant 
difficulty is that certain types of documents, namely leniency statements and settlement 
submissions, are entirely excluded from disclosure1812 without any obligation to first 
conduct a proportionality test of whether they, or at least a part of the information 
contained in them, should be disclosed to the claimant in order to make the bringing of 
an antitrust damages action possible, especially when it would be impossible without 
access to some of that information. Instead, in line with the Pfleiderer Ruling,1813 it is 
suggested that national courts should genuinely be able to consider the implications 
both for public and private enforcement of granting or refusing a request of disclosure 
of evidence. In the current Directive the focus is rather on protecting public enforcement 
more than necessary at the cost of private enforcement. A more balanced approach 
would be called for in order to ensure that private enforcement could serve as an 
important complement to public enforcement, and not merely play a rather residual role. 
 
Pursuant to the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, final infringement decisions by 
a national competition authority will have a probative effect, as far as the finding of an 
infringement is concerned, in subsequent damages actions, but only if they are brought 
1812 Article 6 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1813 See Judgment in Pfleiderer EU:C:2011:389, paragraph 30. 
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in the same Member State.1814 If the damages claim is brought before the courts of 
another Member State, the issue of the existence of an antitrust violation might have to 
be re-litigated, thus leading to a waste of time and resources, and increasing the costs of 
the action. Ultimately, this would however depend on the rules of the Member State in 
question as it may grant such binding effect under its national legislation.  
 
In order to facilitate follow-on claims by consumers or consumer associations, it is 
submitted that final NCA and competition court decisions should also be given a 
presumptive binding effect in civil proceedings before the courts of other Member 
States. In turn, the defendant could be allowed to rebut this presumption if it would 
breach the requirements of fair trial, or the geographical scope of the infringement 
would make it irrelevant with regard to the damages claim in relation to the market in 
the Member State in which it is brought.1815 In addition, the presumption of binding 
effect could be rebutted if there were manifest errors of facts in the investigation. 
 
The establishment of some common rules regarding limitation periods will in turn 
contribute to increased legal certainty. It should also facilitate the bringing of damages 
claims especially in Member States the limitation periods of which are currently very 
short.1816 The requirement that the victim must have knowledge of the infringement and 
the harm that it has caused him before the limitation period begins to run1817 is crucial 
as otherwise the limitation period might have expired even before the victim learned 
about the infringement. However, common guidelines should be provided on the criteria 
that should be assessed in order to determine whether the claimant had such knowledge, 
as it would otherwise result in uncertainty about the moment from which the limitation 
period starts to run. On the other hand, by only providing for minimum limitation 
periods, the Directive respects the principle of procedural autonomy. For situations not 
1814 Article 9 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1815 See BASEDOW, J., “Recognition of Foreign Decisions with the European Competition Network” in 
BASEDOW, J., FRANCQ, S. and IDOT, L. (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation. Conflict of Laws 
and Coordination, Hart Publishing, 2012, p. 393-402, at p. 397 and 401-402. 
1816 See CRAIG, L., JAZRAWI, W., GARTAGANI, S., SIAKKA T. AND FITZGERALD-FRAZER, K., 
“A summary of recent developments in antitrust damages claims, collective redress and funding in the EU 
and UK”, G.C.L.R., Volume 6, No. 3, 2013, R41-R47, at R43. 
1817 Article 10 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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specifically regulated by the Directive, the limitation periods will have to respect the 
limits established by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
 
The Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions establishes that undertakings are jointly 
and severally liable for harm caused by their joint behavior.1818 However, an 
undertaking which has been granted immunity under a leniency program will be liable 
to injured parties other than its direct or indirect purchasers or providers only if they 
were unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers. The provisions 
governing liability aim to restrict the liability of an undertaking which has been granted 
immunity, but can only do so to a limited extent since victims’ right to full 
compensation must always be respected and, moreover, as the damages awarded are 
only single damages, the possibility of restricting the liability in damages is limited.  
 
These provisions also make it possible for injured parties to choose to bring damages 
actions against the defendant most likely to be able to pay the compensation. From the 
claimants point of view this simplifies litigation as they could obtain compensation 
from one single defendant for the whole harm that they have suffered. The claimants do 
not have to be direct customers of the defendant, but in line with ÖBB-Infrastruktur,1819 
as long as they can demonstrate that the defendant should have taken into regard that the 
anti-competitive conduct could result in the loss that the injured parties have suffered, 
the defendant could be held liable in civil damages. For the defendant this could result 
in uncertainty about whether it would be able to seek contribution from its co-infringers 
because some might have ceased to exist, and the costs of determining the relative 
responsibility of each co-infringer for the harm caused to injured victims could be 
high.1820 
 
According to the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, the passing-on defense is 
allowed, but the infringer has the burden of proof that the overcharge has been passed 
on.1821 The burden of proof relating to passing-on is different in cases involving indirect 
1818 Article 11 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1819 See Judgment in ÖBB-Infrastruktur, EU:C:2014:1317, paragraph 37. 
1820 See HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for 
infringers and victims?”, E.C.L.R., Volume 35, Issue 2, 2014, p. 51-55, at p. 54. 
1821 Article 13 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
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purchasers claiming compensation for damages resulting from an overcharge which has 
wholly or partly been passed on to the claimant. Indirect purchasers must demonstrate 
both the existence of such pass-on, although reasonable requests for disclosure from the 
defendant and third parties will be allowed.1822 Allowing the passing-on defense could 
constitute an obstacle for antitrust damages actions, because indirect purchases and, 
especially consumers at the end of the distribution chain, will encounter large 
difficulties in proving the exact amount that has been passed on to them, particularly in 
situations involving several intermediaries. In order to mitigate the effects of a passing-
on defense, arguably, consumers should have a possibility of joining forces in a 
collective or representative action in order to be able to share the litigation costs. 
 
As to the quantification of harm, the Directive contains a rebuttable presumption of 
harm resulting from a cartel.1823 The Commission has also issued guidelines on the 
quantification of harm in antitrust damages actions.1824 Although they are not binding, it 
is still a positive development that the assessment of harm has been improved by giving 
a greater role to national judges, and making the involvement of competition authorities 
in the assessment of harm possible. This could at least somewhat facilitate the 
compensation especially of indirect purchasers which generally have the largest 
difficulties in proving the exact amount of harm that has been passed on to them. 
 
But problems still remain. For instance, no common rules are provided for causation, 
remoteness or quantification of loss, so national divergences will prevail. Furthermore, 
the burden of proof and the standard of proof with regard to quantification of harm will 
largely be determined according to the national rules, which must respect the principles 
of equivalence and effectiveness. National courts will also have discretion to decide to 
which degree they will follow the non-binding guidelines for quantification of harm, so 
again the methods relied on may significantly vary from one Member State to 
1822 Article 14(1) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1823 Article 17 of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1824 See Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 167, 
13.6.2013, p. 19-21; and Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide on quantifying harm in 
actions for damages based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union Accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in 
actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, SWD(2013) 205, 11.6.2013. 
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another.1825 It is also to be expected that economic evidence will prolong and make 
litigation more expensive.1826 
 
The aim of the Directive to encourage consensual dispute resolution could sometimes 
offer consumers, and maybe also SMEs, at least a possibility of obtaining some 
compensation since, without effective collective redress mechanisms, their current 
exercise of the right to compensation is limited in most Member States. However, given 
the advantageous provisions for settling co-infringers (e.g. suspension of antitrust 
damages proceedings, reduced liability for settling co-infringers, and limited 
contribution obligation), there could be a risk that the Directive would in practice rather 
result in increasing alternative dispute resolution at the cost of damages claims. This 
could be problematic because injured parties generally tend to be the weaker party, and 
there will not be equality of arms since the infringers tend to have access to most of the 
relevant evidence needed to prove the infringement and the extent of the damage. 
 
Moreover, a number of issues have not been included in the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions. For instance, it does not provide for collective redress, or contain 
rules regarding the fault requirement or costs of antitrust damages actions. Since the 
costs of damages actions often constitute a significant obstacle to bringing an antitrust 
damages claim, especially for consumers with small individual claims, some rules, or at 
least recommendations, concerning the cost rules would be needed. Similarly, a 
modification of the “loser pays” principle should be considered in line with Directive 
2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.1827 
 
Moreover, the prohibition of punitive or multiple damages at Union level should be 
reconsidered because it is contrary to existing EU law. Instead, its usefulness for certain 
types of antitrust violations, namely hard-core cartels, should be examined since it could 
lead to higher deterrence of the most harmful competition infringements. 
1825 See VANDENBORRE, I., HOFFMAN LENT, K. and GOETZ T.C., “Actions for antitrust damages in 
the European Union: evaluating the Commission’s Directive proposal”, G.C.L.R., Volume 7, Issue 1, 
2014, p. 1-9, at p. 5. 
1826 See HOWARD, A., “The draft Directive on competition law damages – what does it mean for 
infringers and victims?”, E.C.L.R., Volume 35, Issue 2, 2014, p. 51-55, at p. 53. 
1827 This directive allows a derogation if the “loser pays” principle does not result in a fair outcome in the 
case. 
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 The most noteworthy omission from the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions is the 
lack of any kind of collective redress mechanism. Instead, the Commission has merely 
chosen to introduce non-binding recommendations on collective redress 
mechanisms.1828 The Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress intends to 
establish some common principles both for injunctive collective redress and 
compensatory collective redress, concerning standing to bring a representative action, 
admissibility of such actions, information about collective actions, reimbursement of 
legal costs of the winning party, funding, and cross-border cases.1829 Regarding 
specifically compensatory collective redress, the Commission has issued 
recommendations relating to the construction of the group based on the “opt-in” 
principle, collective ADR and settlements, legal representation and lawyers’ fees, 
punitive damages, funding, and collective follow-on actions.1830 These are all important 
issues to consider in designing an optimal compensatory collective action but, arguably, 
the legal instrument chosen will fail to bring about a significant improvement of 
compensatory collective relief in a medium-term. Instead, a directive would be a more 
efficient legal instrument, since it imposes binding obligations on the Member States, 
while it still allows the respect of different legal traditions, and leaves Member States 
some choice as to the form of the measures to be implemented. 
 
Admittedly, the Commission Recommendation also includes features which would be 
worth exploring in order to propose a binding EU legislative measure. For instance, the 
horizontal approach, and the possibility of applying both for collective injunctive and 
compensatory relief are to be welcomed as consumers often face difficulties also in 
bringing claims in other fields than competition law, such as general consumer claims 
or environmental claims. However, a binding instrument would be required in order to 
genuinely improve access to justice of consumers.  
 
1828 2013/396/EU: Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive 
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law, OJ L 201, 26.07.2013, p. 60–65. 
1829 Part III of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1830 Part V of the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
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Moreover, the recommendations are not sufficiently extensive because the common 
principles laid down are generally based on encouraging a modest form of collective 
actions and conservative means of funding. One of the main problems of the existing 
collective redress mechanisms at national level is that they are commonly based on the 
“opt-in” principle, and the costs of the actions constitute as significant barrier for 
bringing antitrust damages actions. The Football Shirts1831 and Mobile Cartel1832 cases 
in the United Kingdom and France illustrate the limited efficiency of the “opt-in” 
model. The first case only resulted in the compensation of a small fraction of the injured 
parties, and the second case failed. Arguably, the only effective way of ensuring an 
“effective remedy” under Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union for consumers would be to leave the decision of whether a collective 
redress action should be brought based on the “opt-in” or “opt-out” model to the courts, 
at least in cases involving numerous damages actions of low-value. 
 
The Commission Recommendation is also too restrictive regarding contingency fees 
and alternative ways of funding collective actions. Since public funding is 
decreasing,1833 there is a need to ensure sufficient funding of collective actions by 
introducing contingency fees in the EU (or by finding other alternatives) to fund 
collective actions. Provided that contingency fees are subject to judicial scrutiny or 
regulated in another effective manner, their possible negative effects can be reduced.1834 
Furthermore, by limiting the obligations of group members to pay the legal costs to the 
group representative and to those members who have de facto had an opportunity to 
exercise their right to opt out, the opt-out collective action should not generally pose 
any constitutional problems. 
 
The issue of distribution of damages is also important especially in cases involving 
claimants at different levels in the distribution chain and, in particular, in collective 
actions. There would therefore be a need to decide on how damages which cannot be 
1831 See Competition Appeal Tribunal, Notice of a claim for damages under section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998, Case No: 1078/7/9/07. 
1832 See http://www.cartelmobile.org/. 
1833 See HODGES, “Europeanization of civil justice: trends and issues” C.J.Q., 26(JAN), 2007, p 96-123, 
at p. 99-100. 
1834 Ibid., at p. 108. 
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distributed among the victims should be distributed. It is submitted that rules concerning 
cy pres distribution should be provided. 
 
Other issues which have not been considered in a satisfactorily manner include the 
coordination of public and private actions in a cross-border situation, and the 
jurisdictional rules. In those areas of law where a public authority can adopt a decision 
finding that there has been a violation of EU law, the national authority should be able 
to act as an amicus curiae in the collective redress action so as to not automatically 
prolong the collective redress proceedings or to impede stand-alone actions. This is 
justified especially in those cases where the decision by a national competition authority 
establishing an infringement does not assess whether the infringement has actually 
caused harm, since its file might be of limited value for proving the damage. Moreover, 
it would be necessary to ensure the coherent and uniform application of the EU antitrust 
rules when proceedings are brought before an NCA of one Member State and, 
simultaneously, an antitrust damages action is brought before a court of another 
Member State.1835 In such cases, some have argued the lis pendens rule of 
Regulation44/2001 could be modified to allow the court before which a collective 
redress action is brought to decline jurisdiction of the case if there is a more appropriate 
forum available which could deal more efficiently with the case.1836 However, this may 
be difficult to achieve in practice. 
 
Analyzing the potential implications of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions and 
the Commission Recommendation on Collective redress Mechanisms together, they are 
likely to only enhance private enforcement in a rather modest manner, and will 
generally fail to improve access to justice in particular for consumers. Therefore, more 
efficient legislative measures would be required in order to ensure the effective and 
uniform enforcement of the Union right to compensation for antitrust violations. Given 
that private enforcement plays a remarkably more significant role in the United States, 
and is also increasing in Canada, their experiences of private antitrust enforcement 
1835 See DANOV, M. and BECKER, F., “The Way Forward: A Strong Case for Reform at EU Level” in 
DANOV, M., BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 407-420, at p. 416-417. 
1836 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 278-279. 
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could serve as valuable inspiration for how to enhance antitrust damages actions in the 
EU, without forgetting to consider the particularities of European legal systems and 
legal traditions. 
 
8.1.4. Lessons to Learn from the U.S. and Canadian Experiences of Private 
Enforcement 
In the United States, antitrust damages actions constitute over 90% of the private 
enforcement.1837 This can be explained by the US civil procedure rules which provide 
additional incentives for bringing antitrust claims, such as treble damages and fee-
shifting rules to the advantage of the plaintiff. Moreover, lawyers play an important role 
since virtually all class actions are brought on the basis of contingency fee 
arrangements.1838 These features are likely to facilitate that complex, meritorious cases 
are also brought. However, in order to avoid possible abuse and to ensure a fair outcome 
for the class members, it is necessary to ascertain that class counsels’ interests are 
closely aligned with those of class members. 
 
In reducing the risks of collective actions, much could be learned from the U.S. and 
Canadian class actions. The U.S. class action is based on the “opt-out” principle which 
also allows bringing claims on behalf of unidentified class members. The advantage of 
this is that the class would normally be sufficiently large to make it worth bringing the 
action, even when the individual injuries of the class members would not be 
economically viable to be enforced individually. The drawback of the “opt-out” model 
is that individuals will be bound by the judgment or settlement resulting from the action 
if they have not opted out from the class in time. Another disadvantage from the 
defendant’s point of view is that opt-outs reduce the finality of the settlement. However, 
the advantage is that the defendant will know the exact number of potential remaining 
claims.1839 
 
1837 See LANDE, R.H., “Benefits of private enforcement: empirical background” in FOER, A.A. and 
CUNEO, J.C. (eds.), The International Handbook of Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham UK – Northampton, MA, 2010, p. 3-11, at p. 4. 
1838 See SITTENREICH, “The rocky path for private Directors General: Procedure, politics, and the 
uncertain future of EU antitrust damages actions”, Fordham L. Rev., 78 April, 2010, p. 2701, at p. 2735. 
1839 See BUSCHKIN, I.T., “The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy – 
Permitting Foreign Claimants to be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts”, 
Cornell Law Review, 90, September, 2005, p. 1563-1600, at p. 1577-1582. 
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Similarly, in Canada, the introduction of class actions has led to antitrust damages 
actions being brought more frequently. Ontario and a few other jurisdictions1840 have 
opt-out class actions, whereas e.g. British Columbia has a combination of “opt-out” and 
“opt-in” regimes: opt-outs apply to residents, while non-residents are subject to the 
“opt-in” principle. Moreover, generous contingency fees can be awarded in order to 
ensure access to justice.1841 Both in the United States and Canada settlement agreements 
have to be approved by a court and must be fair, reasonable and in the best interest of 
the class.1842 
 
Nevertheless, in the EU, opt-out collective actions, and especially the U.S class action, 
have traditionally been viewed with skepticism. Arguably, this resistance against class 
actions in Europe is partly based on ignorance about the U.S.-style class action. Other 
features of the U.S. civil procedure, such as jury-trials and treble damages, which are 
possible, but not necessary, in class actions are also often perceived as an inherent part 
of the class action. For instance, treble damages are also automatically awarded for a 
successful individual antitrust damages action, and are not a special feature of the class 
action.1843 Furthermore, abuses of the class action device mainly occur in other fields of 
law, while the complexity and uncertainty in the outcome of antitrust class actions tend 
to limit the abuses.1844 In fact, the American Antitrust Institute has even found that there 
is no evidence of frivolous antitrust settlements. On the contrary, claimants sometimes 
settle strong cases for too little, not the opposite.1845 In addition, the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 has further reduced the risks of abuses, for example by providing 
that lawyers’ fees should be aligned with the awards made to class members in coupon 
settlement cases.1846 
1840 These jurisdictions include Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia. 
1841 See FACEY, B.A. and ROSNER, D., “Collective Redress for Cartel Damages in Canada” in LOWE, 
P. and MARQUIS, M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2011 Integrating Public and Private 
Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2014, p. 205-234, at p. 223. 
1842 See Sec. 3(e) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1712. 
1843 See TARUFFO, M., “Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective”, Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law, 11, Spring/Summer 2001, p. 405-421, at p. 414. 
1844 See SCHNELL, G., “Class Action Madness in Europe – a Call for a More Balanced Debate”, 
E.C.L.R., Volume 28, Issue 11, 2007, p. 617-619, at p. 618. 
1845 See AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, “The Next Antitrust Agenda: The American Antitrust 
Institute’s Transition Report on Competition policy to the 44th President of the United States”.  
1846 Sec. 3(a) of the CAFA, 28 USC § 1712. 
451 
 
                                                 
 Given that certain Canadian provinces have chosen the opt-out model, but this has not 
led to any reported abuse of the class actions proceedings, and the number of class 
actions has been reasonable thanks to the scrutiny of courts,1847 there is no reason for 
completely ruling out opt-out collective actions in the EU. On the contrary, there is a 
need for opt-out collective actions in cases where the individual claims would be too 
small to be enforced individually. In such situations, the constitutional right of access to 
justice would be better guaranteed in the “opt-out model”. Although the “opt-in” model 
will ensure to a higher degree that an individual will not participate in litigation against 
his will, the possibility of all individuals enforcing their rights in such cases is, in 
practice, limited,1848 and will not necessarily comply with Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
 
In the light of the U.S. and Canadian experiences, it can be concluded that class actions 
are a valuable tool for private antitrust enforcement. Consequently, the EU should 
consider introducing a similar device that would, however, be adapted to the 
specificities of the EU legal systems. It would be likely to mainly increase follow-on 
actions, but could also be useful in stand-alone cases regarding abuses of a dominant 
position and vertical restraints. 
 
8.2. The Way Forward 
The recent legislative instruments adopted by the European Union in order to enhance 
private enforcement are a step in the right direction, although they fall short of 
facilitating access to justice in particular for consumers. However, these instruments 
could serve as a basis for a future directive on collective actions in mass harm situations 
and for facilitating antitrust damages claims by modifying and improving the current 
provisions.  
 
It is submitted that the main required modifications to the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions include ensuring the balance between public and private enforcement 
1847 See MULHERON, R., “Some differences with Group Litigation Orders – and why a class action is 
superior”, C.J.Q., 24(JAN), 2005, p. 40-68, at p. 64-65. 
1848 See TARUFFO, M., “Some Remarks on Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective”, Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law, 11, Spring/Summer 2001, p. 405-421, at p. 413. 
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to a greater extent regarding the access to evidence, and coordinating public 
enforcement actions in one Member State with damages claims brought in another 
Member State in a more efficient way. The limitation periods for brining antitrust 
damages claims should also be further specified. Most importantly, a binding EU-wide 
collective action should be introduced for cross-border cases, and the courts should be 
able to decide on a case-by-case basis whether it should be brought based on the “opt-
in” or “opt-out” principle. The issue of distribution of damages, as well as the types of 
damages available would also require further elaboration. In addition, the cost rules and 
the rules applicable to funding of antitrust damages actions, both individual and 
collective actions, should be overhauled. 
 
Regarding access to evidence, no category of documents should be excluded as such 
from the disclosure obligation, but the Directive should allow national courts to conduct 
a proportionality test of the request for disclosure, and consider the implications of 
disclosure for both public and private enforcement in line with the Pfleiderer Ruling.1849 
In a majority of cases, leniency statements would most likely still be afforded protection 
– and thus this provision would not unduly reduce the effectiveness of public 
enforcement – but exceptionally claimants which would otherwise not be able to bring a 
meritorious antitrust damages action, would be granted access to such statements or to 
part of the information contained in them. 
 
As to the coordination of public and private enforcement actions in different Member 
States, it is suggested that the final infringement decision of another NCA should at 
least constitute a rebuttable presumption for the existence of an antitrust violation in 
civil proceedings before the courts of another Member State. The defendant could 
challenge this presumption, for instance, by showing a breach of the right to fair trial or 
a manifest error of facts in the investigation.1850 Moreover, in order to avoid conflicting 
decisions, the NCAs should, at the discretion of the national court, be allowed to 
participate as amicus curiae before the courts of another Member States, for example by 
submitting statements. 
1849 See Judgment in Pfleiderer, EU:C:2011:389. 
1850 See BASEDOW, J., “Recognition of Foreign Decisions within the European Competition Network” in 
BASEDOW, J., FRANCQ, S. and IDOT, L. (eds.), International Antitrust Litigation. Conflict of Laws 
and Coordination, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2012, p. 393-402, at p. 397 and 401-
402. 
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The limitation periods for bringing antitrust damages claims should also be further 
specified. Since there has been uncertainty in some Member States regarding the 
moment from which the claimant is considered to have had knowledge about the 
antitrust violation and the harm that it has caused it,1851 some guidelines should be 
provided on what criteria courts would have to assess in order to determine this issue. 
 
With regard to collective actions, the introduction of both representative and collective 
actions would be appropriate. It is crucial that actions can also be brought by individuals 
in order to ensure to a higher degree that a redress mechanism is also available to 
victims when representative bodies, due to priority reasons or other reasons, decide not 
to bring an action. However, an “opt-out” model should at least be available for low-
value claims in order to ensure access to justice, and an effective remedy compliant with 
Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Courts should be able to decide at 
the certification stage whether the collective action should be brought based on the “opt-
in” or “opt-out” principle on a case-by-case basis. Arguably, in certain cases it could be 
justified to certify subgroups on different grounds, for instance by applying the “opt-in” 
requirement to non-resident group members, and the “opt-out” principles to residents. 
This should usually allow for ensuring the sufficient size of the group in order to merit 
the action, while it would avoid that non-resident group members would be bound by a 
judgment against their will.   
 
Guidance should also be provided on criteria to take into account in assessing whether 
the interests of the group members are adequately protected. In particular in cross-
border collective actions, the court seized with the case should ensure that the 
requirements of procedural fairness (such as adequate notice) are met, and it should also 
assess whether it is the most appropriate forum to deal with the action. If another court 
would be able to deal more efficiently with the case, the court seized of the collective 
redress action should be allowed to decline jurisdiction over the case.1852  
1851 For example, due to difficulty in determining this exact moment, Finland decided to abolish the 
requirement about knowledge in its new Competition Act. See However, such a solution seems 
unsatisfactory, since in some cases the injured party might only learn about the infringement once the 
limitation period has expired. 
1852 See DANOV, M., FAIRGRIEVE, D., and HOWELLS, G., “Collective Redress Antitrust 
Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement Gap and Provide Redress for Consumers” in DANOV, M., 
454 
 
                                                 
 Most importantly, the EU-wide collective action for cross-border cases should be 
introduced by a directive in order to enhance access to justice. The directive should also 
regulate the distribution of damages, and the allocation of costs between group 
members. Although the main objective should be full compensation of the harm, 
unclaimed damages could be allocated on cy pres basis, or go to a fund for financing 
future collective damages claims. Sufficient safeguards, such as limiting the obligation 
to reimburse costs to the group representatives, have to be put in place to avoid that 
group members which have genuinely not been able to opt out in time will not have to 
pay any adverse costs.  
 
Stronger incentives for bringing damages claims would be, nevertheless, needed in 
meritorious cases, but the outcome of which is uncertain because of their high 
complexity. As representative bodies might prefer to use their (limited) financial 
resources on cases that they estimate that they can win, there might be a certain need for 
lawyers specializing in bringing complex antitrust damages actions. Some incentives, 
such as contingency fees, might need to be developed in order to foster such a 
specialization, although these fees should be subject to judicial approval in order to 
avoid abuses. Because the lawyers’ fees would depend on the success of the claim, they 
would have a strong incentive only to accept cases that are likely to succeed.1853 Also 
other ways of alternative funding, for instance by third-party finance institutions should 
be possible, provided that possible conflicts of interest are eliminated, and the amount 
of the damages should be subject to court approval in order to ensure a fair outcome for 
the group.  
 
Moreover, courts should be able to adjust the “loser pays” rule in line with Directive 
2004/48/EC in order to encourage that damages claims are being brought. Courts could 
also be allowed to cap costs and adjust litigation costs by limiting them to what is 
considered reasonable and proportionate.1854 In addition, any reference to punitive 
BECKER, F., and BEAUMONT, P. (eds.), Cross-border Competition Law Actions, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2013, p. 253-288, at p. 278-279. 
1853 See LESKINEN, C. “Collective Actions: Rethinking Funding and National Cost Rules”, The 
Competition Law Review, Volume 8(1), 2011, p. 87-121. 
1854 Ibid., at p. 107. 
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damages being prohibited should be eliminated as the Court of Justice has held that they 
are not contrary to EU law.1855 
 
In addition, the Commission should provide some guidelines on causation, remoteness 
and foreseeability in order to facilitate the assessment of damages. These issues, as well 
as the burden of proof and standard of proof for the quantification of harm, are 
determined according to national rules, and therefore give rise to divergences. 
Regarding the quantification of harm, although the issuing of practical guidelines was 
justified as a first step taking into account that the type and scope of damage will 
depend on the particular antitrust violation, and should be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, it should be considered in light of the experience of the Member States, whether 
some binding minimum standards would also be called for at EU level. 
 
As regards the choice of the implementation model for the collective action device, the 
horizontal approach adopted by the current Commission Recommendation merits 
further consideration. There is a need for an EU-wide collective action for damages 
based on a mass harm situation in which rights granted under Union law have been 
infringed. A directive would appear as the most appropriate legal instrument by 
allowing respecting the legal traditions and cultural differences of the Member States, 
and also to solve constitutional problems in the most suitable manner while, at the same 
time, providing for sufficient uniformity. But whatever solution will finally be chosen, it 
should be possible to be effectively applied in practice.  
 
An EU collective action could be adopted under Article 81(2)(f) TFEU, which allows 
the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings by promoting 
the compatibility of the rules on civil procedures applicable in the Member States when 
this is necessary in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. This 
legal basis would be justified by the necessity to ensure the effective enforcement of the 
substantive rights granted to individuals and companies under EU law, and the same 
protection of those rights across the EU. This would, in turn, avoid competitive 
advantages for companies established in Member States where it is difficult for 
consumers to enforce their rights. The introduction of an EU collective action would 
1855 See Judgment in Manfredi, EU:C:2006:461, paragraph 93. 
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also enhance access to justice in cross-border situations since currently it is impossible 
in some Member States for consumer organizations to bring collective actions on behalf 
of consumers who are non-nationals.1856  
 
Alternatively, a sector-specific collective action could be provided for antitrust damages 
cases, which could later be expanded to other fields in which mass harm has been 
caused. This option could be appropriate in case it is difficult to find sufficient support 
for a binding horizontal EU collective action, and if there are doubts about the need for 
such an action in other fields. Regarding antitrust damages actions, the need for an 
efficient collective access has already been demonstrated, since currently consumers 
seldom obtain compensation for the harm that they have suffered. The legal basis for a 
directive introducing a collective antitrust damages action would arguably be the same 
as for the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, i.e. it could be based on Articles 103 
and 114 TFEU. 
 
Furthermore, in the past few years a number of Member States have introduced 
collective actions, so it would seem that there is a certain political will for improving 
collective redress and enhancing access to justice. Thus, it would be a question of 
negotiating the details of the collective action design, for which the current Commission 
Recommendation could serve as a starting point. The ideal moment for doing this would 
be in 2016 when the Commission will assess the implementation of its 
Recommendation on Collective Redress. At least the issues outlined above should all be 
addressed in order to make the collective redress mechanism more effective. 
 
8.3. Final Remarks 
The analysis of the current state of private enforcement in the EU has shown that 
although there has been an increase in antitrust damages actions during the past 5-10 
years, such actions are mainly brought by undertakings, and often on the basis of a 
contractual relationship.1857 In addition, many damages claims are believed to be 
1856 For instance, in France, only consumers associations which represent consumers at a national level 
may bring a representative action on behalf of consumers who have been injured as a result of the actions 
of the same professional. Article L.422-1 of the Consumer Code. 
1857 See AHRC Research Project on EU Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012, Conference on September 15th, 2012 at LSE, London, available 
at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/ConferenceReport.pdf.  
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settled.1858 Damages actions brought “as a sword” are generally less frequent and, what 
is more concerning, very few damages claims are brought by consumers. Moreover, 
precisely consumers appear to lack access to justice in the form of effective collective 
redress mechanisms for antitrust violations.  
 
A number of obstacles to bringing antitrust damages claims still remain in the Member 
States, and there is still a significant divergence of the national procedural and tort rules 
applicable to such actions. Divergent rules and standards apply, for instance, to access 
to evidence, the form of collective redress mechanisms available, and funding of 
damages claims. Antitrust damages actions are also mainly concentrated to seven 
Member States, in particular Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 
whereas private enforcement in the form of damages claims is rather negligent in other 
Member States.1859  
 
Until recently, private enforcement in the EU has mainly been enhanced through the 
case law of the Court of Justice. The court has created a Union right to damages for 
antitrust violations,1860 and has clarified the scope of standing to bring antitrust damages 
actions.1861 It has also laid down some principles for reconciling public and private 
enforcement with regard to access to leniency statements.1862 However, the recent 
legislative instruments adopted by the European Union seem to aim to limit the effects 
of this case law by giving a clear preference for public enforcement.1863 Moreover, they 
result in a much more modest harmonization of the national procedural rules governing 
antitrust damages actions than what was initially envisaged during the legislative 
process.1864 Most notably, instead of introducing an EU-wide collective action, the 
Commission merely recommends Member States to provide for representative and 
1858 See RODGER, B.J., AHRC Project, “Competition Law: Comparative Private Enforcement and 
Collective Redress in the EU 1999-2012. UK Report”, at p. 42. 
1859 See Commission Staff Working Paper SWD(2013) 204, Impact Assessment Report on Damages 
actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules accompanying the proposal for a Directive on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union COM(2013) 404 final, 11.6.2013, at p. 19. 
1860 Judgment in Courage, C-453/99, EU:C:2001:465.  
1861 Judgment in Manfredi ECLI:EU:C:2006:461. 
1862 Judgment in Pfleiderer, C-360/09, EU:C:2011:389. 
1863 Article 6(6) of the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions. 
1864 See e.g. the Failed Draft Directive. 
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collective actions.1865 Arguably, the common rules provided for antitrust damages 
actions, which are mostly minimum harmonization measures, are likely to principally 
enhance undertakings possibilities of bringing damages claims in the form of follow-on 
actions based on a Commission decision, or a final decision of the NCA in their own 
Member State. 
 
Consumers, on the other hand, are expected to be the big losers of this reform. They will 
continue to struggle with limited possibilities of proving the harm that they have 
suffered as well as high costs and risks of litigation. Their limited opportunities of 
obtaining compensation undermines the aim to ensure full compensation, and to create a 
level-playing field for antitrust damages actions and remove obstacles to the proper 
functioning of the internal market. In fact, consumers in Member States which facilitate 
the bringing of effective collective actions would be more likely to obtain compensation 
and, as a result, undertakings established in such Member States would face a greater 
risk of civil liability for competition law infringements. 
 
This does not signify that competition law enforcement in the EU should be private-
enforcement driven, but it should be a credible and useful complement to public 
enforcement. The primary goal of private enforcement should also be compensation of 
the harm resulting from antitrust violations, but it is clear that any obligation to pay 
damages will also have a potential deterrent effect on undertakings. Both effective 
public and private enforcement is thus needed in order to ensure compliance with the 
EU competition rules, but the new directive falls short of achieving this. It is a missed 
opportunity to significantly improve access to justice for victims of antitrust violations, 
and it fails to ensure the fundamental right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially for consumers. The EU should 
therefore attempt to address this by a more far-reaching overhaul of the rules governing 
antitrust damages actions, in line with what has been suggested in this thesis, at the 
latest in 2020 when the Directive has to be reviewed.1866 
 
1865 Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. 
1866 Regarding collective redress mechanisms in general, the review will already take place earlier and the 
possibility of introducing an EU collective actions for damages should be taken into consideration in that 
review. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
The main objective of this thesis is to establish what measures would be required to 
ensure the effective private enforcement of antitrust rules in the EU, and to suggest how 
they should be implemented. As the law stands today (before the implementation of the 
Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions), the relevant national procedural rules are very 
divergent, and these procedural divergences increase the risk of differences in treatment 
and lead to legal uncertainty as it is more difficult for the victims and defendants to 
foresee the outcome of an action. Moreover, the low number of antitrust damages 
actions that have been brought to date in the EU in particular by consumers suggests 
that the current system of private enforcement is not working satisfactorily. 
 
Thus, the first objective of the thesis is to establish what procedural rules would need to 
be modified in order to remedy the current under-enforcement of antitrust rules through 
private actions. Therefore, the first part of the thesis aims to analyze the existing 
obstacles to private enforcement in the EU in general and then in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and Finland, in particular. 
 
This thesis also aims to establish that although the primary goal of private enforcement 
should be compensation of the harm resulting from antitrust violations, any obligation 
to pay damages will also have a potential deterrent effect on undertakings. Both 
effective public and private enforcement is thus needed in order to ensure compliance 
with the EU antitrust rules. 
 
The second objective is to analyze the recent EU legislative instruments to enhance 
private enforcement: the Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions and the 
Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms. The purpose is to demonstrate the 
flaws and limitations of the reform, and to determine the additional issues that would 
also require a harmonization or approximation. 
 
Given that private enforcement of antitrust rules plays a remarkably more significant 
role in the United States, and is also increasing in Canada, the third objective of the 
thesis is to examine especially what lessons could be learned from the U.S. and 
Canadian experiences of private antitrust enforcement. In particular, the focus will be on 
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the role of class actions, contingency fees, and discovery in strengthening private 
enforcement since these features are distinctive of the private enforcement model in the 
United States and in Canada.  
 
The last objective of the thesis is to establish the optimal way of improving private 
enforcement. Hence, the final part of the thesis will focus on what issues must be 
regulated in a uniform way in addition to those included in the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions, and how the harmonization of these rules should be implemented. 
 
The thesis concludes that a number of obstacles to bringing antitrust damages claims 
still remain in the Member States, and there is still a significant divergence of the 
national procedural and tort rules applicable to such actions. Divergent rules and 
standards apply, for instance, to access to evidence, the form of collective redress 
mechanisms available, and funding of damages claims. Antitrust damages actions are 
also mainly concentrated to seven Member States, in particular Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, whereas private enforcement in the form of 
damages claims is rather negligent in other Member States. 
 
The analysis of the current state of private enforcement in the EU has also shown that 
although there has been an increase in antitrust damages actions during the past 5-10 
years, such actions are mainly brought by undertakings, and often on the basis of a 
contractual relationship. In addition, many damages claims are believed to be settled. 
Damages actions brought “as a sword” are generally less frequent and, what is more 
concerning, very few damages claims are brought by consumers. Moreover, precisely 
consumers appear to lack access to justice in the form of effective collective redress 
mechanisms for antitrust violations. 
 
Until recently, private enforcement in the EU has mainly been enhanced through the 
case law of the Court of Justice. The court has created a Union right to damages for 
antitrust violations, and has clarified the scope of standing to bring antitrust damages 
actions. It has also laid down some principles for reconciling public and private 
enforcement with regard to access to leniency statements. However, the recent 
legislative instruments adopted by the European Union (i.e. the Directive on Antitrust 
Damages Actions and the Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms) seem 
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to aim to limit the effects of this case law by giving a clear preference for public 
enforcement. Moreover, they result in a much more modest harmonization of the 
national procedural rules governing antitrust damages actions than what was initially 
envisaged during the legislative process. Most notably, instead of introducing an EU-
wide collective action, the Commission merely recommends Member States to provide 
for representative and collective actions. Arguably, the common rules provided for 
antitrust damages actions, which are mostly minimum harmonization measures, are 
likely to principally enhance undertakings possibilities of bringing damages claims in 
the form of follow-on actions based on a Commission decision, or a final decision of the 
NCA in their own Member State. 
 
Consumers, on the other hand, are expected to be the big losers of this reform. They will 
continue to struggle with limited possibilities of proving the harm that they have 
suffered as well as high costs and risks of litigation. Their limited opportunities of 
obtaining compensation undermines the aim to ensure full compensation, and to create a 
level-playing field for antitrust damages actions and remove obstacles to the proper 
functioning of the internal market. In fact, consumers in Member States which facilitate 
the bringing of effective collective actions would be more likely to obtain compensation 
and, as a result, undertakings established in such Member States would face a greater 
risk of civil liability for competition law infringements. 
 
The thesis concludes that in order to incentivize antitrust damages actions and to 
facilitate the right to compensation above all for consumers, it would be necessary to 
introduce class actions and some other forms of procedural devices available in the U.S. 
and Canadian legal systems, once they have been adapted to the European legal systems 
and traditions. 
 
For instance, the introduction of both representative and collective actions would be 
appropriate. An “opt-out” model should at least be available for low-value claims in 
order to ensure access to justice, and an effective remedy compliant with Article 47 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Courts should be able to decide on a case-by-
case basis at the certification stage whether the collective action should be brought 
based on the “opt-in” or “opt-out” principle.  
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The EU-wide collective action for cross-border cases should be introduced by a 
directive in order to enhance access to justice. The directive should also regulate the 
distribution of damages, and the allocation of costs between group members. Although 
the main objective should be full compensation of the harm, unclaimed damages could 
be allocated on cy pres basis, or go to a fund for financing future collective damages 
claims. Sufficient safeguards, such as limiting the obligation to reimburse costs to the 
group representatives, have to be put in place to avoid that group members which have 
genuinely not been able to opt out in time will not have to pay any adverse costs.  
 
Stronger incentives for bringing damages claims would also be needed in meritorious 
cases the outcome of which is uncertain because of their high complexity. As 
representative bodies might prefer to use their (limited) financial resources on cases that 
they estimate that they can win, there might be a certain need for lawyers specializing in 
bringing complex antitrust damages actions. Some incentives, such as contingency fees, 
might need to be developed in order to foster such a specialization, although these fees 
should be subject to judicial approval in order to avoid abuses. Because the lawyers’ 
fees would depend on the success of the claim, they would have a strong incentive only 
to accept cases that are likely to succeed. Also other ways of alternative funding, for 
instance by third-party finance institutions, should be possible, provided that possible 
conflicts of interest are eliminated, and the amount of damages is subject to court 
approval in order to ensure a fair outcome for the group.  
 
Moreover, courts should be able to adjust the “loser pays” rule in line with Directive 
2004/48/EC in order to encourage that damages claims are being brought. Courts could 
also be allowed to cap costs and adjust litigation costs by limiting them to what is 
considered reasonable and proportionate.  
 
As regards the choice of the implementation model for the collective action device, the 
thesis finds that the horizontal approach adopted by the current Commission 
Recommendation on Collective Redress Mechanisms merits further consideration. 
There is a need for an EU-wide collective action for damages based on a mass harm 
situation in which rights granted under Union law have been infringed. A directive 
would appear as the most appropriate legal instrument by allowing the respect of the 
legal traditions and cultural differences of the Member States, and the solution of 
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constitutional problems in the most suitable manner while, at the same time, providing 
for sufficient uniformity. But whatever solution will be chosen, it should be possible to 
apply it effectively in practice.  
 
In short, this thesis demonstrates that the new Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions 
is a missed opportunity to improve access to justice in cases involving infringements of 
the EU competition rules, and the common rules proposed will not be sufficient to 
ensure the effective and uniform enforcement of the Union right to compensation for 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In particular, the Directive will do little to 
improve redress for consumers, the ultimate victims of antitrust violations. The EU 
should therefore attempt to address this by a more far-reaching overhaul of the rules 
governing antitrust damages actions, in line with what has been suggested in this thesis, 
at the latest in 2020 when the Directive has to be reviewed. 
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